Mahomed Ismail vs Faizuddi

After the police investigation the Peti-tioner was sent up on a charge of wrongful restraint. Evidence was taken by the Magistrate on the 16th and 17th March, and on the 28th March a petition was presented by the Complainant referring, no doubt, to sec. 345, Cr.P.C., at the heading but stating, in the body of the document, that it was a petition for withdrawal as well as for compromise. The terms of the petition raise some doubt whether it was a petition for compromise or for withdrawal but, having regard to the facts of the case, the Magistrate certainly ought to have made an order either granting or refusing the application for withdrawal or compromise. Instead of that, he ordered the petition to bo filed with the record to be considered at the close of the trial. This order bears date 6th April. The application was to stop the inconvenience and expense of the trial. There is before us a petition, dated 5th April, which purports to bo an application to compound the offence of wrongful restraint within the terms of sec. 345. The Petitioner was entitled under that section to require that further proceedings should be stayed. It is not clear whether that petition was presented on the 5th or on the 6th April, but it bears date the 5th April, and we have it that, on the following day, there was further discussion in the case, and additional charges were drawn, some of which could not be compounded and it was on this ground that the Magistrate refused to allow the case to bo compounded. Now, when we come to look into the record of the case, we find that evidence was taken on the 16th and 17th March and that, on the 17th March, the charge of wrongful restraint only was drawn by the Magistrate on the evidence then taken. It is impossible to say what induced him to change his mind on the 6th April so as to add additional charges of more serious offences. He had, on that date, the petition of the 28th March before him asking leave to withdraw or to compound the offence; whichever way it might be interpreted, and there was also, previously or simultaneously, another petition asking expressly for leave to compound the offence under sec. 345. Having regard to these facts, we think that the Magistrate should have allowed the parties to compound the offence, and he should have acquitted the accused, and we may add that, on the evidence, there was hardly any sufficient ground justifying the addition of other charges on the 6th April. The Magistrate is, therefore, directed to abstain from taking any further proceedings against the Petitioner. We think that the petition of the 28th March should be regarded as a petition either of compromise or as intimating to the Magistrate that the offence had been compounded and that, upon that petition, the Complainant should have been allowed to withdraw from the case and the Petitioner should have been acquitted, and we accordingly direct that he be acquitted.