Makhan Singh and Others vs Gopal Singh and Others

This is an appeal filed by Makhan Singh and his minor children, against the order dated 1st May, 1969, of Mr. Gurbachan Singh, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ludhiana, dismissing their application u/s 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for grant of compensation holding that the application was barred by limitation.

The facts of this case are Mrs. Rasham Kaur wife of Makhan Singh Petitioner and Rup Rani sister of Resham Kaur, were going in a, rickshaw on 8th July, 1967 near the District Courts at Ludhiana at about 2.30 p.m. when Truck No. PNF 5604 belonging to Messrs Kartar Goods Transport Company, Moga, driven by Gurpal Singh Respondent came from the side of Kailash Cinema. It is alleged that the truck was driven by the driver rashly and negligently and it ran into the rickshaw in which Mrs. Resham Kaur and Mrs. Rup Rani were going and they were run over by the truck and died at the spot. Makhan Singh, the husband of Resham Kaur and Petitioner, Appellant 2 to 8 who are minor children of Makhan Singh and Resham Kaur, filed an application on 22nd February, 1968 u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation on the allegations that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck by Gurpal Singh, Respondent No. 1 and, therefore the driver of the truck and its owner Messrs Kartar Goods Transport Company, Moga, Respondent No. 2 were liable to pay compensation. The application was also filed against the insurance Company, with whom this truck was insured, but its name was not known to the Petitioners.

An objection was raised by the office that the petition was barred by limitation, but inspite of this the case was registred and notices were issued to the Respondents 1 and 2. The Respondents did not appear inspite of the service and, therefore, they were proceeded ex parte. The learned Claims Tribunal, however, came to the conclusion that the accident took place on 8th July, 1967 and this application, which was filed on 22nd July, 1968, was barred by limitation, and he dismissed the same, feeling dissatisfied the Petitioners have filed this appeal to set aside the order of the Tribunal.

The learned Counsel for the Appellants Mr. G.S. Chawla, contended that the office had raised an objection that the petition was barred by time, but the Claims Tribunal registered this petition and issued notices to the Respondents, and therefore, he must be deemed to have condoned the delay in filing the petition, and in support of this contention he relied on Rule 4 and 5 of the Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964, framed by the Punjab Government, according to which when the application under Sections 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, is barred by time, the Claims Tribunal can dismissed the same summarily. This contention is devoid of force and must be rejected.

In this respect reference may be made to Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Bhaskar Bhilakji Thakar v. Chhotte Lal Rai and Ors. 1967 A.C.J. 172, which is as under:

The claimant filed an application for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, after the expiry of the period of limitation. He filed an application for condonation of delay. The Claims Tribunal ordered that a notice should be issued to the Respondents to show cause why the delay should not be condoned. The claimants opposed the issue of notice to the Respondent on the ground that the Tribunal bad to determine that the application was prima facia fit to be entertained without issuing notice to the other party. It was question of condonation of delay was entirely a matter between the claimant and the Tribunal and that the Respondent has no say in this regard and therefore, once the Tribunal had taken a decision at the time of entertaining the application that it was fit for condonation of delay, the Respondents had no right to challenge the order.

Held it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to determine whether the application was good to be entertained, without issuing notice to the Respondents, but it would not be correct to say that the order passed at that initial stage was final and that the Respondents had no say in the matter. The Respondents were entitled to challenge the order after a notice was issued to them.

This authority fully applies to the present case and in view of the above, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellants is rejected.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioners-Appellants contended that the Petitioners 2 to 8 were minor at the time of the accident, which took place on 8th July, 1967 and they are still minors and they were entitled to exclude the time upto the date of attainment of majority and in support of this contention he relied on a Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hayat Khan and Ors. v. Mangi Lal and Ors. 1970 A.C.J. 331 wherein it was laid down that:

Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 only excludes an appeal or an application. The word ''suit'' as contemplated in the provisions of the Limitation Act, has a wider meaning and includes any legal proceeding commenced by one person against another in order to enforce a civil right. Although the proceedings u/s 110-A are not technically termed as suit they are instituted by the presentation of an application which is more or less like a plaint. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder for the trial of claim petition clearly show that proceedings u/s 110-A are in the nature of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, an application u/s 110-A would attract the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. Application u/s 110-A falls with the scope of the word ''suit'' used in Section 6 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, where the applicant u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was a minor on the date of the accident, he is entitled to the exclusion of time upto the date of attainment of majority.

To the same affect was the law laid down by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Bhopal and Anr. v. Smt. Munna Bai and Ors. 1971 A.C.J. 203 In the latter ruling it was not disputed before the learned Judge that the provisions of Section 6, Limitation Act were applicable to claims under the Motor Vehicles Act by reason of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, and therefore no finding was given whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was a Court and the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act were applicable to the application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

However in the other two rulings referred to above of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was observed that though the proceedings u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, are not technically suits but the provisions of the trial of petitions show that the proceedings u/s 110-A are in the nature of a suit under the CPC and, therefore, the application u/s 110-A would attract the provisions of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, by virtue of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. According to these authorities the application of the Petitioners-Appellants 2 to 8 was within time.

As against this learned Counsel for the Respondents relied upon a ruling of our High Court in Harbans Singh v. Atma Singh and Ors. 1966 A.C.J. 172 where Mehar Singh J. (as he then was) held as follows:-

...that Claims Tribunal appointed u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a persona designate and is not a Court. Therefore, the provisions of Sections 29(2) and 22(1) of the Limitation Act do not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal. An application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, is not a suit, it being an application before a persona designate, provisions of Sections 29(2) and 22(1) of the Limitation Act are not attracted.

Similarly a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Khairunnissa A.K. Saddiki and Ors. v. The Municipal Corporation, Bombay and Ors. 1966 A.C.J. 37 held as under:

''The Appellants filed an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, against the Municipal Corporation Bombay and its employees. The application was dismissed by the Tribunal as required by Section 527 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 had not been given to the corporation.

Held: no such notice is required to be given to the Corporation for filing application for compensation u/s 110-A because these applications are not suits. The Claims Tribunal is not a Court. It is not governed by any legislation applicable to Civil Courts.

However, the learned Counsel for the Appellants referred to me a Full Bench decision of this High Court in Smt. Shanti Devi and Ors. v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala and Ors. 1971 A.C.J. 247 The question referred for decision to the Full Bench was, does an appeal lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a single Judge in appeal filed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939? The learned Judges answered this question in the affirmative. It was further held in this ruling as under:

Held: therefore, that the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal clearly resemble to the proceedings in a Civil Court and the Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. The proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are not in the nature of arbitration proceedings and that the Claims Tribunal while dismissing if the Claims acts as a court.

The learned Counsel for Appellant, therefore, contended that the Claims Tribunal was a Court and, therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act apply. The aforesaid decision of Mehar Singh J. (as he then was) in Harbans Singh case 1966 A.C.J. 172 was not cited before the Full Bench. The counsel for the appellents contended that this Single Bench authority stood over-ruled by implication by the Full Bench decision.

It is thus clear that there is a conflict of decision on the point, whether by virtue of Section 9(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to applications filed for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act reads as under;

No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in ime.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed for Schedule, the provisions of section shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

It is therefore necessary to have an authoritative pronouncement on this point of law which is of daily occurrence. The following questions of law are, therefore, framed for decision:

Whether by virtue of Section 29, Sub-section (2), Limitation Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act are applicable to applications for compensation made u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939?

If the first question is answered in the negative whether the limitation to file applications u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act can be extended under the provision to Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act on the ground of minority of the claimants." The papers, therefore, be laid before My Lord the Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench to decide the above questions of law.

March 20th, 1972

Pritam Singh Patter, Judge

JUDGMENT

The question of law that was referred by my learned brother to a Larger Bench has been answered in Shrimati Chawli Devi and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 1973 A.C.J. 519 We see no reason to differ from the decision of the Division Bench and, therefore, in view of that decision, it has become academic to deal with the question referred. The decision in Shrimati Chawli Devi''s case will govern the matter.

As the Tribunal merely dismissed the claim on the question of limitation and did not determine the matter on merits, the case will now go back to it for determination in accordance with law. The decision of the Tribunal dismissing the claim as barred by time is set aside. The costs will abide the event. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on May 1, 1974.

D.K. Mahajan,

Pritam Singh Pattar,

Judges.