Maliaperumal Iyengar and Another vs Nachiappa Chetty

Best, J.—It is contended that the decree gives no remedy beyond the property ordered to be sold in default of payment within six months

and that such ''payment was optional with the defendants. I am unable to accede to either of these contentions. The cases cited by the judge

support his view that on the property being sold, and the proceeds being found to be insufficient, the decree-holder is entitled on application to a

further decree u/s 90 of the Transfer of Property Act for recovery against the persons of, and by the sale of other properties belonging to, the

judgment-debtors--provided the personal liability is not barred.

It is next contended that in the present case, the personal liability is time-barred, itthe period of limitation is calculated from the date of the

original cause of action to the date of the application u/s 90. But, in my opinion, the question is whether the personal remedy was barred when the

suit was brought In the present case it was admittedly not barred then.

In Ammanna v. Gurumurti ILR (1892) M. 64 the personal remedy was barred when the suit was brought. Hence the remark by Mr. Justice

Muthusawmy Aiyar (at p. 66) that the direction to pay in six months as given in that decree was "" not to fix a personal liability for the debt, but to

enable the defendants to save their right of redemption.

This appeal fails, therefore, and is dismissed with costs.