Malukchand Chatrabhuj vs Chimanlal Amarshi

Chhatpar, J.—This revision application arises out of a suit filed by the opponent for recovery of the price of goods alleged to have been sold to the present applicant. The suit was tried as a small cause and the Court passed a decree for Rs. 92-3-0 interest and costs against the Defendant, who has now come in revision to this Court.

I have heard Mr. Joshi, the learned Advocate for the applicant, at length on the merits of the case. He has led me through the evidence on the record and argued with considerable force that the suit of the Plaintiff was false. If I were sitting as a Court of first appeal. I might probably have agreed with this contention but I am dealing with a revision application u/s 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, wherein my powers of interference are limited. The law has advisedly not given a right of appeal in petty cases triable as small causes and I would be defeating the purpose of the law if I were to sit as a Court of first appeal and decide the question in the present case, which is one of pure fact depending on the appreciation of evidence adduced in the case. Though the powers of the Court of Revision u/s 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act are wider than those u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure, yet it has been consistently held by the High Court of Bombay that the Section ought not to be construed as giving the aggrieved party a right of appeal on points of law, much less on points of fact. I may refer to the case of-the Poona City Municipality v. Ramji Raghunath 21 Bom 250 (A), wherein it was held that the powers conferred by the section were purely discretionary and the section did not give a right of appeal in all Small Cause Court cases either on law or fact; the High Court should determine in what cases it should exercise the powers conferred upon it. In the case of- Bell and Co. Ltd. Vs. Waman Hemraj, , Beaumont C.J. observed as under:

In my opinion that section ought not to be construed as giving the parties a right of appeal on points of law. The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that, possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at.

And in the case of- Vithalbhai Motibhai Vs. The Nadiad Electric Supply Co. Ltd., , where the earlier cases were cited, a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Broomfield and Divatia JJ., observed as under:

Under Section 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, this Court has no doubt wider powers of interference than those given by Section 115 of the Code, and although the intention of the Legislature obviously was that these comparatively unimportant cases should be finally decided by the Small Cause Courts, it is no doubt right and proper that the High Court should have these powers of revision in reserve. We do from time to time interfere in exercise of that power on grounds similar to those which would justify interference u/s 115 or, apart from those grounds, when there is reason to think that there has not been a fair trial or that a palpable injustice has been committed or even in the case of a simple error of law if it is a matter of general importance. In the present cases the most that can be argued is that there has been an error of law. But it cannot possibly be argued that there is any matter of general importance. The disputes, which are not in themselves serious disputes, concern the parties to the litigation and no one else. It would be entirely wrong in our opinion and contrary to the intentions of the Legislature to allow Section 25 to be used in such a way as to give an ordinary right of appeal on points of law.

Following the practice of the Bombay High Court, I do not think it proper to interfere with the decision of the trial Court. In the present case the question involved is one of pure fact. The revision application is, therefore, dismissed with costs.