Mam Deen vs State of Haryana and others

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—On September 8, 1992, the Petitioner took the land measuring 93 kanals 3 marlas on lease from the Respondent-Gram Panchayat. The lease was for a period of two years. The Petitioner had to pay Rs. 36,000/- per year. This period expired on September 7, 1994. Despite that the Petitioner has not vacated the land. He has also not paid any lease money after September 1994. Yet the Petitioner maintains that the Gram panchayat cannot ask him to vacate the land in dispute.

After the expiry of the lease, the Petitioner apprehended his eviction. He filed a civil suit for the issue of a permanent injunction restraining the panchayat from dispossessing him except in due course of law. This suit was decreed by the civil Court vide its judgment dated April 10. 1995. It was held that the panchayat shall not dispossess the Petitioner except in accordance with law.

The panchayat filed a petition u/s 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961. It submitted that the lease having expired, the Petitioner was in unauthorized occupation. He should be evicted. This claim was accepted by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, vide order dated December 11. 1998. A copy of this order is on record as Annexure P-2 with the writ petition, Aggrieved by the order, the Petitioner filed an appeal. It was dismissed by the Collector vide order dated March 18, 1999. A copy of this order is on record as Annexure P-4 with the writ petition. The Petitioner has approached this Court through the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the validity of the orders at Annexures P-2 and P-4.

The Petitioner alleges that the Gram Panchayat is not the owner of the land. In fact, the entire area in possession of the Panchayat was partitioned, The land in dispute was found to be ''evacuee'' property and belongs to the custodian. Thus, the Panchayat had no right to initiate proceedings u/s 7 or to seek the eviction of the Petitioner. On this basis the Petitioner claims that the impugned orders deserve to be quashed.

The claim made on behalf of the Petitioner has been contested by the Respondent-Panchayat. A written statement has been filed. It has been averred that the Panchayat having given the land on lease and the period having expired, his possession is wholly unauthorized. Still further, it has been averred that the Petitioner is not entitled to "challenge the ownership particularly when he has himself taken the land on lease from the Gram Panchayat" On these premises, the Respondent prays that the writ petition should be dismissed.

Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard. Mr. Malik, has contended that the land in dispute does not form a part of the Shamlat Deh. It belongs to the custodian. It does not vest in the Panchayat. Thus, the Panchayat had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings u/s 7 or seek eviction of the Petitioner.

Admittedly, the lease had expired on September 7, 1994. Despite that the Petitioner has continued in possession for the last about six years. We asked Mr. Malik, if the Petitioner has continued to pay the lease money after September, 1994. He has spoken to the Petitioner, who is present in court, and has stated that no payment has been made. It is, thus, clear that the Petitioner has not paid any thing since September 1994. He has continued to keep the land by initiating one or the other proceedings for the last about six years. Should the writ court invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of such a person?

We are clearly of the view that there is no equity in favour of the Petitioner. The lease had expired in September 1994. Thereafter, the Petitioner has not paid even a penny to any one including the Panchayat. He has continued to derive income from the land. He had initially filed a civil suit for injunction. Then, the proceedings were initiated by the Panchayat. After the Petitioner had lost before the authorities, he has approached this Court through the present writ petition in April 1999. Thus, he has used the process of law to defeat its purpose. We find no ground to interfere and to allow the Petitioner to continue in occupation of the land. Helping such a person would be against the basic tenets governing the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction.

It is true that proceedings for partition of land had been initiated in the year 1983 vide order dated December 17, 1983. The Assistant Collector, I Ind Grade, had ordered the partition of the land. It may be, as alleged by the Petitioner, that a part of the land in possession of the Panchayat was found to be belonging to the custodian. It may also be true that the land does not, strictly speaking, form a part of the Shamlat Deh of the village. Yet, the fact remains that the land had been given on lease to the Petitioner by the Gram Panchayat. The lease was for a period of two years. This period had expired on September 7, 1994. Despite that the Petitioner has neither paid any thing to the Panchayat on account of use and occupation of the land nor has he vacated. The Petitioner having taken the land on lease from the Panchayat, we are clearly of the view that by virtue of the principle contained in Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, he is estopped from challenging the title of the Panchayat in respect of the property in dispute.

The provision embodies a principle of public policy. It debars a tenant from denying the title of the landlord. The purpose is obvious. The law considers it improper to allow a tenant to dispute the title of the landlord. It thus, prohibits him from disputing the title of the landlord. This principle is clearly applicable in the present case. The Petitioner cannot be permitted to contend that the Panchayat had no title to the land.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent has referred to various decisions in support of his contention. These are, Gram Panchayat Vs. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings and Others, ; Ramji Dass Nirmohi Vs. Gurbux Singh, land Jarnail Singh and Ors. v. Joint Director, Panchayats and Ors. 1999 (1) P.L.J. 318. The plea that a tenant cannot dispute the title of the landlord has been upheld in Jarnail Singh''s case. It has been held that the period of lease having expired, the tenants "had no right to remain in possession of the land. Their possession was unauthorized. That being so, the Panchayat was entitled to move a petition u/s 7 for their eviction from the land." These decisions clearly support the claim of the Respondent.

Mr. Malik, contended that the Panchayat was not the owner. The land was not a part of the Shamlat Deh. Thus, the petition u/s 7 was not maintainable. We are not inclined to accept this contention. Firstly, as observed above, the Petitioner is not entitled to challenge the title of his landlord. Secondly, it is the admitted position that the Petitioner had filed a civil suit in the year 1994. He had sought a permanent injunction. If it was his case that the Panchayat was not the owner and that it cannot evict him, he could have sought a declaration in that behalf. He did not. Having taken the land on lease from the Panchayat, the Petitioner cannot be permitted to continue on the land for ever. The Panchayat, in the circumstances of this case, had rightly initiated proceedings for the eviction of the Petitioner. The claim of the Panchayat having been accepted, we find no ground to interfere. Furthermore, a perusal of the order dated March 18, 1999, passed by the Collector shows that a revision filed by the Panchayat regarding the partition of the land etc. is pending before the Financial Commissioner. In para 6 it has been recorded that "after hearing arguments ... and perusal of the file it has been found that according to the statement of a Clerk of the office of the Financial Commissioner .... the revision has been adjourned sine die." It cannot, thus, be said that the proceedings regarding the title of the property have finally concluded against the Panchayat. That being so, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner cannot be sustained.

Mr. Malik, contended that the provisions of the 1961 Act were specifically amended by Haryana Act No. 13 of 1996. Sub-clause (ii-a) to Clause (g) of Section 2 was inserted to provide as under:

(ii-a) was shamilat deh, but has been allotted to any person by the Rehabilitation Department of the State Government, after the commencement of this Act, but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985.

A perusal of the above provision shows that the land, which was initially described as Shamlat Deh, but had been allotted to any person by the Rehabilitation department between the period from 1961 to July 9, 1985, ceases to be a part of the Shamlat Deh. This provision has no application to the facts of the present case. The land has not been allotted to the Petitioner by the Rehabilitation Department. It has not even been suggested that there was any order of allotment in favour of the Petitioner. Thus, the reference to the provision is wholly irrelevant.

Mr. Malik, raised another plea. He contended that in the case of Gram Panchayat Devru v. Harinder Malik etc., the Assistant Collector had refused to interfere with the possession of the lessees. The action in adopting a different yard stick in the case of the Petitioner was untenable.

We have perused the order dated August 30, 1996. It has been placed on the file as Annexure P-5. A perusal of this order shows that "the disputed land was allotted to the allottees on 14.6.1983... Respondents have taken the land on 70 years lease from the allottees. It was allotted to them on 14.6.1983 and purchased the land on 28.9.1993 from the allottees". On the basis of this factual position, it was concluded that "the disputed land does not come within the definition of Shamlat Deh... and in this way the ejectment application of the applicant Gram Panchayat u/s 7 position in the case of Harinder Malik was totally different. In the present case, it is the admitted position that the land in dispute was never allotted by the Rehabilitation Department to any one. The Petitioner had not purchased it from any allottee. He had got it on lease for a period of two years from the Panchayat. Thus, there is no parallel between the two cases.

Mr. Malik, has referred to the following decisions:

Naurang Singh (Died) Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, , Gram Panchayat Gram Sabha Village Ugani v. State of Punjab and others, 1997 (2) P.L.J. 3, Mehla and Ors. v. Assistant Collector and others, 1984 P.L.J. 37, Puran v. Financial Commissioner (Appeals) Punjab and Ors. 1996 P.L.J. 539 and Mange Ram and Others Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, . The factual position and the legal issues involved in these cases are totally different from those arising in the present case. Thus, it is not necessary to refer to these decisions in detail.

No other point has been raised.

In view of the above, no ground for interference is made out. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.

Sd/-K.S. Garewal, J.