Management of Messrs. Associated Industries Ltd. vs Bipin Behari Singh and Another

P.K. Goswami, C.J.—This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order of the appellate authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, hereinafter called ''the Act''.

The Petitioner-company which is an industrial establishment under the Act, submitted its draft Standing Orders to the certifying officer and the same, after certification, was sent to the parties on 2nd December, 1964. Respondent No. 1, representing the Union of the workers, preferred an appeal to the Labour Court, Gauhati, on 22nd December 1964 and the case was duly registered being No. 14 of 1964. After hearing the parties, the appeal was disposed of by the Labour Court on 29th January, 1966 in favour of the Union. The Petitioner moved the High Court on 23rd March 1966 under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Labour Court and the petition was allowed on 21st November 1967 holding that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The High Court observed:

It is unfortunate that the Respondents had misconceived their remedy by filing their appeal in a wrong forum under some mistaken impression.

Thereafter, on 6th December 1967, the Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal to the Respondent No. 2, being the appellate authority under the Act, praying at the same time for condonation of the delay. The Petitioner raised before the appellate authority a preliminary objection on the ground of limitation. The appeal u/s 6 of the Act is to be filed within thirty days from the date on which the copies of the Standing Orders are sent to the parties. Since, in this case, the certified Standing Orders were sent to the Union on 2nd December 1964, the appeal before the authority was clearly beyond time. It is common ground that if the period wherein the opposite party was successfully prosecuting his appeal before the Labour Court and later on resisting the writ petition before the High Court were excluded u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, the appeal before the appellate authority would be in time. The appellate authority, by excluding this period as a bona fide prosecution before a wrong court, admitted the appeal. Hence this writ application.

The point, therefore, that falls for consideration in this application is whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be invoked by the appellate authority.

Before we look at the provisions of the Act, we may quote Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which is material for the present purpose:

In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

Before we construe Section 14(2), we have to see the nature of the proceeding, out of which the appeal arose. The appeal is against an order in a proceeding before a certifying officer u/s 5 of the Act. That proceeding is not a civil proceeding inasmuch as an order in such a proceeding does not relate at that stage to any civil rights of the parties as such, or to any infraction of such rights. The Act requires employers to precisely define the conditions of employment and to make the same known to workmen. The conditions are to be certified by a certifying officer u/s 5(3) after hearing the parties and making appropriate orders, if any, u/s 5(2) of the Act. The conditions for certification of Standing Orders are that provision has been made therein for every matter set out in the Schedule to the Act as applicable to the industrial establishment, the standing orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act and that the provisions of the standing orders are fair or reasonable.

It is true that u/s 11 every certifying officer and appellate authority have all the powers of a civil court for certain specified purposes mentioned therein and shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of Sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This circumstance, by itself with nothing more, will not convert a certifying officer to a ''Court'', nor the proceeding before it to a ''civil proceeding''. If, as we have held, the proceeding before the certifying officer is not a civil proceeding, it will not change its character when taken in appeal before the appellate authority, which, in this particular case, was taken to the Labour Court, and admittedly a wrong forum. Section 14 can be invoked only if the earlier proceeding had been a ''civil proceeding'' and had been ''prosecuted ... in a court''. Section 14(1) refers in terms to the ''period of limitation for any suit'' and ''whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision.'' These expressions clearly refer to a civil suit prosecuted in a civil court. When we come to Section 14(2), the reference is to ''any application''. But the expression ''civil proceeding'' ''whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision'', and ''prosecuted ... in court'' are repeated. When these expressions are used in the same section, it is difficult to give a different meaning to the word ''Court'' and include a tribunal or a labour court with the trappings of a court within the terra. In our opinion, the Labour Court, whether wrongly or rightly, exercising the power of the appellate authority u/s 6 of the Act, is not a ''court'' for the purpose of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If prosecution before the Labour Court was not in a ''civil proceeding'', nor in a ''court'', the fact that the matter was later agitated on the writ side of the High Court against the order of the Labour Court does not make the earlier proceedings before the Labour Court a civil proceeding in a court.

In the result, the appeal was clearly time-barred before the appellate authority and it had no power to admit the same by invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. We make no order as to costs.

We may, however, observe that u/s 10 of the Act, the standing orders are immutable for the first six months from the date on which these came into operation. But, there is no bar in the way of the employer or workmen in applying to the certifying officer to have the standing orders modified after the said period.

D.M. Sen, J.

I agree.