Manager, Bhooteachang Tea Estate vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Another

Ranjan Gogoi, J.—The Government of Assam by notification dated 21.11.1992 referred the following two questions to the learned Labour Court, Assam at Guwahati for adjudication :

Whether the Management of Bhooteachang T. E. are justified in dismissing Shri Raghu Munda and Shri Jatindra Tanti from service with effect from 29.9.1987 ?

If not, are the said workmen entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits, if any, or any other relief in lieu of reinstatement ?

After reference was made by the aforesaid notification, Reference Case No. 14 of 1992 between Shri S. S. Rautola, Manager, Bhooteachang T. E. and the Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangha, Branch Office Rangapara, PO - Rangapara, Dist- Darrang, Assam, was registered and notices were sent to the management in the name of Shri S. S. Rautola, Manager, Bhooteachang T. E. As the management did not appear before the learned Labour Court, Assam at Guwahati, the learned Labour Court, after examining one of the workmen in the proceeding before it passed an exparte Award dated 15.11.1993 answering the first question referred to it in negative and on that basis directing the reinstatement of the workmen with back wages.

The management after being served with a copy of the exparte Award, filed an application before the Labour Court, for setting aside the said exparte Award dated 15.11.1993 and on the basis of the said application Misc Case. No 1/94 way registered by the learned Labour Court. In the aforesaid Misc Case, the Manager of the Tea Estate examined himself. The learned Labour Court by order dated 22.6.1994 after holding that the materials on record did not show that the management was prevented by sufficient cause for not appearing in the Reference Case, refused to set aside the exparte Award dated 15.11.1993. Aggrieved, the management of the Bhooteachang T. E. has instituted the present writ proceeding.

Mr. S. N. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Mr. H. Sarma, learned counsel and Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned counsel for the respondent- workmen, have been duly heard.

The very elaborate submissions advanced by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the writ petitioner can be conveniently compartmentalized into three broad categories.

The first contention advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner is that the petitioner management was prevented by sufficient cause from contesting the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, inasmuch as, no notice of the said proceeding was served on the management. In this regard, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, has submitted that the notices issued from the learned Labour Court were marked in the name of Shri S.

Rautola, Manager, Bhooteachang T. E. and as the said person had retired from service long back, the first notice received from the learned Labour Court (Ext- A) was redirected to the said individual. The subsequent notice (Ext- C) was not received by the management at any point of time. In this regard, Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has placed before the Court the very elaborate evidence tendered in the Misc Case No. 1/94 on behalf of the management on the point of the practice prevalent in the Tea Estate with regard to delivery and receipt of registered letters. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that in view of the aforesaid practice in force in the Tea Estate since the year, 1991, no question of refusal Ext-C, i.e., notice sent by the learned Labour Court, can legitimately arise. The findings recorded by the learned Labour Court to the effect that Ext-C was duly served but refused by the management, is, therefore, a perverse finding.

The next contention advanced, on behalf writ petitioner management is that the industrial dispute in question having been registered in the name of Shri S. S. Rautola as the Manager of the Bhooteachang T. E. is nonest is law, inasmuch as, the said dispute ought to have been registered in the name of the Management of the Tea Estate and not in name of an individual. The proceedings having been initiated on wrong premises, the contention advanced is that all subsequent actions therein are as initio void.

The third and the last contention, advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner is in respect of the tenability of the Award on merits. The learned Senior Counsel, by drawing the attention of this Court to the charge sheet issued to the two concerned workmen and the dismissal orders passed, has contended that even in the case of an exparte Award, the learned Labour Court, was obliged to record its findings on the basis of the materials available on record. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the aforesaid materials which were duly exhibited before the learned Labour Court have been ignored and the impugned findings have been arrived at on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the workman, examined before the learned Labour Court.

Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned counsel for the respondent-workmen, has sought, to controvert the submissions advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner by contending'' that in the facts of the present case, the order of the learned Labour Court dated 22.6.1994 refusing to set aside the exparte Award, cannot be said to be vitiated by any error apparent on the face of the record or by any known perversity which would justify interference of the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Dasgupta has further contended that the workman examined before the learned Labour Court, has clearly testified that a reasonable opportunity was not afforded to the workmen in the course of domestic enquiry and the said evidence not having been rebutted due to absence of the management before the learned Labour Court, the findings recorded on the merits of the case ill the impugned exparte Award dated 15.11.1993 would equally not call for any interference by this Court.

The submissions advanced on behalf of the rival parties have been duly considered, I have perused the charge sheet against the workmen as well as the dismissal orders passed by the management. The Award dated 15.11.1993 and the impugned order dated 22.6.1994 passed in Misc Case. No 1/94 have also been duly perused by me.

The power of the Labour Court to set aside an exparte Award even in the absence of any provision in the Industrial Disputes Act, has been settled by a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, While undoubtedly the power to set aside an exparte Award is vested in the learned Labour Court, the exercise of such powers would be governed by the provisions of the CPC contained in Order 9, Rule 13. In other words, before setting aside an exparte Award, the learned Labour Court has to be satisfied that the party praying for setting aside the Award was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing before it. The satisfaction is of the learned Labour Court and unless such satisfaction has been arrived at unreasonably or in a perverse manner, interference by the writ Court would not be called for. It is not the province of the writ Court to substitute its satisfaction in place of the satisfaction reached by the learned Labour Court. The jurisdiction of the writ Court would be in an altogether different field as already indicated above. Adverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the learned Labour Court in the proceeding before it has held that the case of the management that Ext-C was not served was not substantiated as a material witness, i.e., the Post Master, who could have testified as regards the existing arrangement for receipt and delivery of letters by registered post in the Tea Estate, was not examined. In the absence of relevant evidence and materials which could have been unfolded by examining the Post Master, the learned Labour Court thought it fit to hold that the degree of satisfaction that has to be generated for setting aside the exparte Award, was absent in the present case. The findings reached, therefore, can neither said to be vitiated by any error apparent or by any perversity so as to cause interference with the same. The first contention advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner, therefore, has to fail.

Coming to the second argument advanced by Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner, this Court finds that while it is true that the Reference Case No. 14/92 was wrongly registered in the name of the individual garden Manager, this Court is unable to accept the further contention advanced dial the aforesaid irregularity in registration of the Reference Case would render the entire of the proceedings in the Reference Case null and void. No precedent has been cited on the ground that there is none. If that be so, this Court would like to put on record that keeping in mind the spirit behind an industrial adjudication as envisaged by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a mere irregularity in the registration of a Reference Case should not be construed so as to lender the entire proceeding null and void. To hold so, in the considered view of the Court, would be set at naught the spirit behind the Act.

Coming to the last argument, advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner, this Court finds that Shri Raghu Munda one of the workmen was examined before the learned Labour Court on his own behalf as well as on behalf of the other workman Shri Jatindra Tanti. The testimony of Shri Raghu Munda is clear and unequivocal. The Enquiry Officer instead of proceeding with the enquiry is stated to have directed the workmen to disassociate themselves from Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangha, the affiliation to which Trade Union was the genesis of the allegations against the workmen. The workman in course of his deposition has further stated that both of them were not allowed to cross-examine the management witnesses and their evidence was also not recorded. As against the aforesaid testimony of the workman, the learned Labour Court had before it the charge sheet issued and the order of dismissal wherein it has been recorded by the management that full opportunity was given to the workmen to defend themselves by cross-examining the management witnesses and to produce their own witnesses. The learned Labour Court between the two versions available naturally opted to rely on the oral testimony made on oath by the workman which was also not rebutted. It is on the aforesaid basis that the eventual conclusion that the workmen were not afforded with reasonable opportunity and, therefore, the dismissal order was vitiated, was reached by the learned Labour Court. The conclusion reached, in the manner as indicated, can hardly be faulted with and, therefore, would not be open for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Viewed from the aforesaid perspective, the contention advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner that fire learned Labour Court had gone wrong in holding that the dismissal of the workmen was made with retrospective effect would be hardly relevant. The farther contention that as only one workman, i.e., Shri Raghu Munda was examined two separate enquiries were held in respect of the two separate charge sheets the conclusions of the learned Labour Court are grossly erroneous, would be equally irrelevant.

In view of above, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. The same shall stand accordingly dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.