Manager, Rosin and Turpentine Factory vs Ali Begma

A.S. Anand, C.J.—This appeal is directed against the award of the Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act, Rajouri, dated

3.8.1982 and has arisen in the following circumstances:

Faiz Mohd. deceased was an employee of the Appellant-factory as a daily wager. On 25.7.1981, he left his home to report for his duty at the

factory. For reaching the factory he had to cross a river and while crossing the river he was washed away in the strong current of the river and

died. His widow Ali Begma, Respondent herein, filed an application before the Commissioner under Workmen's Compensation Act, Rajouri

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner') claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Notice was issued to the

Appellant whose manager appeared on 2.12.1981. No objections were filed to the application and on the other hand the manager of the

Appellant, as its authorised representative, got his statement recorded admitting the employment of the deceased as also the factum of his death on

25.7.1981 while crossing the river on his way to report for duty at the factory. He also deposed that the deceased at the time of his death was

drawing Rs. 309.16 as his monthly wages. The Respondent also appeared before the Commissioner and in her deposition stated the manner in

which her husband, an employee of the Appellant, met with his death on 25.7.1981. She further deposed that for going to the factory from his

home as also while returning to his home from the factory daily, the deceased had to cross the river, because the factory was located across the

river. She was not at all challenged in the cross-examination. The Commissioner after considering the evidence on the record came to the

conclusion that to reach the factory, the deceased had to cross the river and that he was doing so on every day. He accordingly held that the

deceased died during the course of his employment and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the premises of the factory, would be

deemed to have been extended to include the river, which the employee had of necessity to cross to reach the factory. He, therefore, calculating

the compensation in accordance with the provisions of Schedule IV awarded compensation of Rs. 19,200/- and made an award accordingly.

Mr. Khajuria, learned Counsel for the Appellant, has not disputed either the fact that the deceased was an employee of the Appellant or the

position that he died on 25.7.1981 while crossing the river on his way to the factory. Even the calculation of the compensation has not been

disputed by him. Learned Counsel has, however, urged that the Respondent was not entitled to receive any compensation because according to

the learned Counsel the accident though had occurred during the course of the employment of the deceased but it did not occur ""out of his

employment."" Mr. S.C. Gupta, learned Counsel for the Respondent, has, on the other hand, argued that the evidence on the record clearly

established that the deceased had died as a result of an accident which occurred out of his employment and in the course of his employment.

With a view to appreciate the rival contentions at the Bar it would be profitable to first notice the relevant statutory provision.

Section 3 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides:

Employer's liability for compensation.--(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his

employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:

Provided that the employer shall not be so liable--

(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days;

(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to--

(i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or

(ii) The wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of

workman, or

(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of

securing the safety of workmen;

xxx xxx xxx

On its plain reading, the section requires that for recovering compensation under the Act the personal injury must be caused to a workman by an

accident and that accident must have arisen ""out of and in the course of his employment."" Since neither the factum of employment nor the factum of

death by accident has been disputed in the instant case, the only condition which was required to be satisfied for awarding compensation is:

whether the accident arose ""out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased?

There is hardly any general principle which can be evolved to explain and define the phrase arising ""out of and in the course of employment"" and

in the ultimate analysis each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts. The principles, however, which are required to be present to the

mind of the court while considering the ambit and scope of the said expression in a given case as deduced from the case law are that there must be

causal connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment. It is not necessary that the workman must

be actually working at the time of his death or that the death must occur while he was working or at the place of work only. It would suffice to

establish that the accident occurred at or about the place where the employee was performing his duties or where for the performance of his duties

he was required to be present and that it had causal connection with the employment of the workman. The expression ""arising out of employment

is also to be understood to mean that during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service.

In other words, there must again be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. To put it slightly differently, if the accident has

occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed. The Workmen's Compensation

Act being a piece of beneficial legislation, the expression ""arising out of employment"" and ""in the course of employment"" must not be given a

restricted or a narrow meaning. The expressions are wide enough to include cases where, by virtue of the duty that a workman is called upon to

perform, he meets with an accident at a place other than his actual place of work where he of necessity had to be at the time of the accident.

Because in such a case there would be a notional extension of the place of work to include the place where the workman met with the accident. In

such a case there would be a causal connection or association between the employment and accidental injury. It was as early as in 1917 that Lord

Finlay, in Dennis v. A.J. White and Company (1917) AC 479 observed:

If a servant in the course of his master's business has to pass along the public street, whether it be on foot or on a bicycle or an omnibus or car,

and he sustains an accident by reason of the risks incidental to the street, the accident arises out of as well as in the course of his employment.

Similar approach has been accepted by the courts in this country also and I myself subscribe to this view which gives a liberal interpretation to

the expression with a view to advance the object of the beneficial legislation. (See in this connection with advantage Public Works Department Vs.

Smt. Kausa, ; General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Agnes 1958 65 AC J 473 (SC) and Bhagubai Vs. General Manager, Central

Railway, V.T., Bombay, .

Thus, though as a general rule the employment of a workman commences when he reaches the place of his employment and ceases when he

leaves that place, but this general principle is subject to the theory of notional extension of the place of work so as to include an area which the

workman passes and repasses for going to or leaving the place of work and would also include an area where the workman is of necessity

required to be by virtue of his employment. There would in such cases be a notional extension in both time and place. Each case, however, has to

be decided on its peculiar facts and circumstances and no cut and dry formula of universal application is possible to be evolved.

In the light of the aforesaid discussion let us now consider the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

The widow of the deceased in unambiguous terms stated on oath that the deceased workman had of necessity to cross the river for going to

the factory as well as for returning from the factory to his home. There was no challenge to this assertion of the widow in the cross-examination.

The employer-Appellant had not even filed objections to the claim petition filed by the widow of the deceased employee. No such objection was

raised before the Commissioner either. It is also pertinent to notice that though the manager of the Appellant-factory as its authorised

representative appeared before the Commissioner and got his statement recorded he also did not say that there was no necessity for the deceased

employee to cross the river or that the employee could take some other route for going to or returning from his place of work. As a matter of fact

the correctness of the stand of the claimant that the deceased of necessity had to cross the river has not at all been disputed during the trial of the

claim petition and, therefore, it is futile for the learned Counsel to now urge that the. accident did not arise out of his employment or that there was

no causal connection between the injury sustained by the deceased employee and the work done by the employee. The unrebutted and

unchallenged evidence on the record leads to an irresistible conclusion that the accident was sustained by the employee by the reasons of the risks

incidental to his employment and that the accident in the instant case arose both out of as well as in the course of his employment. The theory of

notional extension of the place of work so as to include the river which the workman had of necessity to cross for going to or leaving the place of

work would be squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. We are, thus, of the opinion that the deceased-employee died

during the course of his employment with the Respondent and that the accident occurred out of his employment and, therefore, his widow, the

Respondent herein, was entitled to receive compensation from the Appellant in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation

Act. We find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs.

The amount which was deposited by the Appellant with 'the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Act, Rajouri, shall be disbursed to the

Respondent against proper receipt.