Managing Committee Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth VsThe State of Tripura

S. Talapatra, J.—The petitioner, Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth, an establishment owned by Shree Shree Anandamayee Sangha and represented by its Managing Committee, has questioned the validity of the order dated 12.06.2013 (Annexure-P/5 to the writ petition), issued by the authority constituted under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (the Labour Commissioner, Govt. of Tripura). By the said order dated 12.06.2013 (the impugned order) the petitioner has been directed to pay the minimum wages fixed by the Government to the teaching and non-teaching staffs of the school and to pay the differences of wages between the minimum rate of wages as fixed by the State Government and the actual rate of wages as paid as arrears to teaching and non-teaching staffs within one month from the date of the order, after holding that the petitioner is not a voluntary organisation and the teaching and non-teaching staffs of the petitioner are entitled to get the minimum rates of wages as fixed by the Government in the employment of the private teaching institutes/coaching schools (excluding State Government aided private schools). A statement of such arrear has also been enclosed in the impugned order, which runs as under:

STATEMENT

Wages of the Teachers of Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth, Palace Compound, Agartala

STATEMENT

Wages of the non-teaching staff of Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth, Palace Compound, Agartala

Total Due Drawn :-Rs. 4,72,70/- (Rupees Four Lakh Seventy Two Thousand Seventy) only

Even though the petitioner has not disputed the existence of the Notification under No. F.21(25)-LAB/ENF/MVV/INS/98/103-08, dated 12.01.2004 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition), whereby in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Minimum wages Act, 1948 (Act XI of 1948), read with subsection (2) of Section 5 of the said Act and, after considering the advice of the committee, appointed under clause(a) of subsection (1) of Section 5 of the said Act, the Governor has been pleased to fix the minimum rates of wages in the employment of the private teaching institutes/coaching schools (excluding State Government aided schools). By the said notification, the rate of wages specified in column 3 of the schedule below the said notification, has been declared to be payable to the teachers and other employees in the employment of private teaching institutes/coaching schools in the State of Tripura against the categories specified in column Nos. 1 and 2 in that schedule. The rate of the minimum wages fixed thereby, has been declared to come into force with effect from the date of issuance of the notification i.e. 12.01.2004, as published in the Tripura Gazette Extraordinary Issue dated 11.03.2004. For purpose of reference, the entire schedule is reproduced hereunder :

SCHEDULE

The petitioner, by way of amendment, has assailed the said notification dated 12.01.2004 as ultra vires, as according to the petitioner that has not been issued after completing the formalities required by Section 5(1)(a) of the Minimum Wages Act. Similarly, the notification dated 10.09.2012, revising the rate of wages in the amended schedule is invalid due to the absence of the advice required to be taken from the Central Advisory Board, constituted u/s 8 of the Act. Above all, according to the petitioner, all the additions to the schedule by exercising power u/s 27 read with Section 3 of the Act are wholly illegal and cannot be treated to be a part of the statute, inasmuch as, the addition amounts to amendment in the statute and, such amendment in the Central statute cannot be effected without taking the consent of the Central Government and cannot be enforced without the assent of the President of India. Thus the notification issued by the Govt. of Tripura, Labour Department on 10.09.2012 is void ab initio and inoperative.

By the Notification under No. F.22(44)-LAB/ENF/MW/INS/98(L)/7926-37, dated 10.09.2012 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition), the rate of minimum wages had been revised from the date of the said notification by way of amendment in the schedule. For purpose of reference, the said schedule is reproduced hereunder :

SCHEDULE

There is no dispute that on the basis of a complaint, which was received by the office of the Labour Commissioner on 13.08.2012 (Annexure-P/3 to the writ petition), (hereinafter, ''the complaint'', in short), filed by the petitioner and some others to the Labour Commissioner, Department of Labour, Govt. of Tripura, who is also the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, a proceeding was initiated for enforcement of the minimum wages and, the petitioner was asked by the notice under No. F.22(8)-LAB/ENF/MW/2003(B)/7999-8020, dated 11.09.2012 (Annexure-R/3 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2), to show cause as to why necessary action shall not be taken for enforcement of the minimum wages to its teachers. In response to the notice, the petitioner filed their reply in the form of a written statement on 07.06.2013 (Annexure-P/4 to the writ petition), contending that the respondents No. 4 to 25, hereinafter for short, the teaching and non-teaching employees of the petitioner (the complainants) are not paid wages within the meaning of the term as defined u/s 2(h) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and, as such, the authority under the Minimum Wages Act (the Labour Commissioner, Govt. of Tripura) does not have any authority for directing the petitioner to enforce the minimum wages in terms of the schedule and the revised schedule as reproduced.

The violations provided as the ground for the action as contemplated in the notice, according to the petitioner are entirely baseless on the face of the documentary evidence produced by them. The petitioner has further re-asserted that the teachers and the staffs are appointed on honorary basis and some honorariums are given to them. As per direction of the court, before the writ petition has been taken up for hearing, the records of the authority of the Minimum Wages Act have been produced. From the records, it appears that a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondent No. 3, the Labour Inspector, stating that the petitioner had engaged some teaching and non-teaching staffs by issuing appointment letters as "honorary basis and temporary basis" and, therefore, they have been appointed as the permanent employees by the Management for purpose of education by issuing the appointment letters, but and they are being deprived of their minimum wages fixed by the State Government under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has replicated the submissions made before the authority constituted under the Minimum Wages Act except the challenge to the notifications fixing the minimum wages as stated. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has raised the following questions :

(i) Whether the complainants can claim minimum wage as they were not appointed on any contract of wage, but engaged as the volunteer on gratuitous payment of honorarium?

(ii) Whether Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act authorises the State Government to add to the schedule of employment inasmuch as the Minimum Wages Act is a Central statute included in the concurrent list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution or whether issuance of such notification u/s 27 of the Act would amount to amendment of the Central Statute.

(iii) whether before issuing the notification amending the schedule incorporating the employment under the category of schools alike the petitioner and revising the wages, the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act has not been complied or the notifications are void ab initio for their violation? and

(iv) whether the complaint is time barred in terms of Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and, whether the impugned order dated 12.06.2013 is bad in law for non-considering that aspect of the matter or whether the impugned order is bereft of reasons?

In support of that contention, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on the following decisions :

(i) S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India,

(ii) State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Manoj Kumar @ Chhotu, and

(iii) Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others,

The apex court, in all those decisions, generally held that the purpose of disclosure of reasons is that people must gather confidence in judicial and quasi-judicial authorities from their reasonings. Unless reasons are disclosed, a person cannot know whether or not the authority concerned has applied its mind. Also giving reasons minimises the chances of arbitrariness. It is also an essential requirement of the rule of law.

Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has questioned the motive of the complainants as well as of the respondents No. 1 and 2 as they have wilfully misrepresented or suppressed the material facts, which amounts to fraud and, fraud vitiates everything. In this regard, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the following decisions of the apex court:

(i) Rajeshwar and Another Vs. Board of Revenue and Others,

(ii) R. Varadarajan Vs. Thirumangai Naidu and others,

(iii) Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others Vs. Smt. Asha Goel and Another,

(iv) Shiv Kant Yadav Vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Others,

(v) Arunima Baruah Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

(vi) Dalip Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, and

(vii) Sri Srinivasa Bhat (D) by L.Rs. and Others Vs. Sri A. Sarvothama Kini (D) by L.Rs. and Others,

While recapitulating his submissions, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the honorarium is a gratuitous payment, a voluntary reward for which no remuneration could be collected by law. According to the Black''s Law Dictionary, it''s a payment of money or anything of value made to a person for service rendered for which fees cannot be legally or are not traditionally made. He has relied on a few documents including the report of the Labour Inspector, the respondent No. 3, where it has been reflected that the complainants were appointed on payment of honorarium temporarily and the application for affiliation made to the Central Board of Secondary Education after obtaining the No Objection Certificate from the State Government, where a statement has been made that ''no remuneration is paid to the employees'' and, acceding to that statement affiliation was granted by the Central Board of Secondary Education. For defining honorarium or for purpose of getting to the meaning of the honorary employees, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on the following decisions of the apex court :

(iii) Md. Ashif and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others,

(iv) State of Assam Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

(iii) Anokh Singh Vs. Punjab State Election Commission,

(iv) The Secretary, Sh. A.P.D. Jain Pathshala and Others Vs. Shivaji Bhagwat More and Others, and

(v) Purno Agitok Sangma Vs. Pranab Mukherjee,

Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also referred to the letters engaging the complainants.

Appearing for the respondents No. 4 to 25, Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has seriously raised the question of maintainability of the writ petition, inasmuch as the writ petition has been filed by the Managing Committee, Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth. According to those respondents, the Managing Committee, being not a registered society does not have any standing to maintain the writ petition. In support of that contention, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has relied on a full bench decision of the Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association, Madras Vs. Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu, Rural Development and Local Administration Dept., Madras and Others, , a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sand Carrier''s Owner''s Union and others Vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta and others, and, a decision of the Gauhati High Court in The All Manipur DIC Supervisor''s (KVI/Textiles/EI) Association Vs. State of Manipur, reported in (2000) 1 GLR 355, where it has been held that such association or the entity having not been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or under any other statute lacks in standing to maintain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has categorically stated that the payment of remuneration is an unilateral decision of the authority and the so called appointment letters (Annexure-P/2 series to the writ petition) were never accepted by the complainants. Referring to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 6 to 24, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has drawn attention of this court to Annexure-PR/1 series, which shows that the President of the petitioner had issued certificates in favour of those respondents, declaring that they are holding a permanent post and they were regular teachers of the petitioner and, on the basis of the said certificates the private respondents got admission in the Tripura University under their Distance Education Programme. The Tripura University has acknowledged those certificates as would be evident from the letter of the Officer on Special Duty, the Director of Distance Education, Tripura University, dated 16.04.2013, filed alongwith the affidavit-in-rejoinder by the petitioner. That apart, Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has pointed out that the complainants (the respondents No. 4 to 24) have been shown either as the teaching staff or non-teaching staff in the declaration filed for affiliation to the Central Board of Secondary Education. According to the affiliation Bye-laws of the Central Board of Secondary Education (Annexure-PR/2 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 6 to 25), ''teacher'' means a person in the employment of an institution affiliated with the Board for teaching purposes (clause xxix). The affiliations are subjected to the said Bye-laws and, according to the Bye-laws the affiliated schools are bound to pay "salaries as per State Govt./U.T. scales of pay". It appears from the records so produced by the petitioner on 26.03.2014 in terms of the leave granted by this court that while recognizing the school, the District Education Officer, West Tripura District Zonal Office, Agartala has conveyed the professional recognition to the petitioner subject to a number of conditions including "(vii) The salary and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service of teachers shall be as prescribed by the State Government under sub-rule (1) of rule (18) for the purpose of section 23(3) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009". Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has further submitted that even though the school authorities are charging fees from the students, they are reluctant to pay the minimum wages to the qualified teachers, is a disturbing facet. The complainants never suppressed any material facts. Their submissions, either in the complaint or in the counter-affidavit filed in this proceeding are based on the records and, no averment has been made dehors the records.

Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2 has substantially supported the submissions made by Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing for the complainants and unleashed a serious rejoinder against the submissions made by the petitioner as to the legality of the notification by including the category of establishments alike the petitioner under the purview of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and also the notifications dated 12.01.2004 and 10.09.2012. He has submitted that the petitioner''s challenge to the vires of the notification is entirely misplaced, inasmuch as by the Notification No. F.22(44)-LAB/ENF/MW/INS/98/11478, dated 22.12.2000 (Annexure-R/13 to the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2), the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (II of 1948), after conforming to the due procedure, invited suggestions and objections vide Notification No. F.22(44)-LAB/ENF/MW/INS/98/9336, dated 19.08.2000. But, as no suggestion and objection had been received from any person in respect of the said addition within the period of three months from the date of publication of the notification in the Tripura Gazette Extraordinary Issue, the following inclusion has been made :

"Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (II of 1948), the State Government hereby add the employment of Private teaching institute/Coaching Schools (excluding State Government aided Private School), to the part I of Schedule to the said Act."

The learned Advocate General has referred to the provisions of Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which stipulates as under :

"Power of State Government to add to Schedule.-The appropriate Government, after giving by notification in the Official Gazette not less than three months'' more of its intention so to do, may, by like notification, add to either Part of the Schedule any employment in respect of which it is of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be fixed under this Act, and thereupon the Schedule shall in its application to the State be deemed to be amended accordingly."

According to the learned Advocate General, the said notification dated 19.08.2000 has come into effect from 22.12.2000 and, thus the establishments added to Part-I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 are under the obligation to pay the minimum wages to their employees. The learned Advocate General has further submitted that under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the State Government is competent to review, at such intervals, as it may think fit, such intervals not exceeding five years, the minimum rates of wages so fixed and revise the minimum rates, if necessary, provided that where for any reason the appropriate Government has not reviewed the minimum rates of wages fixed by it in respect of any scheduled employment within any interval of five years, nothing contained in this clause shall be deemed to prevent it from reviewing the minimum rates after the expiry of the said period of five years and revising them, if necessary, and until they are so revised the minimum rates in force immediately before the expiry of the said period of five years shall continue in force.

The learned Advocate General has further referred to the provisions of Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, which reads as follows :

"Procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages--

(1) In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled employment for the first time under this Act or in revising minimum rates of wages so fixed, the appropriate Government shall either--

(a) appoint as many committees and subcommittees as it considers necessary to hold enquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision, as the case may be, or

(b) by notification in the Official Gazette, publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date, not less than two months from the date of the notification, on which the proposals will be taken into consideration.

(2) After considering the advice of the committee or committees appointed under clause (a) of sub-section (1), or as the case may be, all representations received by it before the date specified in the notification under clause (b) of that sub-section, the appropriate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix, or, as the case may be, revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each scheduled employment, and unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue :

Provided that where the appropriate Government proposes to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the appropriate Government shall consult the Advisory Board also."

Having referred to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the learned Advocate General has contended that the notification dated 12.01.2004 was issued after complying those provisions. For this purpose, he has referred the notification dated 02.05.2012 (Annexure-9 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2), whereby to all persons likely to be affected thereby, the notice was given to the effect that the said proposal for revising the minimum rates of wages for the workers/employees employed in the employment of private teaching institutes/coaching schools (excluding State Government aided private schools) shall be taken into consideration on and after expiry of two months from the date of publication of the notification in the official Gazette. The proposed schedule is part of the said notification under No. F.22(44)-LAB/ENF/MW/INS/98(L)/3088-92, dated 02.05.2012, it has reflected the proposed minimum rates of wages per month for the various categories of employees/workers under the said category of establishments. Thereafter, by the notification dated 10.09.2012, the minimum rate of wages came into force with effect from 10.09.2012 itself. From a bare reading, it would show that the said notification was issued after consultation with the Advisory Board as contemplated u/s 7 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General has completely disregarded the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that unless the Central Advisory Board constituted under Sections 8 and 9 of the Minimum Wages Act is consulted such notification revising the rate of minimum wages cannot be issued by the State Government or that it would amount to amending the Minimum Wages Act itself. The learned Advocate General has strongly contended that when law itself delegates power to its delegates, no further approval or assent is required. The delegate has to conform to the power that has been delegated to him unless it is demonstrated that the delegate has breached the authority or exceeded its authority in any manner, the exercise of powers as delegated cannot be questioned. These pleas are absolutely based on no difference to law and, hence do not warrant any consideration from this court. Learned Advocate General has further submitted that a similar exercise had been taken while issuing the notification dated 10.09.2012. As such, the challenge to the legality and validity of those notifications are unsustainable. Learned Advocate General has further contended that it has not been disputed by the petitioner that the complainants are working as the teacher and non-teaching staffs in the establishment of the petitioner. There is contract and the contract is apparent on the face of the records produced by the complainants as well as by the petitioner. While defining wage, Section 2(h) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 provides as under:

"wages" means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, by payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment (and includes house rent allowance), but does not include-

(i) the value of any house, accommodation, supply of light, water, medical care, or any other amenity or any service excluded by general or special order of the appropriate Government

(ii) any pension fund or provident fund or under any scheme of social insurance

(iii) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession

(iv) any sum paid to any person employed to defray special expenses curtailed on him by the nature of his employment or

(v) any gratuities payable on discharge."

Nowhere, it provides that there should be a contract of employment. What it provides that there may be the contract of employment, express or implied and the other factors those are the essential part of the meaning of wages that all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money excluding those are provided on special consideration. On the other aspects of the matter, learned Advocate General has submitted that the Minimum Wages Act being a social welfare legislation for protecting the various categories of employees/workers from the exploitation or from unfair remuneration or for enforcing the mandate of the Constitution under Article 23 of the Constitution of India, the technical interpretation requires to be avoided. While dilating on the objection raised by Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner on the delay of filing the petition, he has submitted that by implication, the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, has condoned such delay. Alternatively, he has submitted that from the date of notification dated 10.09.2012, whereby the schedule of the rates of minimum wages had been revised, the notification for enforcement has been issued by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. As such, so far the revised rate of minimum wages are concerned, that cannot be stated to have been barred by the limitation in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which provides that:

"Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub-section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction under sub-section (3) :

Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable :

Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."

Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has placed reliance on Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation and Another Vs. Tiffin''s Barytes Asbestos and Paints Ltd. and Another, , to contend that the notification fixing minimum wages are not to be lightly interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of some irregularities, such as in respect of the constitution of the committee or in the procedure adopted by the committee. The apex court has held in Tiffin''s Barytes Asbestos & Paints Ltd. that :

"It must be remembered that the committee acts only as a recommendatory body and the final notification fixing minimum wages has to be made by the Government. A notification fixing minimum wages, in a country where wages are already minimal should not be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution except on the most substantial of grounds. The legislation is a social welfare legislation undertaken to further the Directive Principles of State Policy and action taken pursuant to it cannot be struck down on mere technicalities."

Placing reliance on U. Unichoyi and Others Vs. The State of Kerala, the learned Advocate General has again contended that the court in exercise of its powers shall ordinarily not disturb the recommendation made by any committee. He has made reference to the following passage:

"When a Committee consisting of the representatives of the industry and the employees considers the problem and makes its recommendations and when the said recommendations are accepted by the Government it would ordinarily not be possible for us to examine the merits of the recommendations as well as the merits of the wage structure finally notified by the Government. The notification has accepted the recommendations of the Committee to categorise the workers and that obviously was overdue. The fact that wages paid in other industries in Kerala, or in other states in comparable concerns, are lower would have been relevant for the Committee to consider when it made its recommendations. In appreciating the effect of the prevalence of lower rates it may also be relevant to bear in mind that in some places and in some industries labour is still employed on wages much below the standard of minimum rates. In fact, in its report the Committee has pointed out that in Kerala the bargaining position of the workers has all along been very weak and wages have tended to remain in a deplorably low level. Therefore the fact that lower wages are paid in other industries or in some other places may not necessarily show that the rates prescribed by the notification are unduly high in any event these are considerations which ordinarily cannot be entertained by us because obviously we are not sitting in appeal over the recommendations of the Committee or the notification following upon them."

To emphasize the employers'' obligation to pay the minimum wages under all circumstances, learned Advocate General has referred a decision of the apex court in The Workmen represented by Secretary Vs. The Management of Reptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. and another, where the apex court has held that :

The concept of ''minimum wage is no longer the same as it was in 1936. Even 1957 is way-behind. A worker''s wage is no longer a contract between an employer and an employee. It has the force of collective bargaining under the labour laws. Each category of the wage structure has to be tested at the anvil of social justice which is the live-fibre of our society today. Keeping in view the socio-economic aspect of the wage structure, we are of the view that it is necessary to add the following additional component as a guide for fixing the minimum wage in the industry :

"(vi) children''s education, medical requirement, minimum recreation including festivals/ceremonies and provision for old age, marriages etc. should further constitute 25 per cent of the total minimum wage."

The wage structure which approximately answers the above six components is nothing more than a minimum wage at subsistence level. The employees are entitled to the minimum wage at all times and under all circumstances. An employer who cannot pay the minimum wage has no right to engage labour and no justification to run the industry.

A living wage has been promised to the workers under the Constitution. A ''socialist'' framework to enable the working people a decent standard of life, has further been promised by the 42nd Amendment. The workers are hopefully looking forward to achieve the said ideal. The promises are pilling-up but the day of fulfilment is nowhere in sight. Industrial wage-looking as a whole-has not yet risen higher than the level of minimum wage.

(Emphasis supplied)

According to Mr. Das, learned Advocate General, while fixing the minimum wages, the capacity of the employer to pay is treated as irrelevant and the Act contemplates that rates of minimum wages should be fixed in scheduled industries with a dual object of providing sustenance and maintenance of the worker and his family and preserving his efficiency as a worker. So it is required to take into consideration cost of bare subsistence of life and preservation of efficiency of the worker and for some measure of education, medical requirements and amenities. This cost is likely to vary depending upon the cost prevailing in the market of various items. If there are inflationary conditions prevailing in the country, then minimum wages fixed at a particular point of time would not serve the purpose. Therefore, Section 4 contemplates that minimum wages fixed at a particular point of time should be revised from time to time. Section 4 postulates that minimum wages fixed or revised by the appropriate Government u/s 3 may consist of basic rates of wages and special allowance at a rate to be adjusted at such intervals in such manner as the appropriate Government may direct to accord as nearly as practicable with a variation in the cost of living index number applicable to such workers, alternatively, it permits the fixation of basic rate of wages with or without cost of living allowance and the cash value of the concessions in respect of supplies of essential commodities at concessional rates, which so authorises or in the alternative it permits an all inclusive rate allowing for the basic rate, the cost of living allowance and the cash value of the concessions. The purpose of Section 4 is to see that minimum wages can be linked with increase in cost of living so that increase in cost of living can be neutralised or all inclusive rates of minimum wages can be fixed. But, from the aforesaid Sections 3 and 4 , it is apparent that what is fixed is total remuneration which should be paid to the employees covered by the schedule and not for payment of costs of different components which are taken into consideration for fixation of minimum rates of wages. It is thus clear from the decision of the apex court in Airfreight Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, that the concept of minimum wages does take in the factor of prevailing cost of essential commodities whenever such minimum wage is to be fixed. The idea of fixing such wage in the light of cost of living at a particular juncture of time and of neutralising the prices of essential commodities by linking up scales of minimum wages with the cost of living index is provided for in Section 4 , but V.D.A. is part and parcel of wages. Once rates of minimum wages are prescribed under the Act, whether as all inclusive u/s 4(1)(iii) or by combining basic plus dearness allowance u/s 4(1)(i) are not amenable to split up. It is one pay package. Neither the scheme nor any provision of the Act provides that the rates of minimum wages are to be split up on the basis of the cost of each necessities taken into consideration for fixing the same. Hence, in cases where employer is paying total sum which is higher than minimum rates of wages fixed under the Act including the cost of living index (VDA), he is not required to pay VDA separately. However, that higher wages should be calculated as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act. Section 2(h) specifically provides that value of the following items is not required to be computed for finding out whether the employer pays minimum wages as prescribed under the Act :

(i) the value of any house, accommodation, supply of light, water, medical care, or any other amenity or any service excluded by general or special order of the appropriate Government

(ii) any pension fund or provident fund or under any scheme of social insurance

(iii) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession

(iv) any sum paid to any person employed to defray special expenses curtailed on him by the nature of his employment or

(v) any gratuities payable on discharge.

Thus, the learned Advocate General has supported the revision as made by the notification dated 10.09.2012 as one pay package, contending that the petitioner is under obligation to pay such package to its employees.

For appreciating the rival contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties, this court has scrutinised meticulously the records as placed before it. The preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition as raised for the complainant that the petitioner is not a registered society and hence lacks in standing should not be adjudged by the hyper-technical rule. There is no controversy that the petitioner is a unit of Shree Shree Anandamayee Sangha, which is indisputably a registered Society, which has authorised its Managing Committee to challenge the action as stated. Hence, the objection as to maintainability does not merit any serious consideration. The pertinent questions would rather be considered by this court.

(i) Whether the complainants can claim minimum wage as they were not appointed on any contract of wage, but engaged as the volunteer on gratuitous payment of honorarium?

This is not in dispute that the respondents No. 4 to 24 are working as the teacher or non-teaching employee in the establishment, namely Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth, a unit of Shree Shree Anandamayee Sangha. The respondents No. 4 to 24, the complainants, even though claimed that they have been permanently engaged by the petitioner, but the petitioner denied that fact. Even the certificates as to their employment as issued to the Director of Distance Education, Tripura University have been questioned by the petitioner. But, the petitioner has not refuted the fact that the complainants have been working in the said establishment, but they have contended that their engagements are voluntary, not based on any contract of wage. As condition for affiliation by the Central Board of Education, the Rules called ''Central Board of Secondary Education Affiliation Bye-laws'' provides as under :

(i) all admissions and withdrawal registers are properly maintained;

(ii) the service records of teaching and non-teaching staffs are duly maintained and updated;

(iii) no teachers are appointed on ad-hoc basis; and

(iv) teaching and non-teaching staff are appointed on prescribed pay scales and no staff are appointed on consolidated pay. They are also paid DA and admissible other allowances as per Central or respective State Government rates.

(Emphasis added)

In the said Bye-laws, the nomenclature, the teacher, has also been defined as under :

"(xxix) ''teacher'' means a person in the employment of an institution affiliated with the Board for teaching purposes."

That apart, as transpired that for purpose of recognition, the District Education Officer has made it clear that the recognition is subject to the payment of the approved wages to the teachers and other non-teaching employees. That apart, what has surfaced is that the complainants being the teacher and non-teaching employees, have categorically stated in their complaint as well as in the counter-affidavit filed by them that they did not agree to be the voluntary teacher or the voluntary non-teaching employee. When it is not denied by the petitioner that the complainants have been discharging the duties as the teaching and non-teaching employees of the said establishment, this court would consider whether they are entitled to the minimum wage or not in view of the constitutional philosophy of doing social and economic justice.

In People''s Union for Democratic Rights and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, the apex court has considered the ambit of Article 23 of the Constitution of India and provided a broader interpretation of the meaning of ''forced labour''. The following passages elucidate the controversy :

The question then is as to what is the true scope and meaning of the expression "traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour" in Article? What are the forms of ''forced labour'' prohibited by that Article and what kind of labour provided by a person can be regarded as ''forced labour'' so as to fall within this prohibition? When the Constitution makers enacted Article 23 they, had before them Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but they deliberately departed from its language and employed words which would make the reach and content of Article 23 much wider than that of Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They banned ''traffic in human beings which is an expression of much larger amplitude than "slave trade" and they also interdicted "begar and other similar forms of forced labour". The question is what is the scope and ambit of the expression ''begar and other similar forms of forced labour?" In this expression wide enough to include every conceivable form of forced labour and what is the true scope and meaning of the words "forced labour?" The word begar" in this Article is not a word of common use in English language. It is a word of Indian origin which like many other words has found its way in the English vocabulary. It is very difficult to formulate a precise definition of the word begar but there can be no doubt that it is a form of forced labour under which a person is compelled to work without receiving any remuneration. Molesworth describes ''begar'' as "labour or service exacted by a government or person in power without giving remuneration for it." Wilson''s glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms gives the following meaning of the word ''begar'': "a forced labourer, one pressed to carry burdens for individuals or the public. Under the old system, when pressed for public service, no pay was given. The begari, though still liable to be pressed for public objects, now receives pay: Forced labour for private service is prohibited." "Begar" may therefore be loosely described as labour or service which a per-son is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it. That was the meaning of the word-''begar'' accepted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in 5. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital: AIR 1962 Bom 53. ''Begar'' is thus clearly a film of forced labour. Now it is not merely ''begar'' which is unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. The practice of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instrument dealing with human rights. It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this prohibition was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the International Labour Organisation in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the Inter-national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be-found. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent laid some emphasis on the word ''similar'' and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to ''begar'' and since ''begar'' means labour or service which a person is forced to give with-out receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words ''other similar forms of forced labour. This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well founded. It does not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferring fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning and content. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution makers should have intended to strike only at certain forms of forced labour leaving it open to the socially or economically powerful sections of the community to exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. Could there be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another without receiving any remuneration at all it should be regarded as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condemnation of Article 23 , but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it should be outside the inhibition of that Article? If this were the true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or economically dominant class to exact labour or service from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of the community by paying a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article 23 . We do not think it would be right to place on the language of Article 23 an interpretation which would emasculate its beneficent provisions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear of the view that Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. The words "other similar forms of forced labour are used in Article 23 not with a view to importing the particular characteristic of ''begar'' that labour or service should be exacted without payment of any remuneration but with a view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that Article all other forms of forced labour and since ''begar'' is one form of forced labour, the Constitution makers used the words "other similar forms of forced labour." If the requirement that labour or work should be exacted without any remuneration were imported in other forms of forced labour, they would straightaway come within the meaning of the word ''begar'' and in that event there would be no need to have the additional words "other similar forms of forced labour." These words would be rendered futile and meaningless and it is a well recognised rule of interpretation that the court should avoid a construction which as the effect of rendering any words used by the legislature superfluous or redundant. The object of adding these words was clearly to expand the reach and content of Article 23 by including, in addition to ''begar'', other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of that Article. Every form of forced labour ''begar'' or otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no difference whether the person who is forced to give his labour or service to another is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or compulsion. Take for example a case where a person has entered into a contract of service with another for a period of three years and he wishes to discontinue serving such other person before the expiration of the period of three years. If a law were to provide that in such a case the contract shall be specifically enforced and he shall be compelled to serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to forced labour and such a law would be void as offending Article 23 . That is why specific performance of a contract of service cannot be enforced against an employee and the employee cannot be forced by compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer. Of course, if there is a breach of the contract of Service, the employee would be liable to pay damages to the employer but he cannot be forced to continue to serve the employer without breaching the injunction of Article 23 . This was precisely the view taken By the Supreme Court of United States in Baily v. Alabama: 219 US 219 while dealing with a similar provision in the Thirteenth Amendment. There, a legislation enacted by the Alabama State providing that when a person with intent to injure or defraud his employer enters into a contract in writing for the purpose of any service and obtains money or other property from the employer and without refunding the money or the property refuses or fails to perform such service, he will be punished with of fine. The constitutional validity of this legislation was challenged on the ground that it violated the Thirteenth Amendment which inter alia provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction". This challenge was upheld by a majority of the Court and Mr. Justice Hughes delivering the majority opinion said :

We cannot escape the conclusion that although the statute in terms is to punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for crime those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose by its effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of compulsion through which performance of such service may be secured. The question is whether such a statute is constitutional.

The learned Judge proceeded to explain the scope and ambit of the expression ''involuntary servitude'' in the following words:

The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and incidents, to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labour free by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one men is disposed of or coerced for another''s benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servitude.

Then, dealing with the contention that the employee in that case had voluntarily contracted to perform the service which was sought to be compelled and there was therefore no violation of the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, the learned Judge observed:

The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labour which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the statute. The full intent of the constitutional provision could be defeated with obvious facility if through the guise of contracts under which advances had been made, debtors could be held to compulsory service. It is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the condition of servitude is created which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforced labour

and proceeded to elaborate this thesis by pointing out:

Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labour or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labour of service, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of the service.

It is therefore clear that even if a person has contracted with another to perform service and there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even remuneration, he cannot be forced by compulsion of law or otherwise to continue to perform such service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibition of Article 23 . This Article strikes at every form of forced labour even if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person obligated to provide labour or service (vide Pollock v. Williams: : 322 US 4). The reason is that it offends against human dignity to compel a person to provide labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so, even though it be in breach of the contract entered into by him. There should be no serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free democratic India which respects the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Moreover, in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on its face voluntary but it may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering into the contract, the employee, by reason of his economically helpless condition, may have been faced with Hobson''s choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the powerful employer. It would be a travesty of justice to hold the employee in such a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him to serve the employer even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggravate the inequality and injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers on account of his economically disadvantaged position and lend the authority of law to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee by the economically powerful employer. Article 23 therefore says that no one shall be forced provide labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contract of service.

Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether there is any breach of Article 23 when a person provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and is paid less than the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that'' ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimum wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. It may therefore be legitimately presumed that when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under law to receive. What Article 23 prohibits is ''forced labour'' that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide and ''force'' which would make such labour or service ''forced labour'' may arise in several ways. It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as ''force'' and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ''force'', it would we ''forced labour''. Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a state of helplessness and despair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work that comes him way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than the minimum wage. He would be in no position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or service provided by him would be clearly ''forced labour.'' There is no reason why the word ''forced'' should be read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only to physical or legal ''force'' particularly when the national charter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new socialist republic where there will be socio-economic justice for all and every one shall have the right to work, to education and to adequate means of livelihood. The Constitution makers have given us one of the most remarkable documents in history for ushering in a new socio-economic order and the Constitution which they have forged for us has a social purpose and an economic mission and therefore every word or phrase in the Constitution must be interpreted in a manner which would advance the socio-economic objective of the Constitution. It is not unoften that in capitalist society economic circumstance exert much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to a particular course of action than physical compulsion or force of legislative provision. The word ''force'' must therefore be constructed to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstance which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage of course, if a person provides labour "or service to another against receipt of the minimum wage, it would not be possible to say that the labour or service provided by him is ''forced labour'' because he gets what he is entitled under law to receive. No inference can reasonably be drawn in such a case that he is forced to provide labour or service for the simple reason that he would be providing labour or service against receipt of what is lawfully payable to him just like any other person who is not under the force of any compulsion. We are therefore of the view that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly, falls within the scope and ambit of the words forced labour under Article 23 . Such a person would be entitled to come to the court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him ceases to be ''forced labour'' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied. It is therefore clear that when the petitioners alleged that minimum wage was not paid to the workmen employed by the contractors, the complaint was really in effect and substance a complaint against violation of the fundamental right of the workmen under Article 23 . Before leaving this subject, we may point out with all the emphasis at our command that whenever any fundamental right, which is enforceable against private individuals such as, for example a fundamental right enacted in Article 17 or 23 or 24 is being violated, it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take the necessary steps for the purpose of interdicting such violation and ensuring observance of the fundamental right by the private individual who is transgressing the same. Of course, the person whose fundamental right is violated can always approach the court for the purpose of enforcement of his fundamental right, but that cannot absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to see that there is no violation of the fundamental right of such person, particularly when he belongs to the weaker Section humanity and is unable to wage a legal battle against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him. The Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority must therefore be held to be under an obligation to ensure observance of these various labour laws by the contractors and if the provisions of any of these labour laws are violated by the contractors, the petitioners indicating the cause of the workmen are entitled to enforce this obligation against the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority by filing the present writ petition. The preliminary objections urged on behalf of the respondents must accordingly be rejected.

(Emphasis supplied)

In People''s Union for Democratic Rights, it has been observed that, it is un-often that in a capitalist society economic circumstances exert much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to a particular course of action than physical compulsion or force of legislative provision. The word ''force'' must therefore be construed to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage.

By the Notification No. F.22(44)-LAB/ENF/MW/INS/98/11478, dated 22.12.2000 (Annexure-R/13 to the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2), the employment of the private teaching institutes/coaching schools (excluding State Government aided Private School) has been added to the part I of Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 in exercise of the power conferred by Section 27 of the said Act. Thus, from 22.12.2000 when the notification adding the employment of the private teaching institutes/coaching schools has been added in the Part I of the schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, the employment under the ''Ma Anandamayee Vidyapeeth'' has become the scheduled employment as defined u/s 2(g) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

In terms of Section 2(g) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, ''scheduled employment'' means employment specified in the Schedule or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. The Minimum Wages Act has also defined ''employer''. By means of Section 2(e) of the Act, ''employer'' means any person who employs, whether directly or through another person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person, one or more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under the Act, and includes, except in sub-section (3) of section 26 all the establishments including the scheduled employment of various nature. The Act has also provided the definition of ''employee'' u/s 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, which provided that ''employee'' means any person who is employed for hire or reward to do any work, skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical, in a scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed and, includes an outworker to whom any articles or materials are given out by another person to be made up, cleaned, washed, altered, ornamented, finished, repaired, adapted or otherwise processed for sale for the purposes of the trade or business of that other person where the process is to be carried out either in the home of the out-worker or in some other premises not being premises under the control and management of that other person; and also includes an employee declared to be an employee by the appropriate Government, but does not include any member of the Armed Forces of the Union.

Having regard to the definition of the employee, the complainants all fall within the definition of employee and, since they are employed under a scheduled employment, they are entitled to get the minimum wages. As such, the elements of suppression of fact, as this court has determined the issue of the nature of engagement, not on the basis of the disputed records, will not have any relevance at all. The object and policy of the legislature in enacting the Minimum Wages Act is to prevent exploitation by fixing minimum wages, which, however, depends much upon the diverse factors, even is variable from locality to locality. The minimum wage can properly be ascertained by the Government in terms of the procedure laid down in the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. To carry out effectively the purpose of the enactment, adequate power has been given to the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government is thus saddled with the statutory liability as well as with the constitutional obligation to fix the minimum wage for the scheduled employment after interval of a reasonable period as prescribed by the statute.

The petitioner has challenged the said exercise made by the respondent-State by publishing the notification dated 12.01.2004 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition), whereby the rates of minimum wages for the scheduled employment, which embraces the educational institutions under reference has been fixed. In terms of the schedule of the said notification dated 12.01.2004, the teacher and the clerical staff are entitled to get Rs. 2,700 per month and the Group-D staffs including Daptri/Helper are entitled to get Rs. 1,710 per month for the Senior Basic/High/Higher Secondary Schools. Whereas Rs. 2,340 per month for the teacher, Rs. 2,250 per month for the clerical staff and Rs. 1,710 per month for the Daptri/Helper/Rickshaw puller are fixed for the Primary level schools (up to class-V). For the pre-primary school, the said rate ranges from Rs. 2,250 for the teacher and the clerical staff, whereas for the Aia/Daptri/Helper/Rickshaw puller, the minimum wage has been prescribed as Rs. 1,710. Thereafter, the said rates were revised by the notification dated 10.09.2012 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition). After revision, the teacher and the clerical staffs for the High/Higher Secondary Schools would get Rs. 5,140 per month, whereas Daptri/Helper/Group-D staff would get Rs. 3,380 and Rs. 4,460 per month for the teacher, Rs. 4,280 per month for the clerical staff and Rs. 3,380 per month for the Daptri/Helper/Rickshaw puller have been fixed for those working in the Senior Basic and Primary Schools (Class-I to VIII). Similarly, for the Nursery/Pre-primary Schools, the teacher and the clerical staff would get Rs. 4,280 per month and, for the Aia/Daptri/Rickshaw the minimum wages has been raised to Rs. 3,380 per month.

In view of the notifications dated 12.01.2004 and 10.09.2012, the complainants are entitled to the minimum wages at the revised rate, if the notifications are not found ultra vires inasmuch as the petitioner has questioned the legislative competence of the State Government and the process followed in issuing those notifications. This aspect of the matter would be dealt by this court after a little while. Having regard to this, this court is of the considered opinion that the complainants are entitled to get the minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, even if there is no contract of wage.

(ii) Whether Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act authorises the State Government to add to the schedule of employment inasmuch as the Minimum Wages Act is a Central statute included in the concurrent list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution or whether issuance of such notification u/s 27 of the Act would amount to amendment of the Central Statute.

This court is constrained to observe that such jurisprudential objection as to the competence of the appropriate Government, the State Government has emanated from misconstruction of the provision of Section 27 and allied provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Sections 5 and 27 , read with Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 prescribe the procedure for fixing and revising the minimum wages, whereas Section 27 authorises the State Government to add to the schedule. Since there is no challenge to the notification dated 22.12.2000 (Annexure-R/13 to the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, this court may not direct any further consideration as to the competence of the State Government to add to the schedule. However, for purpose of reference, it may be placed on record that by the provision of Section 27 , the appropriate Government, after publishing notification in the Official Gazette not less than three months'' notice of its intention so to do, may, by like notification, add to either Part of the Schedule any employment in respect of which it is of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be fixed under this Act, and thereupon the Schedule shall in its application to the State be deemed to be amended accordingly. By Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the State Government has been given power and authority to add any employee in either parts of the schedule and by that addition the Act itself got automatically amended. From a mere reading of the notification dated 20.12.2000, it would be appropriate that the State Government has published the said notification following the procedure as prescribed. The word ''appropriate Government'' has also been defined in Section 2(b) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as under:

"appropriate Government" means/(i) in relation to any scheduled employment carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or a railway administration, or in relation to a mine, oil-field or major port, or any corporation established by a Central Act, the Central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other scheduled employment, the State Government. Thus the State Government falls within the definition of the State Government, the appropriate Government for the category of employee covered by the notification dated 22.12.2000. As such, the said notification cannot be stated ultra vires, rather it is intra vires. The challenge made to the notifications dated 12.01.2004 and 10.09.2012 are that the State Government without consultation with the Central Advisory Board cannot publish such notification, even without the assent of the President of India, such notification cannot be issued by the State Government. If such notification is issued without such consultation or access, that would amount to the amendment of the Central Statute.

From the discussion made on the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it is apparent that the State Government has been delegated such power and, as such, the State Government being the appropriate Government has the authority to add any employment within its competence in either part of the schedule of the Minimum Wages Act. Even for revising, it appears from the records that the State Government has not violated the procedure as prescribed by Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act. It appears that by the notification dated 02.05.2012 (Annexure-9 to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2), issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 read with clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the State Government had proposed to revise the minimum wages for the workers/employees employed in the private teaching institutes/coaching schools (excluding State Government aided private schools) as specified in the schedule. The proposed minimum rates of wages were published by the said notification dated 02.05.2012 as required by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act for information of all persons likely to be affected thereby and, thus the notice was given to the effect that the proposal shall be taken into consideration on or after expiry of two months from the date of publication of the said notification in the Official Gazette. In the said notification, it was also mentioned that any objection and suggestion which may be received from any person with respect to the proposal before expiry of the period specified would be considered by the State Government. But, from the notification dated 10.09.2012, it appears that no objection and suggestion were received against the proposal or for modification of the notice. Thereafter, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 read with clause (iii) of subsection (1) of Section 4 and sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the State Government had consulted with the Advisory Board and, only thereafter, revised the minimum rates of wages in the employment of private teaching institutes/coaching schools (excluding State Government aided private schools) in Tripura. The revised minimum wages has come into effect from the date of publication of the said notification dated 10.09.2012.

On a bare reading of Sections 3 , 4 and 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it would be apparent that the appropriate Government has followed the prescribed procedure strictly. The respondents No. 1 and 2 have also produced all such records including the Constitution of the Advisory Board u/s 7 of the Minimum Wages Act. This court does not find any irregularity in such constitution or in the process of consultation. Section 7 of the Minimum Wages Act is pretty clear on this aspect. It provides that for purpose of coordinating the work of the committee and sub-committees appointed u/s 5 and advising the appropriate Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages, the appropriate Government shall appoint an Advisory Board. Therefore, when there is certain area where both the Central Government and the State Government may exercise their jurisdiction, only then it would be a complex situation. In that event, even the consultation may be sought from the Central Advisory Board. When the scheduled employment is within the jurisdiction of the State Government, the consultation with the Advisory Board for purpose of consultation as provided u/s 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act would be relevant and adequate. It appears that the State Government, after constituting a committee has revised the minimum wages by the notification dated 10.09.2012 and, as such, there is no unconstitutionality in the process or in exercise of the delegated power and, accordingly, the said objection stands rejected by this court.

After issuing the notification, amending the schedule, incorporating the employment under the category of the schools like the petitioner and revising the wages, whether the notifications dated 12.01.2004 and 10.09.2012, are void ab initio or inoperative for non-compliance of the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, should receive some more consideration as it evinces that the procedure prescribed by the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has been appropriately observed by the State Government. For making statement to the Central Board of Secondary Education to the effect that no remuneration is paid to the employees cannot eclipse the statutory provision as provided under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. As such, the submission in this regard made by the petitioner is entirely without substance and, accordingly, such submission is rejected.

(iv) Whether the complaint is time barred in terms of Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and, whether the impugned order dated 12.06.2013 is bad in law for non-considering that aspect of the matter or whether the impugned order is bereft of reasons?

From a bare reading of the impugned order dated 12.06.2013 (Annexure-P/5 to the writ petition), it appears that the aspect relating to limitation has not at all been considered by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 while passing the impugned order. Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 provides that every such application claiming minimum wages shall be presented within six months from the date in which the minimum wages or other amount become payable. Second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act has given power to the authority under the Minimum Wages Act to condone the delay in filing such application claiming minimum wage if the sufficient cause is assigned. No doubt, the complainants did not assign any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in reaping the benefit of minimum wage under the notification dated 12.01.2004 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition). The object of the proviso is abundantly clear by its implication, that belated claim placed after the inordinate delay may dismay the fiscal management of the employer. As such, this aspect of the matter cannot be casually brushed aside. The claim for minimum wages has to be made within six months unless is prevented by the mitigating circumstances. However, the delay that may take place in filing such application within six months, in terms of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, may be condoned by the authority on sufficient cause assigned to it. In absence of sufficient cause or in absence of any initiative for explaining such delay, the authority under the Minimum Wages Act shall not invoke its authority to condone such delay or to direct the employer of the scheduled employment to pay the time barred minimum wages. But, the claim made by the complainants cannot be held to be time barred so far the claims made under the notification dated 10.09.2012, inasmuch as such claim was raised by the complainants on 11.09.2012. The complainants, the respondents No. 4 to 25, are thus entitled to the minimum wages w.e.f. 10.09.2012 at the rate prescribed in the schedule to the notification dated 10.09.2012 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition). But, they are not entitled to get the minimum wages as provided in the schedule to the notification dated 12.01.2004 (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition). This Court has observed that the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, while passing the order dated 12.06.2013, has not provided the proper reasons. It appears to this court that the order dated 12.06.2013 is the final order on terminating the enforcement proceeding. The authority has passed several orders at the different phases of the proceeding. However, it is incumbent on the authority while passing the final order to provide the reasons why he has accepted the claim or passed the direction to pay the minimum wages. Such cryptic orders, without any analysis or reasons should always be avoided by the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. However, this court is not inclined to interfere with the said order in its entirety. It is clarified that the minimum wages would be available to the complainants, the respondents No. 4 to 25 in terms of the Schedule to the notification dated 10.09.2012 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition). They will not be entitled to the minimum wages anterior to 10.09.2012. Since the respondent No. 2 has prepared a statement of wages for the teachers etc. and appended the same with the impugned order dated 12.06.2013, showing the minimum wage from date anterior to 10.09.2012, the authority under the Minimum Wages Act is hereunder directed to prepare a fresh statement in terms of this order. The authority under the Minimum Wages Act shall therefore calculate the minimum wages w.e.f. 10.09.2012 within a period of 15(fifteen) days from today and communicate the same to the petitioner and, the petitioner shall pay such arrear wage to the complainants in terms of the statement as would be prepared by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act within a period of 6(six) months from the date of receipt of the communication from the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. But, the petitioner shall allow the complainants to draw the minimum wage every month w.e.f. 01.10.2014 in terms of the notification dated 10.09.2012 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition).

Having held so, the writ petition is partly allowed to the extent as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.