Managing Director, Punjab State Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs Manjit Singh Sodhi and Others

Mr. Justice Ranjit Singh

This Regular Second Appeal No. 69/2005 Managing Director, the Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Manjit Singh Sodhi and

Others is being disposed of alongwith 13 other Civil Writ Petition Nos. 567/2005 Abnash Chander Sidana and Another v. State of Punjab and

Others, 8975/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Hari Chand Gupta and Others, 16403/2005 Punjab State Cooperative

Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Hukam Chand and Others, 16405/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Sarabjit Singh Johal and

Others, 16413/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Hakim Singh and Others 16415/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank

Ltd., Chandigarh v. Ved Parkash Sharma and Others, 16466/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Jagdev Singh and Others,

19852/2005 Amrik Singh Walia v. State of Punjab and Another, 19882/2006 Gurcharan Singh v. Punjab State Cooperative Bank, Chandigarh

and Another, 1047/2008 Kewal Krishan Kanwra and Another v. State of Punjab and Others, 20051/2008 Harjinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab

and Others, 21740/2008 Balbir Singh Gill and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, and 21792/2008 Karamjit Singh Randhawa and Others v.

State of Punjab and Others.

Common issue involved in all these cases relates to payment of gratuity. The appellant-Bank is in Regular Second Appeal to impugn the

judgments passed by the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court, through which the suit filed by one Manjit Singh Sodhi for payment of

gratuity has been decreed. Manjit Singh had filed this suit with a grievance that he was entitled to the gratuity equivalent to 22 months of salary,

which would work out to be Rs. 2,56,014/- on the basis of the pay and emoluments he was drawing whereas he had been paid a sum of Rs.

2,05,384/-. He accordingly prayed for release of Rs. 50,130/-, which was the shortfall in the gratuity that was payable to him along with 18%

interest per annum. The case set-up by the respondent-plaintiff was that as per the Last Pay Certificate (L.P.C) issued to him on December 24,

1996, his Basic Pay was Rs. 5100, Medical Allowance Rs. 125/-, Dearness Allowance Rs. 5202, interim relief Rs. 710/- and House Rent

Allowance ? 500/-, totalling to Rs. 11,637/-.

Appellant Bank appeared and contested the suit and objected to the prayer made by the respondent-plaintiff, pleading that he was not entitled

to recover any amount of gratuity with interest as prayed for. The claim of the respondent-plaintiff that he was entitled to the gratuity due to 32

years service he had rendered was contested by stating that he had 31 years 11 months and 25 days service and not 32 years as alleged.

Appellant Bank (defendant No. 4) filed a separate written statement, contesting the claim. It was pleaded that respondent-plaintiff was entitled to

gratuity equivalent to 21 months service and, thus, he was not entitled to the amount claimed in the suit. The suit proceeded on following issues:

Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction for payment of gratuity amount of Rs. 56,130/-? OPP

Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest? If so at what rate and what amount? OPP

Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed for misjoinder of parties? OPD

Whether the plaintiff (sic) plaint is not verified in accordance with law? OPD

4-A. Whether suit is not valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD

Relief.

The parties led evidence in support of their respective stands. The respondent plaintiff claimed gratuity equivalent to 22 months of salary on the

basis of his last drawn salary being Rs. 11,637/-. The appellant-Bank, however, maintained that respondent-plaintiff was entitled to gratuity

equivalent to 21 months salary. In addition, it was pleaded that the gratuity would be payable by taking into consideration the Basic Salary plus

D.A, Interim relief and that House Rent and Medical Allowance cannot be considered as part of salary for calculating gratuity.

Pritpal Singh (D.W.2) was examined as a witness by the appellants in support of their case. He admitted while under cross-examination that

total salary drawn by the respondent-plaintiff was Rs. 11637/- and that payment of gratuity was to be made to the plaintiff as per Punjab State

Cooperative Financing Institution Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1970-71 (for short, ""Common Cadre Rules""). By referring to Rule 3a of the

Common Cadre Rules, it was stated that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to receive gratuity equal to the salary of 15 months for putting in 25

years service and thereafter for one month salary for each completed year of satisfactory service. It was on this basis pleaded that the service of

the respondent-plaintiff, being 31 years, he was entitled to gratuity equivalent to 21 months of pay as 7th year of his service was not complete as it

fell short by 6 days. The submissions made by counsel for respondent-plaintiff by referring to Rule June 1, 2011 of Punjab Civil Service Rules,

Volume II, that completed service of 3 months shall be treated as six months period for the purpose of pension was not accepted by the Trial

Court on the ground that Rules for payment of gratuity for the employees of the Bank were Common Cadre Rules and so the Punjab Civil Service

Rules would not be applicable. It was further observed that there was no provision for calculating fraction of a year as a completed year under the

Common Cadre Rules and as per Rule 3a, one month''s pay as additional gratuity was payable for each completed year of satisfactory service

beyond 25 years. Accordingly, it was held that respondent-plaintiff would be entitled to gratuity equivalent to 21 months salary.

By placing reliance on Rule 2(C) of Common Cadre Rules, pay was held to mean average salary inclusive of other remuneration drawn in salary

during the last 12 months and in view of the admitted fact that the total salary drawn by the respondent-plaintiff was Rs. 11637/-, the gratuity

payable to the respondent-plaintiff was calculated to be Rs. 2,44,377/-. Submissions made on behalf of appellant-Bank that definition of ""wages

as provided in the Payment of Gratuity Act (for short ""Gratuity Act"") did not include bonus, commission, house rent allowance and over time

wages and any other allowance, was not accepted on the ground that the gratuity was payable as per the Common Cadre Rules where the salary

was defined to include all other remunerations drawn as salary. Accordingly, the justification advanced by the appellant-Bank to exclude the house

rent and Medical Allowance for the purpose of calculating gratuity was rejected.

Issues No. 3 and 4 were decided against the appellant-Bank on the ground that these were not pressed. Similarly, additional issue framed as 4A

was also not raised at the time of arguments and accordingly was decided in favour of the respondent-plaintiff.

The appellant-Bank had filed appeal against this order primarily on the ground that the legal position was not properly appreciated and the term

''pay'' for the payment of gratuity was not properly appreciated. The Appellate Court upheld the judgment passed by the Trial Court and rejected

the contention raised by the appellant-Bank to the effect that pay would not include other remunerations like house rent, medical allowance. The

first Appellate Court also relied upon Rule 2(C) of the Common Cadre Rules for the purpose of definition of ''pay''. The 1st Appellate Court also

made reference to an order passed by this Court while deciding Civil Writ Petition No. 1182/1997 to say that it was abundantly clear that the

average salary including other remunerations drawn as salary during the last 12 months were to be taken into account while calculating gratuity.

Rather, the Court further held that gratuity can not be calculated on the basis of basic salary alone. The Bank now, thus, is in appeal before this

Court.

From the issues that were framed while deciding the suit and the pleadings that were made, it would come out clearly that the Bank had never

raised any question that the provisions of the Gratuity Act would prevail over the provisions of Common Cadre Rules for the purpose of calculating

gratuity. Without any plea made in this regard, it was vaguely argued before the Trial Court that the wages as defined under the Gratuity Act be

considered for the purpose of calculating the gratuity. In fact, the witness produced by the appellant-Bank clearly conceded the applicability of the

Common Cadre Rules while under cross-examination. The last pay certificate of the respondent-plaintiff was also admitted. However, entirely new

twist is now given to the controversy while arguing the Regular Second Appeal before this Court by pleading that the provisions of Gratuity Act

will have over-riding effect as per Section 14 of the Gratuity Act.

The contention noticed by this Court while issuing notice of motion is that definition of ''wages'' under the Gratuity Act, has been ignored. This

was the precise submission advanced even at the time of admission of the present Regular Second Appeal. Plea was that medical allowance and

house rent allowance could not be taken as a component of pay for the purpose of calculating the gratuity and taking of these into account for the

purpose of calculation would be contrary to the provisions of the Gratuity Act.

Now, while arguing this case before the Court, a new dimension has been given to the controversy. Not only this, the issue apparently is further

compounded due to an action taken by the senior counsel who had appeared for the appellant Bank. His advice to Registrar led to withdrawing

certain communication earlier issued by the Registrar. This has given rise to filing of number of writ petitions by the employees to challenge the said

communication. Bank has also come forward to challenge the calculation of gratuity by filing number of petitions making this advice as a base.

As would be noticeable, the Court had decreed the suit, primarily on the ground that the Common Cadre Rules would govern the payment of

gratuity in this case. There was no specific pleading made that the Gratuity Act is to apply or that it would have an overriding effect. Apparently, to

tide over this tight situation, another novel method appears to have been invented and adopted to move the Registrar to withdraw the approval

granted by him to the Common Cadre Rules. A communication was initiated on October 19, 2005 by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies,

Punjab, to the Managing Director of the appellant-Bank to the effect that the letter No. Credit/CA 4/Amendment/8535 dated June 7, 2001 and

Credit/CA 4/7206 dated May 7, 2002 regarding gratuity were withdrawn on the legal advice given by senior advocate, who is named in the

communication. The communication reads as under:

Proposal sent by you vide letter under reference on the subject mentioned above was considered and on the recommendation of the Managing

Director, Punjab State Co-operative Bank and keeping in view the legal advice given by Sh. H.S.Mattewal, senior advocate High Court, letters

No. Credit/CA 4/Amendment/8535 dated June 7, 2001 and No. Credit/CA 4/7206 dated May 7, 2002 regarding gratuity are hereby withdrawn

and letter No. Credit/CA 4/8230: dated August 24, 1998 will remain in force.

These letters have, thus, been withdrawn on the advice of a counsel, who had appeared for the Bank to argue the Regular: Second Appeal.

The background, which would have necessitated the need to withdraw these communication, may be noticed. On August 24, 1998, Registrar

had issued a communication to'' substitute Rule 3.11 of Common Cadre Rules, which reads as under:

The employee shall be paid Gratuity as per the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Another communication dated June 7, 2001 was issued in response to a letter written by the Managing Director of the, appellant-Bank. It is stated

in this letter that the proposal was considered and it was decided to allow the payment of gratuity as per Annexure V to those Common Cadre

employees who were working as such before August 24, 1998, with the condition that no such employee who has been made final payment due to

any reason whatsoever will be given any benefit in addition to whatever has been paid to him. It was also clarified that the gratuity was to be paid

as per the provisions of the Gratuity Act, to those common cadre employees who were appointed after August 24, 1998, when the amendment in

the Rule 3.11 was introduced. This position was again reiterated through letter dated May 7, 2002 where it was clarified that the gratuity is to be

paid as per Annexure V of the Common Cadre Rules to the employees who were in the common cadre as on July 24, 1998 and the same was to

be paid as per the Gratuity Act, to those employees who came into service or came into common cadre after August 24, 1998. These two

clarificatory communications were withdrawn as noted above and the resultant effect is that it is now pleaded that the Gratuity Act would prevail

over the Common Cadre Rules.

Primarily, it appears to be aimed at circumventing the liability, which is payable up to August 24, 1998 and also to substantiate the stand of the

Bank to challenge the judgment that was under appeal before this Court. This action of Registrar to favour the Bank, which is a party before this

Court, that too on the advice of the counsel representing the Bank would certainly be a cause of concern. It is for the counsel to consider if it was

ethical to tender legal advice in a case where he was representing a party. It would be a cause of grievance to those employees who were affected

because of the withdrawal of these communications. Accordingly, number of writ petitions came to be filed before this Court to seek quashing this

communication dated October 19, 2005, (Annexure P-5), and so also the directions dated August 24, 1998. Prayer in the alternative is made to

say that the said letters be made applicable to those employees who came into common cadre after issuance of the said letters. Civil Writ Petition

Nos. 567, 1047, 20051, 21740, 21792/2008 were accordingly filed by the employees to challenge the communications that were initiated by the

Registrar. Civil Writ Petition No. 19852/2005 was filed by one Amrik Singh Walia, seeking direction for payment for release of his gratuity with an

additional prayer to count his military service for this purpose. Gurcharan Singh, another petitioner filed Civil Writ Petition No. 19882/2006, also

approached this Court for release of his gratuity under the Common Cadre Rules. These two writ petitions were admitted to be heard along with

the Regular Second Appeal on the ground that the common question of law was involved.

During the pendency of the Regular Second Appeal, the Bank also filed some Civil Writ Petitions to impugn the calculation done by the

Accountant General for payment of gratuity by taking into consideration the emoluments/allowances to be inclusive in the pay, on the lines of the

view taken by the Court which is under challenge in the instant Regular Second Appeal and perhaps in some of the writ petitions. The Bank

accordingly challenged the calculation so done through a writ petition to say that the gratuity being calculated by including house rent allowance,

medical allowance, city compensatory allowance and the interim relief, cannot be done but was being done and would be contrary to the Gratuity

Act and in terms of the definition of pay given in Clause 2(c) of the Common Cadre Rules. First Civil Writ Petition filed in this regard is

8975/2005, which was admitted to be heard alongwith this Regular Second Appeal. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 16403, 16405, 16413, 16415,

16466/2005 containing identical challenge were ordered to be admitted for hearing alongwith Civil Writ Petition No. 8975/2005. Some of the writ

petitions filed by the employees were also admitted to be heard alongwith these writ petitions as the identical issues were being raised in all such

writ petitions.

It is being canvassed by the employees that gratuity shall be payable to them in terms of the Common Cadre Rules where the salary is so

defined and, thus, for the purpose of calculating the gratuity, the house rent and medical allowance, which are emoluments payable to them as a

salary are required to be included for the purpose of calculating gratuity. This is what has been held in the civil suit decided by the Courts, which is

impugned by the Bank through present Regular Second Appeal. On the other hand, the Bank would say that pay is to be construed in terms of the

definition contained in the Gratuity Act and accordingly the allowances like house rent allowance or medical allowance etc. would not form part of

pay and hence, cannot be included as part of pay for the purpose of calculating gratuity.

The shift in the stand of the Bank to come out of the judgment passed against it and to substantiate its stand in the Regular Second Appeal can

be clearly discerned. No submission on the lines as are advanced before this Court were ever made in the pleadings while defending the civil suit.

A vague plea was raised that the salary is to be construed as per the definition given in the Gratuity Act. No plea was ever raised in this regard in

the pleadings. It was also not urged, as is now being stated, that the provisions of the Gratuity Act would have an over-riding effect on the other

statutory provisions in view of Section 14 thereof. No plea was raised as is being now urged that exception to this could be only in those situation

where there are better terms u/s 5 of the Gratuity Act that too when exemption is granted. Of course, his plea that the wages will include only

dearness allowance and not other emoluments, as already noticed, was vaguely raised. Plea further is that the emoluments, unless categorized as

pay cannot become part of the pay as per the definition of term contained in various statutes.

The counsel representing the employees would join serious issues regarding the submission made by the counsel for the appellant, who has

appeared for the Bank in some of the writ petitions as well. They would plead that the provisions of the Common Cadre Rules are to be taken into

consideration for payment of gratuity as has even been viewed by the Department as such, till the time the Rule was substituted on August 24,

1998. They would also plead that the Registrar would not have jurisdiction to withdraw the communications as was done by issuing Annexure P-5,

which is under challenge in the writ petitions. By making reference to the provisions of Punjab State Cooperative Societies Act, it is urged that the

approval once granted by the Registrar to the common cadre cannot be withdrawn as it would amount to review of the order for which Registrar

has no power or authority. Alternatively, it is pleaded that in any case once the benefit was granted and is available to the employees as a right, the

same cannot be taken away retrospectively as it would then amount to taking away the accrued rights of the employees, which in any case would

be totally illegal being unconstitutional.

Mr. H.S. Sidhu has advanced his arguments in the Regular Second Appeal. The first difficulty that starred at him in this background was the

pleadings made on behalf of the appellant Bank before the Trial Court. There was total lack of pleadings on the aspects which he argued before

this Court. Rather, the Regular Second Appeal was got admitted on this basis only, which had not been pleaded or urged before the Trial Court in

the pleadings. To tide over this situation, he drew my attention to Tarini Kamal Pandit and Others Vs. Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee (Dead) by Legal

Representatives, to urge that a pure question of law not involving any question of fact was permitted to be raised for the first time even before the

Supreme Court as per the law laid down in this case. The relevant observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in this regard are as under:

This point was not taken in any of the Courts below but learned counsel submitted that because it is a pure question of law not involving any

investigation of facts and as it goes to the root of the matter the Court may permit the point to be taken. In support of his contention that a pure

question of law in the circumstances can be taken for the first time in this Court he relied on the decisions of this Court in (1) Yeswant Deorao

Deshmukh Vs. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, , (2) Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo Vs. The State of Orissa, , (3) Seth Badri Prasad and

Others Vs. Seth Nagarmal and Others, , (4) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anand Swarup (1974) 1 SCC 421 and (5) T.C. Appanda Mudaliar (Dead)

by L. Rs. Vs. State of Madras, . As the point raised is a pure question of law not involving any investigation of the facts, we permitted the learned

counsel to raise the question.

Reference in this regard is also made to T.G. Appanda Mudaliar (dead) by L.Rs v. State of Madras (supra), where new plea raising pure

questions of law relating to interpretation of statute was allowed by the Supreme Court. In Grasim Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs,

Bombay, , a new plea not raised before any Forum below but involving questions of law was allowed to be raised by the Supreme Court. Similar

view was taken by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Rajeswari Amma and another Vs. Joseph and another, . Accordingly, these pleas even if are

being raised for the first time before this Court may require consideration, especially so when the similar issues are arising in the writ petitions,

which are being heard along with this Regular Second Appeal.

The first submission that would require consideration would be regarding the over-riding effect of the provisions of the Gratuity Act in terms of

Section 14. The counsel for the appellant has canvassed that the provisions of the Gratuity Act would have an overriding effect notwithstanding

anything contained inconsistent therewith in any enactment, any other act or any instrument. He would, however, concede that Section 4 of the

Gratuity Act would carve out an exception in this regard by providing in sub-section (5) thereof that ""nothing in this Section shall effect the right of

an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or contract with the employer."" To escape from the rigor of this

exception, the counsel would contend that Common Cadre Rules, being statutory rules, cannot be termed as an award, agreement or contract. As

per him, these terms would not include statutory rules. In support he has placed reliance on Workmen of Metro Theatre, Bombay Vs. Metro

Theatre Ltd., Bombay, . As per the counsel, Section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act was limited to awards, agreements or contract and existing better

terms being covered by Section 5 of the Gratuity Act. These submissions are misconceived as would be seen in later part of the judgment. The

counsel would further contend that the Gratuity Act will over-ride any statutory rules, regulating payment of gratuity to the employees, unless

exemption u/s 5 of the Gratuity Act is granted by the appropriate Government. In this regard, the counsel seeks support from the observations in

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Dharam Prakash Sharma and Another, . This view about the applicability of Gratuity Act was taken because

these provisions were beneficial and were being ignored to pay gratuity.

On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the employees would contend that in case award, agreement, contract or rules provide any better

terms of gratuity, then that would prevail in view of the provisions of Section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act and Section 14 of the Gratuity Act, thus,

would not have effect in such cases as the primary aim of the legislation is to ensure better terms for the employees. It is stated that Section 4(5) is

in the nature of saving clause. The counsel would also contest the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant that Section 4(5) will operate

only in the case of contract, agreement or award and for other exemptions to be applicable, Section 5 of the Gratuity Act would come into play. If

there is no exemption granted u/s 5 of the Gratuity Act, Section 14 of the Gratuity Act would make the provisions of Gratuity Act applicable as it

has an over-riding effect. In this regard, reference is made to Superintendent of Post Offices v. Smt. Sham Dulari and Others, 2006 (3) SCT 577,

where Division Bench of this Court, after relying upon E.I.D. Parry (I) Ltd. Vs. G. Omkar Murthy and Others, , has taken a view that the scheme

of the Gratuity Act indicates that it is not applicable to cases where any other Rule or statute is more beneficial than the Gratuity Act. The relevant

observations in this regard are as under:

We are further of the view that the scheme of the Gratuity Act indicates that it is not applicable to cases where any other rule or statute is more

beneficial than the Gratuity Act. For the aforementioned proposition, reliance may be placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of

EID Parry (I) Ltd. v. G. Omkar Murthy and Others (supra). The converse would also be true that in cases where the Gratuity Act is more

beneficial than the Rules, regulations or any statute then the Gratuity Act would apply.

Reference is also made to Bank of Baroda v. Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act and Others 2008 (4) SCT 7 : 2008 Lab IC

(NOC) 1050 (All), where while considering provisions of Section 4(5) and Section 14 of the Gratuity Act, the Court has held that the Act will be

attracted ipso facto in absence of any exception, notification and will have over-riding effect over any scheme, which is less favourable to the

employees. Contention is that a beneficial legislation is to prevail ipso facto without any notification. Reference is also made to Rajamani, wife and

Nominee of S. Rajagopalan (Since deceased) and 8 others Vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour and the Appellate Authority under Payment

of Gratuity Act, Tiruchirapalli and 2 others, . In this case, it is viewed that no Instrument, Contract, Standing Order, Rule can have force over and

above the provisions of the Gratuity Act. In the same breath, it is also observed that if the employees are given lesser gratuity, then they are entitled

either by virtue of any Representation, Rule or Standing Order that will not stand in a way of claiming full benefits u/s 4 of the Gratuity Act.

In addition, Mr. Vikas Suri, appearing for the respondent-plaintiff in Regular Second Appeal has made reference to the statements of object

and reasons of the Gratuity Act to highlight the fact that this Act was enacted to provide a minimum base and aim was not to curtail the better

terms in any manner. Rather, the entire scheme of the Act, would show that the better terms are to prevail in case, they are available either under

contract, agreement or award or any other enactment. The reference to the statement of object and reasons in enacting this legislation would show

that there was no Central Act to regulate the payment of gratuity to industrial workers. The Government of Kerala has enacted a legislation for

payment of gratuity to workers employed in the factories etc. The Government of West Bengal had promulgated an ordinance prescribing the

similar scheme for payment of gratuity. It was also noticed that the gratuity was also payable under awards or agreements. Other State

Governments had also voiced their intention for enacting similar measures. Accordingly, it was considered necessary to have a Central law on the

subject to ensure uniform pattern of payment gratuity throughout the country.

This Act is, thus, a beneficial legislation primarily aimed at protecting the rights of the employees and was to lay down minimum standard of

payment. This would further be evident from the provisions of Section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act, which provides that this enactment would not effect

the right of an employee to receive better terms of gratuity under any award or agreement or a contract. If the aim was to make this enactment

have an over-riding effect over the other rules, regulations governing the payment of gratuity, though having beneficial terms, then there was no

need to make a provision like Section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act. This provision rather will give out the clear legislative intent to give preference to

beneficial terms over the Gratuity Act. The obvious aim of this sub-section is that employee entitled to the better terms of gratuity, either by way of

award or agreement or a contract would not have to be paid gratuity under the Gratuity Act. That being so, it would be difficult to accept the

submission that this provision would not apply to other enactment or rules or statutes when it has given preference to even terms of agreement,

award or contract. The plea that enactment would apply only when exemption is asked for and is granted would mean that even less beneficial

enactment could prevail which may lead to a contradiction of a sort between Section 5 and Section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act. Thus, the submission

by appellant''s counsel that this sub-section would only operate in the case of award, agreement or contract and would not apply where the gratuity

is payable either by way of rules or statute would amount to negating the very purpose and object behind the enactment of the Gratuity Act.

The counsel for the appellant would urge that better terms would be payable in terms of any other enactment, rules or regulations only if

appropriate Government grants exemption by way of notification, which would be subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification.

The submission on these lines would even amount to misreading the provisions of Section 5 of the Gratuity Act. No doubt, this provision

empowers the appropriate Government to exempt any establishment, factory, mine, oil field, plantation, port, railway company or shop from the

operation of the provisions of this Act but this can be done only when the appropriate Government is of the opinion that employee in such

establishments are in receipt of gratuity or pensionary benefits not less favourable than the benefits conferred under this Act. Thus, the aim of this

Section is to grant exemption for the benefit of the employees and not to curtail or curb their rights to receive better terms for payment of gratuity

under any other enactment.

Section 5(1) of the Gratuity Act talks of exempting establishment as such whereas sub-section (2) regulates the exemption of any employee or

class of employees. The reason behind the grant of exemption under both the sub-sections is same and is that when such employee or class of

employees or establishments are in receipt of Gratuity or pension able benefits not less favourable than the benefit conferred under this Act. This

Section cannot read to mean that unless exemption is granted to either the establishment, employees or class of employees, they could be paid

gratuity which is less favourable or less beneficial to them. If the plea as raised about the over-riding effect is accepted, it would defeat the very

purpose expressed in these provisions of the Gratuity Act. In this regard, the observations made by Allahabad High Court in the case of Bank of

Baroda v. Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act and Others (supra) can be noticed. It is rightly viewed that the Act will be attracted

ipso facto in the absence of exemption notification and will have over-riding effect over any scheme, which is less favourable to employees. The

converse would be equally true and if any other Scheme is favourable, then it would prevail. In fact, the observations of Hon''ble Supreme Court in

EID Parry (I) Ltd. v. G. Omkar Murthy and Others (supra) can be referred here for benefit, which are E.I.D. Parry (I) Ltd. Vs. G. Omkar Murthy

and Others, :

2...In this case, the finding is that the State Act is more beneficial than the Central Act. Therefore, the contentions sought to be advanced on behalf

of the appellant as to repugnancy or otherwise of the State Act would not arise at all. If both the enactments can co-exist and can operate where

one Act or the other is not available then we find no difficulty in making the State Act applicable to the fact situation available as has been done in

the present case. Therefore, we find that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are unsustainable.

The ratio which can be culled out from the above observations is that if the State Act is more beneficial than the Central Act, then even the

argument of repugnancy or otherwise of the State Act would not arise at all. It has been very aptly observed that both the enactments can co-exist.

In order to wriggle out of this proposition that more beneficial enactment has to prevail, the counsel for the appellant contends that these

observations were made in the fact situation of that case which would not apply to the present case. He submits that the Gratuity Act and the

Common Cadre Rules both are applicable and so the Gratuity Act would prevail in view of Section 14 of the Gratuity Act. While so stating the

counsel is missing out a basic point regarding the aim, object and purpose of the Gratuity Act and that more beneficial provisions to prevail, being

the object of the legislation behind the enactment. If any support is needed in this regard, then the same can be had from the Workmen of Metro

Theatre Ltd., Bombay v. Metro Theatre Ltd., Bombay (supra), where it is observed that the Scheme envisaged by the Gratuity Act secures the

minimum for the employees in that behalf and expressed provisions are found under the Gratuity Act under which better terms of gratuity, if already

existing, are not only preserved but better terms could be conferred on an employee in future. Following observations will further clarify the

position Workmen of Metro Theatre, Bombay Vs. Metro Theatre Ltd., Bombay, :

Counsel for the appellant Union urged before us that no standar disation of any gratuity scheme was contemplated by the Act as was clear from

the express provisions contained in Section 4(5) and Section 5 of the Act and that enactment being a beneficial piece of legislation Section 4(5)

should be construed in favour of the employees and that, therefore, the Tribunal''s view that it could not grant anything beyond the scheme

contemplated by the Act was erroneous. In support of such construction reliance was placed upon this Court''s decision in Alembic Chemical

Works Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen, where a similar provision under the Factories Act was construed as conferring power on the Tribunal to fix

the quantum of leave on a scale more liberal than the one provided by the Act, We find considerable force in this submission.

XX XX XX

7......This also becomes amply clear from the provisions of Section 5 which confer power upon the appropriate Government to exempt any

establishment to which the Act applies from the operation of the provisions of the Act if in its opinion the employees in such establishment are in

receipt of gratuity benefits not less favourable than the benefits conferred under the Act. Therefore, on true construction we are clearly of the view

that the expression ''award'' occurring in the above provision does not mean and cannot be confined to ''existing award'' but includes any award

that would be made by an adjudicator wherein better terms of gratuity could be granted to the employees if the facts and circumstances warrant

such grant. It is true, as has been observed, by this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Labour Court Jullunder and Others, , that the Act enacts a

complete Code containing detailed provisions covering all essential features of the scheme for payment of gratuity. But it is also clear that the

scheme envisaged by the enactment secures the minimum for the employees in that behalf and express provisions are found in the Act under which

better terms of gratuity if already existing are not merely preserved but better terms could be conferred on the employee in future. In other words

the view taken by the Tribunal that it could not go beyond the scheme of gratuity contemplated by the Act is clearly erroneous.

Reference here only can be made to Parry and Co. Ltd. v. Second Addl. Labour Court and Others, (1996) 89 FJR 288, where it is observed

that act is not intended to do away with other retiral benefits already existing and available to the employees and that this Act confers extra benefits

on the employees. It is observed as under:

With this background, and the factual concept set clear as above, we proceed to consider the contention of the management that the pension

scheme stood statutorily scrapped after the coming into force of the Act. The Act is apiece of legislation forming a milestone in the annals of labour

welfare schemes in this country. Gratuity, as the term itself suggests, is a gratuitous payment given to an employee on discharge or retirement. The

Act is not intended to do away with other retiral benefits already existing and available to the employees. In brief the Act, the legislation clearly

intended to confer extra benefits on the employees. The Court, while construing the provisions of the Act, which is a piece of social legislation,

must construe them so as to help achieving the object of the legislation. The retiral benefits which stood conferred already on the employee do not

militate against the benefit of gratuity. The endeavour must be to see that the retiral benefit schemes already existing and the scheme of gratuity

under the Act co-exist in a concern.\

Reference here can be made to the case of M.C. Chamaraju Vs. Hind Nippon Rural Industrial (P) Ltd., to observe that liberal view should be

taken, the act being beneficial legislation. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed in this case that the act has been enacted with a view to grant

benefits to the workers, a weaker Section, in industrial adjudicatory process. In interpreting the provision of such beneficial legislation, liberal view

should be taken. Similar view will emerge from the observations made in Bank of Baroda v. Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act

and Others (supra), where the Gratuity Act was held to have an over-riding effect over any scheme which is less favourable to the employee. On

the other hand, if the employees are entitled to better terms under any Scheme, the same would be protected by Section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act.

In The Transport Manager, Kolhapur Municipal Transport Undertaking Vs. Pravin Bhabhutlal Shah, Controlling Authority under Payment of

Gratuity Act, 1972 and Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, , the Court has observed that workman and employer are free

to enter into contract of payment of gratuity at a higher rate and if the settlement does not impose any ceiling limit to the gratuity receivable by an

employee, the Act cannot impose any limit. It is, thus, clear that what is for the benefit of an employee is to be preferred rather than the over-riding

effect of the Gratuity Act. In Beed District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , Hon''ble Supreme Court

negated the prayer of the employees to seek some benefits under the Gratuity Act and other under contract by declining to apply ''doctrine of ''blue

pencil"". Court has held that sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the 1972 Act does not contemplate that the workman would be at liberty to opt for

better terms of the contract, while keeping the option open in respect of a part of the statute. If such an interpretation is given, the spirit of the Act

shall be lost.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the Gratuity Act is a beneficial legislation. It is to be construed in favour of the employees. It would

be erroneous to say that one cannot go beyond the scheme of gratuity contemplated under the Gratuity Act. As held in D.T.C. Retired Employees

Association and Others Vs. Delhi Transport and Others etc. etc., , sub-section (5) of Section 4 is an exception to the main Section under which

gratuity is payable to the employee. The employer, who is more concerned with the industrial peace and better employer employee relations, can

always give benefit to the employees irrespective of any statutory minimum prescribed under law in respect of such reliefs. In all welfare legislation,

the amount payable to the employees or labourers is fixed at minimum rate and there will not be any prohibition for an employer to give better per-

requisites or amount than what is fixed under law. It is also clear that the Gratuity Act is not intended to do away with other retiral benefits already

existing and available to the employees. It is to confer extra benefits. This is a social piece of legislation and the Court has to construe the provision

to help in achieving the object of the legislation. The endeavour has to be to see that the beneficial schemes already existing and the scheme gratuity

under the Gratuity Act co-exist in a concern.

Let us examine this from another angle. Perusal of Section 14 of the Gratuity Act would show that what this Section provides is that the

provision of this Act or any Rules made under the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything which is inconsistent therewith in any other

enactment or any other instrument or contract etc. The Section, thus, lays down that the provisions of this Act would prevail in the case of

inconsistency with another enactment. The counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any inconsistency between the provisions of the

Gratuity Act and the Common Cadre Rules. Merely because some different gratuity is payable would not mean that there is inconsistency between

the provisions of the Gratuity Act and the Common Cadre Rules. It would need appreciation that both the enactments are making provision for

payment of gratuity. Inconsistency would have been if there was no provision made for payment of gratuity under the Common Cadre Rules. The

reason and purpose behind enacting Section 14 of the Gratuity Act again is for the benefit of the employees. The provisions of the Gratuity Act

apparently are given an over-riding effect in case of inconsistency to ensure payment of better gratuity to an employee and not to curtail the better

terms. It is only with this aim that this provision has apparently been enacted so that no employer is able to deny his liability to pay a better gratuity

by invoking the provisions of any award, contract, agreement or instrument. The provisions of this Section are, thus, to be read in conjunction with

sub-section (5) of Section 4 and also with Section 5 of the Gratuity Act. The combined effect of all these provisions would be to ensure better

terms for payment of gratuity to the employees and this enactment, thus, can not be put to use to decline better terms by making it to operate in the

manner as is being urged by counsel for the appellant.

All the judgments that were cited before me would clearly indicate that observations made were only to the effect that beneficial provisions are

to prevail. Where the payment of gratuity is more beneficial under the Gratuity Act then the provisions of this Act would prevail and vice-versa if

some other provisions enacted in respect of an employee would entitle him to better terms, then those would prevail. The employer cannot take

shelter under the provisions of the Gratuity Act to pay less gratuity than is otherwise payable under the statute, rules, regulations, contract,

agreement or award. The contention of the counsel that the provisions of the Gratuity Act would have an over-riding effect in view of Section 14 of

the Gratuity Act would amount to doing injustice and would be contrary to the basic aim and objects of this enactment and in a way would lead to

nullifying or stultifying the very purpose behind enacting the Gratuity Act. Accordingly, this submission of the counsel deserves to be rejected. In

fact, the very act of the Registrar to apply the provisions of Gratuity Act may be open to question if the Act is less beneficial as it would then

violate the mandate laid down in Section 5 of the Gratuity Act. I am, thus, clear in my mind that Section 14 of the Gratuity Act cannot be read in

the manner to give an over-riding effect even in these cases where other enactments are beneficial.

In view of what has been held above in regard to the applicability of the Gratuity Act, there would not be much difficulty to deal with the other

limb of submissions made by the counsel for the appellant in regard to the definition of terms ''pay'' or ''wages''. Once it is held that the Common

Cadre Rules would be attracted to calculate the gratuity, then the salary as defined under the Rules is the only legislation, which would be required

to be taken into consideration and there would not be much need to go into the definition of this term or the ''wages'' under any other enactment.

Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff was also justified in highlighting the fact that the counsel for the appellant has mainly referred to the

judgments which had defined the ''pay'' or ''wages'' under the other enactments and, thus, would not really be relevant to decide the term.

There is substance in what is urged before me in this regard. Once it is held that Common Cadre Rules are to be considered for calculating the

gratuity, then necessarily one is to fall back on the definition of the term pay etc. given therein which would regulate the payment of gratuity.

Annexure V to the Common Cadre Rules contains the Rules for payment of gratuity to the employees. It, specifically provides that these Rules

may be called Rules for payment of Gratuity. Pay u/s 2(c) is defined to mean:

The average of salary inclusive of other remuneration drawn as salary during the last 12 months.

Thus, it can be stated that pay is something which is a broader term and will include salary as well as other remuneration drawn as salary. To

understand the meaning of ''pay'', one may have to know what would salary mean. The same is also defined under the Common Cadre Rules in

Rule 1.3(k). It says:

Salary means the basic monthly pay inclusive of any other emoluments treated as pay.

Accordingly, it can be said that pay is not only the monthly basic pay but would, include other remuneration which are drawn as salary and

would also include emoluments which are treated as pay. It would be reasonable to infer that the salary is not only the basic pay and it is something

more than that. What is then to be seen is as to what are the other remunerations which are being drawn as salary or what are the other

emoluments which are treated as a pay.

There are only two elements which are subject matter of dispute between the parties in the present case. Counsel for the appellant would say

that the house rent allowance and medical allowance can not be treated as part of pay and, thus, are required to be excluded for calculating

gratuity. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents would term these to be either remunerations or emoluments and hence countable towards

salary payable to the employee and, thus, open to be taken into consideration for calculating the gratuity. Since the terms ''emolument'' and

''remuneration'' are not defined under the Common Cadre Rules, it would be fair to look for the literal meaning of these terms as apparently these

have been so used in a literal sense in the Rules. As held in Gestetner Duplicators Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, ,

dictionary meaning may be resorted to as external aid when the definition clause does not define the expression conceptually. The dictionary

meaning of the term ''emolument'' is profit arising from employment, such as salary or fee advantage. In a way, the term is defined as an advantage

arising out of employment. Apart from salary, house rent allowance and medical allowance are payable as advantage to an employee. This is paid

on monthly basis. If we see the meaning of term ''remuneration'', it would mean to compense; to pay for services rendered; reward; pay. It cannot

be said that house rent allowance or medical allowance is not being paid on account of service rendered or that it is not to recompense for the

services rendered. In this background, it would be difficult to say that these remunerations or emoluments would not be part of salary as defined

under the Common Cadre Rules.

Reference made by the counsel to Director Central Plantation Crops Research Institute, Kesaragod and Others v. M.Purushothaman and

other, AIR 1994 SC 2541 to explain the meaning of term ''pay'' would not help him as the Hon''ble Supreme Court in this case has interpreted the

term ''pay'' under fundamental rules where it is defined to mean as under:

(i) the pay, other than special pay granted in view of his personal qualification, which has been sanctioned for a post held by him substantive or in

an officiating capacity, or to which he is entitled by reason of his position in a cadre; and

(ii) overseas pay, special pay and personal pay; and

(iii) any other emoluments which may be specially classed as pay by the President.

Under this definition only those emoluments could be included as part of pay which were specifically classed as pay by the President.

Reference here can also be made to State Bank of India and Others Vs. K.P. Subbaiah and Others, , where the meaning of ''pay'' has been

explained. Pay has been held to be essentially a consideration for services rendered by an employee and is the remuneration which is payable to

him. Remuneration is the recurring payment of services rendered during the term of employment. It is also held that the pay and salary are

necessarily not inter changeable concepts. As per the Hon''ble Supreme Court, there meaning vary depending upon the provisions providing for

them. Thus, the definition of pay in this case would not be relevant. The meaning of the pay and salary as defined in the Common Cadre Rules

would be relevant to assign them meaning. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and Others v. K.P. Subbaiah and

Others (supra) took help of the dictionary meaning to define the word ''pay'' in its ordinary sense. It is also observed that in the service

jurisprudence the expression ''pay'' has technical connotation of its own. Similar ratio can be culled out from Gestetner Duplicators Pvt. Ltd. v.

Commissioner of income tax, West Bengal (supra) where it is held that answer to the question for expression of term ''salary'' must depend upon

the true meaning of the term occurring in the Rules. This would show that salary can be given meaning assigned in the particular Rules. In this case,

the term ''salary'' as given in Section 2(h) of the income tax Act was under consideration, where it is defined as:

''Salary'' includes dearness allowance, if the term of employment so provide but exclude all other allowances.

Thus, this judgment may not be of much help to the counsel.

Another reason which would weigh with me to come to the conclusion that the house rent allowance and medical allowance will be inclusive of

salary is the evidence that was led by the appellant itself during the course of trial. The evidence given by D.W.1, the witness of the appellant,

would show that last pay certificate issued in respect of the respondent-plaintiff included house rent allowance and medical allowance as part of his

salary.

Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has also made reference to the decision of this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1182/1997, annexed as

Annexure P-8 with Civil Writ Petition No. 8975/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd. Chandigarh v. Hari Chand Gupta and Another, where

the gratuity was directed to be calculated by including remunerations. It is held:

A perusal of this rule makes it clear that on retirement, an employee is to be allowed gratuity equal to one month''s pay for each complete year of

qualifying service subject to other conditions specified therein. The word ''pay'' has been defined in rule 2(c) of the rules to mean ""the average of

the salary inclusive of other remunerations drawn as salary during the last 12 months"" Reading Rule 3(a) along with rule 2(c), it is abundantly clear

that average of the salary including the other remunerations drawn as salary during the last 12 months of the service has to be taken into account

while calculating gratuity. In other words, gratuity cannot be calculated on basic salary alone. As per the affidavit filed by the Managing Director,

remuneration drawn by the petitioner during the last 12 months of his service in addition to his salary were not included for calculating the amount.

In this view of the matter, the amount paid to the petitioner is obviously less than what was due to him. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and

direct respondent 1 to calculate the amount of gratuity after taking into account the average of the remuneration drawn by the petitioner during the

last 12 months of his service and then pay the balance to him.

Thus, no case for interference in this part of the factual finding recorded on the basis of evidence given by none other than the witness

produced by the appellant is called for.

The learned counsel for the appellant, however, is justified in urging that the rate of interest allowed on the balance of gratuity amount i.e. 18%

is highly excessive. It can be said that it was only the balance amount of gratuity, which was not paid and which was under dispute. Thus, there was

no culpable neglect noticeable in non-release of this amount. In this background, interest @ 18% per annum would sound excessive.

Civil Writ Petition Nos. 567/2005, 19852/2005, 19882/2006, 1047/2008, 20051/2008, 21740/2008 and 21792/2008

As already noted, challenge in the abovesaid Civil Writ Petitions is to the communication issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, for

withdrawing the approval to the Common Cadre Rules or the communications that were initiated subsequent thereto on the basis of advice given

by the counsel representing the appellant-Bank. During the course of arguments, it was pointed out before me that all these employees are covered

by the Common Cadre Rules made applicable to them prior to August 24, 1998. Learned counsel thereafter mainly pressed his alternative prayer

to say that once the right has accrued to these employees to receive their gratuity under the Common Cadre Rules, the same could not be changed

to their disadvantage by any subsequent order passed by the Registrar as it would amount to taking away their accrued right with retrospective

effect which would be beyond the jurisdiction and power of the Registrar. This legal position would not be in much dispute.

The counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank in these cases though has challenged the maintainability of the writ petitions against the

respondent-Bank but did not seriously dispute the submission that accrued rights could not be taken away retrospectively. The counsel for the

Bank did not dispute that order passed by the Registrar would be amenable to writ jurisdiction. The counsel did not realize that the Bank had itself

also filed writ petition and thus could not have validly raised this objection.

In support, reference is made to Kerala Electrical and Allied Engineering Co. Ltd. Vs. Raveendran Pillai and Others, where limitation on the

amount of gratuity by amendment with retrospective effect was held arbitrary and discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution. In Chairman, Railway Board and others Vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and others, , a Constitutional Bench, has considered the validity of

retrospective amendment in the case of emoluments for the purpose of calculating pension. It is observed that the Parliament has the power to

effect retrospective amendment in the law but cannot take away the accrued and vested rights with retrospective effect. It is further observed that

any reduction in the pension accrued to a retiree amounts to violation of his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and 31(1). Reduction in

pension, with retrospective effect, to which an employee had become entitled on his retirement and was receiving is held unreasonable, arbitrary

and unconstitutional and, thus, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This view is expressed by the Court after making reference to

number of judgments. In State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others, , Constitutional Bench of the Hon''ble

Supreme Court struck down the amendment through which rights of Government servant were sought to be extinguished by making retrospective

amendment. It is observed as under at p. 298 of LLJ:

52... The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing

laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do''s and don''ts of the Constitution neither prospective

nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today

taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore,

the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by twenty years. We are concerned with today''s rights and not

yesterday''s. The legislature cannot legislate today with reference to a situation that obtained twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and

the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the twenty years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history...

Same ratio can be culled out from Y.R. Shenoy and Others Vs. Syndicate Bank and Others, that the gratuity is a statutory right earned by long

and continuous service as a retiral benefit. It is a right if accrued cannot be taken away by agreement between the parties.

Thus, it is fairly certain that accrued rights can not be taken away with retrospective effect in view of the law laid down in the above noted

judgments. The communication addressed by Registrar annexed as Annexure P-5 in Civil Writ Petition No. 21740/2008 on the basis of legal

advice received by him cannot be sustained and is set-aside as it amounted to taking away the accrued rights of the petitioner-employees. Since all

the employees in this case are appointees prior to August 24, 1998 and, thus, governed by Common Cadre Rules. I am not going into the vires or

the power of the Registrar to withdraw the approval granted to the Common Cadre Rules or to his power to substitute the provision in the

Common Cadre Rules to make applicable the provisions of the Gratuity Act to the employees governed by the Common Cadre Rules after August

24, 1998. This issue is left open.

As a result of above discussion, Regular Second Appeal No. 69/2005 is dismissed. However, the rate of interest as at the rate of 18% is

reduced to 8% per annum on the amount due, which is payable from the date it is due for payment to the date of payment.

Civil Writ Petition Nos. 567/2005 Abnash Chander Sidana and Another v. State of Punjab and Others, 19852/2005 Amrik Singh Walia v.

State of Punjab and Another, 19882/2006 Gurcharan Singh v. Punjab State Cooperative Bank, Chandigarh and Another, 1047/2008 Kewal

Krishan Kanwra and Another v. State of Punjab and Others, 20051/2008 Harjinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, 21740/2008 Balbir

Singh Gill and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, and 21792/2008 Karamjit Singh Randhawa and Others v. State of Punjab and Others filed

by the employees are partly allowed. Communication, Annexure P-5 issued by the Registrar bearing No. Credit/CA-4/13275, dated October 19,

2005 is set-aside as it would amount to prejudicially effecting the rights of the employees by taking away the accrued rights for payment of gratuity

under the provisions of Common Cadre Rules, which was in use and on the basis of which the gratuity was being paid.

Civil Writ Petition Nos. 8975/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Hari Chand Gupta and Others, 16403/2005 Punjab

State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Hukam Chand and Others, 16405/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v.

Sarabjit Singh Johal and Others 16413/2005 Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Hakim Singh and Others 16415/2005 Punjab State

Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v. Ved Parkash Sharma and Others, and 16466/2005 Punjab State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Chandigarh v.

Jagdev Singh and Others, as filed by the Bank are dismissed.