High CourtsDivision Bench(1941) 07 MAD CK 0011

Manbuval Hasanath Hamedia Madrasa School vs The Municipal Council

Madras High Court · Decided on 16 July 1941 · Citation: AIR 1941 Mad 834(1) : (1941) 2 MLJ 347

HON’BLE JUDGES
Venkataramana Rao, J

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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 379 words

Venkataramana Rao, J.—The question for decision in this appeal is whether the owner of a private market in a municipality is entitled to

prevent the municipality from opening a new market. Both the lower Courts have decided against the plaintiff.

2.

Two grounds are urged before me : (1) that under the provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act a private owner has got such a right.

The sections referred to are Sections 259 to 267 and Mr. Desikan relies very strongly on Section 267-A as conferring that right by necessary

implication. I am not able to see how Section 267-A gives rise to such a necessary implication at all. All that the section says is that it is open to the

Municipal Council to acquire the rights of any person to hold a private market. That does not confer any right on the owner of a private market to

compel the municipality to acquire his right and not to open a new market.

3.

The second ground is that under the common law of England the owner of a private market can prevent another market being opened within a

radius of 6 2/3miles and, in the absence of any positive enactment in India, that rule ought to be followed. Such a contention was advanced in a

case in Bengal and their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court were not prepared to uphold it. In Hem Chandra Roy Chaudhury v. Krishna

Chandra Saha Sardar I.L.R.(1920) Cal. 1079 Richardson, J., observed that ''there appears to be no such thing as a market franchise or a right to

hold a market, conferred by grant from the Crown'', in Bengal. I do not think that a different principle applies to this presidency. At the same time,

the question is whether I should give effect to that rule of English law. It seems to me that the rule is an artificial rule and is not countenanced even

in England as being a sound one. I do not think it is a rule which is based on any equity or good conscience which compels me to adopt it.

4.

The view of the lower appellate Court seems to be correct. I therefore dismiss this second appeal with costs.

5.

Leave to appeal is refused.