Mangat Rai and Others vs Jullunder Improvement Trust and Others

The Appellants, Mangat Rai Gian Sarup Kohli and Ram Sarup Kohli, feeling aggrieved from the award of the Tribunal have instituted a Regular First Appeal No. 200 of 1963 in this Court. They claimed a sum of Rs. 7,500/ in respect of acquisition of their land made in pursuance of a scheme under the Town Improvement Act, 1922. The Collector awarded a sum of Rs. 3000/- and on a reference to the Tribunal consisting of Shri Banwari Lal, District Judge, Shri C.D. Tiwari and Shri K.S. Manor, the Collector''s award has been affirmed.

The appeal R.F.A. No. 200 of 1963 directed against the order of the Tribunal was admitted by an order of the Registrar on 21st of August, 1963, and a direction was made to print the records. On behalf of the Respondent-jullun-dur Improvement Trust, an application has been made/(Civil Miscellaneous No. 1987/C of 1963) that the appeal is barred by time and is otherwise incompetent. Gurdev Singh," J., by his order of 18th December, 1963, on the joint request of the parties'' counsel, directed that the preliminary objections may be first decided before the printing was taken in hand. It is in pursuance of this order that the appeal has been set for hearing on the two preliminary objections which have been raised by the counsel for the Respondent.

Mr. Sachdev, appearing for the Respondent-Trust, does not press the objection that the appeal is barred by time. He, however, contends that the acquisition having been made under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the Act), an appeal has been specifically excluded from the order of the Tribunal Section 59 of the Act thus provides:

For the purpose of acquiring land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the trust,-

(a) the tribunal shall (except for the purposes of Section 54 of the said Act) be deemed to be the Court, and the president of the tribunal shall be deemed to be the judge, under the said Act;

(b) x x x

(e) x x x

(d) the award of a tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 and shall be final.

It is also necessary to refer to Section 54 of the Land. Acquisition Act which relates to appeals It is to this effect:

54 Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908. (5 of 1908). applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this, Act to the High Court from the award, of from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions, contained in, Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (5 of 1908) and In Order XLV thereof.

There is no provision for appeal in the Punjab Town Improvement Act and the operation of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is specially excluded in Clause (a) of Section 59 of the Act. It cannot be disputed that the appeal is a creature of statute and if the statute does not provide for it or specially bars the entertainment of such appeals, the party aggrieved cannot say that the denial of an appeal constitutes violation of any fundamental right per se. Clause (d) of Section 59 of the Act declares finality to the award of a Tribunal which under Clause (a) is to be regarded as a Court except for purposes of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act For all purposes, the Tribunal is regarded as a Court save that no appeal shall lie from its order. It is to be noted the under the Land Acquisition Act. an appeal lies only to the High Court against the award u/s 54 and the exclusion of Section 54 in Clause (a) of Section 59- makes the intention of the Legislature explicit that the award of the Tribunal Is not open to an appeal. An identical question was raised before a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in AIR 1945 146 (Nagpur) . The corresponding provisions of the Nagpur Improvement, Trust Act, 1936, are contained in Section 61 and may be usefully reproduced:

For the purpose of acquiring land under the Land Acquisition, Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) for the Trust-

(a) the Tribunal shall except for the purposes of Section 54 of that Act, be deemed to be the Court, and the president of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Judge thereunder.

(b) x x x

(c) x x x

(d) the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Aquestion Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) and shall be final.

The Bench of Pollock and Sen, JJ., who held that the right of appeal did not exist from the order of the Tribunal, was governed by the same considerations which have been adverted to. In their opinion, the decision of the Tribunal being final and the provisions of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act being excluded, there was not left any scope for entertainment of an appeal. It was held by the High Court that neither an appeal nor a revision could be entertained from the order of the Tribunal. It was argued that the Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no ''order passed by the Tribunal could be revised by this Court. A similar view was taken by Grover, J., in Jullundur Improvement Trust v. Mulkh Raj, F.A.O. No. 140 of 1955, D/- 7-2-1958 (Punj). It is interesting to observe that before Grover, J., Mr. Karam Chand Nayar, who now appears for the Appellant, had supported the contention which has now been raised against the Appellant by Mr. Sachdev.

Mr. Nayar, on behalf of the Appellants, now urges that the decision of Grover, J. is not correct and submits that a person aggrieved from the award of the Tribunal cannot be left without a remedy and the legislature did not contemplate such a situation. It has been argued by him that the applicability of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act having been specially provided for the general terms in which Section 54 has been excluded cannot cut down the right of Appeal. We are not able to follow this argument especially when it is conceded by Mr. Nayar that the right of appeal cannot be claimed as a matter of course but has to be granted by statute.

The further, argument of Mr. Nayar that the appeal should be treated us a petition lot revision cannot be acceded to. In tact, the Nagpur High Court was concerned mainly with the revision which was filed and it was held that the High Court had no power under the provisions of Section 115 of the CPC to exercise the jurisdiction. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Nagpur High Court and. in our opinion, a revision is not entertainable.

Reference may also be made to a Division Bench Judgment of this Court or Mahajan an Pandit, JJ. in Civil Writ No. 1590 of 1960 D/- 18-3-1983 (Punj). The vires of Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act was challenged on the ground of discrimination and the denial of a right of appeal. After an examination of the entire provisions of the Act, the Bench reached the conclusion that Section 59 could not be impugned on the grounds either of discrimination or the absence of a right of appeal. It was assumed in that case that the right of appeal from the order of the Tribunal did not exist and after considering the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel, we are also of the view that this Court can neither entertain an appeal from the order of the Tribunal nor can it interfere with it under its revisional jurisdiction.

It remains to consider the last "contention of Mr Nayar that the memorandum of appeal should be treated as a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The sole question which has been determined by the Tribunal is the quantum of compensation and prima facie there is nothing fundamentally wrong in the assessment which has been made by the Tribunal. Far from making any attempt to show the invalidity of the order of the Tribunal confirming the award of the Collector, Mr. Nayar has appealed to us for an examination of the award on the ground that full court-fee has been paid by the claimants. Now, in exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, this Court has primarily to be governed by the consideration whether the Tribunal acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction or has violated some of the principles of natural justice or its order has resulted in manifest injustice. The Petitioners submitted the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and cannot now be heard to say that it has confirmed the award without any power vested in it to do so. Nor has it been shown to us that the award or the order of the Tribunal confirming it has resulted in manifest injustice. Whatever way we look at this Court cannot examine the matter on the merits and there is nothing in the plea of Mr. Nayar that the matter should be examined under the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances, we make no order as to costs.