Mangi Lal vs State of Rajasthan

Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.—The appellant, Mangi Lal s/o Lalchand, as per prosecution case, on 30.11.2004 at 09:00 A.M. trespassed into the house of Smt. Bilasbai, the wife of late Laddu Lal, situated at Rizwan Gardan, Town Chhabra, poured kerosene oil on her body and put her on fire.

Smt. Bilasbai due to burn injuries died on 05.12.2004 at 03:00 P.M. in the M.B.S. Hospital at Kota.

The Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Baran, vide its impugned judgment dated 31.10.2006 held the appellant guilty for offences punishable under Sections 452 and 302 of Indian Penal Code.

Having convicted the appellant for the above said offences, by a separate order of even date, the trial Court sentenced him as under:--

"For offence under Section 302 I.P.C. the appellant was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-. In default of payment of fine to further undergo two years simple imprisonment.

For offence under Section 452 I.P.C. appellant was sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine to further undergo six months simple imprisonment."

The prosecution case rests upon two dying declarations. One dying declaration, Exhibit-P/4 was recorded by Sub-Inspector Pradhuman Singh (PW-2), who was then posted at Police Station, Chhabra. Another dying declaration, Exhibit-P/1, was recorded by Krishna Kant Pathak (PW-1), who was then posted as Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chhabra.

Besides above two dying declarations, prosecution has also relied upon the testimony of Anju (PW-5), daughter of deceased, aged about eight-years and Antima (PW-9), another daughter, aged about seven-years. These witnesses have deposed that the appellant came to their house and put their mother on fire. Anju (PW-5) and Antima (PW-9) have been duly corroborated by the testimony of Dhanraj (PW-6) and Hemraj (PW-7), who were tenants in the house. The witnesses had testified regarding presence of appellant, Mangilal at the place of occurrence near to the garden of the house.

We first shall deal with the dying declaration (Exhibit-P/4), on the basis of which a formal First Information Report (Exhibit-P/3) was registered.

Pradhuman Singh (PW-2) deposed in the Court that on 30.11.2004 at about 09:15 A.M. he received a telephonic information from the Duty Doctor Chhabra Hospital that one lady named as Smt. Bilasbai in a burnt condition has been admitted to the Government Hospital, Chhabra. Upon information received, Sub-Inspector, Prabhuman Singh (PW-2), A.S.I. Ramesh Narayan and Constable Gopalaram reached at Government Hospital, Chhabra. They found Smt. Bilasbai lying admitted in the hospital. The witness presented an application before the Medical Officer regarding fitness of Smt. Bilasbai to make statement. The Duty Doctor declared Smt. Bilasbai to be fit to make the statement. The witness then recorded statement Exhibit-P/4 of Smt. Bilasbai, on the basis of which a formal First Information Report was registered.

It will be pertinent to mention here that the Duty Doctor on the application (Exhibit-P/5) has mentioned that "she is fit to make the statement".

The statement (Exhibit-P/4) made by Smt. Bilasbai when translated into English reads as under :--

"Parchabayan/statement of Smt. Bilasbai wife of late Shri Laddu Lal, by caste Luhar, aged about thirty-five years, resident of Near Rizwan-garden, Chhabra, at present admitted for treatment at Community Health Centre, Chhabra, dated 30.11.2004 at 10:00 A.M.

On asking stated that on 30.11.2004 in the morning at around 09:00 A.M. I was alone at my house and was in the process of going out of the house. My children were playing outside the house. Yesterday in the night my Gurubhai Mangilal came to my house and gave push to the door of the house, as he wanted to outrage my modesty, hence, I did not open the door. Today morning at about 09:00 A.M. Mangilal came inside my house, lifted the can of the kerosene oil and poured the same upon me and with an intention to kill me ignited a match-stick. After putting me on fire, he ran away from the spot. Accused was seen running out of the house by Rukmani and my devar Ramswaroop. Due to fire, my head, face, chest, feet and both the hands have received burns. On noise raised by me, my mother-in-law, Kanyabai and Rukmani came running, poured water upon me and doused fire. My son-in-law - Rajendra and residents of the locality got me admitted at Chhabra hospital for treatment."

Thumb Impression Bilasbai."

Thus, in the present case, occurrence had taken place on 30.11.2004 at 09:00 A.M., the statement (Exhibit-P/4) was recorded by Pradhuman Singh (PW-2), Sub-Inspector, who was then posted at Police Station, Chhabra on 30.11.2004 at 11:15 A.M. and the case was registered at the same time.

After recording statement (Exhibit-P/4), Sub Divisional Magistrate, Karishan Kant Pathak (PW-1) was called to the hospital and he recorded statement (Exhibit-P/1) of Smt. Bilasbai.

The said statement (Exhibit-P/1) when translated into English reads as under :--

"Statement of Smt. Bilasbai wife of late Shri Laddu lal, by caste Luhar, resident of Chhabra - Near Rizwan-gardan.

I state on oath that my Gurubhai Mangilal came to my house at Chhabra at 09:00 A.M. Immediately, on coming to my house, he poured a can of kerosene oil upon me and put me on fire by igniting a match-stick. He intended to outrage my modesty. In the night, he came to my house, I had not opened the door.

Thumb impression of Smt. Bilasbail"

So far as present case is concerned, suffice it to say, at the trial, prosecution, in all, had examined eighteen witnesses and proved on record as many as fifteen documents, being Exhibit-P/1 to Exhibit-P/15.

Thereafter, the statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973., all incriminating evidence was put to him. He raised a plea that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated.

In defence, accused had examined two witnesses, namely Hazari Lal (DW-1) and Chotey Bahi (DW-2). He had also placed reliance upon statement of Anju recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit-D/1 and Exhibit-D/2).

As per prosecution case, deceased, Smt. Bilasbai, was having three daughters and a son.

Rakesh (PW-3), the son of the deceased. The Court had asked few question to him and after being satisfied itself that he is competent to depose, the Court had recorded his testimony. In the Court, this witness (PW-3), stated that after leaving two younger sisters, mother and Mangilal in the house, he had gone to attend school. In the school, a son of his uncle came to call him and informed that Mangilal had poured kerosene oil on the mother and had put her on fire. He had gone to the hospital, where his mother was admitted.

Anju (PW-5), daughter of the deceased, aged about eight-years was also asked few question by the Court and after being satisfied itself that she is competent to depose, the Court permitted her to step into the witness box. In the Court, this witness (PW-5) stated that at 09:00/10:00 A.M. she was present along with her younger sister. Mangilal dragged her mother to the room, poured kerosene oil and put her on fire. Mangilal after putting her on fire, ran away from the spot.

To similar effect is the statement made by another daughter, namely Antima (PW-9).

Hemraj (PW-7), aged about fifteen-years, stated that he was a tenant in the house of the deceased. In the morning, he had witnessed the quarrel between deceased and Mangilal. At that time, he, Kamlesh, Dhanraj and daughters of the landlady were present at the house.

Dhanraj (PW-6) has also deposed in the Court that on the day of occurrence, in the morning, deceased was having quarrel with Mangilal. Thereafter, Mangilal had come to his room.

Snehlata Shringi (PW-17) stated that on 30.11.2004 Smt. Bilasbai was brought to the Government Hospital, Chhabra, by Pradhuman Singh (PW-2). The witness had examined Smt. Bilasbai and found 55% burns on her body. For further treatment, Smt. Bilasbai was referred to the Government Hospital, Kota.

Dr. Gurudayal Singh Vishnar (PW-18) stated that on 05.12.2004 at 03:00 P.M. at M.B.S. Hospital, Kota he had conducted autopsy on the dead-body of Smt. Bilasbai. As per opinion of the doctor, the cause of death was Septicemia due to ante-mortem burn injuries sustained.

Krishna Kant Pathak (PW-1) who was then posted as S.D.M. Chhabra, stated that he was informed that Smt. Bilasbai has been admitted in the Government Hospital at Chhabra in the burnt condition. He recorded statement of Smt. Bilasbai (Exhibit-P/1), which bears signatures at point A and B. The witness has also narrated the facts stated in the dying declaration (Exhibit-P/1).

In cross-examination, this witness admitted that Exhibit-P/1 does not contain fitness certificate issued by the doctor. The witness further admitted that Smt. Bilasbai was speaking in Haroti dialect, whereas regional language of this witness (PW-1) is Bhojpuri. The witness also admitted that there are difference between Haroti and Bhojpuri dialects. The witness further stated that statement (Exhibit-P/1) was not recorded in Haroti language. The witness further admitted that Exhibit-P/1 has not been recorded in question and answer form. Lastly, this witness admitted that Exhibit-P/1 was not recorded in his own hand writing, but same was dictated to the clerk.

In cross-examination, Pradhuman Singh (PW-2), admitted to be correct that Ramswaroop (PW-11), being devar of deceased was annoyed with her due to grudge made by the appellant in the house of the deceased. The witness denied the suggestion that he has written Exhibit-P/1 on the asking of the family members of the deceased.

Mr. Shiv Charan Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant, questioning the authenticity of the dying declaration, has submitted that the same is not admissible.

Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant has relied upon the case of Surinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2012) CriLJ 1043 : (2011) 13 JT 290 : (2011) 4 RCR(Criminal) 658 : (2011) 12 SCALE 172 : (2011) 10 SCC 173 : (2011) 12 SCR 1205 : (2012) 1 UJ 118 , wherein considering that the deceased had suffered 95-97% burns injuries, the Court held that it is highly doubtful whether it would be possible for her to affix her thumb impression below her statement. It is also observed that it is not clear that when the whole body of maker of dying declaration was burnt and bandaged as to how her thumb impression could be obtained. Furthermore, since the doctor may have been busy, in attending other patients, in the facts and circumstances of that case, said dying declaration could not form the sole basis of conviction.

Relevant Para 28 of the aforesaid judgment relied by the learned counsel reads as follows :--

"28. Though there is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration but the court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary and in that event, there is no impediment in basing conviction on it, without corroboration. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Likewise, where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any declaration the evidence with regard to it is rejected. The dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. All these principles have been fully adhered to by the trial Court and rightly acquitted the accused and on wrong assumption the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal."

Merely because dying declaration was recorded on the dictation given by Krishan Kant Pathak (PW-1), we cannot discard dying declaration (Exhibit-P/1).

Further reliance has been placed upon the case of Uka Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2001 SC 1814 : (2001) CriLJ 1821 : (2001) 2 Crimes 188 : (2001) 1 DMC 727 : (2001) 4 JT 472 : (2001) 3 SCALE 251 : (2001) 5 SCC 254 : (2001) 2 SCR 1052 : (2001) 2 UJ 849 : (2001) AIRSCW 1478 : (2001) 3 Supreme 238 , wherein Hon''ble Apex Court observed that the Court must satisfy itself regarding its trustworthiness and voluntary nature and fitness of mind of the deceased to make dying declaration.

There is no quarrel with the proposition canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant.

Furthermore, reliance has been placed upon the case of Vallabhaneni Venkateshwara Rao Vs. State of A.P., (2009) CriLJ 3447 : (2009) 8 JT 160 : (2009) 7 SCALE 678 : (2009) 6 SCC 484 : (2009) 8 SCR 1210 , wherein the Hon''ble Apex Court holding that different versions have been given in the dying declarations had discarded the same.

In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sanjay, AIR 2005 SC 97 : (2005) CriLJ 120 : (2004) 10 JT 253 : (2004) 9 SCALE 50 : (2004) 13 SCC 314 : (2004) AIRSCW 6320 : (2004) 8 Supreme 138 , the Hon''ble Apex Court had held that it would be impossible to believe that a person suffering from 95% burns would narrate the details in such vivid manner and coherent way. Furthermore, the Court doubted the dying declaration in that case as the deceased became unconscious at the spot (as recorded in Ext.37) with 95% burns and who was found to be in disoriented condition, therefore, two hours later, the Court held that he will not be in a fit condition to talk to the doctor.

Having gone through the judgments relied, we are of the view that the controversy is no longer res-integra.

We need not devote our time to judgments cited by counsel for the appellant, regarding dying declaration, as the legal position is well settled in the case of Smt. Paniben Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1817 : (1992) CriLJ 2919 : (1992) 1 Crimes 1180 : (1992) 4 JT 397 : (1992) 1 SCALE 655 : (1992) 2 SCC 474 : (1992) 2 SCR 197 , wherein for appreciating dying declaration, the law has been summed up as under:--

"Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court on its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. Munnu Raja and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2199 : (1976) CriLJ 1718 : (1976) 3 SCC 104 : (1976) SCC(Cri) 376 : (1976) 2 SCR 764 : (1976) 8 UJ 154 .

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others, AIR 1985 SC 416 : (1986) CriLJ 836 : (1985) 1 Crimes 344 : (1985) 1 SCALE 108 : (1985) 1 SCC 552 : (1985) 2 SCR 621 , Ramawati Devi Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 : (1983) CriLJ 221 : (1983) 1 Crimes 637 : (1983) 1 SCALE 1 : (1983) 1 SCC 211 .

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. K. Ramachandra Reddy and Another Vs. The Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 : (1976) CriLJ 1548 : (1976) 3 SCC 618 : (1976) SCC(Cri) 473 : (1976) SCR 542 Supp .

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 332 : (1974) CriLJ 361 : (1974) 4 SCC 264 : (1974) SCC(Cri) 426 : (1974) 6 UJ 68 .

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. Kake Singh Alias Surendra Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1982 SC 1021 : (1982) CriLJ 986 : (1981) SCC 25 Supp : (1981) SCC(Cri) 645 .

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. Ram Manorath and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 1 SCALE 527 : (1981) 2 SCC 654 : (1981) SCC(Cri) 581 : (1981) 3 SCR 195 .

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. State of Maharashtra Vs. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617 : (1981) CriLJ 9 : (1981) SCC(Cri) 364 .

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. Surajdeo Ojha and Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505 : (1979) CriLJ 1122 : (1979) SCC(Cri) 519 : (1979) 11 UJ 412 .

(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. Nanhau Ram and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 912 : (1988) CriLJ 936 : (1988) 1 JT 464 : (1988) 1 SCALE 424 : (1988) 2 UJ 50 .

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. State of U.P. Vs. Madan Mohan and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1519 : (1989) CriLJ 1485 : (1989) 2 Crimes 467 : (1989) 2 JT 158 : (1989) 1 SCALE 1087 : (1989) 3 SCC 390 ."

Thus, it is apparent that uncorroborated dying declaration can be made basis of conviction, if same aspire confidence.

Our opinion to place implicit reliance upon Dying Declaration recorded by Magistrate is further fortified by observations made by five-judge Bench of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 2973 : (2002) CriLJ 4095 : (2002) 4 Crimes 42 : (2002) 6 JT 313 : (2002) 6 SCALE 135 : (2002) 5 SCALE 418 : (2002) 6 SCC 710 : (2002) 1 SCR 697 Supp : (2002) 2 UJ 1363 : (2002) AIRSCW 3479 : (2002) 5 Supreme 557 , wherein it was held as under :--

"Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the two decisions of the court which persuaded the bench to make the reference to the Constitution Bench. In Paparambaka Rosamma and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 3455 : (1999) CriLJ 4321 : (1999) 3 Crimes 150 : (1999) 6 JT 585 : (1999) 5 SCALE 451 : (1999) 7 SCC 695 : (1999) 2 SCR 328 Supp : (1999) 2 UJ 1440 : (1999) AIRSCW 3440 : (1999) 7 Supreme 640 the dying declaration in question had been recorded by a judicial magistrate and the magistrate had made a note that on the basis of answers elicited from the declarant to the questions put he was satisfied that the deceased is in a fit disposing state of mind to make a declaration. Doctor had appended a certificate to the effect that the patient was conscious while recording the statement, yet the court came to the conclusion that it would not be safe to accept the dying declaration as true and genuine and was made when the injured was in a fit state of mind since the certificate of the doctor was only to the effect that the patient is conscious while recording the statement. Apart form the aforesaid conclusion in law the court also had found serious lacunae and ultimately did not accept the dying declaration recorded by the magistrate. In the latter decision of this court in Koli Chunilal Savji and Another Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1999 SC 3695 : (1999) CriLJ 4582 : (1999) 4 Crimes 280 : (1999) 7 JT 568 : (1999) 6 SCALE 267 : (1999) 9 SCC 562 : (1999) 3 SCR 284 Supp : (2000) 1 UJ 437 : (1999) AIRSCW 3727 : (1999) 8 Supreme 717 it was held that the ultimate test is whether the dying declaration can be held to be a truthful one and voluntarily given. It was further held that before recording the declaration the officer concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement in question. The court relied upon the earlier decision. In Ravi Chander and Others Vs. State of Punjab, (1998) 8 JT 211 : (1998) 9 SCC 303 wherein it had been observed that for not examining by the doctor the dying declaration recorded by the executive magistrate and the dying declaration orally made need not be doubted. The magistrate being a disinterested witness and is a responsible officer and there being no circumstances or material to suspect that the magistrate had any animus against the accused or was in any way interested for fabricating a dying declaration, question of doubt on the declaration, recorded by the magistrate does not arise.

The court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this court in Harjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 2571 : (1999) CriLJ 4055 : (1998) 3 Crimes 57 : (1999) 2 DMC 169 : (1999) 5 JT 317 : (1999) 4 SCALE 447 : (1999) 4 SCALE 417 : (1999) 6 SCC 545 : (1999) AIRSCW 2751 : (1999) 6 Supreme 390 case wherein the magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 3455 : (1999) CriLJ 4321 : (1999) 3 Crimes 150 : (1999) 6 JT 585 : (1999) 5 SCALE 451 : (1999) 7 SCC 695 : (1999) 2 SCR 328 Supp : (1999) 2 UJ 1440 : (1999) AIRSCW 3440 : (1999) 7 Supreme 640 to the effect that "in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration" has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hyper-technical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind specially when the magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind where-after he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in Paparambaka Rosamma and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 3455 : (1999) CriLJ 4321 : (1999) 3 Crimes 150 : (1999) 6 JT 585 : (1999) 5 SCALE 451 : (1999) 7 SCC 695 : (1999) 2 SCR 328 Supp : (1999) 2 UJ 1440 : (1999) AIRSCW 3440 : (1999) 7 Supreme 640 must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this court in Koli Chunilal Savji and Another Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1999 SC 3695 : (1999) CriLJ 4582 : (1999) 4 Crimes 280 : (1999) 7 JT 568 : (1999) 6 SCALE 267 : (1999) 9 SCC 562 : (1999) 3 SCR 284 Supp : (2000) 1 UJ 437 : (1999) AIRSCW 3727 : (1999) 8 Supreme 717 case."

We are of the view that Sub Divisional Magistrate is most independent person and he will be the last person to implicate the accused falsely.

Furthermore, dying declaration (Exhibit-P/1) is a very small statement running into few words. It simply says that Mangilal was having bad eye on the deceased and in the morning he poured kerosene oil upon her and put her on fire.

Merely because dialects were different, we cannot comprehend that Krishan Kant Pathak (PW-1), being S.D.M. will not be in a position to dictate the contents of the dying declaration.

Furthermore, both Haroti and Bhojpuri are dialects of Hindi and one can understand broad contents and, therefore, testimony of Anju (PW-5) and Antima (PW-9) aspire confidence.

It has also come in the evidence of Dhanraj (PW-6) and Hemraj (PW-7) that the appellant was present near the place of occurrence at that time deceased Smt. Bilasbai had received burns injuries.

Having relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Laxman (supra), we are of the view that Krishan Kant Pathak (PW-1) will be the last person to implicant the accused falsely. Furthermore, doctor had declared deceased fit to make statement.

Taking totality of circumstances, we find no merit in the appeal, even if for the sake of argument, two dying declarations are ignored, then also the evidence of two eyewitnesses, being children of the deceased, aspire confidence and they are duly corroborated by the testimony of Dhanraj (PW-6) and Hemraj (PW-7) and medical evidence.

Resultantly, present appeal stands dismissed, being devoid of merit.