Manindra Mohan Banerjee vs Nirmal Kumar Banerjee

Renupada Mukhekjee, J.—This Rule was issued at the instance of Defendant No. 1 of a Title Suit being suit No. 316 of 1955 of the 4th court of the Munsif of Alipur. It appears that opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 of this Petition filed a suit in the court of the learned Munsif for certain reliefs, to which I shall presently refer. Before the filing of that suit there was a partition suit between the present parties and a final decree had been made in that partition suit to which opposite No. 4 Angurbala Devi was a consenting party on her own behalf and also on behalf of her three sons, namely, opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 who are said to have been minors at that time. That partition decree has been put to execution by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 of Title Suit No. 316 of 1955 and the number of the execution case is 26 of 1954 of the 1st Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore. Opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 instituted Title Suit No. 316 of 1955 for a declaration that the decree passed in the previous partition suit, namely, Suit No. 2 of 1947 of the 1st Court of the Subordinate Judge, Alipore, was not binding upon them being void and illegal. A consequential prayer was also made for restraining Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 of the present title suit from proceeding with the execution case already mentioned. The title suit was valued by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 4 at Rs. 410 and court-fees were paid upon that amount. An objection was taken by Defendant No. 1 that the valuation was hopelessly inadequate inasmuch as the value of the suit should be Rs. 8,00,000 which was the value of the previous partition suit and court-fees should have been paid on that amount. This objection was overruled by the learned Munsif who accepted the valuation put by the Plaintiffs. This Rule is directed against the legality and propriety of that order.

I heard Mr. Bhose who appeared on behalf of the present Petitioner at some length and he argued the case with great thoroughness. Mr. Bhose could not dispute the fact that so far as the question of payment of court-fees is concerned, the suit would be governed by Section 7(iv) Clause (c) of the Court-fees Act, because there is a prayer for a declaration that a certain decree previously passed by a certain Court is not binding upon the present Plaintiffs and there is a prayer for a consequential relief that the execution case arising out of the decree should be stayed. The relief sought by the Plaintiffs has been valid in the present case at Rs. 410 and they have paid court-fees on that amount.

Mr. Bhose contended that Section 7(iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act should be read along with Section 8C of the same Act and if the Court is of opinion that the subject-matter of the suit has been wrongly valued, it may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation of the suit. In support of this contention Mr. Bhose drew my attention to several cases. One such case is reported in Balaram Mondal v. Sahebjan Gazi (1949) 54 C.W.N. 139; in that case it was held by Das J. that the provision of Section 7(iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act is controlled by Section 8C of the same Act and if the Court is of opinion that the Plaintiff has valued his relief inadequately, the Court has got the power to revise the valuation. Mr. Bhose further drew my attention to a ease reported in Saroj Mohan Chatterjee v. Jiban Mull Babu (1953) 57 C.W.N. 909. This case, as I read it, is against the contention put forth by Mr. Bhose. There the suit before the Court was for a declaration that certain kabalas were not valid and binding on the Plaintiffs. There was also a prayer for a permanent injunction. Originally the plaint also contained a prayer for setting aside the kabalas but that prayer was later on deleted at the instance of the Plaintiffs.

Upon these facts, it was held by Das J. sitting with Debabrata Mookerjee J. that the valuation put by the Plaintiffs on the plaint should be taken as final and not liable to interference by the Court under the powers conferred upon it u/s 8C of the Court-fees Act.

In the above connection Mr. Bhose also cited a case reported in Tarapada Ghose v. Sailendra Nath alias Satya Ghose (1952) 57 C.W.N. 131, where also it has been held that a Court has got the powers to revise the Plaintiff''s valuation in cases u/s 7(iv)(c), provided there is some objective standard for determining the valuation. Mr. Bhose contended that in the present case the plaint itself gives some clue as to what should be the objective standard for determination of the valuation. He drew my attention to a schedule of the plaint where the Plaintiffs have made some statements about some losses which they would incur if the decree is allowed to stand. Mr. Bhose contended that the learned Munsif might very well be directed to make an enquiry about the extent of those losses and the extent of the losses should be a guiding factor for determining the value of the suit. In my judgment, this contention of Mr. Bhose cannot be accepted. A Plaintiff may make various statements in his plaint but all such statements should not be taken into account for the purpose of determining the amount of court-fees payable upon that plaint. The real question for assessing the amount of court-fees would be what is the substantial character of the plaint and what relief or reliefs the Plaintiff is asking from the Court. In the present case the relief asked for by the Plaintiff is that a certain decree passed in a partition suit is not valid or binding against the Plaintiffs. By way of consequential prayer the Plaintiffs have also asked the Court to stay some execution proceedings arising out of the decree. This is the real scope of the present suit. In my judgment, there cannot be any objective standard for determining the value of such a suit. The value of the property covered by the decree cannot necessarily be the value of the suit, because if the Plaintiffs'' contention that the decree was passed against them on account of some undue influence and fraud exercised by the Petitioner succeeds, then the decree will be automatically vacated and the value of the decree so far as the Plaintiffs are concerned would not be worth the paper on which the decree was written. The Plaintiffs in the present case would not make any material gain by obtaining a declaration that the decree is not binding-upon them. In the event of their getting such a declaration, "the only consequences which would flow from the judgment would be that the previous decree will be re-opened and both parties will be required to litigate the matter once again. In my opinion, the Full Bench decision in the case of the Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society Ltd. v. Mv. Mafizuddi Ahmed (1934) 38 C.W.N. 589, still holds the field. It was held in that case that in suits to obtain a declaratory decree or other where consequential relief is prayed for and in suits to obtain an injunction falling within Clauses (c) and (d) of Sub-section (iv) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, the Court would have no standard before it on which it may regard the Plaintiffs'' valuation as an undervaluation until suitable rules are framed u/s 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. No such rules have been framed u/s 9 of the last mentioned Act. The case reported in Kanailal Banerjee v. Satyabati Devi (1938) 42 C.W.N. 614 also supports the view which I am taking.

Mr. Bhose, on behalf of the Petitioner, also cited a case reported in Gahar Ali Sikdar v. Nesar Ali Sikdar (1938) 43 C.W.N. 167. This was a decision of Edgley J. sitting singly. This decision in some measure supports the contention raised by Mr. Bhose but then the authority of this case has been doubted in a case reported in Kanai Lal Banerjee v. Dasu Ghose (1954) 58 C.W.N. 922. That is also a decision by a Single Judge. But having regard to the decision of the Full Bench case reported in Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Ltd. v. Mv. Mafizuddi Ahmed (Supra), and also to the Division Bench case reported in Saroj Mohan Chatterjee v. Jiban Mull Babu (Supra), I am of opinion that in the case of a declaratory suit for a declaration that a certain decree is not binding upon the Plaintiff followed by some consequential prayers the proper amount of court-fee should ordinarily be the amount payable on the valuation of the relief sought by the Plaintiff. In the absence of any rules framed u/s 9 of the suits Valuation Act, it would be very difficult for a Court to correct the valuation of the relief asked for by the Plaintiff in the plaint.

On a consideration of all these facts and circumstances, I am of opinion that in the present case, the Munsif was right in accepting the valuation put by the Plaintiff upon the relief claimed by him. There is no ground for interference by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

The Rule is, accordingly, discharged.

I may note here that Mr. Panab Kumar Ghose, Advocate, who appeared on behalf of opposite party No. 7, supported the argument advanced by Mr. Bhose on behalf of the Petitioner.

Parties will bear their own costs in this Court.