Manish Kumar And Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

Rakesh Kainthla, J

Since all the bail petitions have arisen out of the common F.I.R., therefore, they are being taken up together for disposal by way of a common judgment.

The petitioners have filed the present petitions for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 41 of 2025, dated 18.05.2025, registered at Police Station Sadar Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., for the commissi n f ffences punishable under Section 10 and 11 of the Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024.

It has been asserted that the petitioners are young persons and they belong to respectable families. The investigation is complete, and no recovery is to be effected from the petitioners. The petitioners do not have any criminal antecedents. There is no apprehension of the petitioners absconding or fleeing from the course of justice. The petitioners had approached this Court earlier by filing Cr.MP(M) Nos. 1315, 1316 and 1318 of 2025, which were dismissed on 28.06.2025. The police filed the charge sheet before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Shimla, in which 28 witnesses have been cited. It would take some time to record the statements of 28 witnesses. The other accused were released on bail Similarly placed co-accused Ritu was also enlarged on bail. Similar FIRs were lodged for the same offence across the country. Other accused have been enlarged on bail by the Coordinate Bench. Hence the petitions.

The petitions are opposed by filing a status report asserting that the inf rmant made a complaint to the police stating that Chapslee School was a designated centre for the JNV Selection Test conducted on 18.05.2025. Seven candidates, Mo it, Aas ish, Munish, Gaurav, Ritu, Shubam and Mohit were found with unauthorised electronic devices. The electronic devices were recovered from Mohit and Aashish at the time of their frisking at the entry gate, and they were not permitted to enter the examination room. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. They revealed during the interrogation that their father had entered into a deal to get the examination cleared. An amount of ₹2/2.50 Lakhs was to be paid in case of success. The police obtained call detail records, and some records are yet to be obtained. The petitioners were part of an organised crime Syndicate, and similar F.I.R.s have been registered in other States. The charge sheet has been prepared and presented before the learned Sessions Court, Shimla Seven mobile phones and seven devices were sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga and the result is awaited. The other suspects would be associated, and a supplementary charge sheet would be filed before the Court. Hence, the status report.

I have heard Mr. Ravi Tanta, learned counsel for the petitioner(s) in all the petitions and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondents/State in all the petitions.

Mr Ravi Tanta, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The mobile devices stated to have been used by the petitioners for cheating in the examination were sent to SFSL, Junga, and the result is awaited. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioners had used any device to cheat in the examination. The petitioners have been behind the bars since 10.05.2025. The police have filed the charge sheet, and there is no apprehension that the petitioners would influence the witnesses. The petitioners would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. The other persons, accused of committing similar offences, were released on bail by the Coordinate Benches, and the petitioners are entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.

Mr. Prashant Sen, lea ned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/state, s bmitted that the petitioners had earlier filed bail petiti ns, which were dismissed by this Court. A subsequent petition only lies if there is a change in the circumstances. Mere filing of the charge sheet does not amount to any c ange in the circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

It is undisputed that the petitioners had earlier filed bail petitions, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1315, 1316 and 1318 of 2025, and were dismissed on 28.06.2025. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:

“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decisi n and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little r no c nsequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that du ing hese two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673, wherein it was observed: -

It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.

Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:

When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed:

“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a du y o consider the reasons and grounds on which he earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh gro nds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 S C OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he ge s an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Cou and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that j dicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, f r rders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a c ange in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”

Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.

It was submitted that a charge sheet has been filed, and this is a change in circumstance. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a charge sheet does not amount to a change in circumstances. It was observed:

“12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the factum that when a charge sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of circumstance. Needless to say, the filing of the charge sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the prosecution. On the contrary, iling of the charge sheet establishes that after due investigation, the investi-gating agency, having found materials, has placed the charge sheet for the trial of the accused persons.”

Thus, the petitione s cannot claim bail on the ground that the charge sheet has been filed.

It was submitted that the Coordinate Benches of this Court have released the other persons/accused of committing similar offences on bail, and the petitioners are entitled to bail on parity. T is submission will not help the petitioners. This Court is bound by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 518, wherein it was held that a person cheating in a public examination is not entitled to bail. It was observed:

“10. In India, the reality is that there are far more takers of Government jobs than there are jobs available. Be that as it may, each job that has a clearly delineated entry process, with prescribed examination and/or interview process, has only to be filled in accordance thereof. Absolute scrupulousness in the process being followed instils and further rejuvenates the faith of the public in the fact that those who are truly deserving of the positions are the ones who have deservedly been installed in such positions. Each act, such as the one allegedly committed by the respondents, represents possible chinks in the faith of the people in the public administration and the executive.

Since surely there must have been thousands of people who appeared for the exam, and the respondent-accused persons, for their own benefit, tried to compromise the sanctity of the exam, possibly affecting so many of those who would have put in earnest effort to appear in the exam in the hopes of securing a job, we concur with the view of the Trial Cou hat they are not entitled to the benefit of bail. At the same time, it is also true that every person has a pres mption of innocence working in their favour till and s ch time the offence they are charged with stands pr ved beyond a reasonable doubt. Let them stand trial, and let it be established by the process of law that the respondent-accused has indeed not committed any crime in law.”

It was submitted that the petitioners have learnt their lessons by remaining in custody for about six months. This submission overlooks the fact that the bail is not denied to a person to teach him a lesson, but because the nature of the offence is serious, which does not justify the grant of bail. In the present case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the offence of cheating in the government examination is serious, which does not entitle a person to bail. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim to be released on bail simply because they have learnt a lesson.

No other point was urged.

Therefore, there is a force in the submission of Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, that there is no change in the circumstances justifying the grant of bail. Consequently, the present petitions fail and are dismissed.

The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disp sal f the instant petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.