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Judgment
16 paragraphs · 2,219 wordsP.K. Jain, J.—This revision is directed against the judgment dated February 16, 1996, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, whereby conviction and sentence of the petitioner for an offence u/s 304-A Indian Penal Code, recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar, by his judgment/order dated October 27,1994, has been confirmed. The petitioner has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 Vi years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months.
According to the prosecution, the deceased Smt. Rama Rani was a Police Constable. On April 26, 1990 she was deputed on official duty near Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, which was to be over by 11.00 a.m. Her mother-in-law, Smt. Sushila Bedi, after paying obeisance to Darbar Sahib, went to Rama Rani. After the duty was over, Smt. Sushila Bedi along with deceased Rama Rani boarded a rickshaw driven by one Hira Lal. When the rickshaw reached near the petrol pump of Bijli Pahlwan, truck No. PCA-4569, being driven by the petitioner, came from behind at a high speed and hit the rickshaw, as a result of which Smt. Sushila Bedi fell down on the left side whereas deceased Rama Rani fell down on the right hand side and was run over by the said truck and as a consequence thereof she died at the spot. The truck was stopped at a distance and the driver ran away while leaving the truck there.
ASI Harbans Singh (PW 5) visited the spot, prepared the inquest report and forwarded the dead-body for post-mortem. He took into possession the truck and the rickshaw. He prepared rough site plan of the place of occurrence and also got the same photographed. The petitioner was produced before him on that very day by Gurdial Singh and was arrested in this case. Driving licence of the petitioner and registration certificate of the truck were taken into possession. Mechanical inspection of the truck was got done. After completing the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner.
A charge u/s 304-A, Indian Penal Code, was framed against the petitioner which he denied and claimed trial. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses. In his statement u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ''the Code''), the petitioner denied the allegations of the prosecution and pleaded false implication. He examined two witnesses in his defence.
On an appraisal of evidence produced before him, the Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar, convicted and sentenced the petitioner as stated above. His appeal against conviction and sentence did not find favour with the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, which was rejected by the impugned judgment. The petitioner has approached this Court u/s 401 of the Code.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
Shri D. S. Pheruman, learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the conviction of the petitioner, has argued that the Courts below have erred in convicting the petitioner without there being any evidence regarding the identity of the petitioner having been established to be the driver of the truck in question at the relevant time. It has been further argued by the learned counsel that Shri Gurdial Singh, before whom an extra-judicial confession is alleged to have been made by the petitioner, has not supported the prosecution case at all as is evident from his cross-examination. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel that Hira Lal, the rickshaw-puller, was the best eye-witness who has not been produced by the prosecution. It has been argued that the presence of Smt. Sushila Bedi (PW 3) at the spot of occurrence is highly improbable and the conviction could not be based upon her testimony.
On the other hand Mr. Ramanjit Singh, learned Assistant Advocate General, while appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab, has argued that there is a concurrent finding of facts by the two Courts below to the effect that it was the petitioner who was driving the truck in question at the relevant time and while driving the said truck in rash and negligent manner struck against the rickshaw, as a result of which the deceased Rama Nai who fell down on the right hand side, was run over by the truck and died on the spot. It has been thus argued by the learned A.A.G. that this Court will not interfere in its revisional jurisdiction with the concurrent finding of facts by the two Courts below. On merits, the learned A.A.G. has argued that Hira Lal, the rickshaw puller, was a resident of U. P. and was not traceable inspite of all efforts made by the prosecution and as such he could not be examined at the trial. It has been argued that the presence of Smt. Sushila Bedi at the spot of occurrence is highly probable and fully established by the evidence produced on the record. It has been also argued that it was Gurdial Singh PW who had produced the accused before the Investigating Officer on that very day at the spot and the petitioner was identified to be the driver of the truck in question by Smt. Sushila Bedi at the spot itself. It has been pointed out that the mere fact that Gurdial Singh became hostile in his cross-examination would not affect the prosecution case since he has fully supported the prosecution in his examination-in-chief.
I have given my careful thought to the respective arguments advanced at the Bar. It is well-settled that the High Court will not interfere in the revision unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so to prevention otherwise irreparable injustice. The mere fact that the High Court sitting as a Court of appeal might have come to a different conclusion on facts from what the Magistrate arrived at is also not a sufficient ground for interference in revision. When there is a concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below, the High Court, as a rule, will not go into the evidence save in exceptional cases or where the judgment of the facts is manifestly wrong and grossly and palpably unjust. In Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, , their lordships of the Supreme Court of India held that the jurisdiction of the High Court in a criminal revision application is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. That was also a case for an offence u/s 304-A, Indian Penal Code, and there was a concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below that the appellant therein was guilty of negligence in driving the bus and the death of the deceased was caused due to his said negligence driving.
A close scrutiny of the judgments rendered by both the Courts below reveal that the finding of guilty recorded against the petitioner is based on the proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record. Both the Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of guilty against the petitioner which is based on cogent and convincing reason with which I am in full agreement. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to bring to my notice that any manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice in the case in hand has occasioned to the petitioner which requires interference with such an concurrent finding of guilty recorded by both the Courts below.
Even otherwise, I have myself perused the testimony of Smt. Sushila Bedi (PW 3), the complainant, S.I. Harbans Singh (PW 5), the investigating officer, and Gurdial Singh (PW 7). It is correct that neither the name or the description of the petitioner has been mentioned in the first information report which was recorded on the statement of Smt. Sushila Bedi (PW 3), but this omission does not affect the prosecution case at all. The petitioner was produced by Gurdial Singh before Sub-Inspector Harbans Singh (PW 5) on that very day at the spot of occurrence and Smt. Sushila Bedi (PW 3) had identified him there and then while crying. She had noticed the petitioner while parking his truck at a distance, getting down from the truck and running away from the spot of occurrence. She had the time and opportunity to see and identify the petitioner to be the driver of the truck in question. In her statement on oath made before the Court, she has categorically stated that it was the petitioner who was driver of the truck at the time of accident and he ran away from the spot after leaving behind the truck. Statement of Smt. Sushila Bedi is duly corroborated by the testimony of S.I. Haribans Singh (PW 5), who is the Investigating Officer.
Coming to the testimony of Gurdial Singh (PW 7), it is evident that in his examination-in-chief he has categorically stated that on the day of occurrence, the petitioner had come to his shop which was situated nearby and had disclosed to him regarding the accident in question, and thereafter he had produced the petitioner before the police. He has also stated that the driving licence of the petitioner was taken into possession vide memo Exhibit PW 5/A which is attested by him. He has also stated that registration certificate of the truck in question was also taken into possession vide memo Exhibit PW5/ K which is also attested by him. However, in his cross-examination, he has resiled and stated that the petitioner never came to him nor he had produced the petitioner before the police and that his signatures were obtained by the police in the Police Station when he had gone there regarding his passport.
Although Gurdial Singh (PW 7) turned hostile to the prosecution in a dramatic way only in his cross-examination by the petitioner, yet his testimony cannot be said to be washed off from the record. It is to be considered by the Court in each case whether under the circumstances the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Court finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be credit-worthy and act upon it. These views find affirmation in a judgment of the apex Court in Sat Paul Vs. Delhi Administration, .
According to the prosecution, it was Gurdial Singh (PW 7) who had produced the petitioner before the Investigating Officer (PW 5) on the same day at the spot of occurrence, and that the driving licence of the petitioner and the registration certificate of the truck were taken into possession vide memos Exhibits PW 5/A and PW 5/K duly attested by Gurdial Singh. This fact has been expressly admitted and stated on oath by Gurdial Singh (PW 7). The crucial point to be noted is that S.I. Harbans Singh (PW 5), the Investigating Officer, has deposed that the petitioner was released on bail on his furnishing a bail bond and a surety bond and this Gurdial Singh (PW 7) stood a surety for the petitioner vide bond Exhibit - Exhibit PW 5/O executed on the same day, which fully proves the case of the prosecution that it was Gurdial Singh who had produced the petitioner be fore the Investigating Officer at the spot of occurrence on that very day. This fact along with his own testimony regarding the attestation of two seizure memos - Exhibits PW 5/J and PW 5/K are enough to place reliance upon the testimony of Gurdial Singh (PW 7) as contained in his examination-in-chief and to reject his statement made by him in his cross-examination. The petitioner was duly identified by Smt. Sushila Bedi immediately while she was crying at the spot of occurrence itself. The prosecution has already explained as to why Hira Lal, rickshaw-puller, could not be produced and examined. From the above discussion, I find that the conclusion reached by the two Courts below that the petitioner was guilty of gross negligence in driving the truck and the death of the deceased Rama Rani was caused due to his negligent driving, is correct, and there is no reason to interfere with the conviction of the petitioner.
Then the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner ought to have been released on probation of good conduct. This contention is devoid of any force. The Judicial Magistrate Amritsar, rightly observed that no lenient view could be taken against the petitioner for the commission of the offence in question. The sentence imposed upon the petitioner was not challenged before the appellate Court as is evident from the impugned judgment. I also do not find any jurisdiction to interfere even with the order of sentence.
As a result of the above discussion, I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned two judgments recorded by the Courts below. Finding no merit, this petition is hereby dismissed.
