Manjit Singh vs State of Punjab

Harmohinder Kaur, Sandhu, J.

This judgment will also dispose of Criminal Misc. No. 3907M of 1993. U.B. Bakana and another v. State of Punjab.

On 1.6.1991 Shri Tirlochan Singh, Insecticide Inspector, inspected the premises of M/s Rayya Kheti Store and took a sample of Butachlor 50% E.C. branch "Narmadachlor'' manufactured by M/s Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizer Ltd. Gujarat. The sample was sealed into three glass bottles each weighing three hundred miliitres and one sealed sample was sent to the Analyst, Regional Pesticides Testing Laboratory, Chandigarh for analysis. The Analyst opined that the sample sent was misbranded since it contained only 40.1% E.C. of Butachlor as against the guaranteed percentage of 50% E.C. as labelled on the container and, thus, it was not in conformity with the relevant I.S.I specifications with respect to its percentage of active ingredient contents. After obtaining sanction from the competent authority the Insecticide Inspector filed a complaint against the petitioners for their trial for the offences under Sections 3(k)(i) 13, 17, 18 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1963 (the Act for short) read with Rule 10 of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 as also under Section 420, Indian Penal Code. The petitioners both the petitions under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code prayed for quashing of the complaint.

The petitioners alleged that the Insecticide Inspector did not take the sample as prescribed by the rules and no precaution was taken to protect the sample. The sample was seized from a sealed container and the petitioners i.e. Manjit Singh and Gurbax Rai who were merely dealers should not have been prosecuted as they were protected under Sub Section (3) of Section 30 of the Act. It was further pleaded that before launching prosecution it was mandatory to obtain sanction and the sanctioning authority was required to apply his mind before granting sanction, but sanction in this case was granted on a cyclostyled proforma without giving any particulars of the facts leading to the filing of the case. The sanctioning authority did not satisfy himself whether any offence was made or not and the sanction was not valid.

In the return filed by the respondent it was alleged that M/s Rayya Kheti Store, Rayya was granted a licence to sell stock or exhibit for sale the insecticide which was being manufactured by M/s Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizer Company Limited and Manjit Singh was the sole proprietor of this firm while Gurbax Rai petitioner No. 2 was the salesman. At the time of inspection the firm was found selling misbranded butachlor manufactured by M/s Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizer Company. The sample was seized after observing the prescribed proscribed procedure. The petitioners were not protected under Section 30(3) of the Act. Regarding sanction it was alleged that the sanctioning authority was provided with full details of the case by Chief Agricultural Officer, Amritsar and sanction was granted after going through the record and it was a valid sanction.

I have heard Mr. R.K. Chopra, the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr.A.R. Sidhu, the learned Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, and have perused the record.

Although in the petition quashing of the complaint was sought on various grounds but at the time of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners confined his arguments only to the validity of the sanction given by the competent authority for the prosecution of M/s Rayya Kheti Store, G.T. Road, Rayya dealer, M/s Kamal Pesticides Store, Amritsar, distributor and M/s Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizer Company, manufacturer. It was argued that the sanction in this case was granted without due application of mind by the competent authority on a cyclostyed proforma in which only the names of the dealer, distributor and manufacturer were filled. Grant of sanction for prosecution was not an idle formality and the competent authority was required to give permission for launching the prosecution against various persons after considering the facts of the case and finding out that prima facie they had committed some offence. It was also urged that no sanction was granted for the prosecution of any of the petitioners. It was nowhere mentioned in the sanction as to how Manjit Singh or Gurbax Rai were liable for the commission of any offence. This contention of the learned counsel seems quite tenable as sanction to prosecute is an important factor and a condition precedent for launching the prosecution. Section 31(1) of the Act reads as under :

"No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by or with the consent of the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government."

A perusal of these provisions shows that a court cannot take cognizance of the offence under the Act except when a proper sanction is granted by the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government. For a sanction to be valid it must be established that in was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged and it is desirable that the facts should be mentioned in the sanction. In the instant case a photostat copy of the sanction is Annexure P3 which is on a cyclostyled form. Only names of the dealer, distributor and manufacturer firms are inserted and even the names of the persons incharge of the business of these firms were not mentioned. No sanction was granted for the prosecution of any of the petitioners. It even did not disclose the name of the Insecticide Inspector who took the sample nor the date on which the sample was taken and how the sample was found to be misbranded. Since these particulars are not given in the sanction Annexure P 3, it cannot be said that person authorised by the State Government to grant sanction fully applied his mind and consented to the prosecution of the petitioners after his full satisfaction regarding commission of the offence by them.

As a result I allow both the petitions and quash the complaint Annexure P3 as well as subsequent proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioners.