High Courts

Manjit Singh vs State of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 3 December 1993 · Citation: (1994) 1 RCR(Criminal) 320

HON’BLE JUDGES
G.S.Chahal, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 12612-M of 1991
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Judgment

17 paragraphs · 2,146 words

G.S. Chahal, J.

1.

This order will dispose of two connected petitions No. 12612M of 1991 and Crl. M.No. 12272M of 1992 wherein the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC have been challenged. The facts have been drawn from CA M.No. 12612M of 1991.

2.

On 13th September, 1990 S.H.O. P.S. Nakodar filed Calandra before S.D.M. Nakodar for initiating proceedings under Section 145 CrPC. Parduman Singh was described as party No. 1 and Manjit Singh was described as party No. 2, that Central Government was the owner of land measuring 5.6 kanals and 19 marlas in Village Angakeri P.S. Nakodar. Both the parties were claiming their possession and ownership on this land. In the years 19871988 and 1989, the Khasra Girdawari stood in the name of Manjit Singh while the Khasra Girdawari dated Ist May 1990 records Parduman Singh in possession. Civil suits were pending between the parties in the Court. Manjit Singh had also got a stay order in his favour from the Commissioner, Jalandhar on 2nd April 1990 and a notice of the same had been served on Parduman Singh. Both the parties are trying to sow the crops claiming their ownership and possession. There was thus apprehension that some quarrel may not take place between the parties on account of this land dispute. Both the parties are arrogant and thus the proceedings.

3.

Taking cognizance on the basis of this Calandra, S.D.M. Nakodar, issued notice to the parties to file their reply. This order is dated 13th September, 1990 annexure P3. On 8th November, 1990, the S.D.M. after hearing the parties and considering the replies found the case to be of emergent nature and thus acting under Section 146 CrPC. appointed Naib Tehsildar as the receiver. Manjit Singh preferred a revision petition but the same was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, treating the order to be an interlocutory.

4.

Manjit Singh in his petition has averred that he was in possession of about 16 kanals of land out of the total area of land measuring 56 kanals 19 Marlas and this possession is continuous and he had sown different crops; that in May 1990 Parduman Singh tried to take benefit of some stray entries in the revenue record and threatened the possession of the petitioner and Joga Singh (Joga Singh is stated to be in possession of 38 Kanals). Joga Singh then filed a suit and ultimately an order directing maintaining of status quo was passed on 4th September 1990. This order is Annexure P1. Parduman Singh also filed a suit for permanent injunction and in that suit a stay order dated 9th of August 1989 had been passed; that the petitioner was in admitted possession of the land and since there were civil suits pending, the proceedings under Section 145/146 CrPC were not justified.

5.

Joga Singh in his petition has claimed that he was not made a party to the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC and the moment be learnt about the proceedings he moved an application for being impleaded as a party. He also challenges the proceedings on the basis of pendency of a civil suit.

6.

The respondents claimed that Dalip Singh s/o Chattar Singh father of the respondent was allotted 3793/4 S.A. land in village Anga Kiri in lieu of the land held by him in Pakistan. Subsequently, 43/4 S.A. were cancelled and declared surplus and put to auction. Manjit Singh petitioner and Jasbir Singh and Kuldip Singh participated in the auction and were the highest bidders. In the meanwhile Dalip Singh applied for reaccounting of the area of land held by him in Pakistan and on the basis 1133/4 S.A. was restored to him and it was also ordered that the allottee could purchase the remaining cancelled area. Against this reaccounting/restoration of the area to the allottee the auctionpurchasers namely Manjit Singh petitioner Jasbir Singh and Kuldip Singh filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1454 of 1974 which came up for final hearing before Mr. Justice S.S. Sodhi on September 10, 1982 and it was held that they had no locus standi to challenge the order setting aside the auction sale and also they could not maintain the writ petition with regard to the area of the land that was in excess of the entitlement of Dalip Singh. A copy of the judgment is Annexure R1. The respondent opted for purchase of the excess area and his case was recommended on 10.2.72 vide annexure R2. That the sale in favour of Manjit Singh had never been confirmed and he was never put in possession and he forcibly wanted to grab the land. Manjit Singh and Joga Singh have no right or title in the property. Joga Singh is a Nihang and is conniving with Manjit Singh so as to grab the land; that no doubt civil suits are pending but the order was of such a nature that any person with the help of muscle men can enter into possession.

7.

Parduman Singh is the successorininterest of the original allottee and according to the address given he is resident of Chander Kalan, distt. Hissar and the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that he did not have many supporters in this village is probably correct. The police officer was conscious of the fact that Parduman Singh who was the owner of the land and was also claiming the property and even gone to the civil Court could not possibly restrain the petitioners from interfering with his possession. It was thus with this background that the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC. were initiated. Manjit Singh claims to be in possession of 16 Kanals of land but it is only Joga Singh who has gone to the civil Court to seek an injunction and the civil Court having failed to decide which party was in possession prima facie had only ordered maintaining of status quo.

8.

The question that arises for decision is whether on the mere pendency of a civil suit, no proceedings under Section 145 CrPC, should be taken. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohinder Singh v. Dilbagh Rai, 1976 PLR 803, dealing with such a situation made the following observations :

"In such cases involving the disputes of possession in my view three types of orders can be envisaged to be passed by the Civil Courts; (i) the appointment of receiver to manage the properties in dispute, (ii) the restraining of one of the parties from interfering with the possession of that other party during the pendency of the suit; about which the civil Court prima facie feels satisfied and (iii) the maintenance of status quo about the possession of the property during the pendency of the case.

If a civil Court appoints a receiver then there is no possibility of any dispute of the possession as the receiver gets into the possession of the property on behalf of the Court and is to deliver it to that party in whose favour the Court ultimately decides. In such case there cannot be any possibility of the dispute giving rise to the proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, as the Court removes apprehension of the breach of peace by putting the property in its custody.

In the second type of cases prima facie it appears that there may not be any scope for the criminal Court to act under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, because the Civil Court prima facie feels satisfied about the possession of one of the parties to the litigation before passing the ad interim order in his favour defending his possession. On giving a deeper thought I do not think that this jurisdiction of a criminal Court be restricted. Cases are not wanting where a party obtains an ad interim order in his favour to the effect that during the pendency of the suit the other party will not interfere in his possession. If the other party uses force to dispossess him, in spite of the stay order in his favour, leading to the apprehension of the breach of the peace creating a situation for the launching of the proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and attraction of its emergency powers under subsection (4), the Magistrate will then step in, not to start parallel proceedings but to defend the orders of the civil Court not allowing the aggressor to establish himself in possession of the subject matter of the dispute in violation of the orders of the Court. In such a situation if the Magistrate acts then he adds the weight of the executive authority to respect the order of Civil Court for maintenance of status quo and does not violate any law. Yet another type of cases can be anticipated where one may enter into wrongful or forcible possession of that property leading to proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. He may approach a Civil Court and obtain an order in his favour that he may not be dispossessed from the property or for the maintenance of status quo. If this argument is accepted that when the Civil Court is seized of a case then proceedings under section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, cannot continue and are to terminate, then armed with the order of the civil Court he may go to the criminal Court and get the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC. dropped. After this he can get the civil suit filed by him dismissed and thus prepetuate his wrongful possession.

The third type of cases, that is maintenance of status quo during the pendency of the civil suit is a situation in which a civil Court does not prima facie feel satisfied about any party being in possession of the subject matter of the suit. In such cases when both parties claim possession, dangerous situation can develop with the anxiety of both or any one of them to get into actual possession. If the situation deteriorates then the police or the Magistrate cannot act as silent spectators to witness the breach of the peace if they act in such circumstances and the Magistrate attaches the subject matter of the dispute under Section 145 CrPC then he would be acting to defend the maintenance of the status quo as ordered by the civil Court."

Their Lordships of Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., 1985(1) RCR 278 , observed that criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction while a Civil Court is examining the matter of possession and the parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction order, appointment of receive; for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute. This judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court was explained by Pritpal Singh, J. in Jagdish v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, 1987(1) RCR 433 and the Hon''ble Judge held that the observations of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant''s case do not come into conflict with the law laid down in Mohinder Singh''s case and the Supreme Court has not laid down the rule that in every case where a Civil suit is pending regarding the same subject matter, proceedings under Section 145 CrPC. cannot continue.

9.

In Khehar Singh v. Satnam Singh, 1990(3) RCR 219 , Chowdhri, J. again explained the principles of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant''s case and considering the facts of the case before him, made the following observations :

"The authority is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. There the Civil Court had adjudicated with regard to possession as went as title of the land in dispute in favour of one party against the other. It was observed by their Lordships that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter of the present nature. It was, therefore, felt to be an abuse of the process of Court in invoke the jurisdiction of the criminal Court in the facts and circumstances of that case. It was in the peculiar facts of that case that it was held that parallel proceedings should not continue and order of the learned Magistrate was quashed."

10.

In the light of the principles of the authorities quoted above and the fact that civil Court having not been able to determine as to which of the party was in actual possession and Parduman Singh being a person who is living away from Village Angakeri, S.H.O. Nakodar was justified in moving the Calandra under Section 145 CrPC and the S.D.M. was justified to act on that Calandra and proceed with the same. The pendency of civil suit in these circumstances was not sufficient to hold that the criminal Court should not have moved into action. No case is made out for interference by this Court and this petition is hereby dismissed.