Manmohan Singh vs M/s Amritsar Overseas

K.S. Kumaran, J.—Respondent herein-M/s Amritsar Overseas filed a Criminal Complaint against the accused petitioner herein under Sections 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 I.P.C. The complainant''s witness No. 3 was being examined. Through him certain documents were sought to be introduced into evidence on the side of the complainant. This was objected to by the petitioner on the ground that the documents were not specifically mentioned in the complaint, nor copies thereof were filed at the time of the complaint and that these documents were not relied upon even at the time of the pre-summoning evidence. This objection taken by the petitioner accused was sustained by the learned Additional C.J.M., Amritsar on 2.12.1999. Against this order declining to taken on record these documents as evidence on the side of the complainant, the complainant filed Criminal Revision No. 6 of 2000 before the Sessions Court, Amritsar. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar held that the order passed by the learned Additional C.J.M. is against the provisions of Section 254(2) Cr.P.C, which provides that the Magistrate may on the application of the prosecution or the accused, issue summons to witness to produce any document or other thing. The learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that the scope of Section 254(2) Cr.P.C. is very vast enabling the prosecution or the complainant or the accused to summon any document to support his or her case, even after the framing of the charge, but before the complainant''s examination is concluded. Ultimately, the learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the Revision Petition setting aside the order of the learned Additional C.J.M. and directing him to permit the complainant to produce all the documents relevant to the case during the course of his evidence. Aggrieved, the petitioner-accused has come forward with this Criminal Revision Petition.

I have heard the counsel for both the sides and perused the records on file.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that inasmuch as the complainant had not mentioned about these documents in his complaint, nor had produced the copies thereof along with the complaint, and had also not relied upon these documents at the pre-summoning stage, the complainant, if at all, could have filed a petition u/s 311 Cr.P.C. only. He, therefore, contends that the learned Magistrate was right in declining the request of the complainant. He contends that the complainant had not even filed an application for reception of these documents into evidence.

But, in my view, the fact that the complainant had not mentioned about these documents in his complaint, and that he had not produced, or relied upon these documents at the time of the evidence in the pre-summoning stage, cannot be a ground for declining permission to introduce these documents into evidence. As has been rightly held by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the provisions of Section 254(2) Cr.P.C. enable the Court to summon any document on an application by the prosecution or the accused. Therefore, had the complainant filed an application for permission to produce these documents into evidence, the Court would be justified in allowing the documents to be received into evidence subject to proof and relevancy, in the circumstances of this case, where the examination of the witness of the complainant only was in progress at that stage. But the contention is that the complainant had not filed any such application. Therefore, in my view, the complainant should have filed an application u/s 254(2) Cr.P.C. for reception of these documents into evidence.

But, the vital objection taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners that when the learned Additional C.J.M. had declined permission to the complainant |o introduce these documents into evidence, the complainant was not entitled to file a Revision Petition against the same as it was only an interlocutory order. Therefore, the learned counset for the petitioner contends that this order of the learned Additional C.J.M. being an interlocutory order, the Revision petition filed by the complainant was not maintainable and, therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not competent to pass an order setting aside the order of the learned Additional C.J.M. and directing him to receive the documents into evidence. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decisions of this Court in Dalip Singh alias Daljit Singh v. State of Punjab 1985 (1) R.C.R, 325 and Purshotam v. Firm Ram Cltander 1986(1) R.C.R. 443. In the first case the prosecution evidence was closed. Then prosecution filed an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. for permission to lead additional evidence, which was declined by the trial Court. The Slate filed a Revision in the Sessions Court, which was allowed. On further Revision, this Court upheld the contention that the Revision before the Sessions Court was not maintainable and set aside the order of the Sessions Court. In Purshotam''s case (supra) the complainant moved an application for summoning certain witnesses who were not mentioned in the list of witnesses, which prayer the learned trial Magistrate declined. But, on a Revision Petition by the complainant, the learned Additional Sessions Judge ordered the summoning of the witnesses. Against that order a Revision Petition was filed in this Court. It was contended by the petitioner that an order disallowing additional evidence was an interlocutory order against which a Revision was not maintainable. This contention was accepted by this Court and the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was set aside.

The learned counsel for the petitioner also relies upon another Decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Cheeka Coop Credit Service Society and others 1992(1) R.C.R. 294. That was a case where after recording of part of the evidence, the prosecution moved an application u/s 311 Cr.P.C. for summoning certain additional witnesses, whose names were not mentioned in the list of witnesses attached to the complaint. This application was rejected by the Special Court, against which the State had filed the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside the order. The contention of the respondent before the High Court was that the impugned order was an interlocutory order and no petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. was competent in view of the provisions of Section 397 Cr.P.C. This contention of the respondent was upheld by holding that the impugned order of the Special Court being interlocutory in nature, could not be interfered with by the High Court.

Relying upon these decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Additional C.J.M. by declining permission to the complainant to introduce certain documents into evidence, had only passed an interlocutory order by which the rights of the parties have not been finally settled and, therefore, the Revision Petition before the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not maintainable.

As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, . That was a case where the police had submitted a final report in respect of the appellants (before the Hon''ble Supreme Court) on the basis of which the appellants were released by the Judicial Magistrate. This was affirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, on a Revision filed against that order. A complaint was filed against the appellants and others, but the Judicial Magistrate dismissed the same. But the learned Sessions Judge, on Revision by the complainant, accepted the Revision, remanded the matter and ordered further enquiry. On receipt of this order of the learned Sessions Judge, the learned Magistrate summoned the appellants straightaway. The appellants (before the Hon''ble Supreme Court) then filed a petition under Sections 482 and 397 Cr.P.C. to quash this order of the learned Magistrate on the ground that the Magistrate had issued the summoning order without application of mind. The High Court refused to interfere on the ground that summoning order was an interlocutory order and therefore, a Revision was barred u/s 397(2) Cr.P.C.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court then proceeded to consider as to what is the connotation of the term "Interlocutory order" appearing in Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. which bars the Revision of any such order and held as follows :-

"It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in S. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie u/s 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside Ihe purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court."

The Hon''ble Supreme Court after referring to the following observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Vs. Shri Gokal Chand, :

"In the context of S. 38(1), the words "every order of the Controller made under this Act", though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and to not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceedings, the Controller, may pass many interlocutory orders under Ss. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examinalion of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties."

held that -

"The aforesaid decision clearly illustrates the nature and incidents of an interlocutory order and the incidents given by this Court constitute sufficient guidelines to interpret the connotation of the word "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-section (2) of S. 397 ofthe 1973 Code."

The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that as per the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court relied upon by the respondent also, the order passed by the learned Magistrate regarding the admissibility of certain documents is only an interlocutory order against which no Revision is maintainable.

I agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner in this respect. The order passed by the learned Magistrate does not adjudicate on the rights of the parties. It has only given its decision as to whether the documents sought to be introduced into evidence by the complainant are admissible or not. This order is only an interlocutory order against which no Revision could be filed in view of the specific bar contained in Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. Therefore, the impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge has to be and is accordingly set aside.

The Revision Petition is allowed accordingly, setting aside the impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

Revision allowed.