Mannu Kaushik and Others vs State of Chhattisgarh

Sunil Kumar Sinha, J.—Heard.

Case diary of Crime No. 81/2005 registered at Police Station Kawardha, Distt. Kabirdham (C.G.) for the offence punishable under Sections 294, 323, 506/34, IPC read with Section 3(1)(x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, perused.

The case of prosecution is that on 26-3-2005, on the occasion of Holi festival, some procession was going on in Village Madmada, where the complainant namely Ram Roop Satnami resides. The applicants, who are the residents of another village, Bahmani of Distt. Kawardha had also gone to see the procession in Village Madmada. It is alleged that during the course of procession, these applicants started eve-teasing the girls, which was opposed by the complainant. The further allegations are that when the complainant opposed the applicants for their said act, these applicants abused him and assaulted one Lala @ Amrit Das. The First Information Report was lodged on 26-3-2005 by Ram Roop Satnami. It is alleged in the FIR, that while assaulting the injured the applicants used filthy language against the injured and the complainant in the following manner --

-----------------**eq>s xkyh nsrs eknjpkn lkys pekj ge yksx D;k dj jgs gS rqe euk djus okys dkSu gksrs gks**----------------

The submission of learned Counsel for the applicants is that the applicants and the injured both reside in two different villages, they were not known to each other, therefore, it is not a case of an intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. He also submits that since the act of insult was not alleged to the intentional as is provided in Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act, the said offence would not be made out and a bar u/s 18 of the said Act would not be attracted in this case.

Per contra, learned Counsel for the State argues that there is an act of intentional humiliation on the part of the applicants while causing injuries in the same transaction in consequence of abuses by using filthy language against the complainant which he repeats after reading the FIR, which I have quoted earlier, and he vehemently argues that in this manner the offence u/s 3(1)(x) would be made out and the provisions of Section 18 of the Special Act would be attracted in this case and the petition filed u/s 438, Cr.PC would not be maintainable.

For the manner of taking a decision with respect to attraction of Section 18, the points raised by the State and learned Counsel for the applicants is no longer res integra as it has been held that if the contents of the FIR or the complaint disclose a commission of offence under the Special Act, the Courts would not be justified in entering into a further enquiry by summoning the case diary or any other material as to whether the allegations are true or false or whether there is any preponderance of probability for commission of such an offence. At this stage, the Court can not examine and scrutinize the record of the case in order to ascertain the veracity of the First Information Report or the complaint. The provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 put a complete bar against the entertainment of an application for anticipatory bail where prima facie the contents of the First Information Report disclose the ingredients of the commission of the offence under the Act, 1989, which is apparent from the perusal of the section itself and thus the Court at the most would be required to evaluate the FIR itself with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting the alleged offence, then the Court would not be justified in entering into an enquiry as to the reliability or a genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. I have taken this view in the matter of Abdul Abbas v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2006(1) M.P.H.T. 66 (CG) : 2005 Cr.LJ 3051 and I am also fortified in my opinion by the decision of this Court rendered in the matter of Satya Prakash v. State of C.G. 2004 (1) CGLJ 162.

After pronouncement of these two orders of this Court, now the question arises as to whether the First Information Report lodged in this case answers the requirement of prima facie construction of a case u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 or not ? Section 3(1)(x) of the aforesaid Act reads as under:

Punishments for offences of atrocities.-- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

After perusal of the aforesaid section, it would appear that prima facie requirement of this section is an intentional insult or intimidation with an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. That is to say that for the purpose of constituting this offence, the alleged act of insult or intimidation must be intentional with intent to humiliate the member of the special category. If we apply this test in the present case and scrutinize the FIR at its face value, it does not disclose as to whether the applicants and the complainant were previously known to each other or not ? If a case comes like this that the applicants were not knowing that the victim belongs to a particular caste or the special caste, then the act of simple abuse without knowing as to whether or not this particular person belongs to a particular caste, would not prima facie constitute an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act because no intention would be inferable by the circumstances or evidence like this.

In the opinion of this Court, if after perusal of the FIR, it is not prima facie established that the complainant who are members of Scheduled Caste were known to the applicants, I do not consider it proper to prima facie hold that the act done by the applicants was an "intentional" act as is required u/s 3(1)(x) of the Act. Therefore, the result is that a bar u/s 18 of the Special Act would not be attracted in this case.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I allow this application on merits. It is directed that in the event of arrest, these applicants shall be released on bail on each of them furnishing a personal bond in sum of Rs. 5000/- with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Officer arresting them.

Using the principles laid down by the Apex Court in case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra, , I hereby direct that this order of bail shall remain in force for a period of six weeks from today during which the applicants may apply for regular bail before the Regular Court which shall be decided by the said Court in accordance with law.

The petition stands allowed.