Manohar Lal and others vs Budh Ram and others

B.S. Yadav, J.—For the purpose of this appeal it is not necessary to give the facts of the case in detail. Suffice it to say that according to the allegations in the plaint, Moti Ram who was father of Defendant No. 1 Manohar Lal and grandfather of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, was a statutory tenant in a shop situated in Mohendergarh Moti Ram died on 8th October, 1970. After his death, the Defendants occupied the shop. The Plaintiffs who are Respondents in this appeal, filed a suit for possession of that shop treating the Respondents as trespassers in it.

The Defendants contested the suit on various grounds and pleaded that they formed a joint Hindu family with Moti Ram (deceased) and joint Hindu family business was carried on in the shop in dispute. It was also pleaded that they were in possession of the shop in dispute as tenants and the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short the Punjab Act). The learned trial Court held that though the Defendants carried on business jointly with Moti Ram in the shop in dispute but they could not be regarded as tenants in the shop in dispute, as the shop in dispute was taken on rent by Moti Ram It was also held that as Moti Ram was statutory tenant, after his death the Defendants have no right to continue in the shop and their status was that of trespassers Accordingly, Plaintiffs'' suit for possession was decreed. Feeling aggrieved the Defendants filed an appeal but the same was dismissed by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge (with Enhanced Appellate Powers), Narnaul. The Defendants have now come to this Court in appeal.

The main question that arises for determination is whether the statutory tenancy of Moti Ram regarding the shop in dispute was heritable. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that it is so. After hearing the counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that his argument has force Earlier, of course, there ware some decisions to the effect that such a tenancy was not hereitable. However, the matter has now been finally settled by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Damadilal and Others Vs. Parashram and Others, . That case was under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The word "tenant" has been defined in section 2(i) of that Act as follows

A person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act ; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made.

Their lordships remarked:

The definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists. The incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must therefore be the same unless any provision of the Act conveyed a contrary intention.

In that case their lordships held that statutory tenancy was heritable.

In the Punjab Act, ''tenant'' has been defined in Section 2(i) and the relevant portion, for the purpose of this appeal, reads as follows:-

In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

xx xx xx xx xx

(i) ''tenant'' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. xx xx xx

It is clear that the definition of tenant as given in the Punjab Act is practically analogous to the definition of word ''tenant'' as given in the Madhya Pradesh Act. Therefore, the above observations of their lordships will apply to the present case also and it will have to be held that in view of the definition of word ''tenant'' as given in the Punjab Act, it includes a statutory tenant who continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy.

Damadilal''s case (supra) was followed by S.P. Goyal, J. in Mohan Lal v. Ram Dass 1977 (1) R.C.J. 757: (1977) 79 P.L.R. 9 (S.N.). That judgment was confirmed by the Letters Patent Bench of this Court and the judgment is reported as Mohan Lal v. Ram Dass etc 1980 (1) R.C.J. 607. In that case the property in dispute was a shop and the provisions of the Punjab Act were interpreted therein.

Though the shop in question is situated in Haryana where in 1973 Haryana Urban (Control of Pent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short Haryana Act) was enacted but prior to that the Punjab Act was applicable to this State. Moti Ram had died prior to the coming into force of the Haryana Act. In fact the suit had also been filed prior to the coming into force of Haryana Act. Therefore, it is not necessary to refer to the definition of tenant as given in the Haryana Act as urged by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents As discussed earlier, according to the Punjab Act, statutory tenancy was heritable. As held in Goverdhan Dass and Ors. v. Smt Dhan Mala Devi Jain 1984 H.R.R. 202, once the heirs of the deceased tenant inherited the tenancy rights under the Punjab Act, they become tenants under the Haryana Act when it came into force.

As the statutory tenancy of Moti Ram has been held to be heritable, at least by Defendant No. 1, who is his son inherited it and the suit for possession is not maintainable. In Goverdhan Dass''s case (supra) it was remarked:

The next question that requires determination is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit for ejectment. This question also does not require any discussion as the matter has been settled by a Full Bench of this Court in Sewan Horn v. Gobindo Ram and another, ILR 198(1) P&H 245: (1980) 82 P.L.R. 271. After referring to various provisions of the Haryana Act, it was observed by the Full Bench that it was evident that both as regards the substantive law applicable and also the forum in which it was to be enforced, the Act covered the field to the total exclusion of all other laws. It excluded on the substantive aspect the general law of the tenant-landlord relationship and on the procedural aspect barred the forum of the ordinary run of the Civil Courts We therefore, hold that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by a landlord to eject a tenant and consequently the present suit qua the relief of ejectment was not maintainable.

For the foregoing reasons I accept the present appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below and dismiss the suit for possession filed by the Plaintiffs In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.