Manohar Lal Chichra vs Topan Ram

I.D. Dua, J.—The short question which falls for determination in this second appeal from order is whether the ejectment order is a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction and is, therefore, not executable In order to appreciate the position it is necessary to state the facts so far as they are relevant for the present purpose.

An ejectment order was passed on 24-9-1960 in favour of Topan Ram against his tenant Manohar Lal when the tenant was allowed time up to 24-9-62 for vacating the premises. Since the tenant did not vacate the premises in accordance with the order, the decree-holder landlord applied for execution of the order dated 24-9-1960. The tenant resisted the execution on the ground that the order of ejectment had been passed on the basis of a compromise and was, therefore, unenforceable in execution proceedings, being an order passed by the Rent Controller without jurisdiction.

The First Additional Rent Controller, who was executing the order, found, that his predecessor, who had passed the order of ejectment, had, after recording the statement of one witness produced by the Petitioner on 26-8-60, adjourned the case for the landlord''s remaining evidence to 13-9-1960 and then again to 24-9-60. On the last mentioned date, the learned Counsel for the tenant made a statement that his client admitted the bona fide personal requirements of the landlord and that therefore, an ejectment order may be passed. He further stated that the tenant may be allowed two years'' time to vacate the premises. The counsel for the landlord agreed to give two years'' time to the tenant for vacating the premises in question. The Rent Controller thereupon passed the order mentioned above.

Reliance before the executing Rent Controller was placed on K.L. Bansal v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Civil Revn. No. 140-D of 1961 (since, reported as 64 Pun LR 1091) where it had been observed that mere consent of the tenant is not enough for passing an ejectment decree against him on the ground of personal requirement under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (Act No. 38 of 1952). This decision was distinguished by the executing Rent Controller on the ground that the present Rent Control Act (Act No. 59 of 1958) is differently worded and, therefore, the decision on the basis of Section 13 of the 1952 Act is not a helpful precedent for construing Section 14 of the 1958 Act which governs the case in hand.

In the alternative it was also observed that even if it is considered that the Controller has to be satisfied regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlord it was clear in the present case that the Rent Controller passing the ejectment order had actually satisfied himself of the necessary requisites before passing the impugned order. The executing Controller also observed in this connection that Bedi J., one of the members of the Bench deciding Kaushalya Devi''s case, 64 Pun LR 1091 did not disagree with an earlier decision of Grover J. in Vas Dev Sharma Vs. Milkhi Ram Bhatia, , which according to him, was a case similar to the one in hand. On this view the objections were disallowed.

On the matter having been taken on appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal the same arguments were repeated on behalf of the tenant but without success. According to the Appellate Tribunal, the counsel for the tenant had stated on 24-9-60 that it was admitted that the landlord required the premises for his residence and that an order of ejectment on this ground may be passed giving the tenant two years period for vacating the premises. This statement was admitted to be correct by the counsel for the landlord. It thus appeared clear to the Appellate Tribunal that the tenant had admitted the correctness of the grounds of ejectment and it was on this basis that the order for eviction was passed, the Controller having been fully satisfied on the admission of the tenant regarding the existence of the grounds of ejectment. On this premise, the impugned order of eviction was held to be valid.

The Bench decision in Kaushalya Devi''s case, 64 Pun LR 1091 was distinguished on the same grounds on which the executing Controller had done so. It was observed by the Tribunal as well, as it was done by the executing Controller, that there was sufficient material on the file for the satisfaction of the Controller to pass the impugned eviction order.

Reference by the Appellate Tribunal was also made to a judgment of Grover J. in Vas Dev Sharma Vs. Milkhi Ram Bhatia, , and to a still earlier Bench decision of this Court in Babu Ram Sharma v. Bal Singh 61 Pun LR 33 as also to one Madras case and two Allahabad cases in support of the view taken by it. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

On second appeal before me the learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that it is not open to the Rent Controller to pass an order of eviction on compromise because the tenant cannot contract himself out of the statutory protection given to him and that to permit him to do so would obviously be contrary to public policy. According to the counsel, the law imposes an obligation on the Rent Controller to come to an independent conclusion of his own and satisfy himself on the evidence led in the case that the landlord bona fide required the premises for his own residence or for the residence of any member of his family depending on him. According to the submission of the counsel, the Rent Controller cannot depend on the statement of the tenant for coming to such a conclusion. Reliance has, in addition to the decisions already cited before the executing Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, been placed on a judgment by Wanchoo C.J. (as he then was) in Jagjivan Singh Vs. Sitaram, and on Korah Punncn v. Parameswara Kurup Vasudeva Kurup AIR 1956 Tray Co 1 (FB).

I am unable to agree with the Appellant''s contention. The Rajasthan case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the section which the learned Chief Justice was construing there clearly contemplated that the executing Court should go into the matter and the tenant should not be evicted in execution of an order passed before the enforcement of the Rent Control Act, governing that case except on specified ground recognised by the said Act. The order there was obviously one passed before the enforcement of the Rajasthan Control Act. The ratio of that case is, therefore, wholly unhelpful to the Appellant. The Travancore-Cochin case is equally unavailing to the tenant. There also the question of the benefit of the Rent Control Order was under the law determinable at the time when the tenant is sought to be evicted in pursuance of the decree in question. Such obviously is not the position before me.

Unless the law specifically empowers the executing court to go behind the decree or order sought to be executed, the general rule of resjudicata is attracted. In the present case my attention has not been drawn to any provision of the statute which empowers the executing Court to reappraise the reasons of the Court passing the order of eviction under the Rent Control Act and to come to its own conclusion on the merits whether or not the order was justified.

It is true that if the. decree or order sought to be executed is a nullity, the executing tribunal can, and indeed must, go into the question and decline to execute the decree or order as the case may be, but that does not seem to me to be the case in the present appeal. There was undoubtedly material on the record from which the Rent Controller could feel satisfied that, the claim put forth by the landlord was justified and indeed the order passed by him on 24-9-60 does not show that it was merely on the basis of the compromise and without adverting to the pleadings that the Rent Controller had ordered eviction.

In any case, as already observed, in execution proceedings the question as to whether the view of the Court passing the decree or order sought to be executed, is right or wrong can, in the absence of clear statutory provision, no longer be open; and no such provision has been brought to my notice in the instant case. The contention that even if the tenant admits the facts alleged by the landlord, it is obligatory on the Rent Controller himself to hold an enquiry to see whether the plea of admission by the tenant is Justified or not and that if the Controller does not do so his order must be held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity, is without foundation in law and has not been supported either by precedent or by principle cited before me. Such a contention also appears to me to be untenable on the scheme of the Rent Control Act which concerns us in the case in hand.

I may here also notice some unreported and reported cases cited on behalf of the Respondent in support of the view that I have taken. Shiv Narain v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Civil Revn No. 77-D of 1961 (Punj) is a Bench Decision by Capoor and Gurdev singh J. D/-21-5-1962 and Shadi Lal Kapur v. Joti Sarup Guta S.A. No. 211-D of 1962 (Punj) is a decision by Grover-J.D/;- 4-3-1963 in which reliance has been placed on two earlier decisions of this Court in 64 Pun LR 1091 and Vas Dev Sharma Vs. Milkhi Ram Bhatia,

Reference has also been made to a decision by Falshaw J. (as he then was) in Jagan Nath Pershad Jhalani Vs. Jatinder Nath Prem Nath and Others, , where on Defendant�s admission of the strength of the Plaintiff''s case the Court was held to be fully justified in passing a decree for ejectment on the-ground of personal requirement. Hakumat Rai v. Khushi Ram ILR (1959) P&H 2293 is a decision by-IX K. Mahajan J. where also it has been held that there is nothing in law to prevent a tenant from admitting any one of the grounds permissible under the statute and to agree to an ejectment order because by doing so he merely admits his liability to ejectment on a valid basis and such a consent decree cannot be held to be illegal or void.

A half-hearted contention was raised by the Appellant that the admission by the tenant does not cover all the essential ingredients justifying an order of eviction. That, it appears to me, was not the Appellant''s case at any stage in these proceedings and'' as a matter of fact this plea would also be hit be the Respondent''s contention upheld by me that it was the eviction order which should have been challenged by the tenant on revision and that this de-fence is inadmissible in execution proceedings.

As a last resort a prayer was made by the Appellant''s learned Counsel that some more time for vacating the premises should be given. This prayer is wholly misconceived at this stage. He has had enough of time and as a matter of fact the eviction order itself gave him two years ''time which expired'' on 24-9-62. I do not think, in the circumstances of this case, any further indulgence in favour of the Appellant is called for.

For the foregoing reasons this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.