Manohar Rajgond & Ors. vs State of Madhya Pradesh

The present revision under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C preferred by applicants against the order dated 31.07.2017 passed by First Additional

Sessions Judge, Narsinghpur (M.P.) in S.T. No.163/2017 whereby the learned Judge has framed the charge of offences punishable under

Sections 304-B, 498-A of IPC and Section 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, against the applicants.

The case of the prosecution in brief is that the applicant No.3 is husband of deceased Smt.Jayshree, applicant No.2 is her mother-in-law and

applicant No.1 is elder brother of applicant No.3. The marriage of deceased was solemnized on 06.06.2010 and after marriage the deceased was

living with applicants in her marital home at village Bandhi Pithehara. It is alleged that deceased was subjected to cruelty by the applicants in

connection with demand of dowry. On 24.03.2017 deceased sustained burn injuries at her marital home, she was brought to the hospital for

treatment where her dying declaration was got recorded and subsequently during treatment she succumbed to her injuries on 31.03.2017. The

police registered an offence against the applicants and after usual investigation submitted charge-sheet for the offences punishable under Sections

304-B, 498-A of IPC and Section 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

The trial Court by passing impugned order dated 31.07.2017 framed the charge of offence punishable under Sections 304-B, 498-A of IPC

and Section 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the applicants and proceeded for trial. Against this order the applicants have preferred

present revision.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicants that the applicants have been falsely implicated in this offence. They have never made any

demand of dowry or practiced cruelty with the deceased. In her dying declaration the deceased has categorically stated that she had sustained

burn injuries accidentally while she was cooking food. She has not alleged anything against the applicants regarding demand of dowry or cruel

treatment meted out by her. Later on, under influence of the parents the police has registered the offence against the applicants. There is substantial

delay in lodging the report of offence. The delay is not explained. The applicants No.1 and 2 are living separately from the deceased. The trial

Court has committed error in framing the charge of alleged offence against the applicants. No prima facie, case is made out against them.

Learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer and submitted that there is ample evidence available on record to show the involvement

of the applicants in commission of crime. The trial Court has rightly framed the charge against the present applicants.

Heard rival submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the copy of challan filed in M.Cr.C. No.13466/2017.

It is not denied that the deceased was wife of applicant No.3. Applicant No.2 is her mother-in-law and applicant No.1 is her Jeth. They are

husband and relatives of husband. It is also not disputed that the death of deceased was caused by burn injuries within seven years of marriage.

After the incident the deceased was brought to the hospital by her husband and applicants. In her dying declaration although, she had stated that

she caught fire accidentally while she was cooking food, but later on, when her parents arrived at the hospital she had informed them that the

applicants had set her ablaze. She had given earlier dying declaration under the influence and threat of applicants. The parents and other witnesses

have also stated that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by applicants in connection with demand of dowry. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to

give rise a strong suspicion against the applicants for commission of alleged offence. The probative value of earlier dying declaration of deceased

could be considered on merits after completion of trial. This is settled law that at the stage of framing of charge the trial Court is not expected to

consider and scrutinize the material on record meticulously. If the judge forms an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has

committed the offence the judge may frame the charge.

Hon''ble Apex Court in case law Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 in para 17 observed as under:-

Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court in terms of Section 228 Cr.P.C, unless the accused is discharged under Section

227 Cr.P.C. Under both Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C, the Court is required to consider the ""record of the case"" and the documents submitted

therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the Court and in its opinion there is ground for

presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section concerned exists,

then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption

is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the Court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to

that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction, It may even be weaker than a prima facie case.

Later on, in para 19 Hon''ble Apex Court further observed as under:-

at the initial stage of framing of a charge, the Court is concerned not with proof but with strong suspicion that the accused has committed an

offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the Court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible

with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage"".

In view of the evidence and material collected during investigation against the applicants, the prima facie, case of offence punishable under

Sections 304-B, 498-A of IPC and Section 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is made out against the applicants. The trial Court has committed no

illegality in framing of charges of alleged offence against the applicants by passing the impugned order.

Thus, I do not find any merits in present revision and is hereby dismissed.