Mansoor Ali vs The Government of Tamil Nadu

P. Sathasivam, J.—The detenu himself challenges the detention order dated 16.10.2003, detaining him as goonda under the Tamil Nadu Act

14 of 1982. The ground case relates to an occurrence that had taken place on 20.09.2003 for the offences under sections 341 and 302 IPC. The

detenu has one adverse case to his credit for the offences under sections 506(ii) and 302 read with 34 IPC.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner after taking us through the grounds of detention, would contend that inasmuch as the detaining

authority has referred in para 6 of the grounds of detention that he considered the ground case and ""past cases"" and taken the decision to detain

the detenu under Preventive Act, whereas the detenu had only one adverse case. The detaining authority has not applied its mind before passing

the order of detention. He also submitted that since the only one adverse case related to an occurrence on 31.03.2002 and the ground case,

according to the prosecution, had taken place on 20.09.2003, there is no proximity with reference to the adverse case. Accordingly, the

respondents are not justified in passing the order of detention.

We dispose of both the contentions in the following manner. It is true that the grounds of detention refers only one adverse case, that was on

31.03.2002, which had taken place in Bhuvanagiri Fish Market within the jurisdiction of Bhuvanagiri Police Station. The detenu was charged for

the offences under sections 506(ii) and 302 read with 34 IPC.

Though in para 6 of the detention order, the detaining authority had stated that he perused and considered ""past cases"", it refers only one

adverse case, that took place on 31.03.2002 and the ground case on 20.09.2003. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has referred to all the

details and even relating to the adverse case that had taken place on 31.03.2002, in the earlier paragraph, we are of the view that merely because

there is a reference ""past cases"", it cannot be presumed that the detaining authority has not applied its mind properly.

Coming to the next contention, namely, proximity, it is true that the adverse case related to the occurrence on 31.03.2002 and the ground case,

on which the detention order was passed, taken place on 20.09.2003. In this regard, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the

respondents has brought to our notice the details regarding the occurrence that had taken place on 31.03.2002 and the subsequent event on

20.09.2003. In the first case, it is the claim of the prosecution that the petitioner/detenu being hireling, brutally murdered the younger brother of

Masilamani, namely, Thangamani on 31.03.2002 at Keel Bhuvanagiri, that too, in Fish Market. It is also brought to our notice that the second

incident though it had taken place quite after sometime, namely, 20.09.2003, the very same person, who is a hireling, murdered the brother of the

said Thangamani, viz., Kaliamoorthy when he was proceeding to the market in a bicycle along with other persons.

In this regard, the learned Government Advocate very much relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Subbiah vs

The Commissioner of Police, Madras City (1993 L.W.(Cri.) 113. While considering the proximity to the earlier occurrence, Their Lordships after

referring the definition to Section 2(e) of the COFEPOSA Act, have observed as follows:-

The definition of ''goonda'' refers to the habitual commission or attempt to commit or abatement of the commission of offences specified in the

section. When a person is found to be a goonda it goes without saying that he is a person who habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets

commission of offences. Hence, it is not necessary further for the authority to wait for his committing another act which is likely to cause prejudice

to the maintenance of public order. If the facts and circumstances placed before the authority are sufficient to enable him to arrive at the conclusion

that he is a goonda then those facts and circumstances are sufficient to consider the second question also as to whether such acts will cause

prejudice to the maintenance of public order. The object of the Act is to prevent the person concerned to act in a manner prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order. It would be futile to contend that the authority should wait till he acts in such a manner. In that case it will not be

preventive detention but a case of detention after the commission of the offence. Hence a reading of S. 3(1) together with S. 2(a) and (f) of the

Goondas Act makes it clear that if the commission of offences is sufficient to brand a person as a goona within the meaning of S. 2(f) they can

themselves be taken into account for considering the question whether he is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

In para 32 of the order, they further held that

if the materials before the authority prove that the person concerned had habitually committed offences or attempted to commit the same or

abetted commission of the same that would be sufficient to show that he is a goonda and the fact that cases were not actually registered against him

would not in any way be material"".

Considering the materials placed before the detaining authority in the case on hand, we are in respectful agreement with the said conclusion. It is

also relevant to note that in para 31, Their Lordships have held, after referring the judgment of the Supreme court in Raj Kumar Singh Vs. State of

Bihar and Others, , that even a lapse of one year between the two offences would not negative the proximity of the offences by a habitual offender.

In the light of the above discussion and in view of the materials placed before the detaining authority, we are unable to accept the arguments of

the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently, the habeas corpus petition fails and the same is dismissed.