Manzoor Hussain vs State of J&K

Thakur, J. - The instant review petition has been preferred seeking review of the judgment and order dated 10.6.2015, passed in LPA(OW) No.

66/14, along with an application seeking condonation of delay of 65 days in filing the said review petition.

Objections to the above condonation of delay application have been filed. However, the counsel for the petitioners was heard on merits of the

review petition as well with a view to see as to whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record.

Needless to say that the Letters Patent Appeal aforementioned was dismissed by this court by holding:

i. that OWP No. 1411/2013, was not maintainable on the principles of Order 2 R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in as much as the petitioner

did have an occasion to challenge the notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act at the time of filing of

writ petition, OWP No. 501/2013, which they did not; and

ii. that it was hit by the principles of delay and laches in as much as OWP No. 1411/2013, was filed on 07.10.2013, against the final award (it.

28.06.2013, in which the petitioner had also questioned the legality of notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act aforementioned.

Counsel for the petitioners, however, failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record but tried to re-agitate the whole issue once

again on the presumption that the conclusions arrived at by this court were erroneous in law. This is clearly impermissible in as much as in the garb

of invoking the review jurisdiction of this court, a party cannot be permitted to re-agitate the issues already decided except on the ground a review

is otherwise permitted i.e. in case there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record.

The Apex Court in the case reported as N. Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria & Ors., (2013) 15 SCC 534, held as under:-

A careful look at the impugned order would show that the High Court had a fresh look at the question whether the appellant could be impleaded

in the suit filed by the respondent No. 1 and, in the light of the view which it took, it recalled its earlier order dated 08.06.2011. The course

followed by the High Court is clearly flawed. The High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction by reconsidering the merits of the order dated

08.06.2011. The review jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does

not call for review. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is self evident, needs no search and stares at its face. Surely, review

jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.

Apart from this, it be seen that the petitioners in OWP No. 1411/2013, had also challenged the final award dated on . 28.06.2013. The issue

whether a final award can be permitted to be challenged in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was considered by one

of us (Thakur, J) in the case of Mushtaq Ahmed & Anr. v. State & Ors., 2014 (1) JKJ 436 [HC], where almost in a similar set of facts, the

petition was dismissed by placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported as Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v.

The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 482. In the aforementioned case, the Apex Court held as

under:-

It is thus well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings

have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of

the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors

into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the

award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights

were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion

exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.

In the light of the ratio of the aforementioned judgments of the Apex Court, we cannot persuade ourselves to allow the review petition, which is

found to be without merit and is, accordingly, dismissed along with the application seeking condonation of delay.