Maravadi and Others vs Pamakkar

The suit in this case is one for arrears of maintenance instituted by 15 members of a family in South Canara governed by the Aliyasantana system

of law, against its manager or Yejamanathi the defendant. The plaint alleges that the defendant left the family house of the parties and went away to

reside elsewhere about five years before the date of the suit, and that she neglected to look after the maintenance of the plaintiffs, junior members

of the family. The defendant denied that she quitted the family house and contended that several of the plaintiffs were living away from the house.

She alleges she has no objection whatever to maintain the plaintiffs if they all come and live in the family house. She denies the plaintiffs right to

separate maintenance when not living in the house. Her case is that the 4th plaintiff and her minor children, plaintiffs Nos. 10 to 12, were living in

the house of 4th plaintiff''s husband, that the 5th plaintiff and her minor children, plaintiffs 13 to 15, were residing at the 5th plaintiff''s husband''s

house, and that 8th and 9th plaintiffs were living in the house of their father. It is not stated that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3, 6 and 7 were living

elsewhere.

The District Munsif found that the defendant was not living in the family house but in another house of her own about 3 miles away from the

former and he held that the defendant had failed to maintain any of the plaintiffs during the period for which maintenance is claimed. He also found

that the plaintiffs 4, 5 and 8 to 15 had not been proved to have been living away from the family house though some of them might be visiting at the

houses of their husbands or fathers. He awarded plaintiffs a 15/40th share of the income the plaintiffs being 15 out of a total of 40 members in the

family. On appeal the District Judge dismissed the suit by a judgment which we cannot but regard as unsatisfactory. He had not found whether the

defendant went away from the family house to reside elsewhere or not. He objects to the Munsif''s decree awarding to the plaintiffs a numerically

proportionate share of the family income. He is no doubt right in doing so. He says that the District Munsif''s decree further takes no account of the

considerable time spent by the various palintiffs in their fathers'' or husbands'' houses during which they were entitled to no maintenance at all in

their family house. We cannot ascertain from this record bow much, if any, maintenance is really due to them. But he does not find what time, if

any, each of the plaintiffs was away from the family house. He has assumed that a member going on visit to the house of a relation such as husband

or father, would be '' disentitled '' to maintenance or that the Yejaman would be entitled to make proportionate reduction from the maintenance due

to that member. He then says: "" It appears clearly, however, that the Yejamanathi has always been willing to maintain all those who lived and

worked at home, and it is clear from the evidence of P.W. 4 who tried to hold a panchayat about the matter that plaintiffs'' real purpose is to live

away from home in their husbands'' and fathers'' and wives'' houses and do no work at home and yet draw their full share of maintenance from

there. This they cannot do."" Here again he has assumed without discussing the question that a person not doing work in the family house is not

entitled to maintenance even when he is willing to live there, for he has not decreed any maintenance to the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 and 6 and 7 who,

the 1st defendant does not allege were living away from the family house. It is clear that we must set aside this judgment and remand the appeal for

rehearing and fresh disposal. But as the Judge has enunciated several questionable propositions of Aliyasantana law, we consider it our duty, in

order to avoid a further remand, to express our view of the law which should govern and dispose of the suit.

According to the Aliyasantana system which is very similar in its incidents to the Marumakkathayam Law (see Subbu Hcggade v. Tongu (1869)

4 M. H.C.R. 196 as no member of the family is entitled to enforce partition of the family property which belongs to all the members, every junior

member is entitled to be maintained by the Kar-navan and has the right to object to any improper administration of the property of the Tarwad and

to see that it is duly conserved for the use of the Tarwad. The income belongs to all and all are entitled to participate in the benefit of it but the

manager is entitled to administer the property and to use the income for the common benefit of all the members. As observed in Narayani v.

Govtnda ILR (1884) M. 352 the Tarwad is a family of which the Karnavan is the manager, and although as asenior member he enjoys special

consideration, he has no higher claim in the enjoyment of the income than any other member of the family. He has a right to expend as he pleases

for the common benefit of all. The right to maintenance is an individual right. In Kunhamatha v. Kunhi Kuttir Ali ILR (1883) M. 233 Turner C.J.

says :"" Each member of a Tarwad has a right to be maintained and suffers a personal wrong if that right is not accorded to him."" The right is not

confined to cases where a member has no means of his own because by virtue of his ownership in the Tarwad property he is entitled to participate

in its income. See Thayu v. Shungunni ILR (1881) M. 71. It has been held that a suit for maintenance by a junior member of a Marumakathayam

or Aliyasantanam family is one that falls under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, as a suit to enforce the right to share in joint family property--

Achutan Nair and Another Vs. Kunjunni Nair and Another, --and not one under Article 129, which applies to suits which are strictly for a right to

maintenance where a person has owned property belonging to another. The Tarwad property cannot be sold except in cases of necessity without

the consent of rhe, junior members. See Kalliyani v. Narayana (1805) I.L.K. 9 M. 266 and Raman Menon v. Raman Menon ILR (1900) M. 73.

Junior members are entitled to recover on behalf of the family property improperly alienated by the manager Anantan v. Sankaran ILR (1890) M.

In other words the right to maintenance in a Malabar Tarwad is the mode in which the right of ownership is enforced.

As no one can enforce partition between the members and as it is the practice for ail the members to live together in the same house, all are

generally maintained in the Tarwad house by the Kama van in whom the right of management is vested and one of whose primary duties is to

maintain all the junior members according to the means of the family. The manager who is also the protector of the other members and the guardian

in law of those who are minions has not only considerable discretion in his management of the property and the use of it for the benefit of the

members but also considerable disciplinary power in the government of the household. To him must fall the allotment of the quarters of each of the

members and if the family house is insufficient for the residence of all, the allotment of a separate house to some of them, As the governor of a

family sometimes consisting of numerous members he would naturally distribute also the work of the family and would have the powers of

correction over the members. But this right of his as the head of the family co-exists with the rights of all the members as legal owners of the family

property and the latter cannot be allowed to be seriously prejudiced by the former,--see Teyyan Nair v. Raghavan Nair ILR (1881) M. 171. The

law regulating the right of junior members to maintenance has been gradually developed in the decisions of the court and it is necessary to state the

position in which it now. stands. In the earlier cases it was sometimes stated that the right of a member is only to be maintained in the family house

and that he has no right to maintenance if he resided elsewhere. But it will be observed that in some of the cases at least this statement was made in

denial of the right of any member to enforce the payment to him separately of a proportionate share of the income. Such a claim was regarded as

an indirect attempt to enforce a right to partition which no member of a Marumakatayam Tarwad possesses.

In A.S. No. 275 of 1858 (Tellicherry) and in A.S. Nos. 238 and 278 of 1860 (Tellicherry) such a claim to an aliquot part of the family income

was negatived by Mr. Holloway. See Moore''s Malabar Law and Custom, pages 124 and 125. The statement that a definite share of the income

cannot be claimed by a junior member is no doubt coupled in one of these cases, A.S. No. 275 of 1858, with the statement that the junior

members aie not entitled to be supported out of the family house from the family property.'' But it is doubtful whether the learned Judge intended to

lay down any such rigorous rule, for, in another case where also a proportionate share of the income was claimed by some junior members of the

family, after negativing such a right, he abstained from decisively laying down that no member had a right1 to be maintained out of the family

house,--see Moore, p. 125. The last case came up to the High Court in appeal and in dismissing the appeal Frere J. gave expression to the dictum

that the members individually are only entitled to maintenance in the family house and the doctrine of the English equity as to the right of cestui que

trust to call for an account has no application to a case like the present- Kunnigaratu v. Arrangaden (1864) 2 M. H.C.R. 12. It will be observed

that the denial of the right to an account does not necessarily lead to a denial of the right to some portion of the income for maintenance outside the

family house. Frere J. proceeded to explain his concurrence in the judgment of Mr. Holloway who, as already pointed out, did not decide that

there would be no right to separate maintenence. The next reported case--Subbu Heggade v. Torgu (1869) 4 M. H.C.R. 196 -was one from the

South Canara Distri ct and the parties were governed by the Aliyasantana Law. There the plaintiff, a female member of the family, sued on behalf

of herself and her children and grandchildren for maintenance both past and future. She was living with her husband in her houst; her claim was

resisted on the ground that she was entitled to no maintenance during the lifetime of her husband who was bound lo provide for her according to

the usage obtaining in South Canara. The Subordinate Judge negatived this contention and gave the plaintiff a decree. The Civil Judge on appeal

held that an Aliyasantana husband was bound to support his wife and children, but confirmed the decree awarding the plaintiff''s maintenance from

the family property. The special appeal was heard by Scotland C.J. and Ellis J. They dismissed the plaintiff''s suit. They held that "" the suit was

.obviously not brought to recover the necessary means of support but to obtain under the name of maintenance the separate enjoyment of a portion

of the income of the property equivalent to the share of it which the plaintiff had failed to recover by her suit for a division. The claim in the plaint is

very similar to that in the case of Kunnigaratu v. Arrangaden (1864) 2 M.H.C.R. 12, in which the suit was held not to be maintainable on the

ground that it was an attempt to obtain indirectly relief which the plaintiff could not obtain directly."" They then proceeded to consider whether the

plaintiff could claim maintenance. They observe that "" no decision could be based on any custom applicable to the parties "" and that the case

should be decided "" on the reasonable effect to be given to the Aliyasantana Law in regard to the rights of the family collectively and individually in

the family property and to the nature of the marriage relation."" Reference is made to Bhutala Pandia''s work according to which no member has a

right to partition and the possession and control of the property belongs exclusively to the manager.

They then observe : ""So far the law appears to be settled and imports clearly, we think the presentation of the unity of the family as the only

effectual mode of securing to the members severally a full share of the beneficial enjoyment to the joint estate-The obvious effect of allowing one or

more members to quit the family and live apart on a portion of the income of the estate sufficient to support a position and enjoyment by the other

members would be to reduce the benefit of the family in a greater or less degree according to the number of members who might choose to live

separately on such allowances and nearly as much so as by appropriating the shares in the corpus of the property on a division. It seems to us,

therefore, that the pecuniary beneficial interest of the members individually in the family property is in its nature incompatible with the separation

from the family.'' No objection can be taken to the statement that no member can claim either a proportionate share of the income or a sufficient

portion to enable him to maintain the same position outside the family as those who live in the family house do, for obviously it would cost more to

support a person singly on the same scale or comfort than it would do if he lived in the family residence. But this does not logically lead to the

conclusion that a member living away from the family is not entitled to any thing out of the property for his maintenance. The judgment then refers

to a passage relied on by the plaintiff in the suit from Bhutala Pandya''s work which provides that "" if misunderstandings arise between the elder and

younger sisters, the elder shall provide the younger with a house and household articles."" Ahbaku v. Ammu Chetti ILR (1880) M. 282 is also

referred to as well as a statement by Mr Strange in his "" Manual of Malabar Law "" where the author says "" Females, whether in alliance with males

or not, reside in their own families."" It need hardly be observed that Mr. Strange''s statement does no more (than state the social practice of

females residing in the Tar wad house and in no way supports the inference, that if they live with their husbands they are not entitled to

maintenance. The learned Judges finally say that a wife''s residence with her husband must be treated as a separation from the family, as the union

between the sexes according to the Aliyasantana Law is not a marriage but concubine and refer to the practice in Malabar of women continuing to

live in their Tarwads without residing with their husbands. They state that it will probably be found that the general law would impose an obligation

on an Aliyasantana husband to support his wife and children but do not rest their judgment on that ground. As the learned Judges expressly base

their judgment on inference to be drawn from the principles of Aliyasantana L,aw it may be permissible to point out with all respect that neither the

social custom of married women living in their family house nor the absence of a right to an action for a definite share of the family income would

seem to support the conclusion that a woman has no right to maintenance at all when she lives with her husband in his own house. The decision

does not expressly deal with the right of male members to live outside of the family house for purposes of work, education or other good causes.

In Peru Nayar v. Ayyappen Nair ILR (1880) M. 282 Kernan and Muthusawmi Iyer JJ held that where a Karnavan has been the cause of quarrels

which necessitates a member leaving the family house he weuld be entitled to separate maintenance. The same rule would apparently apply even

though the quarrel may not be due to the Karnavan, but a member is obliged to leave the house in consequence of quarrels which the Karnavan is

not able to put an end to. If the Karnavan does not allow a member to live in the family house or in consequence of ill-treatment makes it

impossible or difficult for him to live there, there can hardly be any doubt that separate maintenance will be awarded. A decree for maintenance

was also given where there were several houses belonging to the Tarwad and the claimant lived in one of those houses-C. K. Nalla Kandyil

Parvadi v. C.K Chathu Nambiar ILR (1881) M. 169. It was apparently not thought that the Karnavan had the power in such a case to require any

particular member to live in the Tarwad house and it was considered that.it was not wrong on the part of a member in such a case to live away

from the Tarwad house. A further step was taken in Chekkutti v. Pakki ILR (1889) M. 305 where separate maintenance was allowed to a junior

member not living in the family house but in another house belonging to the Tarwad. The court observed that the Karnavan did not contend that the

plaintiff lived apart from him without his permission and contrary to his wish. But C. K. Nakakandiyil Parvadi v. C. K. Chathu Nambiar ILR

(1881) M. 169 does not recognise any right on the part of the Karnavan to compel the residence of a member in a particular house, where there

are more houses than one belonging to the Tarwad. S.A. 23 of 1882 also recognises a right to separate maintenance where there is no room in the

family house, a question on which apparently the court is at liberty to arrive at its own finding. In Raman v. Ittiyamma (1899) 9 M.I4.J. 153

Subrahrnany a Aiyar and Moore JJ. held that a woman while living with her children in a house belonging to her own Tarwad would not be

disentitled to maintenance by occasionally leaving that house in order to visit her husband in his own house. Mr. Moore, referring to this decision in

his book on Malabtr Law, observes : "" It must be admitted that this decision read with that arrived at in Parvathi v. Komaran ILR (1883) M. 341

leaves the law as to the question in a very doubtful condition. That is, they are not in acccrdance with any strict doctrine of the right to maintenance

being limited to cases where a member lives in the Tarwad house.

Teyyan Nair v. Raghavan Nair ILR (1881) M. 171 is an important decision, for it recognises the principle that the right to maintenance is not

conditional on a member being of good behaviour. The learned JudgesInnes and Tarrant JJ. observe : "" A Tarwad does not differ in this respect

from an ordinary Hindu family the manager of which is not entitled to exclude the members from a right to participation in some portion of the

income of the family property. The Karnavan''s right to require a member to obey him cannot override the latter''s right to maintenance."" In

Krishnan and Another Vs. Govinda Menon and Others, Subrahmanya Aiyar and Moore JJ. held that a junior member was not entitled to be paid

by the Karnavan the expenses incurred by him for being educated in an English school in a place distant from the Tarwad house. The Karnavan

contended that he was not bound to defray the expenses of the plaintiff''s education in the English language and that he was willing to give the

plaintiff such education in his own place as was practicable there. The suit was framed as one for maintenance generally and the question was not

therefore considered whether a person leaving the family house for the purpose of attending a school even though it is not agreed to by the

Karnavan is not entitled to separate maintenance. In Kesava v. Unikkanda ILR (1887) M. 307 Brandt and Parker JJ. held that where the

Karnavan himself had left the family house separate maintenance might be awarded to a junior who does not live there.

The cases cited above show that where there is substantial inconvenience in living in the family house either on account of want of room there or

because there are quarrels which make it uncomfortable to a member to live there, and where there are several houses belonging to the Tarwad

and a member lives in one of them, and where the Karnavan''s conduct had afforded a valid excuse for a member living away from the Tarwad

house, separate maintenance may be awarded. The general result of the decided cases is, in our opinion, that in order that a member of

Marumakkathayam or Aliyasantana Tarwad may be entitled to separate maintenance, he or she should be able to allege some good ground for

doing so. It would be unwise to hold that the decisions up to date have exhausted the list of good grounds which may be urged . It is the

recognised practice in South Canara for a woman and her minor children to live with her husband See Subbu Hegadi v. Tangu (1869) 4 M.H.C.R.

It. is a common practice iti North Malabar and a growing practice in South Malabar. See Parvathiv. Kumaran ILR (1883) M. 341. The

interests of social improvement would be against discouraging such a practice. There is no principle in the Marumakkathayam or Aliyasantana law

requiring that it should be discouraged. The only principle which lias ever been relied on against the award of separate maintenance is that the

family properly should not be diminished by such award. But this does not require anything more than that in determining the rate of maintenance

more should not be allowed than would be received by the claimant if he resided in the family house along with its other members. We are not

bound to shut our eyes to the fact that families governed by this"" system of law are often numeious and consists of persons related in very different

degrees of kindred and no social or economical service is done by compelling them all to reside in one house where they have good grounds in not

doing so. Several cases have come up to this court which show that in the houses of Rajas and other well-to-do Tarwads, it is the rule to allow

separate maintenance. If a member lives away from the Tarwad house for an improper purpose that would be a good ground for refusing .

separate maintenance. What purposes are proper and what improper may be safely left to the decisions of courts. It may happen that the husband

of a woman is not able to support her fully. To force her to live in the Tarwad house in such a case under the penalty of being refused all

maintenance can only be a disadvantage both to her and to the Tarwad. Similarly where a member willing to earn a part of his maintenance by

doing elsewhere work which may not be available near his own house, it would equally be a disadvantage in such a case both to him and to his

family if maintenance from the family income were altogether withheld from him. It is not alleged in this case that any of the plaintiffs Nos. 4 to 15

was living away from the family residence for a purpose which can be regarded as otherwise than proper. The suit is one for past maintenance and

in such a case it would no doubt be open to the court to infer from the conduct of any of the plaintiffs that hear she waived the right to maintenance

during any portion of the period in question. It may be sufficient to show that the conduct of the party was such as to lead to a reasonable inference

of waiver of any claim for maintenance against the Ejamauathi; on this point see Raja Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasad Nayadu v. Raja Yarlagadda

Durga Prasada Nayadu ILR (1900) M. 147. In the absence of such waiver the right to maintenance cannot be refused. The District Munsif was

certainly wrong in dividing the total income of the property into as many shares as there are members, and in awarding 15/40 th share to the

plaintiffs on the principle of an equal share to each member. The Karnavan has to defray the expenses of all ceremonies in the family. He has to

keep up the house and other family properties. The principles on which maintenance should be calculated are laid down in the judgment of this

court in Narayam v. Govinda ILR (1884) M. 352 and Kunhammatha v. Kunhi Kutti Ali ILR (1883) M 233 . On the conclusion we have come to,

it will be necessary for the lower appellate court to decide whether the defendant left the family house as alleged by the plaintiffs. But the question

how long any of the plaintiffs resided away from the family house and the circumstances under which he or she did so will have to be decided in

order that a conclusion may be come to on the question to maintenance for the period in question or any portion thereof can be held to have been

waived by any or all of the plaintiffs.

With these observations we reverse the decree of the lower appellate court and remand the appeal for fresh disposal in the light of our remarks.

The costs in this court will abide the result.