Marina Ammayi vs (Changanti) Sundayya and Others

Ramesam, J.—This appeal arises out of a suit brought on the foot of a mortgage bond dated 5th December 1906 (Ex. A) executed by

defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is a Kamma woman aged 55. According to the terms of the mortgage bond Rs. 6,000 were

borrowed and they were to be repaid in six annual instalments of Rs. 1,000 each on the first April of each year beginning with 1908 and ending

with 1913. The rate of interest in the first instance is 12 per cent per annum but the deed provides that if two consecutive instalments remained

unpaid the entire principal and interest outstanding due at the time shall, without reference to future instalments, be recoverable together with

interest thereon at 15 per cent per annum from the date of default till the date of payment. The mortgaged property comprises 763 acres in

different villages in the East Godaveri District. By a sale-deed dated 17th March 1908 (Ex. B) the mortgagor sold the equity of redemption in 757

acres and one cent in five of the villages of the mortgaged property to five persons;. (1) Falloori Sathayya, (2) Marina Sooranna, (3) Marina

Veeranna, (4) Pathoori Kannamma and (5) Yeriagadda Manikyam. Of these 5 persons the second and the third are the sons of the mortgagee

under Ex. A., the fourth and the fifth are the daughters of that mortgagee; and the first is the father-in-law of the third, that is Marina Veeranna.

These five entered into a kind of agricultural partnership. They purchased the 757 acres and after carrying on some agricultural operations they

settled their accounts and sometime in 1909 and 1910,. divided the purchased properties between themselves and also settled their accounts in

connexion with their liabilities relating to the purchase and the subsequent agricultural operations. The sale-deed was for Rs. 28,000 which

consisted of Rs. 6,918, the mortgage amount due to the plaintiff under Ex. A, Rs. 13,082, paid before the Sub-Registrar and Rs. 8,000

represented by a promissory-note Ex. B (1) of the same date. The evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 shows there was a division of the lands in 1909 and

1910 and lists of shares (vatala jabitalu) were drawn up in connexion with the said divisions but apart from the division of the lands, it appears

there was a settlement of their accounts showing how much each had to contribute originally, how much has been already contributed and for how

much more each sharer remained liable. The main liability was in equal shares. Where the contributions made by each person are unequal, the

balance which would still remain due will also be unequal. That some such settlement took place prior to 1911 is the case of both parties. The

plaintiff''s case on this matter was not expressly set forth in the plaint but was developed in the course of the trial, but defendants 2, 4 and 5

pleaded it in their written statement. Para. 5 of their written statement runs thus:

The vendees agreed at the time of their sale to discharge the mortgage bond in accordance with their specific shares. The plaintiff also consented to

the same; and subsequently each of the sharers paid off their share of the mortgage debt from time to time and the suit bond is fully discharged....

The accounts were looked into and the bonds were treated as fully discharged and was so entered in plaintiff''s accounts.

It is clear that this paragraph in the written statement shows that the partners settled their accounts inter se. No date is given in the written

statement as to when this took place or what the result of the settlement was. The paragraph only alleges:

These defendants are informed and submit that a sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid in full discharge on or about 21st April 1911 to the plaintiff by the late

Valloori Sathayya.

This sentence implies that sometime prior to 21st April 1911 the share of Valloori Sathayya, one of the vendees also was determined and that

amounted to Rs. 200 by 21st April 1911 and that was paid at or about that time. The plaintiff''s case is that the amounts due from the various

sharers as settled in 1910 were unequal, that the amount due from Valloori Sathayya was about Rs. 3,759, that the amounts allotted to the other

sharers were all paid off to the plaintiff and that after giving credit to those various amounts paid by the other sharers she brings the present suit to

recover the amount remaining due.

It may now be convenient to describe the various defendants. Defendant 1 is the original mortgagor. Defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of Valloori

Sathayya; defendants 4 and 5 are the sons of defendant 2 so that defendants 2 to 5 now represent Valloori Sathayya. Defendants 6 and 10 are the

daughters of the plaintiff. Defendants 8 and 9 are her sons. Defendant 7, is the purchaser of some of the items of the mortgaged property and his

case will be dealt with later on.

The properties originally mortgaged under Ex. A are set forth in Schedule A to the plaint and the properties which fell to the share of Valloori

Sathayya in the division between the five purchasers are set forth in Schedule A (1). Para. 9 of the plaint says that the plaintiff has given up the

mortgage right in all the properties other than those in Schedule A (1) and wishes to recover the amount now due only from the properties in

Schedule A (1), and when it is remembered that the properties in Schedule A (1) are those that fell to the share of defendants 2 to 5, this means

that the plaintiff wants to get a decree only against defendants 2 to 5 and to exonerate the other defendants, who therefore are only pro forma

defendants so far as the plaintiff is concerned, for it is possible that claim for contribution may arise between them and defendants 2 to 5.

Defendants 2, 4 and 5 filed one written statement and the defendant 3 filed a separate written statement adopting the written statement of

defendants 2, 4 and 5. I have already set forth para. 5 of the written statement of defendants 2, 4 and 5.

The cause of action for the suit having arisen on 1st April 1909 according to the terms of the mortgage bond, and the suit having been filed on

2nd October 1922, it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege in the plaint how the suit is within time. Accordingly she alleges in para. 4 that Valloori

Sathayya and defendants 6, 8, 9, 10 made a payment of Rs. 1,386, on 1st October 1910 (which was wrongly described in Ex. A as 31st

September 1910, the parties not being conversant with the correct number of days in September). The plaintiff also alleges that defendant 10 made

another payment of Rs. 1,396-10-0 on a day which purports to be 2nd October 1910 but which must be taken to be really 3rd October 1910 on

the footing that the parties thought that September consisted of 31 days. Then she mentions four payments in 1912, 1915, 1917 and 1919 by

defendant 8. There is another payment of Rs. 3,100 by defendant 6 on 26th September 1922. Thus altogether seven payments are alleged in para.

All the seven payments are endorsed on the mortgage bond and in para. 11 of the plaint it is alleged that the suit will be within time if filed within

12 years of the first payment by Sathayya, namely the payment on 1st October 1910, but as 1st October 1922 was a holiday the plaint was filed

on 2nd October. This paragraph reads as if the plaintiff thought that only the payment by Sathayya on 31st September 1910 (that is 1st October

1910) will save the suit from being barred by limitation and that the other payments will not avail her for saving limitation. If the second payment on

2nd October 1910 is relied on, by the plaintiff, the suit is just within time and it is unnecessary to refer to the fact that 1st October 1922 was a

holiday; if the latter payments are relied on the suit is a fortiori within time; but none of these was relied on. This was because the first payment was

made on behalf of all the partners including Sathayya, whereas the other payments were made only by the individual sharers and Sathayya was not

one of them. In the written statement of defendants 2, 4 and 5 they pleaded that the first payment of 31st September 1910 is a forgery and as to

the other payments and endorsements they pleaded they were not true. This obviously means not that the other payments were forgeries, for it is

expressly admitted before us that the endorsements were written and signed by the persons who purport to write and sign them, but that they were

not true payments. These other sharers are sons and daughters of the plaintiff and there is no need for forging such payments, for the plaintiff is

claiming no relief against them. The suggestion on behalf of defendants 2, 4 and 5 is that the plaintiff and other defendants were colluding and those

endorsements were collusive endorsements.

The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on two grounds, first that the endorsement of 31st September 1910 was not genuine and secondly

that the mortgage document was not validly registered as a small item of property, 10 cents in extent, not belonging to the mortgagor was included

in it to procure registration at a place other than the proper place of registration and therefore the transaction constituted a fraud on the law of

registration. The plaintiff appeals In appeal both the points decided by the Subordinate Judge were argued very elaborately by the learned

advocate on both sides.

I first take the question of registration. The mortgaged properties comprise certain extents situated in Katrenikona, Naimmakayala Kotapalli,

Vuppalaguptam and Munipalli and 10 cents of land in Daksharama all these are ryotwari lands and certain other lands (Inam) of about 7 acres

situated in three other villages. All the villages being in the Godaveri District, the document could be registered in the headquarters of the district,

namely Cocanada, but this requires a small additional registration fee beyond the fee to be paid in the Sub-Registrar''s office; but if the document

has to be registered in a Sub-Registrar''s office with reference to the ryotwari lands, excluding the 10 cents in Daksharama, it may be registered

either in Mummidivaram or Amallapur and with reference to the inam lands it can be registered in Kothapatta; but as a matter of fact it was

registered in Daksharama. The parties were able to do this by including the 10 cents in Daksharama. The plaintiff was a resident of Velangi. It is

said that the plaintiff wanted to register the document in Daksharama because she did not want to carry the large sum of money of Rs. 6,000 to the

other three places mentioned which require the crossing of a branch of the river Godaveri, but it appears from the evidence (P.W. 2) and the map

of the Godaveri district also that Cocanada is not more distant from the plaintiff''s village than Daksharama. No false addition need be made if the

document is registered at Cocanada but it requires small additional payment. There is no purpose therefore in resorting to any fraud on the

registration law. But apart from this the defendants must show that the item in Daksharama does not belong to the mortgagor and was included in

the document, the mortgagee knowing that it did not belong to the mortgagor and not intending to take it as security. There is no question of the

non-existence of the ten cents of land as is the case in Harendra Lal Roy v. Haridasi Debi AIR 1914 P.C. 67. The story given by the defendants''

witnesses, D. Ws. 2, 4 and 5 is that the plaintiff was represented in the transaction by her husband and her son-in-law, P.W. 2. It was they that

desired that the document should be registered in Daksharama; the mortgagor said he had no lands at Daksharama: then it was the plaintiff''s men

that suggested that the land of 10 cents belonging to Dinavahi Murthiraju (D.W. 4) should be included in the document. The suggestion is that this

land of 10 cents really belonged to Murthiraju and that this was known to the plaintiff''s men. But the whole of this story was not put to P.W. 2 in

his cross-examination. It was not suggested in the cross-examination of P.W. 2 that the land belonged to Murthiraju, that the fact was known to

3?. W. 2 or that afterwards the whole thing was brought to the knowledge of ''the plaintiff. The whole case was devedoped only in the evidence of

D. W. 2. The written statement itself gave no indication of the ownership of the land. D. Ws. 4 and 5 were examined to prove that the land

belonged to their family, in 1911, there was a partition in their family and that in the partition it fell to the share of the elder brother''s son of D. Ws.

4 and 5 who are brothers. The alleged present owner of the land, that is the elder brother''s son of D. Ws. 4 and 5 is not examined. No document

is produced to show that the land fell to his share. The partition is said to be oral. It is very difficult to test such evidence as it is easily produced. D.

W. 4 married the niece of defendant 1. Defendants 1 to 5 appear by the same vakil who is the brother-in-law of D. W. 4. Though no reflection is

intended to be made by these observations against the vakil, it is clear that defendant 1 has for some reason made common cause with defendants

2 to 5 and he and his brother-in-law have given evidence to help them.

The Subordinate Judge in his appreciation of the evidence on this matter has made the serious mistake of supposing that all the properties

mortgaged under Ex. A except the 10 cents in question were sold under Ex. B. This is a mistake. The seven acres and odd of inam lands situated

in three villages were not included in Ex. B and were reserved by the mortgagor and there is nothing strange in 10 cents of land in Daksharama

being also reserved by the mortgagor. There is nothing convincing to show that the 10 cents of land did not belong to the mortgagor; but, assuming

that it really did not belong to the mortgagor, there is nothing to show that this fact was known to the plaintiff or that the plaintiff never intended to

take this item as security. The observation of the Privy Council in Biswanatha Prasad v. Chandra Narayana AIR 1921 P.C. 8

This case differs tota caelo from the case suggested in argument of a mere failure to make a good title to property dealt with by the instrument, and

which both parties had intended should form part of the security

is in favour of the plaintiff and does not help the defendants. That observation shows that, even if the mortgagor''s title to the property was not

made out, if it appears that it is intended to be taken as security the document is still valid. In that case, it was expressly found as a fact by Cox, J.,

in the High Court, with which the Privy Council agreed, that the parties never intended that the share of Kolhua should really be sold to Udit

Narayan or mortgaged to Polai Lal. Oral evidence suggesting fraud on the law of registration is easily given and difficult to refute by the opposite

side and it should be scrutinised with great care and if it is convincing it must be given effect to, but where it is suspicious the contention must be

disallowed. Here I may observe that the evidence of D. W. 4 is that he said that he had no objection to his land being included in Ex. A is very

improbable and must be taken to be false. Prior to 1911, it was the joint family property of himself and his elder brother, and assuming he was the

manager, why should he allow the property of his family to be mortgaged in a transaction between his wife''s maternal uncle (defendant l) and the

plaintiff His evidence almost implies that the title has vested in defendant 1 by estoppel and after his not raising the objection the property must be

regarded as having passed to defendant 1. But whether this is so or not his evidence is so improbable that one finds a great difficulty in believing it.

What is the reason for his being so altruistic? I am unable to believe D.Ws. 2, 4 and 5. I therefore differ from the conclusion of the Subordinate

Judge on this matter and hold that it has not been shown that the plaintiff was aware of the fact, if it was a fact at all, that the 10 cents of land did

not belong to the mortgagor and that she was a party to: any fraud on the Registration Law. Issue 2 must therefore be found in favour of the

plaintiff.

I now come to the main and substantial point in the ease, which is, whether there is any sum still remaining due under Ex. A, the plea of the

contesting defendants being that it was wholly discharged, and whether the suit is barred by limitation. I will first discuss the latter question, namely,

whether the suit is barred by limitation. (After discussing the evidence as to the genuineness of the endorsement A-1 dated 31st September 1910,

his Lordship proceeded.) The result is that I find Ex. A-1 to be genuine and that the suit is not barred by limitation against defendants 2 to 5.

In the result I have to allow the appeal against 2 to 5, but the question arises, to what sum is the plaintiff entitled? The sum claimed in the plaint

is made out on the footing of the terms of the mortgage bond, that is, the plaintiff calculated interest at the rate of 15 per cent. on the total sum of

principal and interest due on 1st April 1909 up to date giving credit to the various payments, the seven payments mentioned in Ex. A but it is easy

to see that this imposes a larger burden on defendants 2 to 5 than they should bear at any rate according to the settlement in Ex. F as between the

partners. The settlement in Ex. F was made on the footing that interest should be calculated after 1st April 1909 at 12 and not 15 per cent. As I

have already remarked, it is only in this way that Ex. P supports Ex. A-l. Now seeing that there are two penal clauses in Ex. A, namely the clause

making the whole amount claimable on default of payment of two instalments and another clause raising the rate of interest the stipulation is

obviously penal, within the meaning of Section 74, Contract Act, and the parties who made the calculations under Ex. F were probably right in

thinking that the provisions would not be given effect to in Court of law, nor would the plaintiff herself being a close relation of all the parties

enforce it with all its strictness. As a matter of construction of document I think the plaintiff is entitled only to the sum due on Ex. A with interest

from 1st April 1909 at 12 per cent. per annum, This gives compensation both for failure to pay the instalment regularly and for failure to pay the

interest due up to 1st April 1909. But the present calculation in the plaint is made on the footing of 15 per cent. from 1st April 1909. The claim for

the larger interest must be disallowed. It may be said on behalf of the plaintiff that there is no issue on the matter,, but even without an issue, with

reference to Section 74, Contract Act, I think we have-got jurisdiction to cut down the rate of interest as the point does not require for its decision

any oral evidence. But apart from this consideration, there is"" this fact that the parties have calculated at the rate of 12 per cent in Ex. F and the

plaintiff seems to have adopted that calculation and consented to take the various allotments in that paper from the several partners as showing

their proper liability.

The first payment, namely, Ex.. A-I is a joint payment, but after the 1st October the various payments were by the respective persona, liable to

pay them. The second payment of 2nd October of Rs. 1,396-10-0 was by defendant 10 and that refers to "" her share "" of the mortgage money. I

have already mentioned the fact that the payments of 1912, 1915, 1917 and 1919 exactly agree with the allotment made for defendants 8th and

9th after due allowance is made for interest and the last endorsement of 1922 represents the payments of defendant 6. In a simple case of

mortgage by several mortgagors if each mortgagor makes a certain payment in pursuance of an agreement between the mortgagors and the

mortgagee merely takes it as a payment towards the mortgage bond, it cannot be said that the mortgagee had agreed to the division inter se of the

various-shares between the mortgagors; but this is not a simple case of the kind. In the circumstances of this case I think the plaintiff has agreed to

the splitting up of the original liability into several liabilities of the various partners and her consciousness that the endorsement of 31st September

1910 in Ex. A-1 is necessary to prove the claim against defendants 2, 4 and 5 also shows that she recognized the division between the sharers. All

the circumstances of the case probabilise this conclusion. I therefore think that the plaintiff is not entitled to the sum prayed for but to a lesser

amount. After the figure of Rs. 7,672 mentioned in the plaint schedule the calculation of interest must be made at 12 per cent instead of 15 per

cent. The sum arrived at in this way would be Rs. 3,759-1-0, shown as due by Sathayya in Ex. P. This sum shall carry interest at 12 per cent per

annum from 1st October 1910 to the date fixed for payment (8th July 1929) and after that the consolidated amount shall carry interest at 6 per

cent. As the amount is large we will give seven months'' time for payment. The plaintiff will pay and receive proportionate costs throughout.

After I finished the above judgment, I had the advantage of reading ray brother''s judgment. I find I have overlooked the point argued by the

advocate for the respondents viz., that the date of endorsement does not avail u/s 20, Lim. Act but the date of actual payment. I agree with my

learned brother''s judgment on this point. As to defendant 7, the item purchased by him is not included in the Schedule A-1 and the appeal must be

dismissed as against him on this ground.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

This is a suit instituted on 2nd October 1922 on a mortgage (Ex. A) dated 5th December 1906 for Rs. 6,000. Defendant 1 is the mortgagor,

and no relief is claimed against him. Defendant 7 was impleaded on the ground that he was in possession of a part of the property mortgaged. The

other defendants are persons entitled to the equity of redemption at the date of the suit. On 17th March 1908, by Ex. B, the bulk of the property

mortgaged was purchased from the mortgagor by five persons.

Valluru Sathayya, the predecessor in title of defendants 2 to 5, who died some time previous to the suit. 2. Defendant 6, a daughter of the

plaintiff. 3. Defendant 10, another daughter. 4, Defendant 8, the son of the plaintiff. (He married the daughter of Valluru Sattayya). 5. Defendant 9,

another son.

The five purchasers continued to be an joint enjoyment of the properties purchased and they entered into a partition in 1909 and 1910. The

plaintiff exhone rates in the suit, her sons and daughters and seeks to recover the amount due, by the sale of the properties that fell at the partition

to the share of Valluru Sathayya. Defendants 2 to 5, his sons and grandsons, pleaded first, that the mortgage was fully discharged and secondly

that the suit was barred by limitation. There was a further plea taken that the mortgage bond was inoperative for want of proper registration. The

learned Subordinate Judge held that registration was obtained by fraud and that the suit was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit on both

these grounds. In regard to the discharge pleaded, he found against the defence and held that the plea was not made out.

I shall first deal with the question of limitation. In so doing, I shall also deal with the plea of discharge, as to a certain extent, both the defences

rest on the same facts. By the sale-deed Ex. B the purchasers agreed with the vendor (defendant 1) to pay up the amount due to the plaintiff and

discharge the mortgage. The consideration for the sale, namely, Rs. 28,000 was thus made up:

Rs. 6,918 due upon the mortgage

to the plaintiff.

"" 13,082 cash paid before the

Sub-Registrar.

"" 8,000 amount of the promis-

sory note executed by

the purchasers in fav-

our of the defendant 1.

-------------

� 28,000

-------------

The case of the plaintiff is, that just on the eve of the final winding up of the concern by the five sharers, they made a joint payment on 1st

October 1910, of Rs. 1,386 towards the interest due on the mortgage, that it was endorsed on the back of the bond and that the date appearing

against the endorsement the 31st September 1910 is a mistake for the 1st October. The endorsement (Ex. A-l) purports to have been signed inter

alia by Valluru Sathayya. His representatives, defendants 2 to 5, attack the signature as a forgery. One of the main questions to be decided in the

suit is, is this a genuine endorsement? It is part of the plaintiff''s case, that at the winding up referred to, the several sharers agreed to discharge the

plaintiff''s debt, each by paying a certain specified sum-the amount depending on the state of the account between the cosharers. it is said that this

agreement was in fact carried out by all excepting Sathayya. On the mortgage-deed, there are various endorsements of payments said to have

been accordingly made subsequent to the partition.

They bear the following dates:

(1) 2nd October 1910, (2) 15th October 1912, (3) 21st July 1915, (i) 12th July 1917, (5) 13th September 1919, (6) 26th September 1922.

The first of these is alleged to relate to a payment by defendant 10. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th are said to relate to payments by defendant 8.

The 6th is alleged to refer to a payment by defendant 6.

Though the plaintiff relied in her plaint generally, upon all the endorsements noted above to save her claim from the bar of limitation, she more

or less con-fined herself at the trial to the endorsement dated 31st September 1910, and the evidence that was adduced almost exclusively related

to that endorsement. That was the only endorsement to which Sathayya was said to be a party and the plaintiff seems to have thought that to get a

decree against the latter''s representatives, the genuineness of that endorsement must be established. (Here his Lordship discussed at length the

evidence on this point and then proceeded). I have come to the conclusion that Ex. A-1 is genuine and that Sathayya signed it.

A long paragraph in the judgment exclusively deals with the motive for the suit. Many of the matters to which the learned Judge has adverted

seem, in my opinion, to be irrelevant. Between the family of Sathayya and that of the plaintiff, there was continued litigation from about 1919; but

from that fact, it seems to be unsafe to draw any inference. That is, of course, a reason for our scrutinizing the evidence with great care. Although

the nature and history of the quarrels has been fully dealt with at the Bar, it is quite unnecessary to refer to them in detail in this judgment. The fact

that emerges is, that there were disputes both of a civil and criminal nature; in some cases, they ended in favour of the plaintiff''s family and in some,

in favour of Sathayya''s. I desire only to make a few-remarks in regard to this aspect of the case. In discussing the evidence on this point, the

learned Judge says, that in the litigation between defendants 2 and 8, the former uniformly won and he suggests that this suit is in the nature of a

counterblast. On an analysis of the various events, this statement has been shown to-be quite wrong, and the learned Counsel for the respondent

has had to admit this. Then again, the Judge observes, referring to a certain agreement, that was "" brought into existence "" by defendant 8,,

suggesting thereby, that it was a forgery. There is no justification in the evidence for this statement and what is more important is, that agreement,

impeached as a forgery by defendant 2''s wife; has since been found by Courts to be absolutely-genuine. If from this episode an inference is to be

drawn, that can be not against the plaintiff, but against the defence; but I do not propose to take this into consideration and my only reason for

referring to the quarrels is, to show that the learned Judge allowed his bias against the plaintiff to influence his mind The misunderstandings may

show either that the suit is false or the defence unfounded, and they cannot furnish any proper-grounds for judgment.

Mr. C. Rama Row, for the respondent, has contended before us for the first time-that the endorsement (Ex A-l) is not in law sufficient to take

the debt out of the statute. He says, that on the plaintiff''s own showing, the payment was made long before the endorsement and argues that, on

that account, the suit is barred by limitation. True, u/s 20, Lim. Act, the period has to be computed from the time when the payment is made. What

happened in this case? Though the actual payment was on a previous date,, the parties on the date in question agreed to treat it as a payment of

interest towards the bond. I have already dealt, with the evidence on the point. Some amounts had been paid out of joint funds to Gangaraju on

behalf of the plaintiff. There was thus a sum due by the plaintiff to the five cosharers. On 1st October, an account was taken of the sum due by the

plaintiff, interest was added and it was found that Rs. 1,396-10-0 was the. total sum due by her to the debtors, that is, the mortgagor''s

representatives. It was for the first time on that date, that the parties agreed that the debt due by the plaintiff was to be treated as a payment

towards interest under the mortgage bond. It is unnecessary u/s 20 that money should actually pass, for a settlement of account may be as effectual

as a real payment. In, fact a transaction, whereby the parties agree that an amount previously due by the creditor to the debtor shall be treated as

amount paid by the latter to the former, is in substance identical with a transaction where the debtor receives actual payment and pays the amount

back to the creditor. This is exactly what happened in the present case. I have no doubt that this is the correct view to be taken of the law and the

respondent''s contention, therefore, fails. I may note in this connexion that if the evidence on this lacks details, it is not the plaintiff''s fault. In the

plaint, it is distinctly alleged that the payment was made on 1st October, and the point now raised was not taken in the written statement or at the

trial in the Court below.

Further, the endorsement, on a proper construction, amounts, to an acknowledgment of liability u/s 19; and the plaintiff has referred in her

plaint to Section 19 as well as Section 20.

The trial proceeded in the lower Court on the footing that the question of limitation was to be decided solely with reference to Ex. A-l. The

plaintiff accordingly made no attempt to prove the other endorsements on the bond excepting that of 2nd October, 1910. There is sufficient

evidence to hold that the last mentioned endorsement is proved, although the plaintiff did not consciously seek to prove that endorsement. In the

view I have taken, that Ex. A-1 is genuine, I do not propose to consider the other endorsements in the case or their effect more especially,

because there has been no argument before us on the point.

The next point that has to be considered is, whether the registration of the bond was not legal on the ground that it was a fraud on the

registration law. On this point again, as I have said, the finding of the lower Court is against the plaintiff and I regret, that after a careful

consideration of the evidence, I am unable to agree with that finding. The mortgage-deed comprised several items, which may be grouped under

four headings.

Lands in one block, at Nimmakayala Kothapalli, Nunipalli, Pedagadavalli and Uppalaguptam. Extent acres 218-18 cents.

Another block of lands, in Katrene-konda. Extent acres 537-62 cents.

Inams in Palivela, Komarajulanka and Devarapalli, acres 7-75 cents.

Daksharamam 10 cents.

The case put forward by the defence in their pleading is, that defendant 1 to his knowledge as well as that of the mortgagee, was not the owner

of item 4. It was further pleaded:

The said item is a fictitious and unidentifiable piece of property.

It was included in the mortgage solely with the object of getting the mortgage bond registered at Daksharamam. This was the defence that was put

forward in the written statement; but at the trial, one part of it was abandoned. The case that item 4 was a fictitious and nonexistent item, was given

up. The only contention that was pressed was, that defendant 1 was not the owner of the property. Has this contention been made out? The

mortgagor, defendant 1, was examined and he said that the property belonged not to him, but his nephews, who in their turn, gave evidence as D.

Ws. 4 and 5 and confirmed that statement. They had to admit that there was not a particle of documentary evidence to show that they were the

owners. Nothing was more easy for the uncle than to suggest that the item belonged to the nephew. It was to their interest to support that

statement and I regard their evidence as worthless in the absence of any writing to prove their ownership. The nephews, be it noted, are kurnams,

and what prevented them from showing by producing revenue records that they were enjoying the land? Then again, it was D. W. 4, that arranged

the mortgage transaction and it was D. W. 5 that wrote out the mortgage-deed. Is it likely that if that item was their property, they would have

allowed it to be included, to their detriment, in the mortgage executed by their uncle?

Suppose that the dispute was between defendant 1 and his nephews. Would not the fact, that they willingly allowed the property to be

described as belonging to the uncle, be a strong piece of evidence in his favour? And in the absence of any title deed or other documentary

evidence would not that fact be almost conclusive evidence? In my opinion it is an idle contention that the property belonged to the nepews.

Let us now examine the case put forward by the defence as regards how this happened. If this item had not been included, the proper

registration office would have been either that of Amalapuram or Mummidivaram or Kothapetta. The plaintiff, it is suggested, was unwilling to

cross the river with money, to either of these three places. So it was, that a piece of land at Draksharaman was included, to give the Sub-Registrar

jurisdiction. According to the mortgagor, this is what happened:

I said I have no land there. Then they said that some land belonging to Murthraju (D. W. 4) could be included and the document registered at

Drakaharaman. I said I do not know about that and if they arranged that with Murthiraju, I had no objection.

Murthiraju, as D. W. 4, supports the statement and adds:

I did not object to our 10 cents being included in Ex. A.

The document was written at this man''s house and as I have said, the writer was his brother, D. W. 5. The motive suggested is thus one of

convenience. It is admitted that there was another place, Cocanada, where the document could have been validly registered without the inclusion

of this item. It is further admitted that Cocanada and Draksharaman are equidistant from Velangi, the plaintiff''s place. The reason for not choosing

Cocanada (so it is said) is to save a paltry sum of a few rupees, for the registration fee at Cocanada is slightly more than at Draksharaman. When,

two years after the mortgage, the property was sold by Ex. B, it is common ground, that the money was carried across the river and the sale-deed

was registered at Amalapur. The persons who had to take the money in 1908 were, as the evidence shows, the same as those that had to carry it

in 1906. The motive suggested for the fraudulent insertion is therefore utterly inadequate.

I have already said that the case set up in the written statement was in part abandoned at the trial. We further find, that when the plaintiff''s

witnesses were cross-examined, the case as presented at the trial was not even indicated. P.W. 2 was asked in cross-examination whether any

attempt was made to find out that defendant 1 had title to this item. Why was not the case of the defence put to him? P.W. 2 was cross-examined

on 30th October and D. W. 2 gave his evidence on 28th November. There was sufficient time for inventing the story to which the defence

witnesses spoke.

The learned Judge says that the mortgagor sold by Ex. B all the items included in Ex. A excepting the 10 cents in question. This, in the Judge''s

words, is, "" conclusive indication "" of the fact that the mortgagor did not own that item. It is not disputed that this is based on a misapprehension.

There were certain items beyond item 4 not included in the sale-deed. What was regarded by the lower Court as a conclusive argument turns out

to be wrong. Next, the respondent''s learned Counsel argued "" that it was admitted "" that before the mortgage the plaintiff did not care to inspect

the 10 cents in question; but it is in evidence that the item 3, inam lands, were likewise not inspected.

It is for the defence to affirmatively make out that the parties committed a fraud. It seems to me that the evidence falls for short of what is

required in a case of this kind. For invalidating a document on this ground, it is not sufficient to show that the mortgagor contemplated a fraud; it

must be further shown that the mortgagee was a party to that fraud. Harendra v. Haridasi. Did the parties intend or not, that the item should form

part of the security? If the parties did, in any event the mortgagee did, then fraud is out of the question: Biswanath Prasad v. Chandra Narayan. It is

not sufficient to render a document invalid that the mortgagor is unable to establish his title to the property. Their Lordships observe in the second

mentioned case:

This case differs toto caelo from the case suggested in argument of a mere failure to make good a title to property dealt with by the instrument and

which both parties had intended should form part of the security.

Even granting that every word of the defence evidence is true what is its effect? There was nothing to prevent the nephews from consenting to

their property forming part of the security. Nor was there anything wrong in the plaintiff including that property in the mortgage. The crucial

question is, as I have said, was the item intended or not to be part of the security? If it was, the nephews would be estopped from disputing that

their property became effectively subject to the mortgage. In Biswanath Prasad v. Chandra Narayan, it was distinctly found that neither the

mortgagor nor the mortgagee intended that the item there in dispute should form part of the security. In the present case, I am satisfied that there

was a clear intention that the security should operate on the fourth item to whomsoever it belonged, although, as I have already said, I have no

hesitation in finding that defendant 1 was its owner. In this connexion, I must mention, that about two weeks after the evidence was closed, the

defendant applied to the lower Court for permission to file a copy of Diglott Register with a view to prove the title to the item in question. This

application was refused, and, in my opinion, rightly. Apart from the reason given by the Judge that there was no explanation for the delay, the

document is most inconclusive on the point. We have been asked to admit it and for the reasons mentioned we have refused to comply with that

request.

The only question that remains is, to what amount is the plaintiff entitled? She now seeks to recover the entire balance, that is, to throw the

whole burden upon defendants 2 to 5. Can she be permitted to do so? The plaintiff''s conduct shows that she agreed to split up the mortgage and

recognize the arrangements embodied in Ex. F by which the debt was apportioned among the various purchasers. The endorsements made on Ex.

A furnish clear evidence of this fact; they contain reference to the amounts severally payable by each of the cosharers. Moreover, Ex. 1, dated

16th September 1922, is conclusive on this point. I am therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff''s claim against these defendants must be limited to

the amount mentioned in Ex. F that is, to Rs. 3,759-1-0 and to the interest thereon. As regards the rate of interest, the plaintiff''s conduct shows

that she cannot claim more than 12 per cent for, it is on this basis, that she alleges, she received the amounts due from the other co-sharers. The

plaintiff is therefore entitled against defendants 2 to 5 to a decree for Rs. 3,759-1-0 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from 1st October 1920

to the date fixed for sale and with interest thereafter at 6 per cent on the aggregate sum.

As regards costs, I think the proper order is, that the plaintiff shall pay and receive proportionate costs throughout. The date for redemption is

8th July 1929. I have said that defendant 7 was impleaded on the ground that he was in possession of some items of the suit property. It was for

the first time discovered by defendant 7''s counsel, almost at the close of the argument before us, that his client is not in possession of any part of

the property and the suit is on that ground dismissed against defendant 7 but without costs.