Maruthi vs Saheb Rao and Others

Jaganmohan Reddy, J.—This is a second appeal against the judgment of the first appellate Court holding that the discharge by one of the joint decree-holders, viz., Lakshmibai, does not discharge the decree fully as against the other joint decree-holder, Sahib Rao, and that any statement of Lakshmibai or finding of the lower Court with respect to Lakshmibai having received the decretal property will be deemed only to affect her share in it and will not bind the right of the other decree-holder Sahib Rao to enforce in execution the decree. The facts as appear from the records are that Lakshmibai had claimed as maintenance for certain produce annually against her husband''s brother, Sahib Rao. In order to settle this dispute both parties chose three Patel Patwaris of the village, viz., Narayan, Jujja and Maruthi, with whom Sahib Rao deposited the produce of his land claimed by Laxmibai pending settlement of the dispute between them. After the produce was deposited, it is alleged there was a settlement between Sahib Rao and Lakshmibai. Thereafter both Sahib Rao and Lakshmibai jointly filed a suit against these three Patel Patwaris for the recovery of the produce deposited with them which was decreed ex parte in their favour. Saheb Rao filed an execution petition and the judgment-debtors contended that they had handed over the grain to Lakshmibai one of the decree-holders in accordance with the compromise. Lakshmibai also filed an application on 13th Azur 1359-F. to the same effect. The question whether the grain was handed over was gone into by the execution Court which after taking evidence held that the grain was handed over to Lakshmibai. The other decree-holder denied having received the produce. The original Court after giving a finding that Lakshmibai had received the grain, held that if one of the joint decree-holders receives the decretal property, the decree against both of them is deemed to have been satisfied. The first appellate Court has, as already observed, held that this was not so, and basing its reasons on ''AIR 1935 Nag. 25 in the case of Ramakrishna v. Shanker, had come to the conclusion that the decree in so far as Lakshmibai was concerned was satisfied, but to the extent of the halfshare of Sahib Rao there has been no satisfaction and the decree can be executed.

Learned Advocate for the Appellant argues on the authority of Shiddeshwar Rao v. Sham Rao 28 Deccan LR 995 and �''Annapurnamma v. Akkayya 36 Mad 544 that where there is a joint decree and it is shown that the decree was for the benefit of one of them, who has received the decretal amount or property, the decree should be deemed to have been discharged as against both the decree-holders. Where there is a decree passed in favour of several persons jointly any one or more of such persons may unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary, apply for execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all u/s 272 of the Hyderabad CPC corresponding to Order 21, Rule 15 and if the Court under Sub-Section (2) thereof sees sufficient cause for the decree to be executed on the sole application of one of the joint decree-holders it shall make such order. as it deems necessary for protecting the interests of the persons who have not joined in the application. It is therefore clear that this principle will also be binding in cases where there has been a payment out of Court and where the Court is asked to certify such payments u/s 249 of the Hyderabad CPC corresponding to Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code.

The contention of the learned Advocate for the Appellant in my view, both on principle and authority is untenable, because as observed in Ramkrishna v. Shanker AIR 1935 Nag 25, by Grille C.J. at p. 27,

to hold that a payment by a judgment-debtor to one of several decree-holders is a valid discharge against all would be to render the latter part of Order 21, Rule 15, which gives the Court power on the application of one of several joint decree-holders for execution to make provision for the protection of the others entirely nugatory.

The case of Jhakhri Gope Vs. Phagu Mahto and Others, in which Ross, J. had held other-Wise namely that "under Order 21, Rule 15, any one of joint decree-holders can execute the whole decree", is distinguishable on the facts of the case inasmuch as one of the joint decree-holders to Whom satisfaction was made by the judgment-debtor was the father and manager of the joint family of which the other joint decree-holder was a member, and son. At the time when the decree was obtained there was no partition of the joint family and it was only after the decree that a partition is alleged to have taken place. Viewing the judgment in that light, the acceptance of the decretal amount by one of the decree-holders who the manager of the joint family was held to have satisfied the entire decree.

In Ramakrishna v. Shanker AIR 1935 Nag 25 cited above, Grille C.J. observed that if the rule of law as stated in � Jhakhri Gope Vs. Phagu Mahto and Others, ,

it to be interpreted as being of universal application and not applicable only to the facts of the case as enunciated, I must respectfully record my disagreement since the dictum appears to ignore the provision in Order 21, Rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, particularly enacted for the benefit of joint decree holders who have taken no part in an application for execution.

In the case of Muthuswamy Iyer v. Narasimha Iyer 57 Mad 696, Sundaramchetty and Pakenham Walsh JJ. after discussing with approval the case Laxmandas Chaturbhujdas 28 All 252; Lakshmanan Chetty v. Subbiahchetty 47 Mad 920, Md. Silar Sahib & co. v. Nabi Khan Sahib 31 Mad. LJ 93 and Pitchakkuttiya Filial v. Doraiswami Mooppannar 47 Mad LJ 498, held that

a decree standing in the name of a firm must nevertheless be treated as a decree in favour of all the partners jointly even for the purposes of Order 21, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of several joint decree-holders though they are partners cannot, by reason of the provisions of Rules 1 and 15 of Order 21 of the Code, give a valid discharge by receiving the decree amount out of Court without the concurrence of the other-holders.

A later case of the Nagpur High Court in Fatima Bi v. Mt. Tuka Bai AIR 1945 Nag 95 also laid down that a payment made to one decree-holder is not binding on the other decree-holders. It was observed by Grille, C.J. and Sen J. at page 97 that "after a decree has been passed in favour of certain persons they have certain rights. They cannot be defeated by the conduct of other decree-holders". The case of Annapurnamma v. Akkayya 36 Mad 544 referred to by the Appellant''s Advocate is not applicable to the facts of this case, because that was a case under Negotiable Instruments Act where one of the joint payees of Negotiable Instruments gave valid discharge of the entire debt without the concurrence of the other payees and this was held by the Pull Bench (C.J. dissenting) that it validly discharged the debt. The decision of the case was based entirely under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Contract Act, and in my view inapplicable to the point under consideration.

In the case of Shiddeshwar Rao v.. Sham Rao 28 Deccan L. R. 995 a bench of this High Court consisting of Jeewan Yar Jung and Abu Syed Mirza, JJ. held dissenting with the decision of the Bench of this High Court in the unreported case of � ''Kaduri Nagiah v. Dowlatabad Buchiah etc. File No. 25/2 of 1343-F (Hyd) that as far as the execution of a decree is concerned the relinquishment by one decree-holder of the decretal debt puts an end to the decree, particularly where the decree is a joint decree. No reason whatever has been given for dissenting with the decision in Kaduri Nagiah v. Dowlatabad Buchiah. I have therefore, sent for that file and it appears on the similar facts as arise in the case under consideration that Mirza Yar Jung C.J. and Siddiq Yar Jung J. after a full discussion of the question involved held that where there is a joint decree in favour of two or mora persons, one decree-holder cannot have a decree executed only for his benefit. If he has to execute such a decree for his sole benefit he should proceed u/s 272 of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code, and that if he wishes to apply for execution he should do so not for himself but for the benefit of the other joint decree-holders as provided in the said section. They observed that if this is the law in execution proceedings, the decree-holder by settling out of court proceed in a manner so as to adversely affect the rights of the other joint decree-hoider which he has under the latter part of Section 272 of the Civil Procedure Code. In view of what has been observed above by me and the weight of the authority not only of the various Courts in India but also of the unreported judgment of a Bench of this High Court referred to above, I hold that the judgment of! the appellate Court is correct and the appeal] accordingly will be dismissed with costs.