Mathavarapu Ananthramiah vs Venkat Ratnam and Others

Mishra, C.J.—This ia an application under Art. 226 of the constitution for the issue of a writ of Mandanus. The Petitioner Muthavarapu Anantha Ramiah is an inhabitant of Huzurnagar taluq, Nalgonda District, and carries on 26-45-1951, opposite party No. 1, P. Venket Ratnam, the Proprietor of Rama Mohan Motor Service, Vijayawada, was granted renewal for one year of his previous premit for plying stage carriages on Suriapet-Jagayyapet route. It is alleged by the Petitioner that the granting of the aforesaid permit is in flagrant vioiation of the mandatory provisions of Section 57, Motor Vehicles Act. The specific complaint is that the non-adherence to the procedure laid down in the above section has operated to deprive the vested legel right of the Petitioner to take objection to the grant and that the action of the Regional Transport authority in issuing the permit otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the section is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction.

Section 57(1) relates to the procedure which had to be followed in granting ''contract carriage permits'' or private carrier''s permits. It has no application to cases of ''stage carriage permits with which we are now concerned.Sub-section (2) of that section deals with the latter but it has to be read with S.47. Representations against the application made by persons for running stage carriage within the state are allowed by S.47 of the Act and under it there are only 3 classes of presons who are given this right:

(a) persons already providing road transport on any proposed route or routes;

(b) a local or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of yhe proposed route (or routes) lies; and

(c) an association interested in the provision of road transport facilitties.

The applicant does not come within any one of these categories and the question which arises for consideration is whether it open to him to invoke the aid of this Court by way of Mandamus under Art.226 of the Constitution.

It is cocede that the order complained of does not in any manner violate the Petitioner''s fundamental rights. The contention urged on behalf of the applicant is the since this Court has a right to issue writs not only to protect persons whose fundamental rights have been invaded, but also ''for any other purpose the Petitioner is entitled to relief. The words ''for any other purpose'' have been interpreted from time to time by the High Courts and the decisions are uniform that they contemplate only the enforcement of a legal right or performance to refer to the Full Bench case of the Patna High Court in - Bagaram Tuloule Vs. The State of Bihar, . The observation of Mredith C.J. in that case may here be reproduced:

It is quite clear that these words have been added advisedly and must mean something in addtion to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and this is no whether they be read ejusdem generis or otherwise. It is also clear because Art.32, which is the corresponding provision for the Supreme Court does not contain these words, but speaks merely of the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part, and that is obviously because the original jurisdicyion of the Supreme Court extends only to the enforcement of the fundamental rights.

The learned Chiefe Justice then went on to observe:

....Art.226 contemplates the issue of writs and directions for puposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights. At the same time the words can hardly mean that the High Court can issue writs for any purpose it pleases. I think the correct interpretation is that the words mean for the enforcement of any legal right and the performance of any legal duty. To that extent the words must be read ''ejusdemgeneris which is the ordinary principle of construction.

On behalf of the applicant it is said that he had a legal right to raise objection to the grant of stage carrier''s permit to the opposite party No. 1 and that this right was denied to him. We have already mentioned that is not correct as he is not one of the person referred to in Section 47.

The next point which has to be considered is whether the Petitioner as a member of the public can come to this Court for the issue of a Writ of Mandamus. Article 226 does not specifically mention the persons at Whose instance the Writs referred to therein can be obtained. It is, however, well-known that the rights of which protection by way of writs is provided for in the Constitution, is a private and personal right. As observed in -- Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrew W. Mellon (1923) 262 US 447 (B),

it is only where the right or persons or property are involved and such rights can be presented under some judicial from of proceedings, that courts of justice can interpose relief.

Reference in this connection may be made also to the decision in -- Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secy. to Government, Uttar Pradesh Labour Department and Others, wherein a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court laid down that the powers under Art.226 should be sparingly used and only in those clear cases where the rights of a person have been seriously infringed and he has no other adequate or specific remedy available to him. The Petitioners in that case were not affected to him. The Petitioners in that case were not affected by the order of which they complained. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Government to the effect thet the application was not maintainable as it had been filed by a person whose rights had not been directly affected. The learned judges, who decided the case remarked in this connection that:

everyone of the several millions of this State can not be given the right to come up and agitate and re-agitate against an Act or order like the one in question.he can not say that his rights are directly affected by the order. The said are association has been registered under Sec. 4 of the Trade Unions Act, No. 16 of 1929. The applicant is thus a distinct and separate person from the various mills which are members of it and the order complained against is not the assets of the applicant. Neither the bonus nor the retainer allowance has to be paid out of movable and immovable property of the Indian Sugar Mills Association but has to be paid by sugar mills out of their own separate funds.

The same view was taken in -- In Re: P. Ramamoorthi, , and the recent case of -- Biman Chandra Bose Vs. Dr. H.C. Mukherjee, Governor and Others, . In -- Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, . their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that the writs referred to under Art. 226 can be issued in those rare cases only where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without or in excess of jurisdiction or they refuse to exercise a jurisdiction possessed by them. They can also be exercised where redress is sought against violation of the principles of natural justice or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and the act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. Their Lordships emphasize that the jurisdiction to issue writs is not wide enough or large enough to enable High Courts to Convert themselves the correctness of the decisions impugned or decide what is the view to be taken of the points at issue between the parties including the issue of jurisdiction, if any.

It may be mentioned in the present case that amongst the remedies provided for cases in which the prescribed procedure is not followed or wrong decision is given by the Regional Transport authorities in granting the permit, there is a right of appeal and methodes are provided for rectification of errors. The applicant is not amongst the persons who are injured by the grant since he has no legal interest to protect. His consider that he has no ''locus standi'' to come to his Court under Art.226 of the Constitution.

We have advisely thought it desirable to indicate in this case the view of law that has prevailed in the varioous High Courts in connection with the writ jurisdiction. This is because this Court is being inundated with applications under Art.226 of the constitution most of which are obviously untenable on elementary principles which govern the issue of these prerogative writs. We feel that it is necessary for the guidance of the bar to emphasize that the jurisdiction conferred by Art.226 does not provide an alternative mode of redress to the normal process of litigation in ordinary Courts of law. The powers under iy are exercised only for meeting extraordinary cases where personal or private rights of persons have been seriously infringed, and they are otherwise unable to obtain any adequate or prompt remedy for yhe redress of his grievance.

The application fails and is accordingly dismissed.