Matu Ram and Others vs Union Territory of Chandigarh

The Union Territory of Chandigarh acquired 8.58 acres of land in village Dadu Majra, within the Union Territory of Chandigarh vide notification published on May 30, 1980, for rehabilitation of victims of kumhar colony of Sector 25, Chandigarh. The Land Acquisition Collector vide award dt. June 23, 1980, awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 33,000/- per acre. On a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Judge vide his order dt. June 2, 1983, enhanced the compensation to Rs. 76,000/- per acre. Aggrieved, the tenure-holders came up in appeal before this Court Learned single Judge by his judgment dt. Aug. 27, 1984, allowed the appeal and determined the market value of the acquired property at the rate of Rs. 80,000/- per acre. He further directed that they shall be paid solatium at the rate of 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment thereof.

The tenure-holders then filed Letters Patent Appeal claiming that the market value of the property be raised to Rs. 1,00,000/- per acre. This Letters Patent Appeal, was, however, dismissed by a Division Bench by an order dt. Jan. 17, 1985.

After the decision of the said Letters Patent Appeal, one of the tenure-holders appellant Matu Ram died. This application has been presented by the heirs of Matu Ram as also by the remaining appellants. They prayed that the order passed by the Division Bench on January 17, 1985, be modified, granting thereby the benefit of enhanced solatium and interest and additional compensation as envisaged by Act 68 of 1984. In substance, the prayer made by the applicants is that this Court may award to them the benefits envisaged by Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act as introduced by Act 68 of 1984, as also those of Section 23(2) and Section 28 as amended by Act 68 of 1984.

On behalf of the respondent, a preliminary objection has been raised that substance the prayer made in this application amounts to review of the judgment of the Division Bench dt. Jan. 17, 1985 which, application wherein can be filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the judgment. The present application has been filed after about two years and is barred by limitation. There is neither any request for condoning the delay nor has any explanation been offered for presenting the application beyond the period of limitation.

In our opinion, befored ealing with the objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent, it will be apt to appreciate the impact of Act 68 of 1984 on the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 23(2), prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984, provided that in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in each case award a sum of 15 per cent of such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Section 28 of the Act laid down that if the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum, which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from the date of taking possession till payment thereof. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984, inter alia, added new Sub-section (1-A) to Section 23, which laid down that in addition to the market value of the land, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification u/s 4, Sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or to the date of taking possession, whichever was earlier. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 was amendedso as to increase the amount in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition (solatium) from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Likewise, Section 28 provided that the rate of interest provided for on the excess amount awarded by the Court shall be raised from 6 per cent to 9 per cent for the first year and for the following years to 15 percent per annum. Section 30 of Act 68 of 1984 gave retrospective operation to the insertion of Sub-section (1A) of Section 23 and to amendments made in Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act thus : --

"30 Transitional provision.-- (1) The provisions of Sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also, to and in relation to, --

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People, in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before that date of commencement of this Act,

(2) The provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bills, 1982, in the house of the People) and before the commencement of this Act.

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We shall first deal with the applicants'' claim for the benefits under the amended Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.

In the case of Bhag Singh and Others Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh through the land acquisition collector, Chandigarh, , notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on Oct. 19. 1974. This notification was followed by notifications under Sections 6 and 9. The Land Acquisition Collector made the award on Oct 9, 1975 which was eventually enhanced in appeal by the High Court. The High Court directed that the claimants were entitled to 15 percent solatium on the enhanced amount of compensation. The matter was taken up in letters patent appeal, which was decided on Dec. 8, 1982, wherein the compensation awarded by the learned single Judge was enhanced from Rs. 25,000/- per acre to Rs. 38,720/- per acre for the second belt. The matter was then taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court, wherein controversy with regard to the extent of retrospective effect given by the provisions contained in Section 30(2) of the Amending Act was raised. The problem before the court was as to whether amended provisions of Section 23(2) and Section 28 were applicable only to cases where the award was made by the Collector or Court after April 30. 1982, or it applied also to cases where an award may have been made by the Collector or Court prior to April 30, 1982, but the proceedings by way of appeal were pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court on April 30. 1982 and were disposed of subsequent to that date. The Supreme Court, after noticing the conflict of judicial opinion prevailing in that Court in the cases of K. Kamalajammanniavaru (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, and in Civil Appeal No. 3267 of 1979 State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh. decided on May 1. 1985. eventually concluded thus :---

"It is, therefore, clear that u/s 30, Sub-section (2) the provisions of the amended Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April, 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. It would not be a correct interpretation of Section 30. Sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of the amended Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April, 1982 and the commencement of the Amended Act. Even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April, 1982 and an appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April, 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of the amended Section 23, Sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed in such appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court....."

In the instant case, even if the award had been made prior to April 30, 1982, regular first appeal in resepct of that award was filed before the High Court after the 30th April, 1982 and was decided by the learned single Judge on Aug. 27, 1984, before the enforcement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 (the date of enforcement being Sept. 24, 1984). The provision contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 to the effect that amended Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to and in relation to appeals decided by the High Court as between the dates on which the bill for amending the provisions was introduced in the year 1982 and coming into force on Sept. 24, 1984, clearly contains an implication that it is the duty of the Court to amend such decisions and to bring them in acccord with the provisions of the amended Act. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether or not an application made for enforcing such an obligation placed on the Court for modifying its earlier order, falls within the purview of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil P.C.

Similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Shatrunji Vs. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan and Others, , in which the Court was concerned with the scope of Section 4 of the UP. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act, 1952, which ran thus : --

"Power to reduce debts after passing of decree; (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Civil P.C. 1908 or any other law, the Court, which passed a decree to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt, shall on the application either of the decree-holderor judgment-debtor, proceed as hereinafter stated, (2) Where the mortgaged, property (charged under the decree consists exclusively of estate and such estate has been acquired under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Court shall (3) Where the mortgaged property (charged under the decree) consists partly of estate and partly of property other than estate, the Court shall -

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The Court interpreted Section 4 as conferring power on the Court to amend certain decrees already made and held that such exercise of power could not be described as a review and could be exercised independently of it This would be evident - from the following observations made by it in para 13 of the judgment :--

"Counsel for the appellant submitted that when the High Court decided the matter, the High Court applied the law as it stood and a subsequent change of law could not be ground for review. The appellant''s contention is not acceptable in the present case for two principal reasons; first, it is not a subsequent law. It is the law which all along was there from 1962. The deeming provision is fully effective and operative as from 25th May, 1953 when the 1952 Act came into force. The result is that the Court is to apply the legal provision as it always stood. It would, therefore, be error on the face of the record. The error would be that the law that was applied was not the law which is applicable. Secondly, Section 4 of the 1952 Act confers power on the court to apply the law notwithstanding any provision contained in the Civil P.C. Therefore, the application though instituted an application for review was not so. The substance and not the form of the application will be decisive."

It is, thus, clear that when the applicants have moved the application requiring the Court to discharge its obligation by giving to them the benefit u/s 23(2) and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, their application cannot be termed as an application for review. As already stated, Sub-section (2) of Section 30 clearly implies that the benefit of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and amended Section 28 has to be given by the Court even in those appeals which had been decided by it after April 30, 1982, and before coming into force of Act 68 of 1984 (date of enforcement being Sept. 24, 1984). The section has not fixed any time-limit for this purpose. In the circumstances, the application moved requiring the Court to discharge its statutory obligation cannot be said to be barred by limitation merely because it has not been filed as an application for review within 30 days of the date of the judgment.

Coming now to the applicants'' claim for the benefit u/s 23(1 A) is concerned, we find that this amended Section 23(1A) was introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984 with effect from Sept. 24, 1984. The section, on its own, could not apply at the time when the learned single Judge decided the appeal on Aug. 27,1984. Section 30 of the Amending Act gave a limited retrospective operation to Sub-section (1A) of Section 23 and, as held by Full Bench of this Court in State of Punjab Vs. Krishan Lal, , the retrospectivity is confined merely in cases where the award had been made between the two cut off dates, i.e., April 30, 1982 and Sept 24, 1984. Since the award in this case was made earlier, the applicants cannot claim benefit u/s 23(1A) without the aid of Section 30 of Act 68 of 1984.

Learned counsel for the applicants next urged that inasmuch as the letters patent appeal was decided by this Court on Jan. 17, 1985, the appeal will be deemed to be pending till that date and the provisions of Section 23(1A) would be applicable to the appellate proceedings by its own force. We find that the letters patent appeal directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated Aug. 27, 1984, was summarily dismissed by one-line order which ran thus : --

"No ground for interference is made out. Dismissed."

In these circumstances, it cannot be said that while passing the said order, the Court omitted to do something which it wanted to do or it did something which it did not want to do and that the omission in this regard was as a result of some clerical or arithmatical mistake. The case would, therefore, fall outside the ambit of Section 152 of the Civil P.C.. If the Court committed a mistake in dismissing the letters patent appeal filed by the applicants the error in that respect can be corrected only by means of an application for review of the judgment and the present application, if treated as an application for review of the order dated Jan. 17, 1985, would be barred by time. As no application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed for condoning the delay, the application would not be maintainable. However, this does not preclude us from treating this application as an application for correcting the error in the judgment of the learned single Judge dated Aug. 27, 1984, and we treat it accordingly.

It was suggested that in view of the order dated Jan. 17, 1985, passed in the letters patent appeal the judgment of the learned single Judge dated Aug. 17, 1984, has merged in the judgment of the letters patent appeal, and as such, no question of amending or correcting the judgment dated Aug. 27, 1984, arises. In our opinion, where an appeal against a judgment is dismissed summarily, it cannot be said that the judgment merges in the order passed by the appellate Bench. In this view of the matter, we see no impediment in our way in correcting the judgment of the learned single Judge dated Aug. 27, 1984.

In the result, this application succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge dated Aug. 27, 1984 is amended to the extent that on the enhanced amount of compensation as determined by him, the applicants would be entitled to 30 per cent instead of 15 per cent solatium under the amended Section 23(2) as also to the interest calculated at the rate of 9 per cent per annum for one year and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date on which possession of the land was taken to the date of payment of such excess in accordance with the amended Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.