Mayank Chawla vs State & Ors

Rajnish Bhatnagar J

CRL. M.A. 4914/2020

Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The application stands disposed of.

CRL. M.A. 4915/2020

Heard on the application. In the facts and circumstances as mentioned in the application, the application is allowed and the delay is condoned.

The application is disposed of accordingly.

CRL.M.C. 1272/2020 & CRL.M.A. 4913/2020

The petitioner has filed the present petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. with the prayer to quash the impugned order dated 19.11.2018 passed by the Ld.

MM-03 NI Act/SE/ND District Courts, Saket in criminal complaint bearing No. 7727/2018 titled as ""Vipin Kumar Singh Vs. Mayank Chawla & Anr.

and other consequential proceedings arising out of and related to the same.

The respondent No. 2 herein had instituted a complaint under section 138 read with sections 141/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

against the petitioner herein and M/s Skytech Constructions Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Sh. R.K. Chawla in respect of non-payment against one

dishonoured cheque for the amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- issued by petitioner in favour of respondent No. 2.

The Metropolitan Magistrate vide impugned order dated 19.11.2018 summoned the petitioner U/s 138 NI Act.

The petitioner feeling aggrieved, filed the present petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court U/s 482 Cr.P.C.

It has been mainly argued by the Ld. counsel for the petitioner that the cheque in question was a post dated cheque which was issued as a security

cheque without any liability and privity of contract between the petitioner and respondent No. 2. It is further argued that there is alteration over the

leaflet of the cheque in question which was very much apparent but the Ld. trial Court has failed to consider the same.

Now coming to the legal position in this case and taking into consideration the various provisions of Cr.PC which have been discussed in various

judgments time and again demonstrate that the Negotiable Instruments Act, provides sufficient opportunity to a person who issues the cheque. Once a

cheque is issued by a person, it must be honoured and if it is not honoured, the person is given an opportunity to pay the cheque amount by issuance of

a notice and if he still does not pay, he is bound to face the criminal trial and consequences. It is seen in many cases that the petitioners with malafide

intention and to prolong the litigation raise false and frivolous pleas and in some cases, the petitioners do have genuine defence, but instead of following

due procedure of law, as provided under the NI Act and the Cr.PC, and further, by misreading of the provisions, such parties consider that the only

option available to them is to approach the High Court and on this, the High Court is made to step into the shoes of the Metropolitan Magistrate and

examine their defence first and exonerate them. The High Court cannot usurp the powers of the Metropolitan Magistrate and entertain a plea of

accused, as to why he should not be tried under Section 138 of the NI Act. This plea, as to why he should not be tried under Section 138 of the NI

Act is to be raised by the accused before the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 251 of the Cr.PC & under Section 263(g) of the

Cr.PC. Along with this plea, he can file necessary documents and also make an application, if he is so advised, under Section 145(2) of the NI Act to

recall the complainant to cross-examine him on his plea of defence. However, only after disclosing his plea of defence, he can make an application

that the case should not be tried summarily but as a summons trial case.

An offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is technical in nature and defences, which an accused can take, are inbuilt; for instance, the cheque

was given without consideration, the accused was not a Director at that time, accused was a sleeping partner or a sleeping Director, cheque was

given as a security etc. etc., the onus of proving these defences is on the accused alone, in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Since the mandate of the legislature is the trial of such cases in a summary manner, the evidence already given by the complainant by way of affidavit

is sufficient proof of the offence and this evidence is not required to be given again in terms of section 145(1) of the NI Act and has to be read during

the trial. The witnesses i.e. the complainant or other witnesses can be recalled only when the accused makes such an application and this application

must disclose the reason why the accused wants to recall the witnesses and on what point the witnesses are to be cross examined.

The offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is an offence in the personal nature of the complainant and since it is within the special knowledge of

the accused as to why he is not to face trial under section 138 N.I. Act, he alone has to take the plea of defence and the burden cannot be shifted to

complainant. There is no presumption that even if an accused fails to bring out his defence, he is still to be considered innocent. If an accused has a

defence against dishonour of the cheque in question, it is he alone who knows the defence and responsibility of spelling out this defence to the Court

and then proving this defence is on the accused. Once the complainant has brought forward his case by giving his affidavit about the issuance of

cheque, dishonour of cheque, issuance of demand notice etc., he can be cross-examined only if the accused makes an application to the Court as to,

on what point he wants to cross examine the witness(es) and then only the Court shall recall the witness by recording reasons thereto.

Sections 143 and 145 of the NI Act were enacted by the Parliament with the aim of expediting trial in such cases. The provisions of summary trial

enable the respondent to lead defence evidence by way of affidavits and documents. Thus, an accused who considers that he has a tenable defence

and the case against him was not maintainable, he can enter his plea on the very first day of his appearance and file an affidavit in his defence

evidence and if he is so advised, he can also file an application for recalling any of the witnesses for cross-examination on the defence taken by him.

In view of the procedure prescribed under the Cr.PC, if the accused appears after service of summons, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall

ask him to furnish bail bond to ensure his appearance during trial and ask him to take notice under Section 251 Cr.PC and enter his plea of defence

and fix the case for defence evidence, unless an application is made by an accused under Section 145(2) of NI Act for recalling a witness for cross-

examination on plea of defence. If there is an application u/s 145(2) of N.I. Act for recalling a witness of complainant, the court shall decide the same,

otherwise, it shall proceed to take defence evidence on record and allow cross examination of defence witnesses by complainant. Once the

summoning orders in all these cases have been issued, it is now the obligation of the accused to take notice under Section 251 of Cr. PC., if not

already taken, and enter his/her plea of defence before the concerned Metropolitan Magistrate‟s Court and make an application, if they want to recall

any witness. If they intend to prove their defence without recalling any complainant witness or any other witnesses, they should do so before the Court

of Metropolitan Magistrate.

Upon analyzing the provisions of the NI Act, it is clear that Section 138 of the Act spells out the ingredients of the offence as well as the

conditions required to be fulfilled before initiating the prosecution.

These ingredients and conditions are to be satisfied mainly on the basis of documentary evidence, keeping in mind the presumptions under Sections

118 and 139 of the NI Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as the provisions of Section 146 of the Act.

The provisions of Sections 142 to 147 lay down a Special Code for the trial of offences under the Chapter XVII of the N.I. Act. While considering

the scope and ambit of the amended provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court in Mandvi Co. Op. Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore , AIR 2010 SC

1402, has held that the provisions of Sections 143, 144, 145 and 147 expressly depart from and override the provisions of the Cr.PC, the main body of

adjective law for criminal trials. The Supreme Court has further held as under:-

It is not difficult to see that sections 142 to 147 lay down a kind of a special code for the trial of offences under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable

Instruments Act and sections 143 to 147 were inserted in the Act by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,

2002 to do away with all the stages and processes in a regular criminal trial that normally cause inordinate delay in its conclusion and to make the trial

procedure as expeditious as possible without in any way compromising on the right of the accused for a fair trial.

The parameters of the jurisdiction of the High Court, in exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC, are now almost well-settled. Although it

has wide amplitude, but a great deal of caution is also required in its exercise. The requirement is, the application of well known legal principles

involved in each and every matter. Adverting back to the facts of the present case, this Court does not find any material on record which can be

stated to be of sterling and impeccable quality warranting invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.PC at this stage. More so,

the defence as raised by the petitioners in the petition requires evidence, which cannot be appreciated, evaluated or adjudged in the proceedings under

Section 482 of Cr.PC and the same can only be proved in the Court of law. Reliance can be placed upon ""State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Yogendra

Singh Jadon & Anr""., Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 172 of 2017) decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on

January 31, 2020 in which it has been held that ""the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be exercised where the

allegations are required to be proved in Court of law"".

Accordingly, I find no flaw or infirmity in the proceedings pending before the Trial Court. However, the Trial Court shall certainly consider and

deal with the contentions and the defence of the petitioner in accordance with law.

The prayers are untenable in law. Hence, this Court does not deem it appropriate to issue notice to the respondents. Accordingly, the petition is

dismissed and Crl.M.A. 4913/2020 is also disposed of accordingly.