AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
T.N.C. Rangarajan, J.—These petitions arise out of the rejection of the applications for renewal of licences in Form D-2 and D-2 under The Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1970 and The Andhra Pradesh Brewery Rules, 1970.
THE FACTS
The common facts in all these cases can be briefly summarised as follows:
The several companies before us are engaged in the manufacture of spirits and liquor. They are in possession of industrial licences (COB) issued by the Ministry of Industry, Government of India. They had also been issuing licences either in Form B-2 under The Andhra Pradesh Brewery Rules, 1970 or in form D-2 under The Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1970. The excise year ended on 30-9-1993 and accordingly, the licences given in B-2 and D-2 forms were to expire on 30-9-1993. Under Rule 6 of The Andhra Pradesh Brewery Rules, every licence shall ordinarily be for a period of one year and may be renewable at the end of each year on the application made on month in advance. Condition 19 of the licence states that if the licensee fails to apply for renewal after paying the fixed fee, within fifteen days from the date of the commencement of the excise year, he shall pay late fee and if the licensee does not apply for renewal within three months from the date of the commencement of the excise year, the claim of the licensee for renewal of the licence shall abate. Similarly, Rule 10 of The Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules, every licence granted under these rules shall be in force for a period of one year and may be renewed on application for a period of one year at a time. The condition 13 of the licence states that if the licensee fails to apply for renewal of the licence after paying the fixed fee within fifteen days of the commencement of the excise year, he shall pay the fixed fee along with late fee and if the licensee does not apply for renewal within three months from the date of commencement of the excise year, the claim of the licensee for renewal shall abate. Admittedly, the companies, whose licences were expiring on 30-9-1993, had paid the fees and applied for renewal in time. By an order dated 30-9-1993, the Commissioner of Excise allowed the licensees to function beyond 30-9-1993 for one month pending renewal of licences subject to their having completed all the formalities and paid the application fee along with the application. By another order dated 30-9-1994, they were allowed to function beyond 30-9-1994 for one month pending renewal of licences for the year 1994-95 on payment of outstanding dues before 10-10-1994. On 1442-1994 all working distilleries and breweries were permitted to function upto 31-12-1994 pending renewal of D2/B2 licences for 1994-95. On 30-12-1994 they were again permitted to function upto 7th January, 1995 pending renewal of B2/D2 licences for the year 1994-95. On 7-1-1995, they were permitted to function upto 14-1-1995 pending renewal of D2/B2 licences for 1994-95. Again on 12-1-1995, all working distilleries and breweries were permitted to function upto 21-1-1995. All these permissions were given in general terms by telegrams. Thereafter, on 25-1-1995, the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, made a general order, given to all the distilleries and breweries, stating as follows:
This has reference to your application for renewal of B2 licence for the year 1994-95. You have been permitted to function from time to time. The last date of the said period expired on 21-1-1995.
Your application for renewal of licence is rejected in view of the policy decision of the Government to introduce total prohibition in the State of Andhra Pradesh and in view of the provisions of the A.P. Prohibition Ordinance No. 19 of 1994.
Proportionate licence fee, if any, lying at your credit and the deposit/bank guarantee made by you shall be refunded/released after deducting any amount due to the Government.
The companies, thereupon, applied to the Government for permission to close down their units. The Government, by G.O.Rt.No.694, dated 30-3-1995 granted permission u/s 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act to close down the establishment after paying compensation to the workmen as per rules. Simultaneously, the companies have filed these petitions challenging the validity of the order rejecting the applications for renewal of the licences. The workmen of the companies have also filed the petitions praying that permission should not be given for closing down the establishments and in the alternative a scheme should be framed for rehabilitating the workmen who have lost the jobs by the closure of the establishments.
THE LAW
List II to the Seventh Schedule of The Constitution of India enumerates the matters with respect to which the State has the exclusive power to make laws. Entry 8 reads "intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors". Under this entry, The Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (Act No. 17 of 1968) was enacted, and had received the assent of the President on 26-8-1968. Section 13 of The Andhra Pradesh Excise Act provides that no person shall manufacture or collect an intoxicant except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted by such officer, not below the rank of an Excise Superintendent, as may be prescribed. Section 17 provides that the Government may grant for a fixed period a licence for the exclusive privilege of manufacturing or of supplying by wholesale or of both, as required within the State. Section 28 provides for the forms and conditions of the licence and Section 31 provides for the power to cancel or suspend the licence for breach of any of the conditions. Section 32 provides for withdrawing the licences after notice, and for refund of the proportionate licence fee for the unexpired portion of the licence.
In 1993, The Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Wholesale Trade and Distribution and Retail Trade in Indian Liquor, Foreign Liquor, Wine and Beer) Act, 1993, was enacted by which all existing licences of supplying in wholesale the Indian Liquor, Foreign Liquor, Wine, Beer, were cancelled in order to achieve the object of minimising in public interest their consumption, by making appropriate law, as a prelude to totally prohibiting the consumption of the same in course of time. Section 4 of that Act provided for taking over the entire wholse-sale trade by The Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation Limited.
Article 47 of the Constitution states:
Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health-
The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. The Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995 was enacted and it received the assent of the President on 17-2-1995. The Statement of Objects and Reasons was as follows:
Statement of Objects and Reasons:
Article 47 of the Constitution enjoins that the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medical purposes, of all intoxicating drinks which are injurious to health. The Andhra: Pradesh (Andhra Area) Prohibition Act, 1937 which satisfied the above Constitutional mandate was in force in the Andhra Area of the State of Andhra Pradesh until the 30th October, 1969. Prohibition was lifted in the Andhra Area of the State also with effect from the 1st November, 1969 and from that date onwards there has been no prohibition on the sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In recent times, it is noticed that the consumption of the alcoholic drinks has grown alarmingly and has developed into a social evil. Though the sale of arrack was banned by the Government with effect from the 1st October, 1993 there is no ban on the sale and consumption of Indian made liquors and Foreign liquors, beer, wine etc. The women folk in the State of Andhra Pradesh have been agitating for the imposition of total prohibition. The Government have taken notice of their just demand and have decided to impose total prohibition on the consumption of alcoholic drinks other than toddy.
As the Legislative Assembly of the State was not then in session, and as it has been decided to give effect to the above decision immediately, the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Ordinance, 1994 (Andhra Pradesh Ordinance 19 of 1994) was promulgated by the Governor on the 29th December, 1994.
This Bill seeks to replace the said Ordinance.
The preamble of the Act also stated as follows:
An Act to introduce prohibition of the Sale and Consumption of Intoxicating Liquors in the State of Andhra Pradesh and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
Whereas Article 47 of the Constitution of India enjoins that the State shall endeavour to bring about the prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks which are injurious to health.
And whereas there is urgent need in public interest to bring about the prohibition of the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquors, except for medicinal, scientific, industrial or such like purposes, in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh in the Forty Sixth year of the Republic of India as follows:
The present Act No. 17 of 1995 provided for prohibition by Section 7, which is as follows:
The selling, buying, being in possession and consumption of liquor, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or as the case may be, the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, is hereby prohibited.
Section 15 provided for certain exemptions such as permits to persons who are foreigners, to hotels and restaurants to sell foreign liquor or Indian liquor or the holders of permits granted under this Act, permits to those who are medically certified requiring consumption of liquor, permits to tourists from outside the State, permits to members serving or retired belonging to the armed forces to consume liquor, permits to companies etc., who normally entertain foreigners, non-resident Indians and guests coming from outside the State, permits to consume liquor in cases of medical emergency; and permits for sacremental wine used in masses conducted in Churches. Section 32 of the Act provided for a savings clause in the following terms:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to preclude,-
(a) the Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation to carry on trade in liquor in accordance with rules made in this behalf:
(b) the buying and selling of liquor carried on by the military canteens in the State under any licence granted in accordance with the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the rules made thereunder; and
(c) the consumption of medicines containing alcohol.
Section 34 amended the A.P. Excise Act in the following terms:
Amendment of Act 17 of 1968:- In the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968,-
(1) In Section 1, for sub-section (2) the following shall be substituted, namely:-
"(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh: Provided that on and from the date of commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995 the provisions of this Act shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act cease to operate.";
THE CONTENTIONS:
Dr. Singvi, appearing for the petitioners in W.P. 2950/95, contended that irrespective of the constitutionality of the Prohibition Act, the prohibition contained in Section 7 was confined only to consumption and sale and did not specifically prohibit the manufacture. It was submitted that consequently, u/s 34 of that Act those provisions of the Excise Act, which dealt with manufacture did not cease to apply and the licensing authority had the power to grant licences inspite of the promulgation of the prohibition ordinance and the Act. It was submitted that the two reasons given for rejection of the applications for renewal of licences viz., that there was a policy of prohibition and that the provisions of the Prohibition Ordinance and the Act prevented the renewal of licences, were both irrelevant and untenable. It was further contended that once the stated reasons were found to be untenable, the Breweries and Distilleries were entitled to the renewal of their licences since they had a legitimate expectation that their licences, which had been renewed from year to year, on the basis of which they had invested crores of rupees, would be automatically renewed, particularly when they had made the applications in time and paid the required fees. It was submitted that the provisions relating to cancellation or withdrawal of the licences were not applicable to an application for renewal and such renewal was required to be given and cannot be withheld without good cause. It was also submitted that the order rejecting the applications for renewal was made without giving an opportunity to the affected persons to show cause and was also void for violation of the principles of nature justice.
Sri Bobde, appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions 2506/95 & 2574/95, contended that Section 34 of the Prohibition Act is to be so interpreted as to preserve the power of the State to grant licences for manufacture particularly when the prohibition was not total, and liquor was required to be supplied not only to the exempted categories of persons and permit-holders, but also because of the savings clause in favour of the Andhra Pradesh Beverages Corporation, which was, in any event, required to purchase liquor from outside the State to supply to the exempted persons and permit-holders. This contention was further sought to be supported by pleading that the Prohibition Act could not have banned the manufacture of liquor since the power of State Legislature to enact law with reference to manufacture of liquor had been taken away by a declaration made under The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. It was submitted that under Entry 52 to the Seventh Schedule, Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, was to be the subject matter of laws to be made by the Parliament alone and to that extent the State will be denuded of the power to make laws with respect to industries. It was submitted that the Supreme Court had held in Synthetics and Chemicals Limited v. State of U.P., , that once the liquor industry is brought within the purview of The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, the legislative power under Entry 8 was restricted to only such matters as are not governed by the IDR Act. Consequently, the Central Government having given a licence to manufacture liquor under the IDR Act, the State had no power to ban the manufacture. It was submitted that, as a consequence, though the companies had mistakenly applied for renewal of the licences, the licensing authority had also mistakenly assumed that it had the power to reject the application, the impugned order was void ab initio, and the Court could under Article 226, make a declaration that if is void in order to effectively grant relief. It was also argued that the reasons given for rejecting the applications for renewal, showed non-application of mind to the question whether the Prohibition Act actually prohibited the manufacture or not, and it is, thus, arbitrary and untenable.
Sri Kannabiran, appearing for the workmen employed in the companies whose applications for renewal of licences had been rejected submitted that the right to life under Article 21 included the right to livelihood, which was also one of the directive principles asenacted in Article 41 of the Constitution. He argued that if a law is made to give effect to the directive principle under Article 47, it should not conflict with the rights preserved under Article 41. According to him, inasmuch as the Prohibition Act threw all the employees working in the Breweries and Distilleries out of employment for which employers could not be held responsible, the law could be upheld only if it had also provided for rehabilitation of the workers and when it is to be upheld, there should be a direction to the Government to frame a scheme for the rehabilitation of the workers. He also adopted the arguments of the companies to support the plea that the Prohibition Act could not stand in the way of the renewal of the licences to manufacture liquor.
Sri Koka Raghava Rao, appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions 2950/95, 3832/95 and 3248/95, pointed out that the telegrams allowing the Distilleries and Breweries to function pending renewal of licences indicated that the licences were being renewed and a legitimate expectation had been raised by the licensing authority.
The learned Advocate-General contended that the impugned orders were quite valid and were designed to implement the constitutional directive under Article 47. It was submitted that the policy of prohibition had the constitutional mandate and was not required to be spelt-out in detail particularly when it was being introduced in a phased manner. Relying on the decision in Madras City Wine Merchants'' Association and Another Vs. State of T.N. and Another, , he argued that the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to the power of the State to make laws under Entry 8 had been understood to include the regulation of manufacture of liquor and by reading the enactment alongwith Article 47 it was not possible to allow the manufacture of liquor inside the State, as it would impede the proper implementation of the prohibition of consumption of liquor. He submitted that the reasons given in the impugned order were very germane to the issue and once it is the policy of the Government to translate the desire of the people into Law, such policy of prohibition had to be fully implemented by the officers concerned and they had no other option except to reject any application for removal of the licence to manufacture liquor. With regard to the plea of the workmen, it was submitted that it was a natural consequence of legislation for which the Government cannot be responsible particularly in a poor country where Government resources were not enough to go round, which was recognised in Article 41 itself. He also argued that the granting of licence was the privilege which the Government can withhold and there should be no question of any legitimate expectation with respect to the same.
THE POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
(1) Whether the licensees have a legitimate expectation of renewal of the licences?
(2) Whether u/s 34 of the Prohibition Act, the provisions of the Excise Act relating to licensing of manufacture of liquor, cease to apply?
(3) Whether the reasons given in the impugned order are valid?
(4) Whether the law made by the State with reference to the manufacture of liquor is abrogated by provisions of The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act?
(5) Whether the workmen are entitled to the relief in respect of unemployment because of the prohibition of the carrying on of the licences of the industries in which they are employed, and whether the Government has the duty to rehabilitate them?
(6) Miscellaneous points.
(7) The relief/s to which the petitioners are entitled ?
Point No. 1: Legitimate Expectation.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation imposes, in essence, a duty on a public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors. One of the consequences of the incidents of legitimate expectation is that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so. It is generally understood that a person may have legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment (see Halsbury''s Laws of England, Vol. 1(1), 4th Edn. Para 81 at pages 151-152). Such legitimate expectation arises by past practice even if there is no express promise. The Supreme Court noted in Madras City Wine Merchants case (2 supra):
The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection man a mere applicant for grant.
The learned Advocate-General argued that in the present case, the renewal of licences being an annual feature was entirely at the discretion of the authority and the licenses could have no expectation of its being renewed automatically. We are unable to accept this contention because even a discretionary grant of licence cannot be withheld arbitrarily without reason and consequently, the reasons for withholding the renewal has to be stated and the affected party has to be given an opportunity to show cause against it.
A Full Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Syed Shah Mohammed. Quadri, J.) was a party, in its judgment dated April 21, 1995 in Writ Petition No. 22999 of 1994 and batch, summarised the principle relating to legitimate expectation'' thus:
"Thus, it can be seen that the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked either where there is an express promise given by a public authority or where there is existence of a regular practice which a claimant can reasonably expect to continue.
The claim for legitimate expectation can be defeated by showing (a) that the expectation itself is unreasonable; or (b) the conduct of the person seeking to enforce the claim is such that it disentitles him to the equitable relief of the doctrine; or (c) that the expectations run counter to a public policy; or (d) that the policy or the circumstances which gave rise to expectation have changed; or (e) that the claim is contrary to the provisions of a statute."
In the light of those principles, we shall examine the applicability of the doctrine. In the present case, apart from the fact that the licences were being renewed from time to time on the fulfilment of certain conditions relating to the filing of applications and payment of the fees, the rules themselves indicate that the licensee can expect the licence to be renewed. Rule 10(3) of The Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules, states:
A licence may be renewed on application to the Commissioner for a period of one year at a time or for such other period as the Commissioner may direct.
Rule 6 of The Andhra Pradesh Brewery Rules, 1970 also states:
Every licence shall be in Form B-2 and shall be issued in the name of the licensee and shall not be transferable. The licensee shall pay a licence fee of rupees eight lakhs per annum. Every licence shall ordinarily be for a period of one year and may be renewable at the end of each year on the application made one month in advance.
There is nothing in the conditions or in the licences or in the rules reserving the right of the licensing authority to reject any application for renewal, unlike in the case of Madras City Wine Merchants (2 supra), where Rule 14 of The Tamilnadu Retail Vending Rules provided that if the licensing authority decides not to renew the licence he may refuse renewal by an order recording the reasons for refusal and that the licensing authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the licensee before such refusal. We must also consider this in the background of the fact that the industry, which is established is a continuous industry and not a seasonal one and with the large investment made, the unstated policy in the rules with reference to the renewal was that it was almost automatic as long as the application was made in time and the fees was paid. The decision of the Supreme Court in Madras City Wine Merchants case (2 supra) relied on by the learned Advocate-General actually emphasises the fact that doctrine of legitimate expectation can be overruled by legislation. In that case, contrary to the present case, the earlier law allowing retail trade in liquor was repealed and hence, the expectation was defeated. Similarly, the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, , dealt with trade in liquor and not manufacture of liquor and proceeded on the basis that a citizen had no fundamental right to trade. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the Breweries and Distilleries had a legitimate expectation that upon making an application in time and paying the necessary fees their licences will be considered for renewal unless a valid and specific cause could be shown against such renewal.
POINT No. 2: EFFECT OF Section 34
and
POINT No. 3: VALIDITY OF THE ORDER.
The crux of the case is really whether the twin reasons given by the Commissioner of Excise for rejecting the applications for renewal, are valid. The impugned order extracted earlier gives the reasons as policy of Government to introduce total prohibition and the provisions of the Prohibition Ordinance which is now incorporated in the Act.
As regards the policy of prohibition mentioned in the impugned orders, the reliance of the learned Advocate-General on Article 47 of the Constitution, is inadequate. Interestingly, while Article 47 refers only to consumption, Entry 8 in List II to the Seventh Schedule does not refer to consumption. In any event, unless the directive principle enunciated in the Constitution is translated into legislation either by the Union or by the State, the ambit and extent of the policy cannot be discerned, more particularly, in a case like this where the prohibition itself is declared to be made in a phased manner. Even the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act No. 15 of 1993 had stated that the takeover of the wholesale trade in liquor was only a prelude to total prohibition of consumption of the same in course of time. In this background, we can look to the clear effect of the policy only from the words of the statute.
As regards the provisions of the Ordinance now replaced by the Act, Section 34 of the Prohibition Act specifically states that the provisions of the A.P. Excise Act insofar as they are inconsistent with the Prohibition Act shall cease to operate. When we look at the provisions of the Prohibition Act, we find that the preamble as well as the operative portion of the sections refer only to consumption. There are no specific words relating to prohibition of manufacture or production. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate-General that the production is also prohibited by necessary implication inasmuch as according to the stated policy the prohibition was to be introduced in a phased manner. The several stages of the prohibition can reach back from consumption to supply to production. By Act No. 15 of 1993, the supply of the liquor had been taken over by the Government as a first stage. The consumption has been prohibited by the Act of 1995.
The learned Advocate-General pointed out that since Section 7 of the Prohibition. Act prohibited the possession of liquor, there would be the necessary implication that as soon as the liquor is manufactured, the possession of that liquor was in violation of the provisions of the Prohibition Act, inasmuch as it makes the possession without any licence, an offence punishable u/s 8. Section 7 reads as follows:
Prohibition of selling, buying and consumption of liquor:- The selling, buying, being in possession and consumption of liquor, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or as the case may be, the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (Act 17 of 1968) is hereby prohibited.
A close reading of this section indicates that the possession contemplated in that section was for the purpose of consumption or for the purpose of selling and buying to enable consumption within the State. This is because Section 8(b) makes it an offence only if one possesses or sells any liquor without any licence or permission granted under the A.P. Excise Act. It follows that the Act itself envisaged licence being given for possession of liquor obviously because liquor is required to be supplied to permit-holders who are exempt u/s 15, as well as to the A.P. State Beverages Corporation, saved u/s 32 of the Act. It is, therefore, obvious that the stage of production or manufacture is yet to be covered in the phased operation of the prohibition policy.
We find force in the contention of the petitioners that inasmuch as the supply of liquor to the exempted persons and permit-holders as well as to the State Beverages Corporation is preserved by the Prohibition Act, 1995, it cannot be said that even by necessary implication there is a total prohibition of manufacture or production of liquor in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It follows that even according to the provisions of Section 34, the provisions of the Excise Act and production of liquor are left untouched. Since there is no in consistency in the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act relating to manufacture, and the provisions of the Prohibition Act of 1995, in terms of 34 itself, those sections such as Sections 14, 17 and 26 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, do not cease to operate and are still in force. Consequently, manufacturers are entitled to grant of licences for possession also once they are entitled to manufacture liquor and such licence also cannot be unreasonably withheld.
The twin reasons are consequently, to be discerned from the provisions of the Act alone and as we see it there is nothing in the Act to show that there was a policy to prohibit manufacture of liquor or that the provisions of Ordinance as replaced by the Act specifically or by necessary implication prohibited the manufacture of liquor. Thus both the reasons given in the impugned order were irrelevant to the consideration of the applications for renewal of the licences. Accordingly, the licensing authority is required to consider the applications for renewal of the licences without reference to the prohibition policy or the provisions of the Prohibition Act, 1995 as the reasons given in the impugned order of rejection, are untenable.
Point No. 4: LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE.
In view of our decision on the first three points, we consider it unnecessary to deal with the arguments addressed in respect of this point.
Point No. 5: WORKERS'' NEED.
This question of considering the validity of the Prohibition Act with reference to the right to livelihood assured under Article 41 of the Constitution, becomes academic inasmuch as we have held that the Prohibition Act does not ban the manufacture at all. However, we may record the two arguments of the learned Counsel for the workmen viz. that their right to work was a kind of property recognised in The District Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Bhimavarm Vs. Labour Court, Guntur and Another, and approved in State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandrabhan Tale, , and further that the right to live, under Article 21 includes the right to work and the Government had a duty to provide a scheme of rehabilitation of the workers because they were affected by the prohibition of manufacture of liquor. The first prayer in these petitions was a direction to the Government not to sanction the closure of the units, which has become infructuous, because the Government had, by G.O.Rt.No.694, dated 30-3-1995, granted permission u/s 25-O of The Industrial Disputes Act. That sanction will now become invalid because we have held that the companies are entitled to carry on the manufacture. In our considered opinion, this is an area in which no direction can be given by the Court as it will be a matter of policy to be taken by the Government in harmonising the competing purpose of carrying out the constitutional mandate u/s 47 and the constraints of economic capacity for assuring the right to work under Article 41 of the Constitution. The same view has been taken in the decision of the Full Bench in Writ Petition No. 22999/94 and batch. Since we have held that the impugned order is invalid, we see no purpose in discussing this point any further.
Point No. 6: MISCELLANEOUS POINTS.
The petitioners have also raised other contentions such as that the principles of natural justice have been violated by not giving proper opportunity and that the rejection of the applications was discriminatory, considering the fact that toddy was allowed to be manufactured and the State Beverages Corporation was allowed to import liquor. It is true that administrative law requires a clear opportunity to be given to demonstrate that the licensing authority was not justified in making objections to the renewal, and unless an adequate opportunity was given, the order made in violation of those principles of natural justice shall be void R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatechand Nursing Das Vs. Settlement Commission (It and Wt) and Another, . However, on a question of discrimination, the view generally favoured is that in the matter of licences and particularly in the matter of exemptions, it will be a matter of policy for the Government to decide. In any case, we do not consider it necessary to dwell upon these areas since our decision on the very first point concludes the matter.
Point No. 7: RELIEF.
The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the relief should be moulded to suit the exigencies of the case as held by the Supreme Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni Moopil Nayar Vs. The State of Madras and Others, . It was pointed out that the goods already produced were perishable, the process of manufacture was a continuous process, and in the absence of a statutory ban, any delay in the renewal will adversely affect the petitioners as well as their workmen and, therefore, there should be a declaration that the impugned order is void and that the licences stand renewed. We have heard the learned Advocate-General on this issue as well. We have found that the impugned order was invalid and it was void because the reasons given were not germane to the rejection and that it was made without affording an opportunity of hearing and thus defeated the legitimate expectation of the petitioners for extraneous reasons. Admittedly, the applications for renewal are not governed by Sections 31 and 32 of The A.P. Excise Act, which are concerned with only cancellation or withdrawal of licences already granted. We have also seen that there is no specific condition either in the licence or in the rule which enables the Commissioner to reject the applications for renewal, as in the case of Tamilnadu Rules referred to in Madras City Wine Merchants case (2 supra).
We, therefore, quash the impugned orders rejecting the applications for renewal, and we direct the respondents to consider the applications of the petitioners for renewal of 1icences in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this order.
Writ Petitions 2506, 2574, 2950, 3248 and 3832 of 1995 are allowed accordingly. No costs
Writ Petitions 2214 and 2217 of 1995 are dismissed as infructuous.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner requests that some time may be fixed for disposal of the renewal applications. We direct the respondents to consider the renewal applications within four weeks from today.
After the judgment was pronounced the learned Advocate-General made oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. Inasmuch as in our opinion no question of law of general importance which is required to be decided by the Supreme Court, arises in these cases, we decline to grant the leave prayed for. Oral application is therefore rejected.
W.P. No. 667 of 1995:
ORDER
This petition arises out of a letter of intent (relating to Beer) granted by the State Government on 1-1-1993. It is stated in the affidavit in support of the petition that this was kept in abeyance by a subsequent order dated 17-2-93, even after the petitioner had obtained the letter of intent from the Government of India. The actual letter of the Government keeping the matter in abeyance, has not been filed. The petition proceeds on the footing that the Prohibition Act stands in the way of the consideration of the petitioner''s application and, therefore, challenges the validity of the Act. By the orders of the Full Bench dated 21-4-1995 in Writ Petition 22999/94 and batch, the Act has now been upheld. This case was heard along with the batch of cases where by our order in Writ Petition 2506/95 and batch, it has been held that the Prohibition Act does not prohibit the manufacture of liquor. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that it would be sufficient if a direction is given to the respondent to consider the application of the petitioner in the light of our decision in Writ Petition 2506/95 and batch. With this direction, the Writ Petition is disposed of.