Md. Fajur Rahim vs State Of Manipur And Others

Kh. Nobin Singh, J

[1] Heard Shri B.P. Sahu, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Shri M. Rarry, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the respondents.

[2] By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to quash and set aside the order dated 15-07-2019 issued by the Under Secretary (MOBC & SC), Government of Manipur.

[3.1] Facts and circumstances as narrated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner is the Chairman of 6th Waqf Board, Manipur constituted by the Government of Manipur under the provisions of Waqf Act, 1995. While the board was discharging its duties and responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary (MOBC & SC), Government of Manipur issued a show cause notice dated 31.01.2018 purportedly in exercise of the power conferred under the provisions of the Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 as to why the Board should not be dissolved and superseded on the basis of 4(four) charges leveled against it. The Deputy Secretary (MOBC), Government of Manipur, without considering the reply to the said show cause notice, issued an order dated 01.03.2018 dissolving the Board. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 01.03.2018, a writ petition being WP(C) No.217 of 2017 was filed questioning it and during the pendency of the said writ petition, a corrigendum dated 27.03.2018 was issued replacing the word "dissolved" by the word "superseded" in the order dated 01-03-2018. The said writ petition was allowed on 18.05.2018 quashing the order dated 01.03.2018 with the rider that it was open to the State Government to proceed afresh as regards the supersession of the Board in accordance with law. Taking advantage of the liberty being granted by this Court, the respondents issued another show cause notice dated 29.05.2018 which was served upon the petitioner on 02.06.2018 and being aggrieved by the said notice dated 02.06.2018, a writ petition being WP(C) No.488 of 2018 was filed and during the pendency of the said writ petition, the respondents issued another show cause notice serving copies of the documents to the petitioner including the corrigendum after corrigendum changing the paragraphs, dates of show cause notice etc. The said writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 26.07.2018 with the direction that the petitioner therein should submit his response to the show cause notice within a week from the date of the receipt of a copy of the Judgment and Order and on receipt thereof, the State Government should consider it in terms of the provisions of Section 99 of the Act.

[3.2] An appeal being WA No.25 of 2018 was preferred before the Division Bench of this Court which was finally heard on 08.10.2018 but this Court declined to interfere with the Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge granting time till 19.11.2018 to submit his reply to the said show cause. After the dismissal of the writ appeal, the petitioner came to know that there were 2(two) show cause notices on the same date i.e. 29.05.2018 and in order to get it clarified, an application being MC (WA) No.73 of 2018 was filed wherein this Court clarified it. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice dated 29.05.2018 but instead of considering the said reply, the respondents issued an order dated 21.12.2018 superseding the Board which was challenged by the petitioner by way of a writ petition being WP(C) No. 217 of 2018 in which interim order dated 29.12.2018 was passed by this Court suspending the order dated 21.12.2018 which was allowed to be continued until further by this Court on 14-01-2019. During the pendency of the said writ petition being WP(C) No.217 of 2018, the respondents preferred an appeal being WA No.20 of 2019 for vacating the interim order dated 29.12.2018 which was disposed of with the direction that the matter be pursued before the learned Single Judge for disposal.

[3.3] The writ petition being WP(C) No.217 of 2018 was finally heard by this Court on 13.06.2019 and since the tenure of the Board had expired while the Judgment and Order was being prepared by the learned Single Judge, the said writ petition was disposed of with the observation that it had become infructuous and the issue involved therein had been rendered academic which could be decided by this Court in an appropriate case in future.

[4] After the said writ petition having been disposed of as infructuous, the Under Secretary (MOBC & SC), Government of Manipur issued another order dated 15.07.2019 superseding the Board for 6(six) months with immediate effect purportedly in exercise of the power conferred under Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995. Being aggrieved by the said order, the instant writ petition has been filed on the inter alia-grounds that the provisions of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 have been grossly misused while issuing the said order superseding the Board; that on the expiry of the period of supersession as specified in the sub-section (1), the State Government may extend the continuation of supersession by another 6(six) months with reasons to be recorded in writing and the period of continuous supersession shall not exceed more than a year; that the continuance of supersession was not extended as provided in the Act which ought to have been done before the expiry of the period of supersession; that if any supersession order is to be issued, the process should be started afresh as per the provisions of the Section 99 of the Act; that the impugned order could not have been issued without any show cause notice being issued to the petitioner and that the act of the respondents superseding the Board was a pre-planned and politically motivated which is arbitrary, malafide and illegal.

[5] An affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondents has been filed wherein a preliminary objection was raised stating that the intention of the petitioner in filing the case after case was to ensure that the State Government's process of invoking the statutory provisions of Section 99 of the Act was never achieved thereby resulting in the defeat of the endeavour made by the State Government for the ends of justice; that while going through the writ petition, it is seen that the petitioner had not murmured a single word as to how the finding of the State Government was incorrect. In addition thereto, it has been stated that before issuing the impugned order dated 15.07.2019, the State Government had re-examined minutely the show cause notice and reply dated 28.11.2018 with the documents enclosed therewith and therefore, there was nothing wrong in the impugned order which would warrant interference by this Court.

[6] During the course of hearing, it has been submitted by Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that he would not argue as regards the correctness of the reasons recorded in the order, rather he would confine his argument on the issue whether the said notification/ order was issued under sub-section (1) or (3) of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995. According to him, the order dated 15-07-2019 can never be said to have been issued either under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (3) because the procedure prescribed therein had not been followed by the State Government. In other words, it cannot be said to have been issued under sub-section (1) because no notice was given to the Board for explanation. Similarly, it cannot be said to have been issued under sub-section (3) for the reason that it was not issued on the day on which the period of six month had expired, i.e., on 20-06-2019. On the other hand, it has been submitted by Shri M. Rarry, the learned Addl. Advocate General that it can be said to have been issued either under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (3). Since the impugned order dated 15-07-2019 was issued after having considered the reply filed by the petitioner, there was no violation of the principles of audi alteram partem. Moreover, there is no any whisper in the writ petition about the correctness or otherwise of the reasons recorded in it. The said order can also be said to have been issued under sub-section (3) for the reason that it was issued within time because the period during which it was placed under suspension by this Court, was to be excluded while computing the period of six months in terms of the provisions of Section 15 of the Limitation Act.

In order to substantiate his argument, he has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. S,K, Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364; Rajendra Singh Vs. State of MP & ors, (1996)5 SCC 460 and J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, (1998) 3 SCC 540.

[7] The subject matter in issue relates to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995, sub-section (1) of which has been examined and considered by this Court in the case of Md. Fajur Rahim Vs. State of Manipur, WP(C) No. 217 of 2018. Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 reads as under:

"99. Power to supersede Board.-(1) If the State Government is of opinion that the Board is unable to perform or has persistently made default in the performance of, the duty imposed on it by or under this Act or has exceeded or abused its powers, or has wilfully and without sufficient cause failed to comply with any direction issued by the Central Government under section 96 or the State Government under section 97, or if the State Government is satisfied on consideration of any report submitted after annual inspection, that the Board's continuance is likely to be injurious to the interests of the auqaf in the State, the State

Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, supersede the Board for a period not exceeding six months:

Provided that before issuing a notification under this sub-section, the State Government shall give a reasonable time to the Board to show cause why it should not be superseded and shall consider the explanations and objections, if any, of the Board:

Provided further that the power of the State Government under this section shall not be exercised unless there is a prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct or violation of the provisions of this Act.

(2) Upon the publication of a notification under sub-section (1) superseding the Board,-

(a) all the members of the Board shall, as from the date of supersession, vacate their offices as such members;

(b) all the powers and duties which may, by or under the provisions of this Act, be exercised or performed by or on behalf of the Board shall, during the period of supersession, be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the State Government may direct; and

(c) all properties vested in the Board shall, during the period of supersession vest in the State Government.

(3) On the expiration of the period of supersession specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), the State Government may-

(a) extend the period of supersession by another six months with reasons to be recorded in writing and, the period of continuous supersession shall not exceed more than a year; or

(b) reconstitute the Board in the manner provided in section 14."

[8] Section 99 of the Act provides for supersession of the Waqf Board on the grounds as detailed in sub-section (1) and as has been stated hereinabove, in Md. Fajur Rahim Vs. State of Manipur, WP(C) No. 217 of 2018, this Court had the occasion to consider it. The relevant paragraphs 6 to

8 thereof are reproduced hereinbelow:

[6] Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 provides for supersession of the Waqf Board by the State Government on certain grounds as detailed in sub-section (1). In other words, the State Government is empowered to supersede the Waqf Board on any of the grounds mentioned therein. The provisions of Section 99(1) can be divided into parts- one, it relates to the formation of an opinion as regards the performance and functioning of the Waqf Board and two, it relates to the satisfaction of the State Government on the consideration of any report submitted after annual inspection. It is thus seen that the supersession of the Waqf Board by the State Government is to be based either on the opinion or on the satisfaction of the annual inspection report. The first part deals with a case where the State Government is of the opinion that the Board is unable to perform or has persistently made default in the performance of its duty or has exceeded or abused its power or has willfully and without sufficient cause failed to comply with any direction issued by the Central Government or the State Government. The second part deals with a case where the State Government, after consideration of any report submitted after annual inspection, is satisfied that the Board's continuance is likely to be injurious to the interest of the auqaf in the State. The first proviso to sub-section (1) mandates that the State Government shall give a reasonable time to the Waqf Board to show cause why it should not be superseded and shall consider its explanation and objections, if any. The second proviso which has been inserted by way of an amendment sometime in the year, 2013, states that the power of the State Government shall not be exercised unless there is a prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct or violation of the provisions of Act. The conjoint reading of sub-section (1) and the second proviso thereto makes it very clear that the grounds as detailed in sub-section (1) have been qualified by the expression "prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct or violation of the provisions of the Act". In other words, before any action is taken towards supersession of the Waqf Board, there has to be a prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct or violation of provisions of the Act with the State Government. Since there is no material on record to show that a report, after annual inspection, has been submitted to the State Government for consideration, the instant case appears to have fallen in the first category.

[7] The learned counsels appearing for the parties have not brought to the notice of this court any decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as regards the interpretation of the provisions of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 and in particular, sub-section (1) of the Act. It may be noted that the Waqf Act, 1954 and the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 1984 have been repealed by the Waqf Act, 1995. In the Waqf Act, 1954, the power of the State Government to supersede the Waqf Board was conferred under Section 64. But Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has brought to the notice of this court a decision rendered by the Patna High Court in the State Bihar Sunni Waqf Board & anr. Vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1993 Patna 89 wherein the legality and validity of a notice of supersession of the Waqf Board purported to have been issued under Section 64 of the Waqf Act, 1954 came to be challenged. The Hon'ble High Court was pleased to hold that the order of supersession and the show cause notice were based on extraneous consideration and were passed arbitrarily with oblique motive and the relevant para thereof is as under:

"18. On correct interpretation of Section 64 it has to be held that the opinion has to be based on consideration of the explanations submitted in regard to the charges levelled against it and that must be considered by a reasoned order.

The fact of the present case presents a peculiar feature. Each and every allegation levelled against it were categorically repelled and refuted. They were of trivial nature on which no reasonable opinion could have been formed that the Board persistently defaulted in the performance of its duties imposed under the Act. On the other hand, the facts enumerated above would disclose that there was persistent effort on behalf of the respondents and its authorities to interfere with the day to day administration of the Board and it has been brought on record that in a period of 15 years the Boards were superseded 12 limes. It has also been demonstrated that the same charges, more or less, were levelled for claiming supersession. The Board had no adequate and proper opportunity to put its own house in order. No sooner the present Chairman had taken over the assignment, the notice to show cause was issued within four months on the allegations which have been shown to be palpably baseless. Even now the charges have not been established by any cogent evidence. No document in support of the allegation has been brought on record on behalf of the respondents. It has also been satisfactorily demonstrated that no sooner Mr. Ozair Ahmad was appointed as the Secretary to the Board just within a week thereafter a notice for supersession of the Board was issued. Mr. Ozair Ahmad was suspended by the Board on the ground of misconduct and moral turpitude. Information to this effect was in full knowledge of the respondents. Even then, ignoring the suggestion of the Board he was appointed on a false pretext that he was one of the four persons recommended by the Board itself. This has been refuted by the Board in its reply. The four persons in the list were named according to seniority and a clear indication had been given therein regarding the allegations made against Shri Ozair Ahmad and, therefore, a suggestion had been given that some other person be appointed. It has, therefore, been alleged that the show cause notice to supersede the Board was influenced by political considerations and was based on extraneous considerations. It may be pointed out that such statutory authorities must have a free hand in performing its day to day public duty and undue frequent interference on some false pretext or the other will not be conducive to the interest of the people or the Waqf. I find that the show cause in question contained in Annexures 18 and 19 are based on no reason. Neither any reason has been so assigned nor any evidence or material has been disclosed justifying such action. Supersession of statutory body is a serious matter. It is governed by the statute and the provisions contained therein must be strictly followed. Section 64 of the Waqf Act does not give a blanket power to supersede the Board as and when the respondents and its authorities desired to do so and for any reason whatsoever. In the case of M/s. Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., (1990) 3 SCC 280, it was held:--

"In recent times, judicial review of administrative action has become expensive and is becoming wider day by day. The traditional limitations have been vanishing and the sphere of judicial scrutiny is being expanded. State activity too is becoming fast pervasive. As the State has descended into the commercial field and giant public sector undertakings have grown up, the stake of the public exchequer is also large justifying larger social audit, judicial control and review by opening of the public gaze; these necessitate recording of reasons for executive actions including cases of rejection of highest offers. That very often involves large stakes and availability of reasons for actions on the record assures credibility to the action; disciplines public conduct and improves the culture of accountability.

Looking for reasons in support of such action provides an opportunity for an objective review in appropriate cases both by the administrative superior and by the judicial process."

This court is not bound by the said decision of the High Court except the persuasive value thereof but it appears from the book "Commentary on the Law of Waqf in India" authored by Dr. Ahmedullah Khan that the matter was carried upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court which examined and interpreted the scope of the provisions to supersede Waqf Board and observed: "On plain reading of the said provision, it would be obvious that the opinion of the State Government to supersede the Board is not subjective opinion. It has to be based on objective findings and for the reasons to be recorded in writing. The persistent default in the performance of the duty imposed on it cannot be gathered by a solitary instance of irregularity or illegality".

[8] The aforesaid decision has been rendered in the context of Section 64 of the un-repealed Act but since Section 64 thereof has been replaced by Section 99 under the new Act, the fact remains that the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would apply to the facts of the present case as well. As has been stated hereinabove, before supersession of the Waqf Board, the State Government and not the officer dealing with the matter, has to form an opinion which is to be based on objective findings and for the reasons to be recorded in writing. In other words, there has to be sufficient prima facie evidence of financial irregularities, misconduct or violation of the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, it has been categorically stated that there are sufficient prima facie evidence of financial irregularities, misconduct or violation of the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995. On perusal of the writ petition, I is seen that the case of the petitioner is that the supersession is totally illegal and politically motivated and although serious charges are levelled against the Waqf Board, the State Government while issuing show cause notice, has failed to furnish copies of the documents/ evidences on the basis of which the opinion has been formed by it. It may be noted that in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, it is nowhere stated that the copies of the documents have been furnished by it.

[9] Sub-section (2) indicates the consequences that ought to follow after the publication of the Notification for supersession of the Board-all the members of the Board shall vacate their offices; that all the powers and duties shall be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the State Government may direct and that all properties vested in the Board shall, during the period of supersession vest in the State Government. Sub-section (3) which is relevant for the present case, provides for extension of the period of supersession as specified in the notification/ order. It provides that on the expiration of the period of supersession specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), the State Government may extend the period of supersession by another six months with reasons to be recorded in writing and the period of continuous supersession shall not exceed more than a year. For the purpose of extension of the period of supersession of the Board, there are three conditions to be fulfilled-one, the period of six months as specified in the notification shall expire; two, the extension shall be for a period of another six months with reasons to be recorded in writing and three, the period of continuous supersession shall not exceed more than a year. As regards the first condition, the expression "on the expiration of the period of supersession" is significant, while the word "on" is relevant. It may be noted that the word used in the said expression is "on" and not the word "before" or "after". It is thus seen that the extension of the period of supersession cannot, in any case, be extended before or after the expiration of the period of six months as specified in the notification. In point of time, the word "on" lies in between the words "before" and "after" meaning thereby that the extension of the period of supersession shall be made on the day on which the period of six months will expire. In other words, the order of extension or for that matter, the notification shall be issued on the last day on which the period will expire. Any deviation therefrom shall render the order of extension invalid. As per the second condition, the extension shall be for a period of another six months with reasons to be recorded in writing. Since the order of extension is to be issued on the last day of the period of six months as mentioned above, the period of another six months as mentioned in sub-section (3) shall commence from that day. It may further be noted that the reasons are to be recorded for the extension of the period of supersession for another six months. The third condition states that the period of continuous supersession shall not exceed more than a year. This condition can be divided into two parts-one, the period of supersession shall be continuous and two, the continuous period shall not exceed more than a year. These three conditions are interlinked and ought to be read together. The conjoint reading of these conditions makes it very clear that the period of six months will expire on a particular day by counting it from the day on which the notification was issued and the order of extension for another six months shall be issued on that particular day from which the period of another six month shall commence but this continuous period shall not exceed more than a year.

[10] The whole controversy between the parties has arisen for the reason that it is nowhere mentioned in the order dated 15-07-2019 that it was issued either under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (3) but it has been specifically stated therein that it was issued in exercise of power conferred under Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 for six months with immediate. In order to examine whether it was issued under sub-section

(1) , the detailed facts of the case are to be gone into. It may be noted that under sub-section (1), the State Government is empowered to supersede the Board for a period not exceeding six months. The expression "for a period not exceeding six months" is relevant and important for deciding the issue involved herein. It may further be noted that on 21-12-2018 an order was issued superseding the Board for six months which was challenged by the petitioner in WP(C) No.217 of 2018 on the ground that it had been issued without considering the reply filed by him to the show cause notice. This Court vide its interim order dated 29-12-2018 kept the order dated 21-12-2018 under suspension which was extended until further order on 14-01-2019. The said writ petition came to be disposed by this Court on 26-06-2019 holding that it had become infructuous, as the period of the order dated 21-12-2018 superseding the Board, had expired on 20-06-2019. Consequently, the interim order had stood merged with it. This Court's order dated 26-06-2019 appears to have not been challenged by anyone before any appropriate forum. The corollary issue that arises for consideration is as to whether another order can be issued under sub-section (1) superseding the Board for a period of six months with immediate effect, despite the fact that the order dated 21-12-2018 superseding the Board had already been issued by the State Government. The answer is in the negative for the reason that the order dated 21-12-2018 had already been issued superseding the Board for six months and its period of six months had expired on 20-06-2019. It would have been a different matter, if the said order dated 21-12-2018 was withdrawn and was issued again after considering the reply. It had not been done so. The only option left with the State Government was to issue another order under sub-section (3) for extension of the period of supersession after following the procedure prescribed therein and in other words, after fulfilling the conditions mentioned therein. The power of supersession of the Board conferred under sub-section (1) is one time for six months only and it can be extended for another six months under sub-section (3) but the total period of supersession of the Board, both under sub-section (1) and (3) together, shall not exceed more than a year. The power of issuing order superseding the Board, one after another, is not contemplated in sub-section (1) of Section 99 of the Waqf Act. Although the order dated 15-07-2019 appears to have been issued under sub-section (1), it cannot be said to have been issued in accordance with law.

[11] As regards the alternative issue as to whether the order dated 15-07-2019 was issued under sub-section (3), it may be noted that the first order superseding the Board, was issued on 21-12-2018 for a period of six months and its period of six months ought to have expired on 20-06-2019. Therefore, the notification/ order for extension of the period of supersession for another six months as envisaged in sub-section (3) ought to have been issued on 20-06-2019 itself and ought to expire on 19-12-2019. It is not in dispute that the order for extension of another six months was not issued on 20-06-2019. But the argument advanced by Shri M. Rarry, the learned Addl. Advocate General is that while computing the period of six months, the period during which its operation was suspended by this Court shall be excluded and therefore, the period of six months cannot be said to have expired on 20-06-2019. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the provisions of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to contend that the period during which the order dated 21-12-2018 was suspended by this Court, i.e., from 29-12-2018 to 26-06-2019, shall be excluded while computing the period of six months. According to him, since the period of six months will have to expire on 15-12-2019 after the exclusion of the period of suspension by this Court, the notification/ order issued by the State Government on 15-07-2019 is within time and there is no illegality in the extension of the period of supersession of the Board and accordingly, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed by this Court.

[12] The Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted by the parliament and the purpose for which it was enacted is to secure the quiet and repose of the community. The law of limitation is a statute founded on consideration of public policy and expediency. The law of Limitation limits or prescribes a time, after the lapse of which suit or other proceedings cannot be maintained in a Court of law or the persons liable to suit shall become exempt from answering thereon. Section 15 of the Limitation Act reads as under:

"15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases-(1) In computing the period of limitation of any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.

(3) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for execution of a decree by any receiver or interim receiver appointed in proceedings for the adjudication of a person as an insolvent or by any liquidator or provisional liquidator appointed in proceedings for the winding up of a company, the period beginning with the date of institution of such proceeding and ending with the expiry of three months from the date of appointment of such receiver or liquidator, as the case may be, shall be excluded.

(4) In computing the period of limitation for a suit for possession by a purchase at a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale has been prosecuted shall be excluded.

(5) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the defendant has been absent from India and from the territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government, shall be excluded."

On perusal of the provisions of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is seen that it provides for exclusion of time in cases where the suit or application is to be filed in a Court for execution of a decree. It has nothing to do with the issue involved in the present case for the reason that a decree is not being sought to be executed herein and the question of filing a suit or an application is not involved herein at all. In other words, the provisions of Section 15 are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

[13] Assuming for the sake of argument that the period during which the order of supersession was suspended by this Court, shall be excluded while computing the period of six months, the period of supersession as specified in the notification/ order ought to expire on 15-12-2019 and therefore, in view of the observations made hereinabove as regards the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, the notification/ order for extension of the period of supersession for another period of six months ought to be issued on 15-12-2019 only which is yet to come. But on the contrary, the order was issued admittedly on 15-07-2019 meaning thereby that it would amount to issuing it prior to the expiration of the earlier period of supersession. The order for extension of the period of supersession under sub-section (3) shall be issued on the expiration of a period of six months as specified in the earlier order issued under sub-section (1). Therefore, the said notification/ order dated 15-07-2019 cannot be said to have been issued in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995.

[14] There can no doubt about the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decisions relied upon by the learned Addl. Advocate General but since the facts of those cases are not similar to that of the present case, the same will have no application at all. As regards the issuance of an order for extension of the earlier order of supersession under sub-section (3), the question of violation of the principles of natural justice will not arise and only the reasons are to be recorded therein. In terms of sub-section (3), the order for extension of the earlier order of supersession of the Board ought to have been issued on 20-06-2019 for maintaining continuity or it ought to be issued on 15-12-2019 which is yet to come, if his contention that the time taken in the Court during the suspension of the order shall be excluded, is to be believed and accepted by this Court. It may be noted at this juncture that the Board is constituted under the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 and it being a statutory body, its supersession by the State Government is permissible only after following strictly the procedure prescribed therein. Before issuing an order superseding the Board, the application of mind by the State Government is paramount and appropriate steps are to be taken by it in accordance with what is prescribed in Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995 which is mandatory. Non-compliance with the procedure prescribed in Section 99 will render the order of supersession as contrary to law and illegal. In view of the above, it can be safely held that the said notification/ order dated 15-07-2019 was not legally issued under sub-section (1) nor was it issued under sub-section (3) of Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995. Therefore, the Notification/ order dated 15-07-2019 is bad in law and is liable to be quashed and set aside.

[15] In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed and consequently, the impugned order dated 15-07-2019 issued by the Under secretary (MOBC & SC), Government of Manipur is quashed and set aside with no order as to costs.