Meena Kumari vs Kalpana Kumari

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.11.2013 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Ma strate, Sarkaghat, District Mandi (learned Trial Court), vide which the complaint filed by the appellant (complainant before learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC). It was asserted that the accused was passing through the complainant’s house-cum-shop on 07.08 2012 at about 3 PM. The accused enquired from the complainant as to why she had discharged the water from her house into the kuhal. She also called bad names to the complainant. The complainant requested the accused to behave properly and n t to utter filthy words. The accused turned furious and said, “तू बदमाश औरत है .तूने 100 लाडे रखे है .तू चरिरत्रही ने औरतू है . तेरे कई लो गों से नाजायज संबंध हैं, और तेरे नाजायजा संबंधो की मेरे पास सीडी बनी है । तू रातों को होटलों में रहैती है जाहां तू अपानी इज्जतू आबरू बचती है । तू मेरा क्या बिबगांड़ लेगीं ” (You are a rogue woman. You have kept 100 husbands. You are a c aracterless woman. You have illicit relations with many people, and a compact disc cd of your illicit relations has been prepared. You stay in the hotels during the night where you sell your honour. What will you do to me?). These words were used by the accused intentionally to harm the complainant’s reputation in the eyes of the general public, and they were heard by the villagers who were standing nearby. Some of those persons are Mukesh Kumar, Duni Chand, Kashmir Singh, Malka Devi, school children, and school staff of Government Senior Secondary School, Kolni Dhalwan, located at the place of the incident. The people intervened, and the accused went away to her home. She again repeated these words. Therefore, it was prayed that the action be taken against the accused.

The learned Trial Court recorded the preliminary evidence and found sufficient reasons to summon the accused.

When the accused appeared, a notice f accusation was put to her for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The complainant examined herself (CW1), Seema Devi (CW2), and Malka Devi (CW3).

The accused, in her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. She stated that the witnesses deposed falsely. The complainant has diverted the water of her house towards the house of the accused. This resulted in a dispute between the two families. She was innocent. However, she did not lead any evidence in defence.

The learned Trial Court held that Malka Devi (CW3) admitted that she, Seema (CW2) and the complainant belong to one family. The complainant did not examine any shopkeeper or the member of the staff of the school, even though shops and the school existed on the spot. The witnesses also made contradictory versions, which made the complainant’s case highly suspect. The complainant suppressed the dispute between her and the accused, which would make her an unreliable witness. The complainant’s case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the accused was acquitted.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed he present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Statements of the complainant’s witnesses were not properly appreciated. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion. The enmity was not sufficient to discard the complainant’s case. The testimonies of the complainant’s witnesses proved the incident. Therefore, it was prayed t at t e present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

I have heard Mr Shekhar Badola, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr S.K. Banyal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

Mr Shekhar Badola, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the complainant and her witnesses proved that the accused had uttered the words which defamed the complainant and lowered her reputation in the eyes of the public. The learned Trial Court relied upon minor contradictions which were bound to come with the passage of time and were not sufficient to discard the complainant’s case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

Mr S.K. Banyal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the complainant did not examine any of the persons named by her in the complaint; instead, she examined her family members, who made contradictory statements. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and no interference is required with the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:

“23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court g verning the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acqui al of the accused recorded by the trial court.

This Co rt in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State f Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (S pp. 482-83, para 29)

“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a do ble presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

… 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the rder of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was pr ved bey nd a reasonable doubt and no other conclusi n was possible.”

Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity.

41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:

We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the ace of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, nly in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere wi h a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to inte fe e with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases f Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471.”

The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The complainant and Seema Devi (CW2) admitted in their cross-examination that they were not on visiting terms with the accused. Malka Devi (CW3) stated that she had stopped going to the house of the accused after a quarrel. This clearly shows that all the witnesses are inimical to the accused, which would put the Court on guard while appreciating their testimonies.

The complainant specifically asserted in the complaint that the incident was witnessed by Mukesh Kumar, Duni Chand, Kashmir Singh, Malka Devi, her family members, her relatives, the general public, school children and school staff of Government Senior Secondary School, Kolni, Dhalwan. She stated, while appearing as CW1 on 22.07.2013, that Mukesh Kumar, Duni Chand, Malka Devi, Kashmir Singh, etc., heard the words uttered by the accused. Her relatives were also present n the spot. These words defamed the complainant. She examined Duni Chand (CW2) while leading preliminary evidence.

Learned Trial C urt put notice of accusation to the accused, and the complainant examined Seema Devi (CW2) and Malka Devi (CW3). Malka Devi (CW3) admitted in her cross-examination t at she, Seema and the complainant belonged to one fam ly. No reason was assigned for not examining Duni Chand, who was examined earlier, or any independent person. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference for the non-examination of the independent persons.

The complainant, Meena Kumari, stated that she was cleaning the kuhal. The accused was walking in front of her house. The accused started abusing her. She enquired as to why the accused was abusing her. Her statement on oath does not give any reason for the abuse. Thus, the version mentioned by the complainant that the accused enquired as to why the complainant had discharged the water from her house into a drain was not proved by the complainant’s statement.

Malka Devi (CW3) stated that the complainant was sweeping her courtyard. The accused came to the spot and objected to the sweeping. The complainant old her to behave properly, and the accused abused the complainant.

Statement of Malka Devi (CW3) mentions the reasons for the abuse as the sweeping f the courtyard by the complainant. This is contrary to the complainant’s version on oath, who had not mentioned any reason, or the complaint, which mentioned the dischar e of t e water into the Kuhal as the reason for the abuse. Therefore, there was a discrepancy regarding the reason for abuse, which would make the complainant’s version suspect.

Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed.

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondent/accused is directed to furnish her personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfacti n f the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the resp ndent/accused, on receipt of notice(s) thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous appl cation(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.