Meenu Agarwal vs District Magistrate Pauri Gharwal And Others

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

This intra-court appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPMS No. 3097 of 2018 dated 09.07.2019. The appellant-writ petitioner claims to have purchased the subject property from a borrower who had obtained a loan from the second respondent-bank. It is his case that, on its sale to him, the vendor-borrower had handed over the title-deeds of the subject property which are still in his possession even as on date. His complaint is that, even without deposit of the title-deeds, the Bank had proceeded to lend money to the borrower on creation of an equitable mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, even though no title-deeds were deposited with the Bank, nor could it have been so deposited, since it is in the possession of the appellant-writ petitioner.

The petitioner's grievances is that the borrower had played fraud on the Bank, and the Bank had willingly colluded with the borrower in granting him a loan even without taking possession of the title-deeds, and other connected documents, from him while granting him a loan on the basis of an equitable mortgage. According to Mr. Atul Kumar Bansal, learned counsel for the appellant, instead of relegating the petitioner to approach the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short the "Sarfaesi Act"), the learned Single Judge had erred in relegating him to the remedy of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act.

In the order under appeal, the learned Singe Judge has held that the petitioner had the remedy of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act for redressal of his grievance; and, in order to enable him to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the respondent-bank should not take coercive steps, against the appellant-writ petitioner, for a period of one month.

Section 17(1) of the Sarfaesi Act uses the words "Any person (including borrower)", aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4)." Among the measures, under Section 13(4), is the power to take possession of the secured assets. The endeavour of the second respondent-bank to take possession of the subject property, which the appellant-writ petitioner claims to be the owner of, undoubtedly falls within the ambit of Section 13(4); and since the words used in Section 17(1) are "any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measure" it is evident that it is not only the borrower but any other aggrieved person who also can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act. The petitioner is, undoubtedly, a person aggrieved and is therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act.

The scope of interference, in an intra-court appeal, is extremely limited. The learned Single Judge is not a court subordinate since both he, and the Division Bench, exercise the very same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even if there are two possible views and the view canvassed before it, on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, is found by it to be more attractive, even then the Division Bench would refrain for interference as long as the view taken by the learned Single Judge is one of the possible views. Interference would be justified only if the view taken by the learned Single Judge is not even a possible view. Since the learned Single Judge was of the view that the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act, could be invoked, and it is not even contended before us that the learned Single Judge could not have taken such view at all, we see no reason to interfere with the order under appeal.

Mr. A.K. Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner, then seeks extension of the time granted by the learned Single Judge to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The learned Single judge had granted the appellant-writ petitioner one month's time which would expire only on 06.08.2019. It is always open to the petitioner to move the Debts Recovery Tribunal prior thereto. We have no reason to doubt that, on its jurisdiction being invoked by the appellant-writ petitioner, the Debts Recovery Tribunal would consider all the contentions raised by him, and pass appropriate orders, both interim and final, in accordance with law.

The Special Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.

Let a certified copy of this order be issued to the learned counsel for the parties, on payment of the prescribed charges, by 03.08.2019.