Megh Raj vs Dev Kumar and ors.

S.S. Dewan, J.

Criminal Misc. No. 622M of 1983 preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the Code) is directed against the order made by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, on 23rd October, 1981, by which he disposed of Criminal Revision No. 60 of 1981. The disposal by the Additional Sessions Judge was of a criminal revision petition within the purview of Section 397 of the Code.

At the outset, the learned counsel for the respondents in this petition, has raised a preliminary objection that the present petition is not competent in view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code, the relevant provision reads as under :

"397(3) If an application under this Section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."

A bare reading of the above provision would show that there is a statutory bar in subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code against any revision petition being preferred by the same person, where a revision petition preferred by him, has been disposed of either by the High Court or the Sessions Judge. The disposal of the revision petition by either of the said Court becomes final in view of Section 397(3) of the Code.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however urged with great ability that there is no limitation in Section 482 of the Code prohibiting the exercise of that jurisdiction against any order which may have been passed under the Code; Section 482 of the Code is in the following terms;

"482. Saving of inhering power of High Court

Nothing of this Court shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

A careful scrutiny of the aforementioned provision leads to the conclusion that its ultimate part must be read ejusdem generic with the contemplation in the provision that the provision is to be used also to give effect to the orders passed under the Criminal Procedure Code. The dismissal of the revision petition in this case, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, is within the four corners of Section 397 of the Code and instead of giving effect to that dismissal, the ultimate part in Section 482 cannot be used as a substitute for the revisional jurisdiction, the exercise whereof by this Court is barred by subsection (3) of Section 397. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge has become final in view of subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code. In this view, I am fortified by a decision in Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh and another, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 381, wherein it has been held that the object of Section 397 (3) is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders. Any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior Criminal Court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional Jurisdiction of other authority. The language of Section 397 (3) is clear and peremptory and it does not admit of any other interpretation. It was further held that when the Sessions Judge refused to interfere with the order of the Magistrate, the High Court''s jurisdiction was inoked to avoid the order of the magistrate, and not that of the Sessions Judge. The bar of Section 397 (3) was, therefore, effectively attracted and the bar could not be circumvented by the subterfuge of treated the revision application as directed against the Sessions Judge''s order. The revision application before the High Court cannot be treated as an application directed against the order of the Sessions Judge instead so as one directed against the order of the Magistrate. It is not permissible to do so. What may not be done directly cannot be allowed to be done indirectly; that would an evasion of the statute. It is a well known principle of law that the provisions of an Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance.

The inherent power of the High Court, therefore, cannot be used to override a statutory provision containing a clear prohibition like the one contained in Section 397 (3) of the Code. That being the case, the only remedy which the petitioner can invoke, may be under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.