Mela Singh vs Hira Lal Kapur and Others

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—This is an appeal of Mela Singh, Defendant, directed against the appellate judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, remanding the suit to the trial Judge for disposal on merits.

The suit is in respect of a small area of land measuring 9'' � 4�'' in house No. 8294, Park Area, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, and was brought by Shadi Lal Kapur, who now being dead is legally represented by his heirs, Respondents Nos. 2 to 7, and his brother Hira Lal Kapur, for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent against Hari Ram, whose successor-in-interest Mela Singh is. It was objected in the first instance that the suit did not lie before a civil Court as it related to ''premises'' and should have been brought before the Rent Controller. A preliminary issue framed with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court was decided by the Court of first instance in favour of the Defendant. In appeal, however, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge found the matter in favour of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant feeling aggrieved from this order has come to this Court in appeal.

The Defendant admittedly has been carrying on business of selling wares on a rehri in a small parcel of land which had been leased about 10 or 12 years ago. This land is part of the compound of a kothi which has not been leased to the Defendant. The rent note shows that the land was intended to be used for rehri and as would be manifest is an extremely small area. The question which falls for determination is whether the demised property falls within the definition of "premises" in Clause (i) of Section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. "Premises" so defined under the clause means:

any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose and includes--

(i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the building;

(ii) ......

It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, who has argued this case with extreme fairness, that the word ''premises'' has to be given a very ample meaning and should be construed liberally. Reliance is placed on a Supreme Court decision in Karnani Properties Ltd. Vs. Augustin, . It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in order fully to give effect to the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, which are similar to the Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to give them the widest application possible within the terms of the statute. That proposition of law cannot be contested. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the case before the Supreme Court related to a set of rooms in a building and that would clearly fall within the ambit of the word "premises". To a similar effect is a decision of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Burdwan Real Properties Private Ltd. and Another Vs. Lal Behari Kapuria, , which incidentally is also a case of residential accommodation. There can be no manner of doubt that any building or a part of building would constitute ''premises'' within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 2. Sub-clause (i) mentions gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining to any such building or part of the building, and the learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that being included in the building any portion of the ground or garden should also fall within the meaning of ''premises''. The proper construction to be placed on Clause (i) read with Sub-clause (i) is that a garden, ground or an out-house, if it appertains to the building which has been let, would be included in ''premises'' and not if such a garden or ground or a portion of garden or ground is let out independently. Reference may be made to a Single Bench decision of Pandit, J., in Ram Saran and Ors. v. Harbhajan Singh and Ors. ILR 1964 (2) P&H 62 : 1964 P.L.R. 377, where it was held by the learned Judge that:

For the purpose of determination as to whether the property included in the tenancy is ''premises'' or not it has to be seen as to what was actually let by the landlord in a particular case. Where the landlord had only leased out a vacant piece of land, the mere fact that some temporary constructions have been raised by the tenant for his own use would not in any way convert the same into a building.

With this construction of the word ''premises'' I am in respectful agreement and, in my opinion, the present case is on a much stronger footing for the Respondents than the one with which Pandit, J., was dealing. Concededly, there is no kind of construction built on the small piece of land which has been leased with the Defendant-Appellant. The lessee of the vacant site only brings a rehri to this piece of land and sells his wares. There is a decision of Falshaw. J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in Dr. Kanwal Nain. v. Sardari Lal 1952 P.L.R. 14, where it was held that a vacant plot of land containing no building at all, but only a platform or chabutra and forming part of the compound of the landlord''s house, did not constitute ''premises'' within the definition of the word in the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. The Respondents appear to be still better placed according to the ruling of this decision as even a platform or chabutra has not been constructed on the site.

I am of the view that the learned Senior Subordinate Judge has taken the right view of the matter and I would accordingly dismiss this appeal, but would leave the parties to bear their own costs. The parties will appear before the trial Judge on 2nd of November, 1965, which date is already fixed for this purpose.