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Judgment
Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.—This is a revision by the assessees against the order of the Sales-Tax Appellant Tribunal in his assessment
proceedings for the year 1951-52. The assessees carried en business at Salem in the manufacture and sale of groundnut oil and cakes and are
registered as such under the provisions of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act. During the year 1951-52 the the assessees purchased groundnut of
the value of Rs. 22,95,670 and converted it into oil and oil cakes and effected a sale of these products. The gross turnover of the oil and oil cakes
during the year was Rs. 43,59,133-3-1. The scheme of taxation in respect of groundnuts and groundnut oil under the Madras General Sales-Tax
Act is this: Under R. 4 (2) of the Madras General-Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules in the case of groundnuts, the gross turnover of a dealer
for the purpose of these rules is the amount for which the goods are sold by the dealer. In cases, however, where a dealer purchases groundnuts
and manufactures groundnut oil and cakes from the groundnut or kernel purchased by him and who is registered as a manufacturer of groundnut oil
under R. 18 of the Turnover and Assessment Rules, the manufacturer
Is entitled to a deduction equal to the value of the groundnut or kernel purchased and converted by him into oil and cakes provided the amount for
which the oil is sold is included in his turnover.
So. generally speaking when a dealer as a manufacturer includes the sale value of the oil in his turnover, he is entitled to deduct therefrom the
purchase price of kernel or the groundnut, which has been utilised for the manufacture of the oil under R. 18 (2).
Before the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer the assessee claimed exemption from tax in respect of their sale turnover to the extent of Rs.
42,44,102-15-1. This was made up of two items, viz., (1) a claim to a deduction under R. 18 (2) mentioned above, that is, the purchase price of
the groundnut or kernel obtained by them which amounted to Rs. 22,36.371-13-1, and (2) a sum of Rs. 20,07,731-2-0 in respect of which the
claim was based on the sales to that extent being outside the State and so entitled to exemption under Art. 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution. The
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer by his assessment order dated 27th March 1953 allowed some small deductions in the computation of the sate
turnover and also allowed to the assessees a deduction of Rs. 22,95,670 under R. 18 (2). In regard to the other claim for excluding from the
turnover the amount of sales effected outside the State, he allowed a deduction in respect of Rs. 1,00,685-4-6 being the value of the goods sold
through commission agents at Bombay but disallowed the claim to exclude the rest of the turnover totalling Rs. 19.07.045-1C-6. On these
calculations he determined the net turnover for the purpose of the sales-tax at Rs. 19,61,372-3-7, and assessed them accordingly.
The assessee took up the matter in appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer, Salem, and there raised the contention that they were entitled to a
deduction of purchase turnover under R. 18 (2) and that when oil extracted from the groundnut purchased was exported outside the State, they
were also entitled to have the sale price of such exported goods excluded from the assessment under the Sales-Tax Act by virtue of the exemption
granted by Art. 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution. This appellate authority substantially dismissed the appeal and refused to grant to the assessees the
benefit of the exemption conferred by Art. 286 (1) (a) on the ground that they had already obtained relief tinker R. 18 and that to grant them
release both under R. 18 (2) as well as under Art. 286 (1) (a) would in effect be tantamount to a grant in m the Government and not merely afford
relief from the payment of tax. The result of the decision was therefore that the assessees were held entitled to the deduction under R. 18 but they
could not at the same time claim to have the sale price of the commodities manufactured out of the goods so purchased excluded from their
turnover because the sales took place outside the State.
From this decision of the Commercial Tax Officer as the appellate authority, the assessees took the matter in further appeal to the Sales Tax
Appellate tribunal. 7 he contention raised by them there was while the lower authorities rightly granted them the deduction under R. 18 (2) of the
Turnover and Assessment Rules, they had erred in holding that the grant of such deduction was inconsistent with the claim to exemption under Art.
286 (1) (a) on the turnover of the sales effected by them. The view however which the Appellate Tribunal took on this matter was:(1) that on a
proper construction of the rules framed under the Sale-Tax Act in respect of the sales turnover of manufacture of oil, a dealer would not be entitled
to exemption both under R. 18(2) and under Art. 286 (1) affirming the view of the Commercial Tax Officer and (2) that the claim of the assessees
to an exemption under Art. 286 (1) (a) was par amount and the lower authorities had erred in not excluding from the turnover of the assessees
their ""outside sales"". As a result, the basis of the assessment had to be altered inasmuch as the assessees were held entitled to the exclusion from
their turnover of the price realised by the sales effected outside the State but that in respect of such turnover the purchase price of the relative
groundnut or kernel could not be deducted under R. 18 (2). Learned Counsel for the assessees also raised before the Tribunal the contention that
if they found that the assessees were entitled to exemption under Art. 286 (l) (a) the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was confined to their allowing the
appeal, notwithstanding that the assessees might not be entitled to both the deduction as well as the exemption and that inasmuch as both the lower
authorities had granted to the assessees relief by way of deduction under R. 18 (2) such a deduction could not be disturbed by the Tribunal. This
argument was however rejected and the Tribunal held that the entire assessment was before them by reason of the appeal which had been brought
up by the assessees and that it was open to them to lay down the correct basis of the assessment and directed the assessing authority to effect the
assessment in accordance with these principles. It is against this order of the Tribunal which remanded the assessment proceedings to the
Commercial Tax Officer on the basis mentioned earlier that this revision has been filed. There is no challenge about the correctness of their view as
regards the relative scope of the deduction and exemption open to an assessee under R. 18 (2) and Art. 286 (1) (a), as the same is in accordance
with the view expressed by this Court in a decision in Sri Chandramowleswara Oil Co., muruool, In re (1954) 2 M.L.J. 187. - 67 L.W. 480,
where the following proposition was laid down:
If the assessees were exempted from paying tax on the sale turnover of the oil as the sale was outside the State, they cannot claim the benefit of the
deduction under R. 18 of the Turnover and Assess meet Rules.
But it is however the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to pass an order of remand which it did that is called in question by learned Counsel for the
petitioners in this revision. We might mention that in accordance with the order of the Tribunal the Commercial Tax Officer has re-assessed the
assessees by allowing them the constitutional exemption under Art. 286 (1) (a) by excluding from their turnover, sales effected outside the State
but not allowing the deduction to the assessees under R. 18 (2) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules, The result of the reassessment on this
footing has been that the net assessable turnover has been increased from Rs. 18,63,222-8-7 which was the figure originally arrived at by the
Commercial Tax Officer, to Rs. 23,34,550-91. We are not concerned now with the correctness of the latter figure but only with the jurisdiction of
the Appellate Tribunal to pass the order of remand in the form adopted by them.
The entire question turns upon the powers of the Sales-Tax Appellate Tribunal under S. 12-A of the General Sales-Tax Act. The relevant
portions of this section run in these terms :
12-A (i) :- Any assessee objecting to an order relating to assessment passed
(i) by the Commercial Tax Officer whether on appeal under S. 11 or suo motu under S. 12, Sub-S. (1) or
(ii) by the Deputy Commissioner sua molu under S. 12, Sub-S. (2), may, if the asses3ee has not preferred an application for revision of the order
under S. 12, Sub S. (2), or under Sub-S. (3) of that section, as the case may be, appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within sixty days from the date
on which the order was communicated to the assessee..........
(4) The Appellate Tribunal shall, after giving both parties to the appeal a reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such order thereon as it thinks
fit.
(5) Notwithstanding that an appeal has been preferred under Sub-S- (1), tax shall be paid in accordance with the assess merit made in the case :
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, in its discretion, permit the appellant to pay the tax in such cumber of instalments, or give such other
direction in regard to the payment of the tax, as it thinks fit;
Provided further that if as a result of the appeal any change becomes necessary in such assessment, the Appellate Tribunal may authorise the
assessing authority to amend the assessment, and on such amend meat being made, the amount overpaid by the assessee shall be refunded to him
without interest, or the further amount of tax due from him shall be collected in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as the case may be.
The argument, advanced by Mr. Swaminatha Iyer, learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners was based upon the language of Sub S. (4)
which authorises the Appellate Tribunal ""to pass such order thereon as it thinks fit "". The expression ""thereon"" it is contended, limits the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal not merely to the assessment which is complained of but to the grounds upon which the order of the lower authorities is attacked by
the particular appellant. It is stated that it is not the entire assessment that is before the Appellate Tribunal at the stage of the bearing of the appeal
but only those portions of the assessment order which an appellant attacks.
Learned Counsel based this argument mainly on certain decisions on then scope of S. 33 (4) of the Indian income tax Act where words similar
to those in S. 12-A (4) of the General Sales-Tax Act occur. Before referring to those decisions it is necessary to point out that under the Madras
General Sales-Tax Act it is the assessee and the assessee alone that has the right of appeal to t States has no right of filing an appeal or cross-
objections against any order of the assessing authorities; as also that the income tax Act does not contain any provision such as to be found in the
second proviso, to Sub S. (5) which we have extracted above. We shall be dealing with the effect of these distinctions at a later stage.
The first decision to which our attention was invited was that of the Bombay High Court in THE MOTOR UNION INSURANCE CO., LTD.
Vs. COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax, BOMBAY., of the Indian income tax Act contains language almost identical with that which is used in
S. 12-A (4) of the General Sales-Tax Act and runs thus:
The Appellate Tribunal may after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall
communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner.
The facts of the case were as follows: The assessee, a non-resident company, incorporated in the United Kingdom carried on insurance
business in British India in tines other than Life Insurance. The income tax Officer who was the assessing authority proceeded under R. 6 of the
Schedule and included in its assessment an amount of Rs. 7,615 as interest received by the company. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner on
appeal confirmed the assessment and the assessee appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the income tax Officer was wrong in applying
R. 6 of the Schedule but should have applied R. 8 with the result that the income earned in the shape of interest was increased to Rs. 49,549. The
question was whether the Appellate Tribunal was entitled to so enhance the assessment. Dealing with the scheme of appeals under the Indian
income tax Act, Kama, J., as he then was, stated :
After the income tax Officer has made an order, if the assessee feels aggrieved, he can appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The
powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such a case are defined in S. 31. Sub-S. (3), Cl. (a) in terms provides that in disposing of an
appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment. He has also power under Cl. (b) to set aside
the assessment and direct the income tax Officer to make a fresh assessment, after making such inquiry as the income tax Officer thinks fit, or the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct. It is significant that there is no provision for appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the
Department against the assessment made by the income tax Officer. Under S. 83 a right of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal is given, on the order
made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. That right is given both to the assessee and to the Commissioner. Under Sub-S. (3) the appeal
has to be filed in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner. Under Sub-S. (4) the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties
to the appeal an opportunity of being beard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate the orders to the assessee and to the
Commissioner.
On behalf of the Commissioner it is urged that S. 88 (4) does not circumscribe the powers of the Tribunal, and leaves the Tribunal at large to
raise any question it pleases and decide the same. In our opinion, this argument is unsound. Apart from the statute, it is elementary that if a party
appeals, he is the party who comes before the Appellate Tribunal to redress a grievance alleged by him. If the other side has any grievance he has
a right to file a cross-appeal or cross-objections. But if no such thing is done, the other party, in law, is deemed to be satisfied with the decision.
(The Italics are ours). He is, of course, entitled to support the judgment of the first officer on any ground, open to him, but he is not entitled to raise
a ground so as to work adversely to the appellant and in his favour..... word ""thereon"" used in S. 38 (4) only means ''on the appeal'', which must
mean on the grounds raised in the appeal. Read in that way, the Sub-Section only gives power to the Appellate Tribunal to give its decision and
pass orders in respect of all grounds urged (which must be on behalf of the appellant) in respect of the decision appealed against. In deciding those
grounds it can pass appropriate orders. But, in our opinion, it is not open to the Tribunal itself to raise a ground or permit the party who has not
appealed, to raise a ground, which will work adversely to the appellant"" (Italics are ours).
It will be seen that the construction of the word ""thereon'''' is related to the fact that the department has a right of appeal and that by not
availing themselves of such a right, they should be deemed to have acquiesced in or agreed to abide by the decision of the lower authority. In this
connection we might refer to a decision of this Court in Gajalakshmi Ginning Factory v. Commissioner of income tax (1953) 1 M.L.J. 35, where it
has pointed out the relevancy of this feature in considering the powers of the income tax Appellate Tribunal.
The decision of the Patna High Court in Jagarnath Therani v. Commissioner of income tax, Bihar and Orissa 2 I.T.C. 4, was next referred to.
There the assessee was carrying on business In the district of Purnea and had also branches at Calcutta and Jalpaiguri. in the assessment order in
question the income tax Officer at Purnea who was the assessing authority reserved for future consideration the income derived from the Calcutta
and Jalpaiguri branches, and made an assessment in regard to the income derived by the assessee from his business in Purnea District, The
assessee appealed against this assessment to the Assistant Commissioner and this appellate authority while reducing the assessment on the Purnea
business enhanced the assessment as a whole by including in the assessable income that which was derived from Calcutta and Jalpaiguri branches.
The assessee then had a case referred to the High Court by the Commissioner of Income Tax as to whether the Assistant Commissioner had the
power to include a source of income which was not at all assessed by the income tax Officer. The learned Judges held that as the income tax
Officer who was the assessing authority had reserved for future consideration by himself as such assessing authority, the income derived by the
assessee from the Calcutta and Jalpaiguri branches, the subject matter of the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner was the assessment in
relation to the Purnea business alone and that in consequence the latter had no jurisdiction to travel beyond and seek to assess the income from
those sources which had been reserved for future consideration. We are unable to see how this decision affords any assistance to the petitioners in
the present case.
The last case that was referred to in this connection was that of the Lahore High Court in Messrs. Nawal Kishore Kharaiti Lal v.
Commissioner of income tax, Punjab 9 I.T.C. 356. There the assessee was carrying on business as a jeweller and for the year 1932-33 disclosed
a gross income from sales of Rs. 26,553. The income tax Officer accepted the figures of sales but enhanced the net profits available for
assessment. Against this order the assessee preferred an appeal to the Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Authority acting under S. 31 issued
a notice to the assessee to show cause why certain items of expenditure which had been allowed by the taxing officer should not be disallowed and
the income enhanced. After hearing the assessee the Appellate Authority passed an order dismissing the appeal and enhancing the assessment by a
sum of Rs. 4512. Against the order of assessment as finally passed by the Appellate Authority the assessee preferred an appeal to the
Commissioner of income tax under the repealed S. 32. The Commissioner of income tax partially accepted the appeal and allowed a portion of the
deductions which had been granted by the income tax Officer, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed, on 3rd September. 1934. On the same
day the Commissioner of income tax issued a notice to the assessee to show 6cause why enhancement of the income from the sales of jewellery
should not be made and after receiving the explanation of the assessee passed an order in October, 1934 in the purported exercise of his powers
of review under S. 33 and enhanced the income from the sales from Rs. 26,000 and odd to Rs. 50,000. The question canvassed before the High
Court was whether this order of enhancement by the Commissioner was within his jurisdiction. If the income of Rs. 23,000 and odd which was
added to the assessee was treated as income which had escaped assessment the same was not liable to be included in the assessment because no
notice was served on the assessee within one year of the end of the assessment year under S. 34 of the Act as it then stood. The learned Judges
held that when the Commissioner was dealing with an appeal under S. 32 he could pass orders only with respect to the subject-matter of the
appeal and could not suo motu enhance the assessment which he had power to do under S. 33 but that the latter provision was subject to the
limitations provided in S. 34. Reliance is placed upon a sentence in this judgment dealing with the powers of the Commissioner as an Appellate
Authority being confined to the appeal before him and as not extending to assessing escaped income. But we are unable to find any useful analogy
or assistance furnished by this case for the determination of the question arising in the present revision.
We are therefore unable to read these decisions as a conclusive judicial interpretation of the expression ""thereon"" occurring in S. 12-A (4) of
the General Sales Tax Act and confining the powers of the Appellate Authority to deciding for or against any particular point raised by the
appellant. It will be seen from the extracts quoted above that the content of that expression has been determined with reference to the context and
in the light of the provisions of the Income Tax Act which confer a right of appeal on the Department equally with the assessee. Under the
provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act from any order of assessment passed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, appeals to the
Commercial Tax Officer as well as to the Appellate Tribunal therefrom are open only to the assessee and not to the Department, and the ""powers
of the Appellate Authority to modify the basis of an assessment cannot be circumscribed by the consideration of the Department having accepted
the order of the lower authority in so far as it decided any point against it.
There is also one other matter to be considered in this connection and that is the light afforded by the second proviso to Sub S. 5 of S. 12-A
of the Act. Sub-S. 5 is directed to the consequences of an appeal to the Tribunal and the orders that might be passed in relation to the tax liability
by this Appellate Authority. The body of the section enacts the usual declaration that an appeal does not by itself impede the enforcement of the
orders appealed against. To this two riders are added in the two provisos which follow. The first proviso empowers the Appellate Tribunal, in
cases where they deem it proper, to permit the appellant to pay the tax in installments or in such other manner as the Tribunal might order. Up to
this stage the enactment is dealing with the assessment order appealed against and the limitations subject to which an order could be enforced. The
second proviso deals with the stage subsequent to the disposal of the appeal and enacts the consequences which might follow the order of the
Appellate Tribunal. There are two limbs to the proviso. The first is concerned with cases where the Tribunal accept any of the grounds urged by
the appellant and this results in a reduction of his tax liability and in those cases, if, as a result of the enforcement of the assessment order either
under the main part of Sub-S. 5 or in the manner contemplated by the first proviso, a larger amount has been collected from the assessee than is
warranted by the assessment as modified by the Appellate Tribunal, provision is made for the refund of the excess so collected. The second limit is
concerned with the other possibility namely the effect of the Tribunal''s order necessitating the payment of a larger sum than was originally assessed
and provision is made for the collection of this sum in addition to the sum as originally determined. As this proviso undoubtedly contemplates an
order of the Tribunal leading to an enhancement in the assessment, the construction contended for by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that
the only jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal is either to accept or reject the grounds of appeal raised by an assessee in his memorandum of
appeal cannot be up held. Mr. Swaminathan urged that it was not a permissible rule of construction to widen the scope of an enacting part from
implications to be gathered from a proviso and relied upon a decision of the House of Lords in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance
Society 1897 A.C. 647, as authority for that proposition. The House of Lords was there considering the provisions of S. 2 of the Poor Laws
Loans Act of 1871 under which the Poor Law Board was given authority to borrow money at cheaper rate of interest, in order to pay off loans
carrying a higher rate of interest. The section contained a proviso that loans made subsequent to the enactment could not be redeemed before their
term without the consent of the creditors. The Poor Law Board claimed a right to redeem loans made before the expiry of the term stipulated in
such loans. The argument on which this power was supported was that the proviso indicated that the Board could redeem before the term without
the consent of the creditors and confined the protection only to those creditors who lent money subsequent to the enactment. The House of Lords
affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal held that the proviso was really in the nature of a saving clause and not a true proviso and rejected the
claim of the Poor Law Board. This was really a case where the proviso had been introduced by way of abundant caution. This matter has been
referred to by Lord Herschell at page 656 where the learned Lord said:
My Lords, I am satisfied that many instances might be given where provisos could be found in legislation that are meaningless because they have
been put in to allay fears when these fears were absolutely unfounded, and when no proviso at all was necessary to protect the persons at whose
instance they were inserted.
On the other hand, a later judgment of the House of Lords in Jennings v. Kelly 1940 A.C. 206 , clearly lays down that there is no rule that the
terms of an enacting part have to be construed without reference to the provisos.
The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is, that a section or an enactment must be construed as a whole, each
portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest (per Lord Wright at page 229).
The expression ""thereon"" in Sub-S. (4) has no fixed or rigid meaning. It makes clear from the context and the terms of the proviso referred to
afford some light as to what the Legislature had in mind when enacting Sub-S. (4) in the form in which it is found. This proviso undoubtedly enacts
that an order by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal might in certain cases conceivably result in the assessment being enhanced. Before leaving this
part of the case we might also refer to the terms of S. 12 which confers re-visional powers on the Commercial Tax Officer, Deputy Commissioner
and the Board of Revenue. Each of these authorities is empowered to call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded
by the subordinate authority and after satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceeding to pass such order with respect
thereto as it thinks fit. The words ""with respect thereto"" detached from the context are, it would be recognised, colourless and do not throw any
light on the question whether these revisional authorities have power to enhance the assessment but guidance on this point is afforded by the terms
of Sub S. (6) which runs thus:
No order shall be passed under Sub-Ss. (1) (2) and (8) enhancing any assessment, unless the opportunity has been given to the asses see to show
cause against the proposed enhancement.
It will be noticed that this is really a limitation on a procedure enjoined with respect to a power which is assumed to exist without any positive
provision conferring such power. In this connection the terms of S. 31 (3) of the income tax Act might be usefully referred to. The language there
used is:
(3). In disposing of an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or
annul the enhancement.
There is a proviso:
Provided that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall enhance an assessment or a penalty unless the appellant has had a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement.
The framers of the General Sales-Tax Act, it will be seen, have incorporated the proviso to S. 31 (3) of the income tax Act without introducing
a positive provision as is to be found in the enacting portion of that subsection. Regard thus having had to the manner of drafting adopted by the
framers of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act, we feel that effect has to be given to the implication arising from the second proviso to Sub-S. (5)
that the Appellate Tribunal have a power to pass an order which might result in an enhanced assessment.
We might now sum up our conclusions.
(1) The Appellate Tribunal have no authority to add a new item to the turnover and include therein what was not before the assessing authority for
that would be a matter not assessed but omitted from the assessment.
(2) As the Appellate Tribunal are not the assessing authorities and have merely to determine facts giving rise to the tax liability and the law in
relation thereto, they are obviously empowered to allow an appeal and remand it for the assessment being computed in accordance with the facts,
as found and the law as laid down by them and this re-assessment has to be done by the assessing authorities.
(3) Where the base of an assessment is challenged by an assessee and this is accepted by the Tribunal and the matter is remitted to the assessing
authorities, there has to be a re-assessment in conformity with their order. In the normal cases this would result in the decrease of the tax liability of
the appellant. The second proviso to Sub-S. 5 enables the refund to be obtained by the assessee as a consequence of the re-assessment in
accordance with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal.
But on the facts of the particular case the giving effect to the order of the Tribunal might result in an enhancement of the tax. The point raised by
the petitioners in its ultimate analysis amounts to a denial to the Tribunal of the power to pass an order which if given effect to would result in an
enhancement of the assessment. We are clearly of the opinion that this contention cannot be accepted not merely because of the second proviso to
Sub-S. 5 but also as such a view does not accord with any logical or intelligible construction of the relevant provisions of the Act. To take the
present case as an illustration, the petitioners as appellants before the Appellate Tribunal raised two points for the latter''s determination, viz., (1)
that the Commercial Tax Officer, eared in the view that as assessee was not entitled at the same time to both the relief''s provided for by R. 18 (2)
of the Turnover and Assessment Rules and by Art. 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution and (2) that the Commercial Tax Officer erred in refusing to
hold the sale turnover of oil sold outside the Slate as not falling within the exemption provided by Art. 286 (1) (a). The Tribunal was not bound to
accept both these contentions. The final result of their order was that they rejected the first of the above contentions raised on behalf of the
appellants before them but accepted the second. It meant that while the appellants were entitled to the exemption under the Constitution they were
not entitled to the benefit of both the deduction and the exemption as the Tribunal affirmed the view of the Commercial Tax Officer in this regard.
In this situation the only order that they could pass was one remanding it to the Commercial Tax Officer for making a computation on the basis
suggested by them. In particular cases such a computation might have resulted in a diminution of tax liability. In other cases, as in the present, it
might result in an enhancement of the tax. The validity of their order cannot be judged by the result, that is, the order cannot be held valid if it
resulted in a reduction of tax liability but held invalid and beyond their jurisdiction if the re computation resulted in enhancing the tax. Whether the
expression ''''thereon"" in S. 12-A (4) read in the light of the second proviso to Sub-S. (5) would include the entire assessment order or only those
grounds which are raised for consideration of the Appellate Tribunal by any particular appellant; in the present case the claim to deduction under
R. 18 (2) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules and the constitutional exemption under Art. 286 (1) (a) were so interrelated to each other that it
would not be possible for the Tribunal to pass any order on the appeal other than that which they have passed. In the result, we hold that the order
of the Appellate Tribunal was within their jurisdiction and that was the proper order to pass. The revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
Advocate''s fee Rs. 100.