Messrs. Thilagaraj Match Works vs C. Sundaram

Nainar Sundaram, J.—The tenant within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act, 1960 hereinafter referred

to as the Act, is the petitioner in this revision. The landlord within the meaning of the Act is the respondent herein. The landlord sought the eviction

of the tenant under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act on the ground that he requires the premise in question for the purpose of his paper business. There is

no dispute that the tenant himself is carrying on a match factory industry in the premises in question. The parties placed their evidence before the

Controller and the Controller on assessment of the same did not countenance the case of the landlord and dismissed the petition for eviction. The

landlord appealed and the Appellate Authority came to a different conclusion and ordered eviction of the tenant. The revision is directed against

the orders of the Appellate Authority. Considering the submissions made by Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for the tenant petitioner

herein, I do not feel obliged to dwell in detail over the merits of the case, since I am impressed that the relevant factors which ought to have

weighed with the Appellate Authority for deciding the question in issue have not been adverted to and appreciated by him and I am inclined to

remit the matter back to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration. It is true that the Appellate Authority set forth in his order the ingredients

of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to be satisfied by the landlord before he could have the benefit of the order of eviction under the provision. But as

rightly contended by the learned counsel for the tenant, there has not been an advertence to the relevant aspects, which stand exposed in the case;

for the purpose of finding out as to whether the landlord has made out a case of bona fide requirements, but on the other hand, the Appellate

Authority has approached this in a halfhearted manner and has rendered a decision summarily. I am only delineating certain factors which were

brought to my notice and I am not expressing any opinion over them one way or the other, since they require advertence to and adjudication upon

by the Appellate Authority. There was a petition for eviction filed by the landlord, in 1978. He succeeded before the Rent Controller and as per

certified copy produced by Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the landlord, the proceedings before the Controller got terminated on 6th

August, 1979. The tenant seems to have riled an appeal and on the appeal, the tenant succeeded and the order of the Appellate Authority is dated

26th April, 1980. The documents produced in the present case by the landlord to demonstrate that be is carrying on business relate only to the

period commencing after the order was passed by the Appellate Authority in the earlier proceedings. From this it is urged that there was nothing

but a dishonest intention on the part of the landlord to have the eviction of the tenant at any cost and hence the documents were obviously brought

about to make out a case as to the landlord is carrying on business elsewhere. It was brought out in evidence that the landlord presented a petition

before the Collector to cancel the licence of the tenant and he could not succeed before the Collector. The matter has come to this Court by way

of writ petition at the instance of the tenant. Equally so, it was brought out in evidence that there were proceedings before the Civil Court wherein

the landlord was anxious to obtain an order of injunction against the tenant and conversely the tenant was anxious to obtain an order of injunction

against the landlord.

From these features, learned counsel for the tenant submits that the dishonest intention ought to have been a spelt out. It is not possible to state

that these features are wholly irrelevant as the Appellate Authority would cursorily opine, without adverting to them in detail.

Bona fide is primarily a subjective element. There must exist essential ingredients to establish that the landlord has an honest need to occupy the

premises in question. More than the impulse of the desire of the landlord, there must be force of personal circumstances to make out the landlord''s

honest need to occupy the premises in question. All the relevant materials have got to be looked into and as stated above, bona fide is very much

allied and concerns with a subjective element, and has got to be spelt out by the entirety of facts and circumstances in each case. Next it is

contended by the learned counsel for the tenant that the premises in question is of a very large area, and considering the nature of the business

stated to be carried on by the landlord, his claim for such a large area could not be genuine. The landlord himself has admitted that the main

building itself measures 1,500 sq.ft., and apart from that, there are other rooms. Comparatively, it was also brought out in evidence that the

landlord himself is occupying a portion of the premises belonging to his grandmother, which he says is only under a rental arrangement and when he

was asked about the space occupied by him, obviously to bring out the comparison, he has stated that he cannot give the measurements. It is only

in this context, Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the tenant, brings to my notice a decision reported in Satwant Kaur Vs. Dhund Singh, where

while considering the question under Rajas than Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (17 of 1950) regarding the bona fide user of the

landlord, the Supreme Court took note of the nature of the business of the landlord, to find out as to whether such business requirement should

necessarily be satisfied by requisitioning the entirety of the premises in question in the occupation of the tenant. May be the provisions in the

Rajasthan Act permitted such partial eviction. I should not be understood to have countenanced a rule that under the Tamil Nadu Act, partial

eviction could be accorded, though eviction from the premises as a whole is asked for. No contingency has arisen before me to advert to such a

question. I am referring to this aspect only to say that it maybe relevant on the question of bona fides, and nothing more. In the present case, the

Appellate Authority has not adverted to these features at all and in one place he observes that the bona fide of the claim of the landlord is

extraneous and it should not be tested too severely. This exposes his wrong approach to the question of bona fides which is a relevant one. The

very ingredient of S. 10(3)(e) of the Act requires that the question of bona fides has got to be tested and it has got a due place while adjudicating a

petition for eviction by the landlord under the concerned provisions. It is not the desire of the landlord, but there must bean element of need for the

landlord before it could be stated that he requires the premises for his own occupation. The features referred to above, cannot be eschewed as

irrelevant, for, after all, bona fide will have to be proved in an ordinary manner like any other fact in issue and the entire gamut of facts and

circumstances has to be averred to on this question. As already stated, I am not expressing any opinion over these features on merits, and it is for

the Appellate Authority to advert to them and adjudicate upon the question afresh one way or the other. The discussions above oblige me to

interfere in revision and accordingly the revision is allowed and the matter stands remitted to the Appellate Authority for him to consider it afresh

taking note of all the relevant features and factors of the case on the question of bona-fides, and pass appropriate orders. Both the counsel

represent that for the purpose of comprehensive adjudication of the matter, further evidence has to be adduced. I take note of the request of the

counsel and I direct that the Appellate Authority will permit the parties to place further evidence and he will decide the matter afresh after such

evidence is placed. The Appellate Authority will do well to dispose of the matter expeditiously and in any event within a period of three months

from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.