Metal Printers Company vs Smt. Shila De

Re: C. O. No. 4025 of 2017

Supplementary affidavit filed in Court today be taken on record. The present revision has been taken out by the defendant-tenant against an order

whereby the defendant/petitioner’s application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 was disposed of, thereby

directing the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent along with interest. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argues that the hiring

charge for the furniture in the suit property was a component segregable from the quantum of rent and was erroneously held by the trial court to be a

part of the rent, while passing the impugned order.

It is argued that, although initially the rent included the furniture charges, subsequently the landlord started issuing separate receipts for the rent and

municipal taxes on the one hand and for the furniture charges on the other. By virtue of such separate issuance of receipts, it is argued, the component

of furniture charges was specifically differentiated from the quantum of rent and was made payable separately. Such arguments are controverted by

learned counsel for the opposite party on the premise that it is settled law that all payments made by a tenant for enjoyment of a tenanted property

falls within the category of rent.

It is also argued that mere issuance of separate receipts did not render furniture charges separate from the rent payable. Upon hearing both sides, it

appears that the arguments advanced on behalf of the plaintiff/opposite party are more acceptable. Undoubtedly, separate receipts were being issued

for furniture charges. However, mere issuance of receipts separately would at best determine the mode of payment of rent and not the rent itself. Just

because receipts were being issued separately, furniture charges were not rendered independent of the total rent payable for the suit premises.

Moreover, upon consideration of materials on record, the trial court came to the specific finding that the furniture charges were included in the rent

quantum. Such exercise of jurisdictio was legal and, merely because a different view is possible on the materials on record, this Court is not inclined to

interfere with such order of the trial court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, C. O. No. 4025 of 2017 is dismissed on contest.

There will, however, no order as to costs.

Re : C. O. No. 1928 of 2018

The present revisional application has been filed by a defendant/tenant against an order, whereby the defence of the defendant/petitioner was struck

out under Section 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that on the date when the

impugned order was passed, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was pending, along with an application under Section 151 of the

Code of Civil Procedure for condonation of delay in depositing the amount, as directed under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act.

It is argued that such applications ought to have been adjudicated upon prior to deciding the application under Section 7(3) of the 1997 Act. Such

arguments are controverted by learned counsel for the opposite party on the premise that the trial court substantially dealt with the period of delay in

making such deposits and as such, could not be faulted for passing the impugned order striking out the defence of the petitioner.

It appears from the impugned order that the trial judge came to a specific finding that the defendant at first intentionally denied to pay the amount with

a view to prefer an appeal before this Court, but subsequently had come out with the petition for condonation of delay, after a long period of nine

months, without any cogent ground, to deposit the said amount. In such view of the matter, the defendant was held to have lost its opportunity to

deposit the amount. Only consequent to such consideration, the defence of the defendant/petitioner was struck out by the court below.

As such, it is evident that the trial court, without categorically saying so, dealt with and decided the application for condonation of delay filed by the

petitioner and struck out the defence of the petitioner only as a consequence thereof. In fact, it appears that the application for acceptance of delayed

deposits was filed after a long period of nine months, which takes the deposits beyond the pale of the outer limited stipulated in the proviso to Section

7(2) of the 1997 Act. As such, in any event, the delay in making such deposits could not have been condoned by the court below, such proposed

condonation being de hors the law.

Hence, the trial court did not commit any jurisdictional error or illegality in passing the impugned order, striking down the defence of the

defendant/petitioner. Accordingly, C. O. No. 1928 of 2018 is dismissed on contest. There will, however, no order as to costs. Urgent certified website

copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.