Metta Rama Bhatlu vs Metta Annayya Bhatlu and Others

Phillips, J.—In S.A. No. 750 of 1922: This is an appeal by the 3rd defendant against the decree for specific performance of a contract of

sale entered into by defendants 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs. It has been found that the contract was a valid contract and that the 3rd

defendant (appellant) purchased property from defendants 1 and 2 with notice of the contract. The only question argued in the appeal is that the!

contract is not one of which performance can be enforced by virtue of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877),because it is a contract for

the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief. u/s 12 of the Act, ""unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court

shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer Immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money. "" This rule

would prima facie apply here ; but it is argued that, as there is a condition in the contract for the payment of damages in default of performance,

whether by the vendor or by the vendee, it must be held that the parties considered that the enforcement of these damages would be adequate in

case the contract is not performed. So far as the default on the purchaser''s side is concerned, it is not suggested that the provision for default can

be treated otherwise than as furnishing security for performance. There is really nothing to show that the clause with, reference to the, default on the

part of the vendor was for any other purpose. It is suggested that as the amount fixed as damages was high, such damages must be deemed to be

adequate relief, but as the amount is only Rs. 37-8-0 it does not seem to me a tenable contention.

There are no other circumstances to prove that in this case money compensation is adequate. Consequently this plea must be rejected.

The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.

In C.R. P. No. 442 of 1923 and C.M. P. No. 258 of 1923:--Before the appeal was filed the plaintiff failed to deposit money in accordance

with the decree of the Lower Appellate Court, and it has been held by that Court that it had no power to alter its order giving three months'' time

for the payment and it dismissed the petition put in by the plaintiff for extension of time and also the petition put in for amendment of the decree.

The plaintiff has filed a Civil Revision Petition against this order and has also put in a petition in this Court asking for extension'' of time to be

granted in case the second appeal is dismissed. So far as the revision petition is concerned, it appears to me that in accordance with the principles,

laid down in Abdul Shaker Sahib v. Abdul Rahiman Sahib (1922) 44 MLJ 107. the Lower Court had power to extend the time. It is argued that

that decision relates only to the order of an Original Court, but as it is based on the fact that an order for a specific performance of this nature is in

the nature of a preliminary decree and that the Court does retain power to make any stipulation it thinks fit with reference to the performance I

think that power must vest in the Court which actually passes the order for specific performance and the language of the judgment in the case

support this view--both the judgments of the late learned Chief Justice and of Wallace, J. From the fact that the Subordinate Judge dismissed the

plaintiff''s petition without making any order as to costs it would appear that it thought that there was ground for extending the time but that because

it was not competent to review its own order the request could not be granted. In considering whether time should be granted it has to be

remembered that the delay need not be explained so minutely in a case of this sort as in a case, for instance, under the Limitation Act, where it is

sought to excuse a bar of limitation. In the latter the applicant is seeking to revise a right which he has lost and it is necessary for him to show that

he has not lost it by his negligence. Here it is a question of destroying a right which plaintiff had to enforce a contract and it does not necessarily

follow that because he has been guilty of some delay in enforcing the contract that that fact alone should deprive him of a right which undoubtedly is

his. Consequently, I think that the delay in such a case should be looked at more leniently than a case of limitation. In the present case the: plaintiff

states that he was not aware of the provisions in the decree until the time for payment had passed, and, if that is so, there were very good reasons

for his not making the payment in time. The main cause for the delay appears to be the inordinate time taken by the Lower Appellate Court in

granting a copy of its decree. The copy was applied for on the 14th of October, 1921, and the copy was not ready until the 5th January, 1922 ;

for other reasons the plaintiff did not receive the copy till the 17th January. It is this delay by the officers of the Court that has been mainly

responsible for the delay. I think that it should be excused ; and consequently I order that the time for payment be extended till the date on which

the plaintiff deposited money, or if the deposit has been withdrawn till one month from this date.

I pass no order as to costs of the Revision Petition.