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Judgment
Bill No.,Date,Amount (Rs.),
PF/95-96/46,11.08.1995,"4,70,504.91",
PF/95-96/60,08.09.1995,"4,25,879.58",
PF/95-96/68,22.09.1995,"3,38,166.50",
PF/96-97/90,03.01.1997,"75,527.24",
PF/96-97/91,03.01.1997,"1,47,288.80",
14,"For the price of goods sold
and delivered where no fixed
period of credit is agreed
upon",3 years,"The date of the
delivery of the
goods
15,"For the price of goods sold
and delivered to be paid for
after the expiry of a fixed
period of credit",3 years,"When the period
of credit expires
18,"For the price of work done
by the plaintiff for the
defendant at his request,
where no time has been
fixed for payment.",3 years,"When the work is
done
to acknowledgement of liability by the Government of Kerala and set aside the orders of the Ld. Trial Court and Hon'ble High Court. 7.11. Coming to,,,
the facts of the present case, the letter dated 22.01.1999 Ex PW-1/77 does not amount to acknowledgement of liability by the defendant department of",,,
paying Rs. 3.50 per card for the 3,68,222 license cards microfilmed by the plaintiff company for defendant department, rather the said letter",,,
specifically denies the said liability. If the said letter is taken to be an acknowledgement of liability, then every reply to legal notice which denies the",,,
liability would also come within the purview of Section 18 of Limitation Act, thus, rending the law of limitation meaning less.Â",,,
7.12.This issue is accordingly decided in favour of defendant and CS No.20860/2016 Micrographics India Vs. GNCT of Delhi. Page No. 11 /30,,,
against the plaintiff and it is held that the suit is barred by law of limitation.â€Â    Â,,,
6.I completely agree with the aforesaid findings and conclusions of the trial court, inasmuch as ordinarily limitation for payment for work done begins",,,
from the work being done. In the present case, work was done by the appellant/plaintiff from the years 1995-97 and even assuming that the period",,,
of limitation is extended till the drawing up and sending of the invoices by the appellant/plaintiff to the respondents/defendants, even then the last date",,,
of the invoice would be 24.1.1997 so far as the micro-filming work is concerned and 25.6.1997 so far as the work of upgradation of the equipment is,,,
concerned, and therefore the suit so far as the work of micro-filming is concerned had to be filed by 24.1.2000 and so far as the upgradation of the",,,
equipment is concerned by 25.6.2000, whereas the suit has been filed on 8.5.2002 i.e much after the expiry of the period of limitation.Â",,,
7.Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff argued before this Court, and as was argued before the trial court, that in the letter dated",,,
22.1.1999/Ex.PW1/77 of the respondents/defendants, there is acknowledgement of debt in terms of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and",,,
therefore limitation period stood extended, however, trial court has rightly held that this letter in no manner satisfies the ingredients of Section 18 of the",,,
Limitation Act because this letter in no way admits and acknowledges any debt in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. This letter dated 22.1.1999 reads,,,
as under:-,,,
“F.No. 10/MF/TPT/97/153                                      Â,,,
      Dated: 22.1.1999,,,
Sh. Rajiv Gujral,",,,
Managing Director,",,,
M/s Micrographics India, New Delhi-110014.",,,
Subject:- Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Due payments of Rs.12,88,777.00/- for Microfilming",,,
3,68,222 commercial driving licences cards at the rate of Rs.3.50 per card.",,,
Sir,Â",,,
1.Kindly refer to your invoice number PF/95-96/68 dated 22/09/95, PF/95-96/60 dated 08/09/95, PF/95-96/76 dated nil, PF96-97/90 dated 03/01/97 and",,,
PF/96-97/91 dated 03/01/97 for Microfilming of 3,68,222 Commercial driving license cards at the rate of Rs.3.50/- per card.Â",,,
2.It has been noticed that same jacket, reel and frame number has been provided for 4 commercial driving licence cards. It has also been noticed",,,
that 4 cards are randomly selected instead of serialy and microfilmed together in one exposure. Thus instead of microfilming each card, 4 cards",,,
have been randomly selected and microfilmed has been exposed. This reflects that instead of 3,68,222 microfilms only 92,055 (i.e. one fourth of",,,
3,68,222) microfilm has been exposed. Thus the payment at the rate of Rs.3.50/- can be made only for 92,055 exposures. You had only made",,,
data entry of remaining 2,76,167 cards. It also reflects that material cost is only utilised for microfilming one fourth cards i.e. 92,055 cards.Â",,,
3.The job of microfilming of commercial driving licences was carried out under the supervision of the then MLO (HQ) Sh. J.C. Dabas who had stated,,,
that the cards were brought and stacked in bundles by then newly recruited constables of this department instead as claimed by you, by your staff.",,,
4.Considering the above mentioned facts, it has been decided that the department shall pay at the rate of Rs.3.50 per exposure (i.e. per microfilm) for",,,
only 92,055 exposures (i.e. only for one fourth cards, since one microfilm exposed by you contains four cards randomly selected). However the",,,
labour charges for data entry of remaining 2,76,167 cards can be made at an mutually agreed rate.",,,
5.You are requested to give your consent to the above mentioned decision urgently, so that the matter can be decided accordingly. Yours faithfully,Â",,,
         sd/-,,,
(VISHVA MOHAN) DEPUTY DIRECTOR (OPERATIONS)â€Â Â,,,
The aforesaid aspect with respect to interpretation of this letter Ex.PW1/77 dated 22.1.1999 as not constituting an acknowledgement of debt has,,,
been dealt with by the trial court in paras 7.9 and 7.11 of the impugned judgment, and I agree with the reason and conclusion of the trial court that this",,,
letter Ex.PW1/77 does not extend limitation because there is no acknowledgment of liability by this letter.Â,,,
9(i).Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff then argued that the trial court has wrongly applied the provisions of Articles 14, 15 and 18 of the",,,
Limitation Act inasmuch as the present was not a case of separate sale of goods and separate sale of services i.e the contract was a joint contract for,,,
goods and services, and therefore trial court ought to have applied residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act.Â",,,
(ii)In my opinion, even this argument is misconceived because even assuming for the sake of arguments that instead of Articles 14, 15 and 18 the",,,
residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act applies as contended on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff, yet the residuary Article 113 also provides a period",,,
of three years, and once invoices are raised after work is done, then limitation would definitely commence from the date of the invoices, if not",,,
earlier. In fact, the date of the invoices were from the year 1995 and therefore for the different dates of invoices as stated in para 2.3 of the",,,
impugned judgment and for the dates otherwise stated by this Court above with respect to upgradation of equipment, periods of limitation would have",,,
expired after three years of raising of the invoices, and trial court as also this Court is taking this issue liberally in favour of the appellant/plaintiff of",,,
limitation commencing only on raising of the last invoice on 24.1.1997/25.6.1997, but even taking that date as the date of commencement of limitation,",,,
the suit filed on 8.5.2002 would be barred by limitation.Â,,,
10.There is no merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. Â,,,