Mihir Kumar Das vs State Bank of India and Others

Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J—In this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order as contained in letter No. VIG/Gen/KB/317 dated 27.03.2006, by virtue of which, he was terminated from service. Challenge has also been made to the order as contained in Letter No. A & R/Gen/16 dated 5.9.2006, by which, the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of termination had been rejected. A case was instituted against the petitioner by the C.B.I., while the petitioner was working as a Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Telco Branch, Jamshedpur for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 420/467 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On 27.02.2006, judgment was delivered by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, in which the petitioner having been found guilty was convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Consequent to the judgment of conviction by invoking Section 10(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the services of the petitioner was terminated with immediate effect vide letter No. VIG/Gen/KB/317 dated 27.03.2006. The appeal, which was preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 27.03.2006 terminating the service of the petitioner, met with the same fate as the appeal was dismissed on 4.8.2006.

Heard Mr. Vishnu Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the � 2 - petitioner and Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel of the respondents-SBI.

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that against the judgment of conviction, the petitioner had preferred an appeal being Cri. Appeal No. 427 of 2006, which was admitted vide order dated 18.04.2006 and the provisional bail granted to the petitioner by the trial court was confirmed. Accordingly, it has been submitted that since the petitioner is on bail and appeal is pending, as such the respondents were precluded from invoking the provisions of Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In such circumstances, it has been submitted that letter of termination of the petitioner be quashed. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a judgment in the case of Ram Nandan Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and Others .

Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the allegation, which was subsequently confirmed clearly made out a case of moral turpitude against the petitioner and in such circumstance, the impugned letter dated 27.03.2006 was rightly passed. It has further been submitted that merely because the appeal has been admitted and the provisional bail granted by the trial court to the petitioner has been confirmed, the same would not mean that the petitioner has been absolved from the charges, which were found true by the trial court. Moreover, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of conviction has never been stayed by the appellate court and in such circumstances, the petitioner deserves no lenience.

It is not in dispute that the service of the petitioner was terminated by letter dated 27.03.2006 by invoking section 10(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It is also an admitted fact that the allegations, which were leveled against the petitioner and which were subsequently proved in course of trial do come within the definition of moral turpitude and in such circumstances, the impugned letter dated 27.03.2006 was issued in accordance with law. Merely because, the criminal appeal preferred by the petitioner has been admitted, the same cannot be a ground to set aside/quash the letter of termination as the allegation of moral turpitude still continues to hold the field as neither his order of conviction has been set aside, nor the order of conviction has been stayed by the appellate Court. So far as the judgment, which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the facts of the said judgment are quite different inasmuch as the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 itself provides for termination of an employee convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. Therefore, on discussion of the entire facts and materials on record, it clearly transpires that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference by this Court. Accordingly, there being no merit in this writ application, the same is hereby dismissed.