Mirza Muhammad Ismail Beg and Others vs Sricharan Das and Others

Das, J.—I am unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge in the court below. The defendants instituted a suit under the provisions of section 77 of the Registration Act for a decree directing the registration of a document. The Civil Court passed a decree in favour of the respondents but did not specify the time within which the document was to be presented for registration. In point of fact the document was presented five months after the decree was pronounced by the Civil Court. The question arises, had the registering officer any jurisdiction to register the document. Mr. Asghar, on behalf of the respondents, relies upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gopinath Adhikary Vs. Gadadhar Das, , Mr. Sushhil Madhab Mullick, on the other hand, relies upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Imam Bandi Bibi Vs. Udit Upadhia and Another, . As a matter of fact the point did not arise in either of these cases.

In the Calcutta case the document was as a matter of fact presented for registration within thirty days from the order of the Civil Court and in the Allahabad case the point arose only very remotely. But Sir Francis Maclean, delivering the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case already cited, did express an opinion that there was no positive enactment in the section, that is to say in section 77, that the document must be presented for registration within thirty days after the passing of the decree.

With all respect I am unable to agree with the construction placed upon this section by the late Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court. It is quite true that so far as the first paragraph of section 77 is concerned, it relates to the suit and not to the decree which is to be passed by the Civil Court; but then paragraph (2) provides as follows:--

The provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 75 shall mutatis mutandis, apply to all documents presented for registration in accordance with any such decree and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the document shall be receivable in evidence in such suit.

This takes us back to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 75. Now those sub-sections are as follows:--

Sub-section (2). If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order, the registering officer shall obey the same and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in sections 58, 59 and 60.

Sub-section (3). Such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration.

Reading sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 75 with section 77, it appears to me that the registering officer has jurisdiction to register a document if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days of the decree passed by the Civil Court.

It is in my opinion impossible to escape from the very clear words that have been used by the Legislature in this connection Obviously the Legislature thought that it was necessary to impose some limitation of time for the presentation of a document for registration, and it did think that thirty days ought to be the limit of time. I must allow this appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below. The plaintiffs are entitled to a decree in terms of prayer (1) in the plaint; they are also entitled to their costs throughout.

Adami, J.

I agree.