Mitexco vs Canara Bank

B.P. Colabawalla, J.—The petitioners seek quashing of the orders passed by the Recovery Officer, DRT-II, Mumbai in Recovery Proceeding No. 538 of 2004(i) dated 28th September, 2012 ordering a fresh attachment on the immovable property of the Petitioners; and (ii) dated 4th April, 2013 dismissing the review application filed by the Petitioners seeking a review of the order dated 28th September, 2012.

The primary ground of challenge in this writ petition is that by virtue of rule 68B of the Second & Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Rules) read with section 29 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDB Act), the Recovery Officer seized to have jurisdiction to take any action for attachment and sale of the residential immovable property of the Petitioners as the same was sought to be done after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the Original Application was decreed in favour of the Respondent Bank. According to the Petitioners, the order giving rise to a demand as contemplated under rule 68B of the IT Rules was dated 29th July 2004 (the date on which the Original Application was decreed) and therefore, the period of three years commenced from 1st April 2005 and expired on 31st March 2008. It is on the strength of this rule that the Petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Recovery Officer.

Therefore, the short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is the applicability of rule 68B of the IT Rules, to recovery proceedings initiated under the provisions of the RDDB Act.

We must state at the outset that under normal circumstances, we would have relegated the Petitioners to the alternate remedy available u/s 30 of the RDDB Act which provides for appeals from the orders passed by the Recovery Officer. However, since an important question of law is raised in this petition viz. the applicability of rule 68B of the IT Rules, to recovery proceedings initiated under the RDDB Act, we are entertaining and deciding the writ petition without relegating the Petitioners to the alternate remedy.

The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows:-

(a) The Respondent Bank had granted various facilities to the Petitioners. Since the Petitioners defaulted in payment, the Respondent Bank filed Original Application No. 1824 of 2000 in the DRT-II, Mumbai for recovery of its dues. By an order and judgment dated 29th July 2004, the Presiding Officer of DRT-II, Mumbai allowed the said Original Application and ordered the Petitioners to jointly and severally pay to the Respondent Bank the sums of (i) Rs. 70,51,813/-; (ii) Rs. 16,19,339.96 and (iii) Rs. 1,35,762/- together with interest at the rate of 13% p.a.

(b) Being aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioners preferred an appeal u/s 20 of the RDDB Act before the DRAT, Mumbai. The said appeal was dismissed by an order dated 8th December 2006. This order of the DRAT has not been challenged and has therefore attained finality.

(c) In pursuance of the order dated 29th July 2004 passed by the DRT-II, Mumbai, a recovery certificate was issued on 10th November 2004, on the basis of which, a demand notice was issued to the Petitioners by the Recovery Officer on 28th December 2004. It appears that thereafter for some reason, a fresh demand notice was again issued by the Recovery Officer on 11th August 2005. However, this is irrelevant for deciding the issue in this writ petition.

(d) In execution of the Recovery Certificate, on 24th March 2006, the Recovery officer attached a flat belonging to the Petitioners bearing No. 402, 4th Floor, Sea Sparkle, Juhu Tara Road, Mumbai 400 049 (residential property). This residential property was not mortgaged to the Respondent Bank and is the subject matter of this writ petition.

(e) Similarly, the Recovery Officer, on 8th September 2008, also attached an immovable property belonging to the Petitioners situated at B-311, Virwani Industrial Estate, Goregaon (East), Mumbai 400 063 (commercial property). This property was mortgaged with the Respondent Bank. It appears that the attachment of the commercial property was subjected to an appeal before the DRT (under section 30 of the RDDB Act) and thereafter to the DRAT (under section 20 of the RDDB Act). In both the forums, the Petitioners were unsuccessful and their appeals were dismissed. The DRAT in its order dated 6th October 2009 inter alia held that rule 68B of the IT Rules read with section 29 of the RDDB Act did not apply to a mortgaged property. However, the DRAT observed that the provisions of rule 68B applied to properties which were not mortgaged. This order of the DRAT has also not been challenged and has therefore attained finality. We may straight away add here that the issue whether rule 68B applied to properties that were not mortgaged, was not under consideration before the DRAT. No law on this subject was either cited or discussed by the DRAT in its judgment. We have found the observations of the DRAT on this issue to be incorrect.

(f) Thereafter, on 21st May, 2012 the Petitioners preferred a miscellaneous application before the Recovery Officer (being Exh. 228 in R.P. No. 538 of 2004) for revoking and canceling the warrant of attachment levied on their residential property. On 28th September, 2012 the Respondent Bank filed an application before the Recovery Officer (being Exh. 231 in R.P. No. 538 of 2004) for issuance of a fresh warrant of attachment in respect of the very same residential property.

(g) Both the aforesaid applications (Exhs. 228 and 231) were disposed off by the Recovery Officer vide his common order dated 28th September 2012. The Recovery Officer, after considering the provisions of rule 68B, the non opposition of the Respondent Bank as well as taking into consideration that the Respondent Bank had filed a separate application (Exh. 231) for fresh attachment of the very same residential property, allowed the application of the Petitioners (Exh. 228) for canceling the warrant of attachment on the residential property. At the same time, the Recovery Officer also allowed the application of the Respondent Bank (Exh. 231) and issued a fresh warrant of attachment on the very same residential property, as prayed. This is the first order that is under challenge before us.

(h) Being dissatisfied with the order dated 28th September 2012, the Petitioners preferred a review application (Exh. 235 in R.P. No. 538 of 2004) for review of the order dated 28th September 2012. The said review application was dismissed by the Recovery officer vide his order dated 4th April 2013. This is the second order that is under challenge before us. Considering that the order dated 28th September 2012 itself has been challenged in this writ petition, we are not required to consider whether the order passed on review is correct or otherwise.

To understand the controversy raised in this writ petition, it would be necessary to examine the reasons for enacting the RDDB Act as well as certain provisions of the same. Before the enactment of the RDDB Act, banks and financial institutions were experiencing considerable difficulties in recovering loans and enforcement of their securities. The then existing procedures for recovery of debts due to the banks and financial institutions, due to the delays of litigation in civil courts, had blocked a significant portion of the funds in unproductive assets, the value of which deteriorated with the passage of time. In view thereof, the Narsimhan Committee considered setting up of special tribunals with special powers for speedy adjudication and recovery of such matters. It was therefore considered necessary to work out a suitable mechanism through which dues of banks and financial institutions could be realized without delay. In 1981, the Tiwari Committee was set up. The said Committee examined the legal and other difficulties faced by banks and financial institutions and suggested remedial measures including changes in the law. The Tiwari Committee also suggested setting up of special tribunals for recovery of dues of banks and financial institutions by following a summary procedure. As on 30th September 1990, more than 15,00,000 cases filed by banks and financial institutions were pending in various Courts, which involved the recovery of debts of more than Rs. 6,013/- crores. To unlock this huge amount of public money so that the same could be recycled for the development of the country, the RDDB Act was enacted in 1993 with effect from 24th June 1993.

For the purpose of the present writ petition, we have to analyse the provisions of section 29 of the RDDB Act r/w rule 68B of the IT Rules.

Application of certain provisions of Income Tax Act-The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules 1962, as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income Tax Act:

Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the "assessee" shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under this Act.

(emphasis supplied)

Section 29 of the RDDB Act clearly provides that the Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules 1962 (IT Rules) shall "as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications" as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under the RDDB Act instead of the Income Tax Act. The proviso to the said section further stipulates that any reference under the IT Rules to an "assessee" shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under the RDDB Act.

The expressions "as far as possible" and "with necessary modifications" appearing in section 29 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of C.N. Paramsivam and Another Vs. Sunrise Plaza Tr. Partner and Others, . The Supreme Court, after analysing the law on the subject, inter alia held that the expressions "as far as possible" and "with necessary modifications" appearing in section 29 have been used to take care of situations where certain provisions under the IT Rules may have no application on account of the fact that the scheme under the RDDB Act is different from that of the Income Tax Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The Supreme Court held that from a careful reading of section 29, it was manifest that the IT Rules are attracted only in so far as the same deal with recovery of debts under the RDDB Act with the modification that the "amount of debt" referred to in the rules is deemed to be one under the RDDB Act. That modification was intended to make the position explicit and to avoid any confusion in the application of the IT Rules, to recovery of all debts under the RDDB Act, which confusion could arise from a literal application of the IT Rules. The Supreme Court noted that the IT Rules made provisions which do not strictly deal with the recovery of debt under the RDDB Act, one such instance being rule 86 of the IT Rules which deals with an appeal from an order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer to the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner. The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to hold that rules 57 and 58 of the IT Rules were mandatory and had to be followed by the Recovery Officer.

What can be discerned from the Supreme Court judgment is that the use of the words "as far as possible" in section 29 of the RDDB Act indicate that the provisions of the IT Rules are applicable except such of them as do not have any role to play in the matter of recovery of debts recoverable under the RDDB Act.

Keeping this proposition in mind, we have to examine whether rule 68B of the IT Rules would apply or have any role to play in the matter of recovery of debts under the RDDB Act. Rule 68B reads as under:-

68B. (1) No sale of immovable property shall be made under this Part after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of section 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX;

Provided that where the immovable property is required to be re-sold due to the amount of highest bid being less than the reserve price or under the circumstances mentioned in rule 57 or rule 58 or where the sale is set aside under rule 61, the aforesaid period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property shall stand extended by one year.

(2) In computing the period of limitation under sub-rule (1), the period-

(i) during which the levy of the aforesaid tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum is stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or

(ii) during which the proceedings of attachment or sale of the immovable property are stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or

(iii) commencing from the date of the presentation of any appeal against the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under this Schedule and ending on the day the appeal is decided, shall be excluded;

Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property is less than 180 days, such remaining period shall be extended to 180 days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.

(3) Where any immovable property has been attached under this Part before the 1st day of June 1992, and the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has also become conclusive or final before the said date, that date shall be deemed to be the date on which the said order has become conclusive or, as the case may be, final.

(4) Where the sale of immovable property is not made in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1), the attachment order in relation to the said property shall be deemed to have been vacated on the expiry of the time of limitation specified under this Rule.

Part III to the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act deals with attachment and sale of immovable property. Rule 68B finds place in this part which deals with the time limit for sale of an immovable property that has been attached. Rule 68B inter alia provides that no sale of immovable property shall take place under Part III of the IT Rules after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of section 245-I or as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX of the Income Tax Act, 1961. There is no doubt that the recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act have to be conducted in accordance with the Income Tax Rules. However, in view of the language of section 29 of the RDDB Act which uses the words "as far as possible" would mean that the entire rules with its full force were not made applicable to the proceedings under the RDDB Act. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of C.N. Paramasivam (supra) one has to examine whether rule 68B would be applicable or has any role to play in the matter of recovery of debts recoverable under the RDDB Act. If the said rule has no role to play in the said recovery proceedings, then obviously it cannot be made applicable to the proceedings for recovery under the RDDB Act.

Rule 68B can never be made applicable to the recovery of debts under the RDDB Act for more than one reason. Firstly, the RDDB Act itself contains provisions for attachment and sale of the properties of the Defendant. Section 25 of the RDDB Act stipulates that the Recovery Officer, on receipt of a copy of a recovery certificate, shall proceed to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by (a) attachment and sale of the movable and immovable properties of the Defendant; (b) arrest of the Defendant and his detention in prison; and/or (c) appointing a Receiver for the management of the movable and immovable properties of the Defendant. It is pertinent to note that there is no time limit prescribed under the RDDB Act for the purpose of selling the attached property after the order of attachment is made. The Recovery officer is a creature of the statute and would get jurisdiction only on receipt of a recovery certificate issued u/s 19(22) of the RDDB Act. The RDDB Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for sale of an attached property.

Secondly, Rule 68B contains a reference to a "financial year". The words "financial year" has an application and relevance only to the proceedings under the Income Tax Act. In the present case, the debt that was being recovered by the Respondent Bank was not with respect to any of financial year. It was for recovery of money advanced to the Petitioners in the ordinary course of business by the Respondent Bank. Similarly, the Judgment/decree passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) has no reference to any particular financial year.

Thirdly, Rule 68B stipulates that no sale of immovable property shall be made after the expiry of a period of three years from the end of the "financial year" in which the order giving rise to the demand has (i) become conclusive u/s 245-I, or (ii) become final in terms of the provisions of Chapter XX of the Income Tax Act, 1961. We find a complete absence of such provisions in the RDDB Act.

The provisions of the IT Rules are made applicable to recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act only for the purpose of a fair and transparent procedure to be adopted by the Recovery officer in the matter of recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. This is necessary, as giving a free hand to the Recovery Officer without any kind of an established procedure, could result in arbitrariness. Therefore, the bar as contained in rule 68B with respect to the sale of an attached property after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, or penalty has become conclusive u/s 245-I, or final under chapter XX of the Income Tax Act, has absolutely no role to play in respect of any attachment and sale done under the provisions of the RDDB Act. Rule 68B therefore, to our mind, cannot be made applicable to proceedings for recovery under the RDDB Act.

There is another compelling reason to hold that rule 68B cannot be made applicable to recovery of debts under the RDDB Act. As discussed earlier, the purpose for which the RDDB Act was enacted was to ensure speedy recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions which were locked up in unproductive assets and were not being released due to the delays of litigation in civil courts. It was for this reason that the RDDB Act was enacted so that special tribunals could be constituted for the purpose of speedy recovery. Keeping this object in mind, the Legislature in its wisdom thought it fit that the orders passed by these special tribunals would be executed, "as far as possible" and "with necessary modifications", by applying the procedure set out in the IT Rules and not under the cumbersome procedure of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). If we were to hold that rule 68B applies to recovery of debts under the RDDB Act, we would be defeating the very purpose for which the Act was brought into force, namely the speedy recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. On a plain reading of rule 68B, the same does not fit into the scheme of the RDDB Act either in letter or spirit.

Yet another reason why rule 68B can never fit into the scheme of the RDDB Act is because of section 31 which deals with transfer of pending cases. Section 31 of RDDB Act reads as under:-

Transfer of pending cases-(1) Every suit or other proceeding pending before any court immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal;

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court;

(Provided further that any recovery proceedings in relation to the recovery of debts due to any multi-State co-operative bank pending before the date of commencement of the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act 2012 under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) shall be continued and nothing contained in this section shall apply to such proceedings.)

(2) Where any suit or other proceeding stands transferred from any court to a Tribunal under subsection (1)-

(a) the court shall, as soon as may be after such transfer, forward the records of such suit or other proceeding to the Tribunal; and

(b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application made u/s 19 from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage as the Tribunal may deem fit.

Prior to coming into force of the RDDB Act, the decrees obtained by banks and financial institutions in a civil court were executed under the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC. There is no pari materia provision under Order XXI as in rule 68B of the IT Rules. After coming into force of the RDDB Act, by virtue of section 31 thereof, these execution proceedings get transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). If we were to make rule 68B applicable to recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act, it would effectively mean that the execution of decrees that are transferred to the DRT u/s 31 of the RDDB Act, would also be subject to the time limit set out in rule 68B although there was no such time limit prescribed, when those very same decrees were being executed in the civil court under the provisions of the CPC. This would lead to startling results. For instance, before coming into force of the RDDB Act, an execution application of the bank/financial institution may have been pending in the civil court in which an immovable property was attached and not sold for a period of more than three years. However, on coming into force of the RDDB Act, the moment the execution proceedings are transferred, rule 68B would become applicable and the bank/financial institution would now be barred from selling the very same immovable property that was attached in the execution proceedings in the civil court. Instead of ensuring recovery of the banks'' dues, which was the purpose for which the RDDB Act was enacted, it would in fact have the opposite effect.

Furthermore, under the provisions of the RDDB Act, the DRT has jurisdiction to entertain claims of banks/financial institutions in excess of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs). A claim of a bank/financial institution less than Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs) continues in the civil court. Decrees passed in such suits (decrees of less than Rs. 10,00,000/-) would continue to be executed by the civil court under the provisions of the CPC. If we were to hold that rule 68B applied to recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act, it would effectively mean that though the time limit set out rule 68B applied to execution of decrees of banks/financial institutions whose decretal amount was more than rupees ten lakhs, the same would not apply to decrees of banks/financial institutions which were less than rupees ten lakhs as the same were being executed under the provisions of the CPC. This could never have been intention of the Legislature.

There is nothing in the RDDB Act that suggests that the Legislature intended prescribing different periods of limitation in this regard to claims under Rs. 10 lakhs on the one hand and to claims over Rs. 10 lakhs on the other. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that rule 68B has no role to play in the larger scheme of the RDDB Act and would in fact run contrary to the very purpose for which it was enacted.

We are not alone in taking this view. The applicability of rule 68B of the IT Rules, to recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of J.N. Krishnan Vs. The Branch Manager, Canara Bank and The Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, . The Madras High Court, after analysing the provisions, at paragraph 22 held as under:-

The RDDBFI Act does not contain any provision regarding limitation in the matter of sale of attached property. The provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act and the Income Tax Certificate Proceeding 1963 were made applicable to the recovery proceeding under RDDBFI Act only for the purpose of a fair and transparent procedure to be adopted by the Recovery Officer in the matter of recovery of the debts due to banks and financial institutions. In case the Recovery officer is given a free hand without any kind of established procedure governing the recovery proceedings, it would result in arbitrariness. It was only to regulate the proceedings the relevant Recovery Rules under the Income Tax Act were made applicable to a recovery proceeding under the RDDBFI Act. The various other provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Recovery Rules cannot be imported to nullify the action taken by the Recovery Officer. Therefore, we are of the view that Rule 68B dealing with time limit for sale of immovable property after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand for recovery of which, the property has been attached by the Recovery Officer has no application to an attachment made by the Recovery Officer u/s 25 of the RDDBFI Act. Accordingly, we reject the principal contention regarding the alleged violation of Rule 68B.

(emphasis supplied)

Another very important factor that has to be taken into consideration is that the proceedings under the Income Tax Act are between the revenue and the assessee. In those proceedings, the Tax Recovery Officer is an employee of the State who is employed to recover the tax for and on behalf of the State. However, proceedings under the RDDB Act are adversarial in nature, which are adjudicated upon and recovered by an independent judicial body like the DRT and the Recovery Officer respectively. The bank/financial institution has no control over the activities of the Recovery Officer. It would therefore be highly unjust to preclude the bank/financial institution from recovering their debts by selling the immoveable property of the Defendant, merely because the Recovery Officer did not or was unable to sell the same within a period of three years from end of the financial year in which the Original Application was decreed in favour of the bank/financial institution. There could be various reasons for which the Recovery Officer may not be able to sell the immoveable property within the time frame prescribed under rule 68B. For instance, the office of the Recovery Officer could be vacant or the defendants themselves indulged in tactics to delay the sale beyond the time frame prescribed. All these factors are out of the control of the bank/financial institution and therefore this is yet another indication that rule 68B of the IT Rules does not fit into the scheme of the RDDB Act.

We therefore hold that rule 68B of the Income Tax Rules is not applicable and has no role to play in the recovery of debts under the provisions of the RDDB Act.

Mrs. Sarnaik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the provisions of Rule 68B of the Income Tax Rules were mandatory and in support thereof, placed reliance on the following judgments:-

1) Shri M.U. Joshi Vs. The Tax Recovery Officer, The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and Union of India (UOI),

2) V. Rajendran Vs. Tax Recovery Officer,

3) S.V. Gopala Rao and Others Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, and

4) Noorudin Vs. Tax Recovery Officer,

For the purposes of deciding the controversy in this Writ Petition, we will proceed on the basis that Rule 68B of the Income Tax Rules is mandatory and that any sale held beyond the period of limitation set out therein would be invalid. However, it would make no difference to the outcome of this Writ Petition. As already held by us, rule 68B of the Income Tax Rules is not applicable and has no role to play in the recovery of debts under the provisions of the RDDB Act 1993. In this view of the matter, it is immaterial whether Rule 68B is mandatory or merely directory. All the aforesaid four judgments relied upon by Mrs. Sarnaik were dealing with sales of immovable property for recovery of tax dues under the provisions of the Income Tax Act and not by the Recovery Officer under the provisions of the RDDB Act. The reliance placed on the aforesaid judgments is therefore misplaced and is of no assistance to the Petitioners.

Having held so, we must now turn our attention to the impugned order of the Recovery Officer dated 28th September, 2012. As stated earlier, the Petitioners had filed an application (Exh. 228) and prayed for cancellation of the warrant of attachment dated 24th March 2006 in respect of the residential property on the ground that the same could not be sold after the expiry of three years as per the provisions of rule 68B of the IT Rules. The Respondent Bank also filed an application (Exh. 231) and prayed for issuance of a fresh warrant of attachment in respect of the very same residential property. Both these applications were disposed off by the impugned order whereby the application of the Petitioners (Exh. 228) was allowed and the warrant of attachment dated 24th March 2006 was cancelled. At the same time, the Recovery Officer also allowed the application of the Respondent Bank (Exh. 231) and issued a fresh warrant of attachment in respect of the very same residential property.

Having held that rule 68B has no application to recovery of debts under the provisions of the RDDB Act, we are of the view that the Recovery Officer ought to have dismissed the application filed by the Petitioners (Exh. 228) and declined to cancel the warrant of attachment dated 24th March 2006. Instead, the Recovery Officer cancelled the attachment and thereafter ordered fresh attachment of the same residential property. Though in law, the Recovery Officer was incorrect in canceling the warrant of attachment dated 24th March 2006, we, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, do not think it necessary to interfere in our extraordinary jurisdiction, as by the very same order, the Recovery Officer has ordered that a fresh warrant of attachment be issued for the residential property. It would be an unnecessary formality to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the Recovery Officer to pass a fresh order in accordance with this judgment. In that event, the original attachment would continue. Since the end result is the same, albeit following the wrong procedure, we feel that the interest of justice is served.

In view thereof, the writ petition is hereby dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

The interim order dated 2nd July 2013 shall continue till 31st July 2014 to enable the petitioners to challenge this order.