Mittal Electronics vs Sujata Home Appliances (P) Ltd. & Ors.

Tushar Rao Gedela, J

I.A. 7185/2026 (By D1 for clarification of Order dated 09.09.2020)

Present application has been filed on behalf of defendant no.1 under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1098 (‘CPC’) seeking clarification of the order dated 09.09.2020.

Mr. Neeraj Grover, learned counsel appearing for the defendant took this  Court  through  the  orders  dated  07.02.2020  and  09.09.2020  to  submit that the order dated 07.02.2020 was an ex-parte interim order passed in favor of the plaintiff, while the order dated 09.09.2020 was passed after this Court heard arguments on the applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 and Order XXXIX Rule 4, CPC. He states that by way of the present application, the defendant seeks clarification of the order dated 09.09.2020 to the extent that the defendant be permitted to use the mark ‘SUJATA’ as its trade/corporate name only to the extent that the permission to use‘SUJATA’ as trademark was permitted in respect of goods like RO systems, water purifiers and water filters. In that, he states that the defendant be permitted to use the name - Sujata Home Appliances only for branding the products like ROs, water purifiers and water filters.

In  order to  substantiate  his contentions,  learned counsel referred  to para 61 of the order dated 09.09.2020 to state that the reference to para 36 of the plaint, which is the prayer clause of the interim injunction application of the plaintiff, in the said order was only in respect of the items/products  which  preceded  the  reference  to  the  said  para  36.  In  other words, he contended that while modifying the order dated 07.02.2020, this Court  observed,  “The  applications  are  disposed  of  granting  injunction  in favour of the plaintiff and against defendants in terms of prayer in para 36 of I.A.No.1751/2020 except for water filters, water purifiers and RO Systems, which the defendants can continue to manufacture and sell under the mark ‘SUJATA’”, which can only mean that for the specified items, the defendants can also use the mark ‘SUJATA’ as a trade/corporate name. According  to him,  the  exception  carved out  would  inhere in  the  defendant the right to use the mark ‘SUJATA’ as its trade name or corporate name.

Learned counsel also contended that the aforesaid contention is clearer while reading para 10 and 11 of the order dated 07.02.2020. He stated that while in para 10 of the said order, this Court had granted ex-parte injunction in respect of various products including that of the plaintiffs, it was restricted only to the mark ‘SUJATA’ as appearing on the said products and not to the defendant using the mark ‘SUJATA’ as its trade or corporate name. According to him, this becomes more manifest from the reading of para 11. This Court in para 11 had restrained the defendants  from using  the domain  names  www.sujatahomeappliances.com and www.sujataro.com. From  the above,  learned counsel would have the Court infer that restraint from use of the mark ‘SUJATA’ as trade or corporate  name  has  not  been  clearly  specified  and  rather,  such  restraint  is conspicuous by its absence. Thus, as per learned counsel, what has not been clearly restrained by specification, cannot be deemed to have been so prohibited.

Even otherwise, Mr. Grover would contend that even now, this Court can clarify that the defendants can use the mark ‘SUJATA’ as trade or corporate name restricted only to the products - water filters, water purifiers and RO Systems as this Court has, by the order dated 09.09.2020 specifically  permitted the  defendant  to use the mark ‘SUJATA’  for these three  products  alone.  According  to  him,  clarification  of  this  nature  would not prejudice the case of the plaintiff inasmuch as the defendants are indeed using the said mark, albeit, under orders of this Court for the aforesaid products.

Another leg of his argument was predicated on the prayer in para 36 of the plaintiffs’ application seeking stay. He would contend that the prayer paragraph is omnibus with no clear prayer or reference to restraint of defendants from use of the mark ‘SUJATA’ as trade or corporate name. He would argue that the prohibition sought by the plaintiff was in the passing in a manner as reference and not as the mainstay. Therefore, even the Court while passing orders dated 07.02.2020 and 09.09.2020 did not specifically bar  the  use  of  the  said  mark  as  trade  or  corporate  name  by  the  defendant. He stated that what has not been specifically barred cannot be read in merely because of a reference to para 36 of the application in the said orders.  He  stated  that  merely  because  para  36  has  been  mentioned  would not, ipso facto, mean that every item mentioned therein gets covered. According to him, if that line were to be toed, then the Courts need not specify the extent of the orders and in respect of which items/products such orders are to apply and merely by inserting reference to the prayer para of the suit or application, interim orders can be passed and sustained. He would contend that this cannot be the correct position in law.

Per contra, Mr. Biala, learned counsel for the plaintiff stated that the present  application  is  an  abuse  of  process  and  ought  to  be  dismissed  with costs.  He  invited  the  attention  of  this  Court  to  para  14  of  the  order  dated 09.09.2020 to demonstrate the strong objection raised by the plaintiff in respect  of  not  only the  mark  ‘SUJATA’  used  as  a trademark  but  also  as  a corporate name by the defendant. At the relevant time, he had relied upon the judgement of this Court in Montari Overseas Ltd. Vs. Montari Industries Ltd.: ILR (1997) 1 Delhi 64 for this proposition and had resisted the use as a corporate name by defendant no.1 on the ground of contravention of Section 29(6) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Further to the above contention, learned counsel would draw attention  of  this  Court  to  para  56  of  the  order  dated  09.09.2020  where  the contention noted in para 14 was discussed and considered. From the observations in para 56, learned counsel would contend that this Court had clearly  noted  that Montari Overseas  Ltd.  (supra)  is  not  applicable as  the said case was purely in the realm of dispute only on adoption and use of the name of the company by the defendant. While in the present case, the Court observed that defendant no.1 was incorporated in the year 2017 and not dealing with all the home appliances. It also observed that in IA No.4098/2020, the defendant no.1 was not seeking modification of the ex- parte ad-interim injunction from this Court. On the anvil of this observation, learned counsel vehemently contends that the Court had made its mind  clear  that while  passing  order  dated  07.02.2020 and  09.09.2020, the  defendant  was  specifically  restrained  from  using  the  mark  ‘SUJATA’as corporate or trade name.

In that light, learned counsel would contend that para 61 of the order dated 09.09.2020 has to be now read accordingly and construed in the manner as observed by this Court in para 56 followed by para 61 of the said order.

He also contended that while the order was passed on 09.09.2020, there is no reason why the defendant did not ever seek clarification of this nature,  more  so,  as  the  same  defendant  had  already filed  an  application  as noted in para 56 of the order dated 09.09.2020. He would contend that this application is an abuse of process for the reason that the defendant is trying to wriggle out of the contempt petition filed by the plaintiff in the year 2021. Learned counsel read the prayer clause of IA 4098/2020 to demonstrate that there was no reason why the defendant did not choose to seek this clarification or modification as sought now in the present application.

In  fact,  learned  counsel  referred  to  para  4  of  the  said  application  to contend  that  the  original  trademark  owner  was  running  his  firm  under  the name  and  style  Luxmi  Enterprises  and  not  Sujata  Home  Appliances,  thus the  stand  that  the  defendant will stand to  lose  if  not  permitted to  use the mark ‘SUJATA’ as trade or corporate name is without any factual basis. He would contend that the plaintiff would have no objection in case the defendant is permitted to use the name Luxmi Enterprises as trade or corporate name.

Mr. Grover, learned counsel for the defendant in rejoinder reiterates his original arguments.

This Court has extensively  heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, perused the orders dated 07.02.2020 and 09.09.2020 as well as IA 4098/2020 filed by the defendant.

At the outset, this Court notes that the orders of which clarification is sought was passed almost 5 years from date. During the interregnum, though the defendant did file an application bearing IA 4098/2020 seeking vacation/modification of the order dated 07.02.2020 seeking various prayers, however, did not seek any clarification in the nature as sought now.  No  explanation  has  been  tendered  as  to  why  (i)  similar  clarification was  not  sought  in  IA  4098/2020;  (ii)  the  present  application  seeking  such clarification has been filed with a delay of 5 years. According to the Court, both  aspects  would  entail dismissal  of  the application.  However,  that said, this Court deems it appropriate to still examine the issue, in addition to the above observation.

This Court being Court of Record is bound to examine the orders as they appear to be, without adding or deleting any issue therefrom.

The plaintiff in its prayer paragraph of the interim application for ex- parte ad-interim injunction sought the following relief:-

“36.  It  is  therefore,  respectfully  prayed  that  during  the  pendency  of  the suit  the  Hon'ble  Court may  be  pleased  to  pass  the  order  restraining  the defendants, their directors, partners, owners, dealers, distributors, agents,  stockiest  and  servants,  employees,  assigns  and  all other  persons acting on their behalf from manufacturing, selling, importing, exporting, offering for sale, advertising, directly or indirectly dealing in Geysers, Water  Purifiers, RO  Systems, Ionizer,  Vegetable  Purifier, Juicer,  Mixer, Grinder, Heating, Cooling, Ventilating, Steam Generating and Cooling Appliances and other home appliances and accessories thereof under the impugned trade mark Star SUJATA/SUJATA or any other identical and/or deceptively similar mark to the trade mark SUJATA whether using independently or as part of the corporate name, domain name and E-mail address till the disposal of the suit.

Any other or further order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case be also passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.”

On 07.02.2020, an ex-parte order in the nature granting the following directions was passed:-

“10. Consequently, the defendants, their directors, partners, owners, dealers, distributors, agents, servants, employees etc. are restrained from manufacturing, selling, importing, exporting, offering for sale, advertising their products including geysers, water purifiers, RO systems. Ionizer, Vegetable Purifier, Juicer, Mixer, Grinder, Heating, Cooling, Ventilating, Steam  Generating  and  Cooling  appliances  etc.  under  the  trademark  Star SUJATA/SUJATA or any other identical or deceptively similar trademark in terms of prayer in para-36 of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC.

Defendants are also restrained from using the domain names www.suiatahomeappliances.com and www.suiataro.com and the email address also till the next date of hearing.”

On 04.03.2020, the defendant no.1, the applicant herein, filed an application bearing IA No.4098/2020 seeking the following prayers:-

“(a) Modify the ex-parte ad-interim injunction order dated 07.02.2020 to the extent of allowing the Applicant/Defendant No.1 Company to manufacture, sell, offer for sale, advertise its products, namely water purifiers and R.O. Systems under its registered trademark "SUJATA";

(b) Release the goods/products pertaining to water purifiers and RO systems bearing  the trademark "SUJATA", which were seized and  sealed by various Local Commissioners in terms of the order dated. 07.02.2020;

(c)  Impose  exemplary  punitive  costs  on  the  Plaintiff  for  having  obtained the Order dated 07.02.2020 by playing fraud and misleading this Hon’ble Court into passing the ex-parte ad~interim injunction order;...”

After hearing arguments on the aforesaid application, this Court passed the detailed order dated 09.09.2020. The penultimate paragraph is as under:-

“61. In view of the discussion, the ex parte ad interim injunction dated 7th February, 2020 is liable to be modified for  the  concealment of material facts  by  the  plaintiff  as  also  on  merits.  The  applications  are  disposed  of granting injunction in favour of plaintiff and against defendants in terms of  prayer  in  para  36  of I.A.No.  1751/2020  except  for  water  filters, water purifiers and RO Systems, which the defendants can continue to manufacture  and  sell  under  the  mark  'SUJATA'.  The  goods  seized  by  the learned  Local  Commissioner  and  on  superdari with  defendants  are;  also released in their favour.”

In the above context, it would be relevant also to extract and consider para 14 and 56 of the order dated 09.09.2020 where this Court had noted the arguments of the plaintiff objecting to any modification in the interim order dated 07.02.2020, even to permit the defendant to use the mark ‘SUJATA’ as a corporate name and the Court’s observations respectively. The said para nos.14 and 56 of the order dated 09.09.2020 read thus:-

“14. Defendant No.1 and its purported licensor have not filed any proceedings despite being aware of the registration of the plaintiff thereby estopping the defendant No.1 who today alleges non-use of the registered mark by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not only entitled to an injunction qua the trademark 'SUJATA' used by defendant No.1 but also in respect of 'SUJATA' used as corporate name by the defendant No.1. Reliance is placed on the decision as ILR (1997) 1 Delhi 64 Montari Overseas Ltd. vs. Montari Industries Ltd. and Malhotra Book Depot (supra). The use of registered  mark  of  the  plaintiff  as  the  corporate  name  of  defendant  No.l clearly contravenes Section 29 (6) of the TM Act.

xxx     xxx     xxx

In Montari Overseas Ltd., the Court was dealing with adoption of the name of the company by the defendant. In the present case defendant No.1 company was incorporated in the year 2017 and is not dealing with all the home appliances. But by I.A. No.4098/2020, the defendant No.1 is not seeking modification of the ex parte ad interim injunction on this count.”

From the overall consideration of the orders and pleadings of the parties, it emerges that the plaintiff had indeed sought an order of restraint against the defendant from using the mark ‘SUJATA’ as its corporate name in prayers of the application at para 36, which was the prayer clause of the interim application. It also emerges that this Court in order dated 07.02.2020, while passing the ex-parte ad-interim injunction, had indeed mentioned and referred to prayers in para 36 of the said application. Though, in the order dated 07.02.2020, the Court had, by a separate paragraph, i.e. para 11, restrained the defendant from using the mark‘SUJATA’ in the domain names and had made no reference to the corporate name, however, that by itself cannot be construed to mean absence  of  such  restraint.  This  is  for  the  reason  that  para  10  of  the  order dated 07.02.2020 does infact pass directions in terms of para 36 of the stay application. This Court is neither reviewing the said order nor sitting in appeal to read into or delete anything therefrom or infer any meaning other than what comes to fore on the plain reading thereof.

That apart, admittedly, the defendant did not seek any clarification of this nature when it filed the IA No.4098/2020 and has not tendered any reason why it did not do so. In fact, this clarification has been sought now for  the  first  time  after  a  passage  of  5  years  from  the  passing  of  the  order. This Court can safely infer that the long silence demonstrates that the parties were under no illusion or uncertainty of the directions passed in orders dated 07.02.2020 and 09.09.2020. This is also relevant since the plaintiff had filed an application seeking initiation of contempt proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC in the year 2021 itself on the violation of the defendant’s use of the mark ‘SUJATA’ as its corporate or trade name.  Why  the  defendant  did  not  initiate  any  such  action  previously,  that too in time, is a mystery.

Para 14 and 56 of the order dated 09.09.2020 make it more clear and manifest, the intention of the Court having actually granted restraint of use of the mark ‘SUJATA’ as corporate name as well. This is clear from the observation in para 56 where it clearly distinguishes the ratio in Montari’s (supra)  case  in  respect  of  usage  of  impugned  mark  as  corporate  name  by defendant  and  holds  that  the  defendant  in IA  No.4098/2020  is not seeking modification of the ex-parte ad-interim injunction on this count. Thus, it is beyond reproach or doubt that the Court was cognizant of the directions it had passed on 07.02.2020 and what it was about to pass on 09.09.2020.

The argument of Mr. Grover that Court may not read into the directions in the orders dated 07.02.2020 or 09.09.2020 anything not specified, though seems attractive, yet do not muster any weight. This is for the reason that not only did this Court in the order dated 07.02.2020 refer to para  36  of  the  prayer  clause  of  the  stay application,  but  in  the order  dated 09.09.2020,  under  para  56  and  ultimately para  61,  expressly  reiterated  the directions “in terms of para 36” of the application with some modifications.  This  Court  needs  no  reiteration  nor  substantiation  as  to  the purport and intention behind the aforenoted two orders.

Moreover,  this  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  modification  in  para 61 of the order dated 09.09.2020 draws an exception to the directions in order dated 07.02.2020 and does not supplant the directions in para 10 and 11  of  the  order  dated  07.02.2020.  Thus,  the  exception  only  removes  what was  hitherto  before  encompassed  within  the  original  order  without,  in  any manner, touching upon or tinkering with the remaining parts of the directions.

Thus, in view of the above, this Court is unable to accede to the arguments of the defendant and the application is dismissed.