Miya Hajee Ismail Sahib and Co. vs The Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation

Anantanarayanan, J.—The appellants are the petitioners (Messrs, Miya Hajee Isroail Sahib and Co.), and the appeal is directed against the

order of the Additional Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation, Madras, in Case No. 2 of 1956 on his file. The appeal has been argued

with regard to the single question, whether the court below was right in holding that the Tannery of the petitioners (appellants) was a factory as

defined in Section 2(xii) of the Employees State Insurance Act, daring the period in question.

Now, in the Employees State Insurance Act, Act XXXIV of 1948, ''factory'' is defined in Section 2(xii) as follows :

Factory means any premises including the pre-cincts thereof whereon 20 or more persons are working or were working on any day of the

preceding 12 months and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, but

does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Indian Mines Act, 1923, or a railway running shed."" We note that two essential components

of this definition are the words ""manufacturing process"" and ""power"". Now, the third sub paragraph of the same definition states,

The expressions ''manufacturing process'' and ''power'' shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Factories Act, 1948.

When we look at the Factories Act, 63 of 1948, we find that ''manufacturing process'' is defined in Section 2(k) of the Act as any process for any

of the operations grouped in Sub-clauses (1) to (5) of Section 2(k). We are not, however, concerned with this particular aspect, since it is not in

dispute that the establishment of the appellants is engaged in the tanning and finishing of hides and skins, and, as the court below states, ""In the

premises of the tanner, the raw and tried (sic) skins and hides undergo various processes such as soaking, lining, unhairing, flashing and delining,

scudding, tanning, colouring, buffing etc.

It is not in dispute before me that these pto-cesses, which last for about 45 days, do constitute ""a manufacturing process"", viewed either as

separate operations or integrally taken together. It is further to be observed, that for the purpose of applying the ""relevant provisions, these

separate operations should be integrally considered as a whole. ""Power"" is defined in Section 2(g) of the Factories Act, 63 of 1948 as ""power

means electrical energy, or any other form of energy which is mechanically transmitted and is not generated by human or animal agency.

The admitted facts of the present case are that electrical power is being employed in the establishment of the appellants, for the pumping and

storage of water, which is subsequently being used for several of the processes concerned in finishing the raw hides and skins.

The brief argument upon this aspect can be put in the following form. This electrical power is being utilised for the pumping and storing ot water,

which is, of course, an essential commodity required in the ""manufacturing process"". This is not in dispute. But the power is not directly employed

to transform or alter the products of the process at any stage. This, at best, only amounts to an Indirect utilisation of ""power"", and since there is no

direct relationship between the usa of the power and the manufacturing process, the argument is that the definition in Section 2(12) of Central Act

34 of 1948, already set out, is not applicable to the present facts.

This can be met upon two clear grounds, apart from other arguments with which we are not concerned immediately. The first is that the very

pumping and storage of water in this establishment amounts by itself to a manufacturing process as defined in the Act. In Moosa Kazimi Vs. K.M.

Sheriff and Another, , Rarnachandm lyer J. was of the same opinion, with regard to Section 2(k) and 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948. The learned

Judge observed.

It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to consider that question, as admittedly there is an electric motor for the purpose of lifting water. The

definition of the term ''manufacturing process* to which I have already made a reference, would comprehend such a case.

The present argument can also be met upon another ground. Water is required for the manufacturing process, presumably, at a particular spot and

In particular flow or force. This is riot merely a case of a small quantity of water being utilised in the ordinary way, for, in that event, the employer

would not take the trouble to use electrical energy to pump and store water [n large quantities, and at a height

But, since the use of the electrical energy enables the employer to utilise the water in such manner as is required in the manufacturing process itself,

in effect he is using power for conducting a part of that process. This is hence connected as cause and effect with the process itself, and it cannot

be argued that the definition does not apply.

In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties to bear their Own costs.