M.K. Abdur Rashed Sahib vs A.R. Rahimunnissa Begum

This Civil Revision Petition is against the concurrent order of eviction passed against the petitioner by the authorities below under the Rent

Control Act on the ground of respondent-landlady''s son''s own occupation under S.10(3) (a) (i) of the said Act. It is in evidence that P.W.1, the

said son of the landlady and his wife and children along with the said landlady are residing in a rented premises bearing Door No. 24, Murthuza

Begumpettah Street, Madras-14.

One submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent has inherited the said premises bearing Door No.24,

Murthuza Begumpettah Street, Madras on the death of the landlady of the said premises (who is none other than the mother of the respondent) in

1983, after the R.C.O.P. was filed, and that since the respondent had thus come to own the said premises, which is now in her occupation, S.10

(3) (a) (i) of the Rent Control Act cannot be invoked by the respondent. The said provision runs as follows:�

A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of

the building.

(i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family is not

occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned.

According to the said Counsel, in the expression:�

if he or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city,"" the words ''his own''.

would refer only to the landlady in the present case and not her son. But in very many decisions like Annamalai & Co., v. Sital Achi 1975 (I)

M.L.J. 337 Indian Plywood Manufacturing Co., Messrs v. Balaramiah Chetty 99 L.W. 49, and Kannan, A.S. v. S.C.M. Zackriya 100 L.W. 213,

this court has held that the condition imposed under the said Section as per the words not occupying a residential building of his own is to be

understood with reference to the person for whose benefit the building is required. In Kannan. A.S. v. S.C.M. Zackeriya 100 L.W. 213, referred

to above, this court observed as follows:�

This court has uniformly held that when the premises are sought for by the landlord for the benefit of any member of his family it is only that

member of the family for whose benefit the premises are required who should not occupy premises of his or of her own. The fact that the landlord

occupies premises of his own would not disentitle him from claiming eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any

premises of his own.

In the said decision, the learned Judge also held, referring to the decision in Jagannatha Chettiar v. R.V. Swarnambal 97 L.W. 182, as follows:�

A perusal of the judgment would clearly indicate that the facts in that case are totally different and that therefore, the view expressed by the learned

Judge on those facts is really not in conflict with the laws expressed by this court in the other decisions, referred to above. In Jaganatha Chettiar,

R.V. v. Swarnambal 97 L.W. 182, the landlord has initially sought eviction on the ground that he required the premises for his daughter. He had

also claimed that neither himself nor his daughter was occupying any other building of their own. The tenant has resisted the eviction on the ground

that the landlord was not living in rented premises, but the premises in which he was residing was his own. It is seen from the facts set out in the

above judgment, that though initially the landlord has sought eviction for the benefit of his daughter, who did not have a house of her own, during

evidence he had made it clear that eviction was sought for to enable him to go and live with his married daughter and son-in-law and that he could

not do so in his house since the accommodation in the house, where he was residing, was not sufficient.

Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. As the learned Judge who decided Kannan,

A.S. v. S.C.M. Zackeriya 100 L.W. 213, referred to above, I also feel that there is no necessity to refer to the above said question to a larger

Bench.

Then, the learned counsel submitted that since on 8-3-1982, the petitioner-tenant surrendered possession of a portion of the building which was

in her occupation, she could not invoke S.10(3) (a) (i),but, if at all, she could only invoke S.10(3)(c) that is, the ground of additional

accommodation. But, it is in evidence that the landlady or P.W.1 is not in occupation of the said portion surrendered, but only in occupation of

No.24, Murthuza Begumpet Street, and that the landlady has only dumped some articles in that portion surrendered. Therefore, the lower

appellate Court has rightly held that the petition could be filed under S.10(3) (a)(i) of the said Act. The word ""occupation"" alone is used in S.10(3)

(a)(i) and not the word ""possession"". That is why it was held in Gouri Devi, Mrs. v. Shama Rao (died) 96 L.W. 516 as follows:�

In the case of residential buildings, ''occupation'' can only mean ''living in it''. The fact that some rooms in a house are kept locked by the landlady

will not lead to the conclusion that she is in occupation of a part of the building within the meaning of S.10(3) (c), especially when it is beyond

dispute that the landlady is living in a separate rented building with the other members of her family.

Likewise, it has also been held in Sundaram v. Jothi Bai 98 L.W. 281.

Further it has also been held in Parthasarathy Chettiar P.V. v. The State of Tamil Nadu 96 L.W. 691, and Annamalai and Co. v. Sital Achi 88

L.W. 806, that this court has repeatedly taken the view that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to which portion he must choose for

his personal occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family.

Further, it has also been held in Thangavel, A. v. A. Marriappan 100 L.W. 381, as follows:�

...even though originally the petition for eviction was made under S.10(3) (a) (i) of the Act on the ground that the landlady did not have any

accommodation in her own possession and that she was living in the rented premises, the order of eviction cannot be interfered with merely on the

ground that subsequently the landlady has come in possession of some accommodation even though that accommodation does not fully meet the

need of the landlady. There is no doubt that the petition as framed when it was made was clearly maintainable because at that time the landlady

was not in occupation of any premises of her own. The petition does not automatically become non-maintainable because of subsequent events. All

that has to be seen is whether the accommodation which has now secured subsequent to the order of eviction is sufficient to meet the need of the

family and forcing the landlady to have recourse to another proceeding will only mean multiplicity of proceedings.

Further regarding the other aspects of bona fides also, the courts below have given cogent reasons, like P.W.1 having a big family and there is

frequent quarrel between P.W.1''s wife and her mother-in-law, the landlady and hence the landlady intends to have a separate residence for her

son etc., Therefore, I see no reason to interfere and so I dismiss this Civil Revision Petition. No costs. The petitioner-tenant is granted 3 months

time for vacating the petition building and handing it over to the respondent-landlady, provided he files an affidavit within two the weeks from today

undertaking to vacate the said building within the stipulated time positively.