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Judgment
22 paragraphs · 1,743 wordsSudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri G.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the Respondents.
The Petitioner''s appointment on the post of Constable in U.P. Police Force has been cancelled vide order dated 08.08.2007 passed by he Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad stating that the Petitioner was selected and appointed as a candidate of other backward class but his caste certificate has been cancelled by Tehsildar Madhuban, District Mau vide order dated 24.07.2007 hence it goes to vitiate his entire selection and appointment and his appointment is being cancelled. Both these orders are impugned in this writ petition.
It is not disputed by learned Counsel for the Petitioner that on 23.04.2003 he was issued caste certificate by Tehsildar Madhuban, District Mau verifying that the Petitioner belong to caste ''Sheikh'' which is in other backward class category in the notification issued by the Government and, therefore, is in other backward class category. It is pursuant to this certificate the Petitioner was considered as other backward class candidate and in the merit of respective category he was selected and appointed. Later on Tehsildar Madhuban, District Mau found that the caste ''Sheikh'' is not a caste notified under the Government notification as other backward class and under a mistake of fact the certificate was issued hence he cancelled the caste certificate vide order dated 24.07.2007. Pursuant whereto the Petitioner''s appointment has also been cancelled vide order dated 08.08.2007. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner could not dispute that by notification dated 2 31.05.1998 under Item 62 the categories which were declared to be other backward class are as under:
''ks[k] ljojh �fijkbZ�] fijkgh
The notification nowhere shows that Sheikh is a caste different from other caste namely Sarwari (Pirai) Pirahi etc. It appears that earlier the notification was issued on 15.09.1997 and therein at Item 62 it mentions as under:
''ks[k] ljojh �fijkbZ�] fijkgh
The addition of commas appears to be some clerical mistake and, therefore, a corrigendum notification was issued on 31.05.1998 deleting commas after the word ''Sheikh'' and Sarwari (Pirai). The entry became as mentioned above, i.e., Sheikh Sarwari (Pirai) Pirahi. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that Sheikh is a title given to the people and the same by itself is not a caste hence this title of respect could not have been treated to be a caste.
While construing the notifications issued in reference to Article 341 of the Constitution what is actually mentioned in the notification is only to be seen and nothing can be added or subtracted therein based on the personal knowledge of the authorities. It is not the case that the Petitioner has been issued any subsequent certificate verifying his caste other than ''Sheikh'' which belong to other backward class category. Once the earlier notification was corrected by a later one which shows that ''Sheikh'' by itself is not a caste, the Petitioner ought not to have been allowed to retain the benefit which he received under a certificate issued palpably wrongly to him. In taking this view I am fortified by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Qamruddin v. District Magistrate, Moradabad and others 2005(58) ALR 736 wherein this Court has held:
The Appellant is a Shiekh and he claims to be O.B.C. The post of Pradhan in question was reserved for O.B.C. and hence obviously if the Appellant is not an O.B.C. he is not eligible for the said post. The question is whether the Appellant is an O.B.C.
The learned single Judge in a well considered judgment has noted that ''Sheikh'' does not denote a Muslim caste. It is a title of respect and it is not a title for any particular caste. He relied on a decision of this Court in Shamiuddin v. Addl. District Judge (I) Mathura and Ors. We have carefully perused the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge as well as the judgment in the case of Shamiuddin v. Addl. District Judge (I) Mathura and Ors., and we are in respectful agreement with the view taken therein.
The meaning of the word ''Sheikh'' as given in the Encyclopedia Britanica1960 Edition Vol.. 20 may aptly be quoted as under:
Sheikh (SHIEKH OR SHAYKH), an Arabic title of. respect dating from Prelslamic authority, strictly means a venerable man, of more than 50 years of age. It is specifically borne by heads of religious orders, heads of college (e.g. Al Azhar in Cairo), Chiefs of tribes and headmen of villages and of separate quarters of town. It is also applied to learned men, especially members of the class of "ulama'' and has been applied to any one who had memorized the whole Koran, however, young he might be,
Combined with other terms the word is used in various titles, Sheikk albalad, mayor of a town Sheikh aljabal ("the mountain chief), a popular term for the head of the Assassins mistranslated by the crusaders as "the Old Man of the Mountain. By far the most important of these is the title Sheikh alIslam, which by the 1lth century A.D. was being given to eminent ''ulama'' and mystics and by the 15th century could be claimed by any outstanding mufti. In the Ottoman Empire this title was restricted by Suleman I (152066) to mufti of Instantbul, who was equal in rank to the grand vizier and was head of the religious institutions which controlled law, justice and religion, and education. Because of his right to issue legally binding ''fatwas'' (opinions) this official came to wield great power. In 1924 under the Turkish Republic, the last vestiges of the institution were abolished.
According to Webster''s Third New International Dictionary Volume III ''Sheikh'' means ''head of an Arabic family, clan, tribe or village. An Arab Chief, a Governor, a Prince among peoples of Arabian or Muslim descent. According to Oxford Dictionary ''Shiekh'' means Chief head of Arab tribe family or village, title of eminent Muslim and according to Collins Dictionary, ''Shiekh'' means the head of an Arab tribe, village etc. The New Lexicons Webster''s Dictionary defines ''Shiekh'' as "a title of respect used by Arab, an Arab Chief, head of family, or a headman of a village.
It is thus evident that ''Sheikh'' is a title of respect. Such title, it cannot be gainsaid, is not the. exclusive privilege of a member of Upper/Forward Class. A person belonging to a Muslim Backward Class may also be given such a title of respect by the people of his community.
It is wellsettled that this Court can neither add nor delete any Scheduled Caste or Backward Caste from the list of castes mentioned in the relevant Act or Notification providing for reservations in the U.P. Public Services. In the U.P. Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1994. Other Backward Classes of citizens has been defined in Section 2 (b) as Backward Classes of items specified in Scheduled I. As per Section 13 of the Act the State Government by Notification can amend the Schedule. In Schedule I by means of G.O. dated 15 91997 Item No. 62 Shiekh, Sarvari (Pirai), Pirahi has been shown among the backward class.
If may be mentioned that by the Government order dated 5.11.1998, Sheikh was shown to be a separate Backward Caste, but by means of rectification made on 31.5.1998 in the Government order dated 5.11.1998 the error was rectified and in Item No. 62, Sheikh Sarvari (Pirai) was shown as one of the castes in the list of Backward Classes. Similar was the situation in the Government order dated 25.4.2000.
By means of U. P. Ordinance No. 2/02 dated 6.6.2002 the entry "Sheikh Sarvari (Pirai) Pirahi" was corrected by removing the comma between ''Sheikh'' and ''Sarvari''. The same position has been retained in the G.O. dated 16.2.2003. We have also been shown the Notification dated 20.9.2003 in which it is clearly mentioned that ''Sheikh Sarvari (Pirai)'' is in fact only one caste and not different castes. Hence, we are In agreement with the judgment of the learned single Judge.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner however placed reliance on another Division Bench decision of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 54695 of 2006, Rasheed Ahmad v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 09.07.2009 wherein the matter was remitted back to a committee constituted under the Government Order dated 09.04.1996 to consider the question as to which caste the Petitioner belongs.
In my view this judgment has no application to the facts of this case inasmuch as therein the incumbent was issued a caste certificate verifying his caste as "Sheikh Sarwari" but later on it was cancelled by observing that he was not a "Sheikh Sarwari" but only "Sheikh" and, therefore, is not covered by notification. The Petitioner, Rasheed Ahmad claiming therein that he was "Sheikh Sarwari" and since a dispute of caste was there, this Court directed the matter to be considered by a committee constituted by the Government in this regard.
In the present case the Petitioner has never been recognised by the authorities concerned as belonging to a caste other than Sheikh. Instead initially also he was issued a caste certificate verifying as "Sheikh" and that was never disputed by Petitioner at any point of time. In these circumstances, in my view, it cannot be said that there is a dispute of caste to which the Petitioner belongs. On the contrary the Petitioner was issued a caste certificate verifying his caste as Sheikh which was not a caste notified under Article 341 of the Constitution and when this mistake was detected the same was rectified by cancelling the caste certificate. It is only for the first time in the present writ petition he has claimed in para 22 of the writ petition that he is in fact a "Sheikh Sarwari" by caste and prior thereto no such claim was made by the Petitioner and even when he was issued the caste certificate dated 24.04.2003 which mentions his caste as "Sheikh" and not as "Sheikh Sarwari". Therefore, the Petitioner cannot be allowed to take a new plea for the first time in the writ petition and that too without being supported by any material on record. I, therefore, find no error apparent on the face of record in the two impugned orders assailed in the present writ petition warranting any interference.
Dismissed. No costs.
