Mohammed T. vs State of Kerala and Others

M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J.—The writ petition raises the question of the jurisdiction of the Kerala Police, in the context of Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to conduct investigation against the Petitioner, who is an Indian citizen, in respect of certain offences said to have been committed by the Petitioner in the United Arab Emirates against Respondents 5 and 6 in the writ petition, who had lodged Ext. P-1 complaint dated 17th December 1990 in the State of Kerala.

It is the case of Respondents 5 and 6 in the complaint, Ext. P-1 dated 17th December 1990, that the writ Petitioner, while working as Manager in the shop of the fifth Respondent in the U.A.E., had diverted to his own accounts a sum of 7,82,737 U.A.E. Dirhams. Total sum is said to be about Rs. 90 lakhs. Petitioner, it is alleged is guilty of criminal misappropriation of funds. The fifth Respondent lodged a complaint with the A1 Ain Civil Court and by the time the Court passed a prohibitory order preventing the Petitioner from leaving U.A.E., Petitioner escaped to India, via. Jordan, It is alleged that the money acquired by the above said misappropriation has been sent to India through various banks, to his accounts. Some money was allegedly smuggled into India through clandestine methods. These acts, it is alleged, amount to dishonest misappropriation, criminal breach of trust and cheating.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that inasmuch as the complaint is that the offences took place in a foreign country the police in India have no power of ''investigation''. It is argued that while Section 4 is part of the substantive law, Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 4 thereof, permits only ''inquiry and trial'' in India with the sanction of the Central Government and inasmuch as Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure is in Chapter VIII relating to ''inquiry and trial'', that section cannot enable ''investigation'' by the Indian Police, in respect of an offence allegedly committed abroad. Unless there is an extradition treaty between India and the foreign country, no investigation is permissible in India. Further, learned Counsel contends that Indian Police cannot go to the foreign country for gathering evidence and even if they do, such evidence will not be admissible in India. Indian Courts cannot have extraterritorial jurisdiction.

On the other hand, learned Government Pleader and learned Counsel for the fifth and sixth Respondents contend that u/s 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Police can ''deal with'' the offender and the said words include ''investigation'' also. Such investigation does not require sanction of the Central Government.

The points that arise for consideration are:

(1) What are the principles applicable in regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction of criminal Court in respect of an offence by an Indian citizen which is assumed to have been completed in a foreign country?

(2) What is the scope and effect of Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 4, 188, 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

Point No. 1: In respect of offences allegedly committed by an Indian citizen in a foreign country, particularly where the offence is exclusively completed in such country, the question arises whether the accused can be dealt with by the criminal Courts of the country of which he is a citizen. Several important general principles are evolved to cover such a situation and connected problems. These principles have been extensively considered by several writers of great repute and what we propose to state below is mainly culled out from (he views expressed by leading writers.

In the early 17th century, says Lotika Sarkar, when Bedin''s ''Republic'' was becoming the ideological justification of the Renaissance State, through the concept of sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction began to be based rather on the principle of territoriality. But, in the 19th century and in the present times, the growth of technology has given rise to crimes which are extensively complex and their capacity to harm other states has grown greater. Therefore, the need has arisen to dilute the territorial jurisdiction principle and find exceptions for it either through statute or other principles judicially evolved.

Today, the principles evolved fall into four broad categories, namely, the ''Territorial'' principle; then the ''Protective'' principle; thereafter, the ''Nationality'' or ''Citizenship'' principle and finally, the ''Universality'' principle.

The Territorial principle:

The Territorial principle, according to Lotika Sarkar, flows from the two accepted principles of international law, namely, territorial sovereignty and the equality of States. (See: Oppenheim, International Law I, 8th Edn. 1955.) Territorial sovereignty enables a State to legislate freely, irrespective of the will of other States, provided that such legislation does not violate international law and it is complementary to the principle of equality of all States. The State in whose territory the offence is committed is more suited to deal with it the locus delicti. Proponents of this principle say that the advantages of the ''territoriality'' theory are several. The State where a crime is committed can be said to have the strongest interest in punishing the offender; that State can easily apprehend the accused; the local forum of that State would be the most convenient place for trial since the witnesses and juries are all there and finally the accused cannot be punished unless that country treats the act as an offence. In fact the medieval lawyer was unable to understand how a jury of another country would have knowledge of the crimes committed abroad R. v. Page 1954 I.Q.B. 171.

The territorial principle was applied by the permanent Court of International justice 50 years ago in ''Lotus'' case when the Turkish Courts took action in regard to a collision off the Turkish coast between a French steamer ''Lotus'' and a Turkish collier. The Turkish Court applied the territoriality principle and the international Court accepted the same. But the Court observed:

territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty

(emphasis supplied)

This is because, with the increasing facility of communication and transportation, the opportunities for committing crimes whose constituent elements take place in more than one State, have grown apace. To meet these situations, the jurisdiction of crime founded upon the territorial principle cannot bean adequate remedy unless exceptions are made H. Research on jurisdiction of� Crime (1939) 9 A.M.J. Int. Law (Suppl.) 483 at 484. In the beginning, England was very conservative in its approach. Jossup attributed this to her insular position having no international land-boundaries and knowing only boundaries between countries Transnatitional Law (1951) p. 43. So did America in the early period of history. This was because Anglo-Amercian system differed from other countries following the traditions of Roman Law Preuss (1940) 30 Transactions of the Grutius Society, 134, Things have changed for the better now.

England and the U.S.A. are now compelled to relax their rigid adherence to the territoriality rule. Glanville Williams and Michael Hirst enumerate a large number of statutes in England from 1495 upto 1931. These exemptions from the territoriality rule relate to offences at sea, territorial waters, wireless-telegraphy, customs, sexual offences, bigamy, homicide, perjury, terrorism, hijacking etc. The exemptions have become so numerous that the main principle has very little scope for application. A stage has now reached where the following statement of Sir James Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol. 1 p. 277 looks apposite:

The general principle which requires so many exceptions must be wrong.

A survey of these exceptions shows that most of these exceptions become necessary to protect England''s security and sovereignty for acts done abroad by British subjects as well as aliens. The United States of America also resorted to exceptions to the territoriality rule in its National Protection Act, the Immigration Act, the Anti-Trust laws etc. for the reason that the acts abroad had adverse effect in the United States. The British Law Commission has pointed out Law Commission, Consultation Paper (1987) : �Jurisdiction over fraud offices with a foreign element� (paras 1.1 to l.8) that England might verily become the ''haven'' for fraudsters if the territoriality principle remains absolute. The breaking down of the ''territoriality'' rule is due to its becoming subject to the protective or security principle. We shall, therefore, next refer to that principle.

The Protective or security principle:

The protective principle is based upon the nature of interest of the country injured rather than of the country where the offence has taken place Havard Rescjrch of Jtwisdicton of Crime, p. 543. Prof. Brierly said that the protective theory received its greatest impetus as a result of the aggressive radical nationalism which was launched by the French Revolution and powerfully reinforced by the Italian Risorgimente �Lotus Cose� (1928) 44 L.Q. 154 at 162. Whether the offence is committed abroad by citizens or aliens, if it affects or is likely to affect the security or integrity of another State, that State must be able to take punitive action. This is regardless of the locus delicti. The principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction can be traced to the right of self-defence stated in the U.N. Charter. But, according to Lotika Sarkar, experience showed that situations arose where the right of self-defence was exercised beyond reasonable limits and there was danger of breaching principles of international law.

The long list of English and U.S. statutes referred to by the various authors shows that the exceptions to the territoriality principle are based on the protective principle. This principle has been explained by Glanville Williams as containing two concepts, the ''initiatory'' and the ''terminatory''. For example, when a person commits a crime across a frontier, two views are possible: one that the crime must be taken to have committed where the offender is and secondly, that it is committed where the mischief is completed. These aspects are sometimes described as the ''subjective'' and ''objective'' theories. Lord Diplock referred to these theories propounded bv Prof. Glanville Williams in D.P.P. v. Storehouses 1978 A.C. 55. Our Supreme Court has also referred to Glanville Williams'' article in Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India (1993) S.C.C. 961 recently. As already stated, the protective principle applies to citizens as well as aliens. We shall next refer to the nationality or citizenship principle.

The nationality or citizenship principle and Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code.

The nationality principle, according to Lotika Sarkar, is derived from the sovereignty theory. A State may protect its nationals abroad. This is because a wrong against a citizen is a wrong against his State, which may, therefore, protest and demand compensation on his behalf. Similarly, the State has an interest in punishing its citizens committing offences abroad. Now, it is generally accepted that the protection which a citizen carries with him wherever he goes also imposes upon him a corresponding duty to conform to the standards of conduct demanded of him by his State.Hence, any act or omission of a citizen abroad which violates these standards will be regarded as a wrong against his State, even though it takes place beyond its boundaries and though its impact is felt abroad rather than at home. ''It is the relationship between the State and its citizens, rather than the locus delecli or the place of impact, which is the basis of the nationality principle''. The State of which he is a national will be concerned because of its special relationship with him in regulating his conduct. Lotika Sarkar further says (page 457), referring to Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code, as follows:

India has provided that its Penal Code is applicable to its nationals everywhere, no matter how minor the offence.

This is clear from the very language of Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code. On the other hand, in England, citizens committing offences abroad can be brought to book in England only in certain classes of cases covered by specific statutes. Germany assumes jurisdiction not only over those who are nationals at the time of the offence but who later become nationals. Says Lotika Sarkar (page 460-461):

It could also be argued that where a national commits a crime abroad, his community will have a strong interest in his rehabilitation and in deterring him from criminal conduct in the future.

Here again, there are active and passive personality principles. The former deals with punishment of its citizens and the latter with their protection. The personality principle is followed in China, Germany and Japan also. The passive principle is recognised in the German, Greek, Romanian, Swiss and Israeli Codes but is not accepted in Anglo-American Law (see: Shachor- Landau, page 283). Michael Hirst suggests (page 506) that England had better adopt the nationality principle for, in case England has no extradition treaty with the country where the offence is committed, ''it may sometimes be undesirable for the offender to remain at liberty'', in England. It may be likely that tbe offence be ''repeated'' in the country to which he has returned, namely, England.. These are indeed grave public policy considerations underlying the nationality or citizenship theory, Indeed, Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code which deals with offences committed by Indian citizens abroad, incorporates the nationality principle. The principle while it is good for the country of origin, it must, at the same time, be ensured that so far as the accused is concerned, there is no double jeopardy. We shall now refer to the universality principle.

Universality principle:

The basis of this principle is that there are certain crimes against international law which, in the absence of an international Court of criminal justice, could be punished by the municipal Courts, irrespective of locus delecli commissi (see: Shachor-Landau page 284-5). Under this principle fall offences involving piracy. Gases under the convention on obscene publications 1923 and suppression of counterfeiting currency, 1929 also fall in this category. Soon, offences like genocide falling under the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 1948 came within the principle. Today- more offences against drug traficking, laws relating to suppression of immoral traffic in women and children, hijacking, terrorism, have joined the list.

The above discussion is a survey of the general principles relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction of criminal offences. Point No. 1 is decided accordingly.

Point No. 2:-The nationality or citizenship principle discussed under Point No. 1 finds place in Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code, as stated by Lotika Sarkar. That is the substantive part of the law. The procedural provisions are contained in Sections 4 and 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Initially, the substantive provisions, now contained in Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code, were there in Section 8 of the Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879 and the procedural provisions of Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure were there in Section 9 of the said Act of 1879. They were also there with slight change in the language in the Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1872 see: Empress v. Manganlal ILR (1882) 6 Bom 622; Narayan v. Emperor AIR 1935 Bom. 437. In the latter case, Sir John Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) observed:

In general, the subject of trials in British India, for offences committed outside India is dealt with by Section 4 I.P.C. and Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure. It is instructive to note the history of those two sections. They are taken substantially from Sections 8 and 9 of Foreign jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879.

The Supreme Court of India, in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Ram Narain (1993) S.C.C. 961 referred to Section 4 of I.P.C. and Section 188 of Code of Criminal Procedure arid on facts found that the accused was not a citizen of India at the time of the commission of the offence and held that the Indian Courts could not try the offence. In that context, Mahajan, C. J. observed, referring to Section 4 I.P.C. and Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure that the rule enunciated in the sections is based on the principle that qua citizens, the jurisdiction of Courts is not lost by reason of the venue of the offence. If, however, al the time of the commission of the offence, the accused person is not a citizen of India, then the provisions of these sections have no application whatsoever'', ''The circumstances that after the commission of the offence, a person becomes domiciled in another country or acquires citizenship of that State, cannot confer jurisdiction on the Courts of that territory retrospectively''.

Recently, in Central Bank of India Vs. Ram Narain, the Supreme Court was dealing with a continuing offence of criminal conspiracy and cheating of which part of the acts were done in India. While holding that, in such circumstances, sanction of Central Government u/s 188 Code of Criminal Procedure was not necessary, their Lordships considered both Section 4 I.P.C. and Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure In the discussion, it is said, ''Judicial power of a State extends to the punishment of all offences against the municipal laws of the State by whomsoever committed within the territory. It also has the power to punish all such offences wherever committed by a citizen. The provision of Chapter VIII of Code of Criminal Procedure are elastic and not ''peremptory''. It is also stated by K. Ramaswamy, J.:

Section 188 by fiction dealt with the offences committed by a citizen of India or a foreigner outside India or on high seas or elsewhere or on any ship or aircraft registered in India. Such person was directed to be dealt with in respect of such offences, as if he had committed them at any places within India at which lie may be found.

(emphasis supplied)

Sahai, J. in a separate judgment, also referred to these provisions.

Now Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code permits, under the nationality or citizenship principle, Indian Courts to apply the provisions of the said Code if a citizen does acts abroad which amount to offences under the Code. That the Petitioner is a citizen and that the acts attributed to him abroad in the complaint filed by the fifth Respondent before Police, amount to offences in India, admits of no doubt. That depends on the investigation, inquiry and trial in India.

Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

Section. 188-. Offence committed outside India:-When an offence is committed outside India-

(a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere;

(b) by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India,

he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found:

Provided that, notwithstandining anything in any of the preceding sections of this chapter, no such offence shall be irquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.

(emphasis supplied)

Section 2(g) defines ''inquiry'' as follows:

Section 2(g)- ''inquiry'' means every irquiry, other than atrial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.

Section 2(h) defines ''investigation'' as follows:

Section 2(h): ''investigation'' includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a Police Officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf.

Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on which reliance is placed, reads as follows:

Section 4- Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws:

(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall lie investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the. provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force, regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying, or otherwise dealing with such offences.

Counsel for Petitioner contends that assuming that the substantive provisions in Section 4 I.P.C. could apply if facts are proved, Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure which permits a criminal Court in India to ''deal with'' the matter, does not apply to enable ''investigation'' by Indian Police. According to him, even if the Petitioner can be said to have been ''found'' in India as required by Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure still, inasmuch as Section 188 is in Chapter XIII dealing With ''inquiry'' and ''trial'' and inasmuch as the proviso to Section 188 also refers to ''inquiry'' and ''trial'' of extra territorial offences, no section in Chapter XIII, much less Section 188, can permit ''investigation'' into such extraterritorial offences. It is argued that ''investigation'' envisaged in Section 2(h) Code of Criminal Procedure is different from ''inquiry'' as defined in Section 2(g) Code of Criminal Procedure and trial. Reliance is also placed on Section 4 Code of Criminal Procedure to say that the words ''dealt with'' in Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure do not include investigation, inquiry or trial.

We are unable to agree. As pointed out by the Supreme Court and various High Courts, Section 4 I.P.C. and Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure are complementary. The former refer to the substantive law and the latter to the corresponding procedural law. We cannot presume that in Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure the legislature used the words ''dealt with'' by restricting the meaning to something other than investigation, inquiry or trial. The Supreme Court in Ajay Aggarwal''s case (1993) S.C.C. 961, has observed that Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure creates a statutory fiction by using the words ''as if''. The section confers jurisdiction on the Court where the alleged offender is found, for the purpose of ''dealing'' with the offence.

The word ''deal with'' in the main part of Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure is, in our view, used in a wide sense. While the proviso to Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure requires sanction of the Central Government for purposes of ''inquiry''- and ''trial'', the words ''deal with'' in the main part must necessarily include atleast ''inquiry'' and ''trial''. The words ''deal with'' in Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, referred to above, as amounting to something other than ''investigation, ''inquiry'' and ''trial'', therefore, falls to the ground. In fact, even while construing Section 4 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court has stated in Delhi Administration Vs. Ram Singh, that the words ''dealt with'' in that section include vot only ''investigation'', ''inquiry'' and ''trial'' but other aspects also. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, the words ''dealt with'' in Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure must be held to include ''investigation'' also, apart from ''inquiry'' and ''trial''. For purposes of ''investigation'' into offences committed abroad, sanction of the Central Government is not necessary.

It is true Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure is in Chapter XIII dealing with ''inquiry'' and ''trial''. But, that, in our opinion, is not conclusive. On the other hand, Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure is complementary to Section 4 I.P.C. and must cover the procedure relating to ''investigation'' also. Headings of chapters are external aids and can be resorted to only if there is any ambiguity in the enacting words. See Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co., Bombay, at 141; M/s Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1990 S.C. 689 at p. 693. Further, the scope and ambit of the main part of Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be controlled by the proviso. The words ''dealt with'' in the main part cannot be restricted to ''inquiry'' and ''trial'' used in the proviso.

In fact, in Ajay Aggarwal''s case (1993) S.C.C. 961 at 980, K. Ramaswamy, J. observed that, even under the proviso to Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure, the sanction ''is not a condition precedent to take cognizance of the offence. If need be, it could be obtained before trial begins''. As to the meaning of the word ''found'', the accused is found within the particular jurisdiction irrespective of the question as to whether he was brought there against his will or unlawfully. Bose, J. (as he then was) in AIR 1948 251 (Nagpur) observed that it did not matter whether the person came there voluntarily or in answer to summons or under illegal arrest.

The provisions permitting the Court to take action and deal with the accused where he is ''found'', as are contained in Section 188 Code of Criminal Procedure are almost similar to provisions in a large number of statutes referred to by Prof. Glanville Williams.

We are in agreement with the views of K.T. Thomas, J. in Remla v. S.P. of Police 1993 (1) K.T.L. 412, that u/s 188 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Kerala Police can conduct ''investigation'' into offences committed abroad and no sanction of the Central Government is necessary for the said purpose.

The original petition is dismissed accordingly.